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ABSTRACT
A policy analysis of aid coordination and management in the health sector of
Bangladesh: assessing the instruments, exposing the agendas, and considering the
prospects for Government leadership
In the 1 990s, the coordination and management of aid in the health sector became more
firmly established on policy agendas as a result of concern that the increased volume of aid
and increasing number and diversity of donors in the sector was leading to an unmanageable
proliferation of demands on recipient Governments. Global interest in coordination, coupled
with a dearth of critically-informed, conceptual or empirical, analyses of the subject, gave
impetus to this in-depth examination of the processes at work.
Based on a review of the literature, this study began by defining the issues and developing a
typology of instruments used to coordinate aid. A conceptual framework was developed for
assessing coordination mechanisms. The framework was tested through an historical analysis
of aid coordination revealing the enabling and constraining factors governing progress in this
area of development management. Bangladesh was chosen as a case study, primarily due to a
long-standing, concerted effort of the World Bank to coordinate a number of bilateral donors
through a country-based Consortium.
Drawing upon interviews with stakeholders, documentary analysis, as well as a questionnaire
survey, an entrenched, non-comprehensive system of aid coordination and management
exercised by donors was exposed. Caution on the part of Government officials in assuming a
prominent role in aid management was exacerbated by fragile systems and weak capacity.
This was reinforced by aid agency practices. Evidence suggests that coordination may be less
concerned with the purported aims of rationalising external assistance to Government's
programmes, than with the desire among competing agencies for leadership in the sector. Aid
agencies and Government recognise that aid coordination provides a powerful tool with
which to exercise leverage over the policy process. This consideration has coloured their
desire to lead coordination processes and conditioned the extent and manner they wish to be
involved in coordination arrangements. Given the findings of this study, the prospects for
improvements and government leadership in aid coordination and management appear
equivocal at best.
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CHAPTER ONE
Too many blues? The sweet and sticky of aid coordination
1.1 Introduction
Strictly off the record, the problem is simply one of too many lollies. The
Government behaves like a child. We, the donors, act like aunts and uncles. Its
hands are full; yet we compete to push more of our own blues, and it keeps
trying to grasp them.
Representative, UN agency, 1996
The past two decades have witnessed an upsurge in the number of external agencies
involved in the health sectors of low-income countries. Concomitantly, there has been an
increase in the volume of resources transferred through multilateral, bilateral and non-
governmental organisations to these health systems. Notwithstanding the beneficial
impact of increased resources, recipients and donors are increasingly concerned about the
effects of this trend and, particularly, how to coordinate the different inputs.'
A common concern about aid to countries' health sectors stems from the perception that
health systems are weakened by poor coordination of external resources. 2 Recipients
frequently despair of an unruly mélange of external ideas and initiatives that, too often,
results in project proliferation and duplication, unrealistic and contradictory demands and,
ultimately, a loss of control over the health development process. Donors often express
concern over aid efficiency and effectiveness, two areas it is assumed will gain from
increased coordination. Consequently, both recipients and donors frequently call for ways
of better managing the aid relationship.
Although the concept of coordination holds considerable intuitive force, and presages an
elixir to many ills of aid, some aid practitioners and academics have voiced scepticism.3
Such misgivings may be spawned by disbelief over the actual ends to which coordination
is advocated and pursued. One does not need to be cynical to question the extent to which
coordination is truly driven by a desire to rationalise the aid relationship (i.e., enhance the
efficiency of aid and reduce the heavy burden fragmented 'assistance' imposes on
recipients). Coordination may equally be conceived as a means for the coordinator to
exercise power over the coordinated. Underpinning this view is the notion that each actor
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pursues his or her own narrow self-interests rather than some common good, such as the
'value-added' to the entire health sector which might result from improved coordination.
The relative dependence of low-income countries on development assistance, and the
major power imbalances between the aid agencies themselves, may lead the weaker
parties to dispute the very desirability of coordination, particularly where it is equated
with hegemony and control. Yet, given the relatively independent nature of agencies in
the aid regime (as arms of donor governments or branches of the United Nations
'family'), and autonomy of recipient nation states, it is understandable that sceptics
question the extent to which coordination is at all feasible. Of course, neither of these
suppositions rules out the possibility for some middle ground where inter-dependencies
among givers and between givers and takers favours coordination for a more mutually
beneficial relationship.
Over the past decade, efforts to initiate and/or improve aid coordination have been made
in direct proportion to the calls for improved coordination. Anecdotal reports assert,
paradoxically, that enthusiasm and initiative do not correlate with success. This raises a
number of questions which have yet to receive adequate consideration: what, for
example, is successful aid coordination?; what can be learned from past experience?;
what constrains and facilitates aid coordination?; and what are the prospects for improved
practice? This research aims to provide answers to such questions.
This Chapter begins with why aid coordination is on the health sector agenda, what is
meant by coordination, and what forms it has taken in the health sector. The Chapter then
turns to the study itself: setting down the research questions and aims; mapping out its
parameters; proposing a framework to assess aid coordination efforts as a hypothesis for
testing; and elucidating and justifying the research design and strategy adopted. In order
to understand the context in which aid management has taken place in the case study
country, Chapter Two provides some basic information on Bangladesh, particularly to
explain foreign control of the aid management process. Chapter Three explores the
manner in which the Government of Bangladesh has managed foreign assistance,
particularly in the health and population sector, from the country's independence in 1971
to 1997— with emphasis placed on the manner in which donors have prevented the
system from reaching its potential. The succeeding three chapters - 4, 5 and 6 - describe
the evolution and functioning of three distinct donor-driven coordination arrangements,
before presenting competing views and assessing their effectiveness. Chapter Four looks
at how efforts to improve the operational assistance in the United Nations system have
played themselves out in the health sector in Bangladesh. The long-standing 'Consortium
Chapter 1: Problem statement and research design 	 14
of donors' is the focus of Chapter Five. Chapter Six focuses attention on the most recent
development in aid management, namely the sector-wide approach. The final Chapter
returns to whether there are too many lollies; where the sweet and sticky interact.
Drawing on a summary of the study's findings, Chapter Seven refines the conceptual
framework ex hypothesis, enumerates the determinants of health sector aid coordination
in Bangladesh and assesses the prospects for improved practice. The thesis concludes
with a set of guidelines for aid coordination and identifies a central research question for
further investigation.
1.2 What gave rise to interest in aid coordination in the health sector?
Barry dates the inception of donor coordination with the first ad hoc meeting of creditors
to India which met in 1958 to resolve the country's foreign exchange crisis. 4 Over the
decades, as the volume of aid to developing countries escalated, so increasingly was the
need for coordination recognised. Interest in coordination of external resources in the
health sector can be traced to several factors both within and outside the sector. 5
 Five
sector specific trends can be identified: the expanding number and increasing
heterogeneity among external agencies; the growing proportion of assistance in many
health budgets; the proliferation of aid projects; the gradual transition in the forms,
channels and systems of aid; and the nature and goals of health sector reform.
1.2.1 Increasing number and diversity of external agencies
The 1980s saw a growth in the number and type of agencies involved in the health sectors
of developing countries. This growth may have contributed to increased interest in the
area of coordination. In Ghana, for example, in 1992, Smithson found 199 donors
"stumbling over each other". 6
 That situation was not atypical. At the same time in
Zimbabwe, in addition to approximately twenty multilateral and bilateral agencies, Green
and Matthias identified 254 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with activities to
improve health. 7
 The present study found that in Bangladesh, 18 bilateral agencies and 13
multilateral agencies committed funds to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
between 1992 and 1996, while more than 400 NGOs were active in the sector. The
absolute growth in number of external actors in the sector coincided with the emergence
of new players. Whereas the World Bank did not provide health sector loans before
1980, by the early 1990s it had become the most important external fmancier in countries
of low and lower-middle income. 8
 Other significant multilateral agencies to emerge
during the I 990s included the European Union and regional development banks.9
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A further development concerns the composition of the aid community. A marked shift
was witnessed during the late 1980s and 1990s when an increasing proportion of aid was
channelled through NGOs.'° By 1990, an estimated 23% of external assistance was
provided to the health sector through NGOs, up from 13% in 1982.uI12 There are,
however, great variations among agencies and countries. In Bangladesh, for example,
USAID now provides 100% of its health sector assistance directly to NGOs' 3
 and in some
sub-Saharan African countries, NGOs account for up to 50% of health service delivery.'4
A common view holds that these agencies "resist coordination." 5
 Although the
multilateral institutions, such as WHO, are obliged to work through the apparatus of the
government, such is not always the case for NGOs; although they may have to be
licensed or registered to work with government, they do not have operate through it.
The proliferation of actors provides strong justification for enhanced efforts at
coordination. According to LaFond, "increased involvement of donors may bring more
confusion to the development process." 6
 In some countries, the situation is exacerbated
by the rapid succession of agencies. In Mozambique, for example, the end of the 1980s
saw dramatic reductions in Soviet and Italian aid and the arrival of the World Bank, the
European Community and Danish aid. With the new donors came new agendas and
consequent confusion for ministry officials.' 7
 In such turbulent environments,
coordination is urged as a means of continuity.
1.2.2 Increasing volume and importance of aid
Related to the increased number of donors is the growing importance of aid in terms of
public health expenditure in many countries. Whereas, in 1977, external resources
accounted for only 0.5 per cent of health sector expenditure in developing countries, this
figure had increased to roughly 3% by 1990. Growth in external finance was particularly
marked after 1986.I819 Although marginal in global terms, aid plays a crucial role in
many low-income countries. For example, according to 1990 data, in twenty three sub-
Saharan countries, as well as in Guyana, Bhutan and Nepal, external assistance, as a
proportion of total health expenditure, exceeded 25 percent; in eight countries it exceeded
50 percent.° These figures may, however, underestimate the true extent of aid in public
health expenditure. In Nepal, for example, where the official figure is 30 per cent, an
estimated 40 per cent of external aid is not reported to government, hence Nepal's actual
reliance on aid is significantly higher. 2 ' Chad represents an extreme case of dependency.
While public per capita expenditure on health barely changed between 1985 and 1990,
external assistance tripled in that period, to about five times the amount apportioned by
the Government.22
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In those countries where aid has assumed prominence in the health budget, the need for
coordination between expenditures of domestic resources and aid arises ipso facto. Yet
poorly coordinated external assistance in the context of aid dependence carries an
additional risk. In particular, when donors make forceful but divergent demands on policy
and planning machinery, which are often already weak and overextended, there is a great
likelihood of inconsistency and incoherence in government response. Aid, it has been
argued, is influential in shaping recipient policies and programmes. 23 '24
 A five country
study found that the main investment strategy pursued by health ministries was
"maximising resource flows into the health system at any cost" and one cost is often
coherence.25
 The study cites the case of Nepal, where "the Government regularly accepts
donor projects which conflict with national policy goals." Justice also found that "in
exchanges between donor agencies and recipients countries, the donors' priorities
predominate."26
 Such findings were confirmed by an analysis of the formulation of two
health policies in Uganda. 27
 Many health sector reviews suggest that donors often
promote different policies, distinct administrative systems and even disparate therapeutic
regimes. Increasing aid dependency in the health sector underlines the urgency to
establish coordination arrangements which promote greater consistency in donor
behaviour.
1.2.3 Project proliferation and recipient institutional weakening
The swelling ranks of donors has tended to result in a proliferation of projects. As many
governments do not maintain a comprehensive and up-to-date system for collecting
information on externally funded activities, the exact number of projects is rarely known.
Morss coined the phrase 'institutional destruction' to describe the negative cumulative
outcome of projects on ministerial institutional capacity. 28 These effects relate to the time
and other resources devoted to administering aid (particularly the burden of maintaining
multiple and duplicative management systems), the displacement of national priorities
resulting from the salience placed on donor goals, competition for scarce local skills
which inflates salaries and result in perverse incentives, and the blurring of lines of
authority and accountability.
Clift maintains that "it is the multiplicity of projects, however worthy in their own right"
which presents the greatest impediment to development. 29 Multitudinous, donor-driven
projects may not only undermine administrative capacity, but also have an erosive effect
on the government's capacity for coherent strategic planning, leading to fragmentation
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and inconsistency. Because project funds do not pass through the government budget,
project proliferation reduces the scope for preparing comprehensive sectoral budgets.
A World Bank Director summarised the situation as follows:
The most obvious dimension where existing investment assistance is not as
effective as it could be, lies in the fragmented nature of the assistance: the
multiplicity of donors, the multiplicity of objectives, the multiplicity of
management systems, the multiplicity of procurement, disbursement, accounting
and auditing procedures. In such a context, even if each individual piece of
project assistance was well designed, it is difficult to see how any government,
whatever its so-called absorptive capacity, could effectively manage such a
mosaic of aid.3°
The deleterious effects of project proliferation have been noted in numerous ministries of
health. In Mozambique, health officials were found to be spending "most of their working
hours entertaining visiting delegations, meeting donors, and preparing project
documents."3 ' Foster describes international health agencies as competing for 'clients'.32
WHO calculated that a project director in West Africa was out of post for 120 days in one
year to attend different donor-sponsored events. 33 The proliferation of projects, and
demands associated with them, is one of the major concerns prompting attention to
coordination.
Paradoxically, interest in aid coordination may also relate to its potential to enhance the
capacity of recipients to execute projects more successfully. LaFond echoes the
sentiments of others when she writes that "donors' experience investing in health in the
1 980s was often disappointing." 34 Fund disbursement was too often sluggish and slippage
in project implementation was widespread. This gave cause for concern as the agencies
faced increasing pressures from their governing bodies and other constituencies to
demonstrate results, preferably quick and measurable ones. 35 Donor staff, in turn, were
often evaluated within their agencies on their ability to 'empty the pipeline' of funds.36
Their capacity to do so hinged to a great extent on the ability of health ministries to
approve and implement projects. Ironically, analysts such as Cassen 37 and Van Arkadie38
pointed out that the ability of the recipient administration to absorb funds and undertake
project related tasks was contingent, among other things, on reducing and rationalising
donor demands. Improved inter-agency coordination may, therefore, have been seen by
donors as a vehicle to enable recipients to improve upon the rates of project
implementation and, thereby, meet exigencies which donors faced.
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1.2.4 Changes in the forms, channels and systems of aid
Demands for enhanced donor coordination in the health sector have coincided with the
shift in the forms, channels and systems of aid, particularly the experience with
programme support and nascent moves toward sector-wide approaches. 39
 During the late
1 970s and I 980s it became increasingly apparent that project effectiveness depended, not
only on project design, but also, and often significantly, on the wider policy environment.
Consequently, aid disbursements became increasingly tied to institutional and policy
40,41
changes agreed to and implemented by national authonties.
	 One mstrument which
was introduced to support this change in aid policy was programme aid, also known as
budget support. These are generic terms which denote the provision of a variety of
material goods which are sold by the recipient to the private sector, thus generating local
currency which is available to the treasury or specific ministries. Two characteristics of
this form of assistance were germane to aid coordination: (1) as the funds generated were
disbursed through the budget, in theory, they obviated the need for parallel systems for
aid management; and (2) as donors usually demanded some say in how the funds were
allocated or the reforms enacted, they presaged greater external involvement in the policy
and budgeting processes. In practice, a review of programme aid in the health sectors of
Nigeria and Mali found it to be as labour intensive as project assistance for both donor
and recipient, since funds were tightly ear-marked and accounting procedures
cumbersome. 42
 Nevertheless, experience with this form of health sector aid, although
limited, drew attention to the effects of uncoordinated and contradictory donor support.
The impetus for sector-wide approaches (SWAps) took firm root in the mid-i 990s, when
the World Bank threw its intellectual weight behind the concept with the wide circulation
of three policy papers43" '45
 and made the sector approach the centre piece of its new
health lending strategy. 46
 Although consensus is emerging around the notion that a SWAp
does not represent a single aid instrument but an approach to health development,47'48
there is general agreement that the idealised SWAp is underpinned by six principles, four
of which are: (i) the key stakeholders agree to a broad, medium-term sector policy or
strategic framework; (2) the strategy is reflected in a prioritised, public expenditure
programme which is sector-wide in scope and, therefore, inclusive of all planned
spending by both government and donors; (3) all major donors endorse the strategy and
expenditure programme and agree to phasing out assistance which is inconsistent with the
approach; and (4) donors use and strengthen common implementation and administrative
arrangements which are integral to, and do not duplicate systems already in place in the
recipient's public administration.
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The sector-wide approach has fuelled interest in aid and donor coordination for a number
of related reasons. A successful SWAp would behove all major donors to agree on the
content and direction of a broad policy framework, set priorities with respect to resource
allocation, and ensure that all expenditure be coordinated through an agreed public
expenditure programme. This, in turn, demands a degree of consistency among actors
whose views might be informed by a range of values and ideologies. Yet disagreements
must be overcome, for it has been recognised that offers of aid for activities which do not
conform with aims of the sectoral strategy, or fall outside of the agreed investment
programme, could dilute the aims of sector reform if accepted by the recipient. For
example, the World Bank has complained that by prioritising hospital construction, both
Japan and France subverted the Bank's reform package which gave priority to public
health and essential clinical services. It argued that these 'gifts' resulted in greater
allocations of subsequent recurrent budgets from primary to tertiary health services,
thereby subverting the policy aims of its proposed reforms. 49
 In their review of practice in
sub-Saharan Africa, Gilson and Mills conclude that "the critical lesson of past experience
is that health sector reform requires a policy package rather than a series of independent
reforms;"5° others concur by calling for a 'comprehensive approach'. 51 '52
 Donors acting
alone or at ideological odds with the reforms will frustrate the process.53
Not surprisingly, it is often difficult for donors and recipients to arrive at an agreement
over the sector strategy and even more so for recipients to comply with conditions
stipulated in accompanying loan and/or grant agreements. Compliance may require the
combined political clout of the entire aid community. As such, coordination has been
promoted as a mechanism for blocks of donors to increase their leverage over recipient
administrations, through, for example, agreements on common sanctions. Nolke
speculates that, in sub-Saharan Africa at least, coordination is perceived as a power-base
for development agencies. 54
 Some actors have been explicit in this regard: according to
an European Union council resolution, coordination would "maximise the ability of the
Community and its Member States to exercise an influence on the area of
development."55
Proponents of the sector-wide approach aspire to systems for appraisal, disbursement,
procurement, reporting, accounting, and auditing of external resources which dispense
with multiple, distinct, bilateral arrangements between individual donors and recipients in
favour of common systems embedded in the recipient's public administration upon which
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all donors can rely. Therefore, the debate moved on from the unresolved problem of
'harmonising' donor procedures and requirements to getting donors to make greater use
of national systems for financial management, performance monitoring and procurement.
Designing such systems, which meet the needs of all parties, will require an
unprecedented level of coordination among donors and between donors and government,
and raises concerns about accountability and attribution. Nevertheless, the feasibility has
been discussed at the global level, 56 with recipient governments 57
 and within particular
countries, and some progress has been recorded (e.g., Ghana 58
 and Zambia's 'basket
account' 59). Effective sector-wide investment is predicated upon concerted action and
will require strong mechanisms for coordination.
1.2.5 Coordination and the goals of health sector reform
While new approaches to assistance have drawn attention to the desirability of enhanced
donor coordination, so too has support for what has been loosely called 'health sector
reform.' 6° Greater efficiency, effectiveness and equity are central, although at times
conflicting, objectives of health sector reform. 61 '62Aid coordination is germane to sector
reform for its potential to contribute to the attainment of each of these goals.
Although definitions of efficiency abound, for the purpose of this discussion, efficiency is
defined as an input-output measure. Two types of efficiency are commonly
distinguished. Allocative efficiency relates to the extent of optimality in the distribution
of resources among competing uses; in other words, whether an activity is worth doing in
reference to its social benefits and costs. Aid may thwart allocative efficiency for two
reasons. First, donors may not select the project that gives the greatest health benefit for
a given cost (assuming there is an objective way to value benefits). This happens most
frequently with 'tied aid' when economic criteria are relegated to secondary consideration
in deference to donor commercial interests. Bollini and Reich report that all but one of
Italy's bilateral health sector assistance projects during the I 980s consisted of capital
63intensive infrastructure investments of pnmary benefit to Italian construction firms.
Political and diplomatic motives may equally over-ride economic criteria in decisions
regarding aid allocations. Inappropriate capital investments, whatever their motivations,
may carry deleterious long-term recurrent cost implications which run counter to
allocative efficiency (hence the World Bank's discomfort over aid financed teaching
hospitals). Second, failure to meet allocative efficiency may arise because donor
judgement of benefits differs from recipient judgement (i.e., a matter of values). This
occurs when donors fund predetermined activities without due consideration of local
preferences. Failure to meet allocative efficiency criteria for either reason may not only
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subvert the optimal use of the aid itself but may also divert local matching resources
(human, administrative, fmancial) from investments made according to economic criteria.
Coordination may therefore serve the interests of efficiency to the extent to which it
facilitates greater consistency (and transparency) in matching external investment with
priorities determined through evidence-based approaches (e.g., burden of disease and cost
effectiveness studies).
Technical (or operational) efficiency relates to the extent to which choice and utilisation
of input resources produce a specific health output or service at lowest cost. LaFond
notes that "health facilities in Pakistan, Nepal and Ghana were frequently over-staffed
reflecting the priorities of donors' vertical programmes" as opposed to efficiency
considerations. In some cases, the number of staff exceeded the average number of
patients seen in a day.M Examples of technical inefficiency are legion: services overlap;
ministry officials are often obliged to meet a succession of missions when one gathering
would suffice; non-complementary technologies are employed; programmes often have
multiple information, accounting and reporting systems and are subject to repetitive
evaluations.65
 These are familiar characteristics of health sector aid which, if checked
through improvements in donor coordination, would provide significant gains in technical
efficiency.
Effectiveness is commonly understood as a measure of the extent to which a project,
programme or sector attains its set objectives. In this regard, external resources ought to
be evaluated on the basis of their contribution to a coherent sector-wide strategy and
policy framework. Health assistance has often been criticised for inducing fragmentation,
as opposed to coherence, as a function of the competing, shifting, and sometimes
conflicting policies, programmes and activities which are advocated and funded.66'67'68
For example, in Uganda, five national health plans were found to co-exist, each funded
by a different donor. 69
 Coordination can provide the means to enhance the use of external
resources to reinforce the effectiveness of the sector as a whole.
Although the definition of equity is much debated, 70'7 ' the concept is broadly concerned
with the distribution of burdens and benefits of the health care system. From the
perspective of the user, equity is about who pays for and who benefits from services.
With respect to benefits, coordination may, for example, reduce geographical inequities.
In the absence of aid coordination, there have been reports of donor supported islands of
excellence in seas of under-provision. According to Green and Matthias "there is
certainly enough evidence of the wasteful duplication of facilities provided by different
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NGOs in specific locations, coupled with an absence in other areas." 72
 As for the
distribution of burdens, the ad hoc or uncoordinated application of payment systems may
lead to some patients paying while others do not. A World Bank review found, for
example, in one West African country "three different cost-recovery policies, each
sponsored by a different donor agency" in different parts of the country.73
The equity implications of aid may also be considered from the perspective of service
providers and administrators. For example, in Lesotho, the ministry of health reported on
the effect of aid on staff morale as follows: "Donor input into one area can cause
resentment in another; better working conditions and transport facilities in donor funded
projects appear in stark contrast to conditions other staff are working under." 74
 Similar
effects related to inconsistencies among donor practices have been reported in Kenya and
in Ghana.75 Differences in per diem payments is particularly divisive. The Joint
Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) of the United Nations is forming a common
approach among member agencies for payment to government staff, 76
 and ad hoc efforts
have been recorded in numerous countries to harmonise compensation to civil servants
for their participation in donor-funded projects.
1.2.6 Factors exogenous to the health sector
In addition to sector-specific issues, at least three factors external to the sector have
played a role in placing aid coordination on the agenda. First, beginning in the early
1 980s, aid has come under ever greater scrutiny. 77
 A number of studies of aid
management found aid coordination wanting and recommended improvements,
particularly at the country and sectoral levels. 78 '79 ' 80
 The second trend relates to the
increasing instability and insecurity in large parts of the developing world and the
concomitant increase in the diversion of aid from development to relief and rehabilitation
activities. 8 ' The need for improved coordination under these circumstances is heightened
by the fact that there are usually questions surrounding the adequacy or perceived
legitimacy of the recipient state. 82 Consequently, funds tend to be disbursed through a
variety of non-governmental channels, 83 in some instances in the context of an
institutional void, 84 in others without the consent of government and frequently without
regard to any coherent or comprehensive plan. 85 Substantial uncertainty within agencies
over mandates under complex emergency situations further frustrates attempts at
coordination. Green, in assessing the role of the UN in emergency responses, asserts that
the ability of the various UN agencies to speak in a "harmonious chorus" will, to a crucial
extent, condition its success in contributing constructively in these complex situations.86
Given the drift toward instability and the major rOle of outside institutions in periods of
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instability, the relevance of improved systems of coordination cannot be overstated. The
third factor, relates to the previous point, namely the mounting confusion over UN
agency mandates.87
 This concern is echoed in the health sector where there is not only
significant overlap in functions and mandates 88
 but, in many instances, open competition
over leadership and coordination. 89
 While both WHO and UNDP have formal mandates
to coordinate UN operational and technical cooperation at the country level, this
responsibility has been increasingly usurped by the World Bank.9°
The above inconclusive discussion points to a wide range of factors which have
converged to place the coordination of external inputs firmly on the health policy agenda.
It suggests that donors have been the principal driving force behind coordination. Yet, in
light of recent enthusiasm expressed in sector-wide approaches, it appears that
governments may also be seeking mechanisms through which aid management can
support the implementation of agreed national policies, through national systems.
Although particularly evident in the well documented cases of Ghana 91 and Zambia,92
interest in SWAps has been recorded in at least ten additional low-income countries.93
Perhaps the very notion of aid and donor coordination may be undergoing a
transformation, with the focus less on aid and donors and more on recipients and their
policy making, management and administrative capacity. To focus the discussion, the
next section will explore the concept of coordination.
1.3 The concept of coordination
Heading the list of confusing concepts is the term 'coordination, 'which many see
as one of the key goals of UN reform
K. Lee, 1998
1.3.1 What is meant by aid coordination?
In spite of agreement among donors on the need for improved aid coordination, even
those taking a leading part in advocating or practising it have failed to define what they
mean by the term. For example, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
has undertaken a series of reviews on the subject, yet its published guidelines and
principles do not set out a concise meaning. 95 '96'97 The World Bank has made repeated
calls for greater donor coordination in the health sector, but has proposed no clarification
of the term. Both UNDP and WHO claim some authority for coordination of UN
activities in the health sector, yet neither has proposed a formal or working definition of
the concept.
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The existing literature, both conceptual and empirical, is also of limited utility in defming
coordination. Where definitions have been proposed, they tend to range from
minimalist,98 to descriptive,99 to normative.' 00" 0 ' Some have noted its process nature102
while others have pointed to its numerous dimensions, covering different objectives and
activities. Barry, for example, suggests that it can involve any one of three clusters of
activities: consultation (the exchange of information or perspectives); concertation (the
development of consensus, for example, around policy, programme objectives and
priorities); and operational coordination (for example, sponsoring joint activities or
relying on common management arrangements).'° 3
 Weiss makes a useful distinction
between 'coordination by command,' 'coordination by consensus' and 'coordination by
default."°4 Yet, none of these approaches is satisfactory if one is concerned with who is
coordinating whom, what and to which ends. A more encompassing definition of health
sector aid coordination at the country level was developed as a starting point for this
study:
any set of formal or non-formal activities, relating to health sector development,
at any level, led by the recipient or a donor agency, which aims to ensure that
external inputs to the health sector strengthen and enable the health system to
function more effectively, and in accordance with local priorities, over time
105(adapted from Buse and Walt ).
This definition recognises that aid coordination may take a number of forms. Implicit is
the notion that coordination is not a static quality, but an input-output oriented process
and a means to an end. Here the emphasis is on improving the effectiveness of the health
system. Although there may hopefully be links between good aid coordination, sectoral
effectiveness and health outcomes, there are a host of intervening variables as well. On
the one hand, there is scepticism about the contribution of aid to development' 06 and, on
the other, convincing evidence that much health gain is produced outside of the health
sector.' 07 Our concern is that through coordination, aid contributes to making the health
sector more effective and efficient rather than further undermining it. While both donors
and recipients are involved, and may act independently of one another to seek
improvements in the working relationship, this definition puts the recipient in the driver's
seat in so far as the direction of development is concerned. The definition purposefully
leaves ambiguity between donor coordination and aid coordination and does not touch on
the related issue of integrating external resources within the framework of domestic
resource management, two points to which I will return throughout the discussion.
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1.3.2 Health sector aid coordination mechanisms
A range of activities can be construed as aid coordination, provided they aim to ensure
that aid strengthens and makes health systems more effective. It is useful to distinguish
between those activities which are led or initiated by government from those
predominantly donor instigated, while recognising that, in practice, many will be jointly
executed. Recipient led strategies fall into three categories, although overlap occurs: (1)
those which develop and/or strengthen capacity, institutions or systems to coordinate
external resources; (2) the development of plans around which donors can coordinate;
and (3) the establishment of fora which permit greater information exchange.
1.3.2.1 Capacity strengthening and institution building for improved aid coordination
It has been argued that the key to donor coordination lies with the recipient government
"willing the end and instituting the means to achieve it."°8
 The ability of the recipient to
undertake the latter is severely constrained, particularly in highly aid-dependent
countries, by the weakness of existing institutions. WHO states that developing capacity
for aid management has been identified as a priority by most countries in greatest need.109
Apparently, expertise in financial management and budgetary analysis, health
information systems, systems development, institutional and policy analysis, and
planning are required. There is also the difficult task of developing the talent to handle
the politics of coordination; confronting large external agencies demands considerable
political acumen.
Of equal importance to skills acquisition is the development of institutional structures
which facilitate productive skill deployment. Some ministries of health have established
formal structures for managing donor resources (e.g., aid coordination units). There are,
however, few examples in the literature of effective management of external resources by
such structures. Ghana provides one possible exception, where a ministry restructuring in
1993 enhanced the power of the external aid coordination unit, 110 thereby enabling it to
"pro-actively control donor activities." There is evidence that some donors appreciate
the value of aid management departments. For example, one division within WHO has a
mandate to strengthen such units. 112
 In Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, the African
Development Bank offered to allocate those resources it had earmarked for autonomous
project implementation units to indigenous aid management units if they could be
effectively established by the ministry." 3 There are, however, problems associated with
these units. First, there may be conflict over control of the departments, perhaps as a
function of the resources involved. In Zambia, for example, the Planning and
Management Unit and the Health Reform Implementation Team each has a mandate,
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although ambiguous, in managing donors." 4
 In Nepal, within the ministry of health,
there co-exist two planning divisions, each with a perceived role in donor coordination.
Second, the establishment of dedicated units for aid management begs the question of the
desirability of separating the management of external from domestic resources; it could
be argued that a better alternative would involve general strengthening all departments
which have a mandate for resource management (e.g., budgeting, procurement, etc.).
More needs to be learned about the effectiveness and costs of aid coordination units.
Associated with the development of recipient skills and institutions for aid management is
the issue of systems. One of the problems of poor donor coordination is the profusion of
aid management systems, each developed to meet the needs of an individual donor.
Strengthening national systems for aid delivery and monitoring, such as procurement,
accounting, auditing and performance monitoring which meet the requirements of the
majority of donors, would represent a large step toward improved aid coordination.
1.3.2.2 Planning as a coordination tool
The planning process provides a powerful vehicle for aid coordination. Through the
process, common government-donor policy direction can be articulated, priorities
established, the principal strategies and programmes outlined, institutional responsibilities
(both local and foreign) assigned, and the costs of programmes explicitly set down
against contributions provided by the ministry and the donors involved. A national health
plan has, therefore, been described as an essential tool through which to negotiate with
donors" 5
 and may enable the recipient to be proactive in negotiations."6
The basis of good planning is an accurate analysis of the situation. Donor-ministry
collaboration in the preparation of a situation analysis can strengthen coordination. In the
foreword of a situation analysis in Lesotho, the minister of health affirms, perhaps merely
as a rhetorical gesture, that "the information compiled is expected to allow our traditional
partners in health - like international and bilateral agencies - to identify areas of common
interest for future joint 	 ' The preparation of the document itself was a joint
undertaking of the ministry and the EC, World Bank and WHO. It has been stressed
elsewhere, that a plan's success rests primarily on its ownership. Two countries (Zambia
and Ghana) provide indications of the potential of coordination as a by-product of
planning.' 20" 2 ' It should be noted that both countries have avoided voluminous and
detailed plans, opting instead for quite loosely defined strategy documents and annual
spending plans around which to unite donors.
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1.3.2.3 Recipient-led consultations
The third cluster of recipient-led aid coordination strategies comprise consultations or
other exchanges between the government and donors pertaining to policy directions,
priorities and/or activities. These may be organised nationally, sectorally, thematically or
sub-sectorally and include a range of the players from either side. To be effective they
need to reduce the number of repetitive and redundant bilateral interactions between
donors and the recipient administration and provide information which leads to more
successful coordination. These range from the annual, formal, rather structured Round
Table Process,' 22
 often co-chaired by the ministly and UNDP, to monthly meetings
convened by the secretary of health where donor agency representatives share coffee,
information, views and intentions which may lead to improved coordination. Whereas the
formal processes often rely on informal discussions, the latter may be insufficient for
coordination. The advantage of the formal consultations is their proclivity to force the
preparation of concrete plans and the articulation of commitment to these.
One can also distinguish four clusters of donor-led coordination strategies: (I) lead donor
arrangements; (2) changes to the forms, channels and systems of assistance; (3)
organisational changes in the donor institutions; and (4) enhanced information
management. In reality, these do not form discrete categories as components of one
strategy may also be involved in others, yet they are helpful in thinking about what
constitutes donor-driven coordination.
1.3.2.4 Lead-donor coordination arrangements
Three distinct forms of coordination through lead-donor arrangements can be discerned.
In geographical zoning, or 'area-based programming,' assistance is directed to a particular
province or district for health system development under the aegis of a lead agency.
Zoning may allow the recipient to meet primarily or exclusively with the lead agency
instead of the usual range of donors for the area in question. In addition, it should
decrease the number of external actors, reduce donor competition for popular projects
and scarce resources, encourage greater policy coherence and decrease activity
duplication in any one zone.
From the existing literature, it is not possible to ascertain if the purported benefits of area-
based programming obtain in practice. However, studies suggest some negative impacts.
In Ghana, a review found that central officials were reluctant to accept zoned support
because it led to differential systems development while local officials commented upon
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the dissatisfaction staff feel when posted to a 'neglected'
	 tn 23
 Zoning may also
impact negatively on geographical equity. By choosing to work in some areas rather than
others, donors may neglect poorer or less accessible populations. In Mozambique, for
example, Colombo found that 18 districts had up to 6 NGOs providing services and
assistance, 85 districts had one or two NGOs, and 25 districts were left uncovered.' 24
 At
times, zoning may undermine local ownership of health systems development through a
process of balkanisation. Cliff writes, "in just one example of many possible, an NGO
project leader banned a M011 nutritionist from entering 'his' district." 25
 The most
important down side of zoning may rest in the loss of policy coherence from a national
perspective. With these types of arrangements, donors may lose sight of, or actually
undermine, the implementation of national policies and plans.
Sub-sector specialisation is a variant of the lead-agency coordination strategy. As in
geographical zoning, an agency is designated a lead role, in this instance not for a region,
but rather for a sub-component of the health sector. Sectoral sub-components may
comprise areas such as financing, reproductive health, management support, essential
drugs, etc., depending on the structure of programmes within the ministry. Sub-sector
specialisation is appealing in that it provides the opportunity to realise the comparative
advantages of individual donors. This form of coordination is intended to reduce the
number of actors in a sub-sector area, decrease the number of contradictory policies
signalled to the ministry in a certain field, and reduce the number of interactions the
ministry has with external actors in regard to a particular issue or programme
intervention. The benefits of issue-specific coordination may lie in its potential to
engender a culture of coordination in the health sector. In that the focus is narrower than
the entire health service structure, a greater degree of coordination may be possible than
where more ambitious goals are set. Where positive results are achieved, issue-specific
coordination may act as a model encouraging wider coordination
An example of sub-sector specialisation is provided by initiatives in Zambia in the early
1 990s. While the overall management of donors was said to remain the prerogative of the
ministry of health, donors were assigned lead roles in specific areas. For example, in the
field of manpower planning and policy, ODA took the lead with WHO and JICA in
subordinate positions; in quality assurance, DANIDA provided leadership with WHO as a
co-partner. In a number of domains, however, it remained unclear which agency was in
fact responsible for coordination. For example, under the category labelled
HIV AIDS/STDs/TB, no fewer than eight major agencies had a 'lead' role at the national
level. 126
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In practice, thematic leadership may evolve in an ad hoc manner in response to concerns
common to a number of donors instead of according to an overarching plan to designate
lead agencies in a comprehensive manner for all facets of the health system. Whether or
not such initiatives will enhance or undermine sector-wide coordination remains open to
question. Issue-specific emphasis may have deleterious effects on the wider system
similar to those caused by vertical intervention programmes: sapping resources and
competing with sector-wide mechanisms. Moreover, it is not clear whether thematic
coordination instruments have been effective. For example, a WHO assessment of
country-level HIV/AIDS coordination found few success stories' 27
 and one study in
Zambia suggested that less than a third of all external resources for 11W/AIDS were
coordinated through the National AIDS Programme, which was intended to coordinate
action in this field.'28
Sectoral consortia provide the third variant of the lead donor model. The consortia differ
from other lead agency arrangements in two crucial respects. First, in the other models,
most of the key agencies would be assigned or assume leadership in one area or another.
In the case of consortia, one donor leads the entire process and pack of donors. Second,
in the consortium model, the scope of coordination entrusted to the leader is much greater
than in the other models, often encompassing the sector as whole.
Consortia often exhibit a number of features which facilitate coordination. Typically they
involve the most important actors and provide a mechanism through which to pooi
knowledge, negotiate a division of labour based on comparative advantages, and reduce
duplication. Consortia respond to a need for formal leadership and encourage donors to
work within a set framework of priorities. To the extent that donors pool resources and
utilise common implementation arrangements, efficiency savings can be realised. From
the perspective of the recipient, the demands and conflicting signals from the donor
community are reduced as they are channelled, mediated and filtered through the voice of
the lead agency.
Yet the consortia carry disadvantages as well. These relate primarily to the power and
influence which the leader of the consortium, once ensconced, may exert over other
donors, the recipient administration and the policy process in general. The pros and cons
associated with the World Bank-led Bangladesh Consortium are addressed in Chapter
Five.
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1.3.2.5 Reforming the forms, channels and systems of aid to facilitate coordination
As noted above, changes in the forms, channels and approaches to assistance have
motivated interest in coordination, but also constitute strategies through which to attain
improved coordination. Channelling funds through multi-donor consortia provides one
such mechanism. A less ambitious strategy is project cofinancing, which involves pooling
donor resources into one discrete project. Smaller donors often fmd it attractive to buy
into a project designed and executed by a development bank or multilateral agency.
Cofinancing may improve coordination if it diminishes project proliferation and donor-
induced policy or service fragmentation. Cofinancing has additionally been toted as an
aid management, resource saving device. Recipients, in particular, are likely to benefit
from not having to meet several donors consecutively nor report on activities in multiple
formats.
Two types of cofinancing are distinguished. Injoint cofinancing, donors designate a lead
agency for project execution and management. Nolke argues that this type of
coordination is most likely to occur where an agency with a high level of analytical
resources and meagre financial assets interacts with a financially flush but analytically-
poor institution. 129
 Cofinancing between the World Bank and the African Development
Bank (AfDB) during the 1980s has been explained in these terms.' 30
 In parallel
cofinancing, donors maintain responsibility for a discrete area of a project, and control
their own funds. This type of coordination does not have the advantage of reducing the
burden on the recipient (separate accounting and supervisory missions may still be
demanded), but it does offer opportunities for greater coherence between participating
donors in terms of policy content.
Cofinancing has mixed potential as a coordination tool. The extent to which it has
become the norm is not clear, and certainly the proliferation of single-donor projects
persists. Perhaps donors cannot or will not face the potential loss of control and visibility
inevitably involved with cofinancing. The utility of cofinancing when it is undertaken as
a one-off venture may be limited. Finally, where cofinanced projects have been
undertaken, there is little evidence of the extent to which they actually reduced recipient
workload. There is certainly limited understanding of recipient's perspectives on
cofinancing.
The use of programme assistance and sector-wide approaches (SWAps) to achieve
greater coordination of external inputs has been discussed above (section 1.2.4). Both
Chapter 1: Problem statement and research design	 3 1
hold significant potential for aid coordination, particularly the SWAp because it provides
a process through which donors and recipients work together to resolve the inevitable
tensions related to policy, planning and resource deployment in the aid relationship. Yet,
it should be recognised that both are ambitious strategies requiring substantive changes
on the part of donor agencies, and are most likely to succeed where there is strong
institutional capacity in the recipient country, precisely those aid-dependent states which
need donor coordination most urgently.
1.3.2.6 Reforms to the way donor agencies do business
Given the constraints to coordination identified in the preceding discussion, it is apparent
that a number of institutional changes affected by donors would facilitate the
management of aid by recipient ministries of health. These include the harmonisation of
procedures as well as changes in organisational values, structures, and programming
processes.
Donors' administrative procedures can divert scarce recipient skills from regular
functions of government.' 3 ' If each external agency sets unique requirements (relating to
project identification, appraisal, formulation, execution, monitoring and evaluation,
accounting and auditing, equipment procurement, hiring and benefits for local staff and
consultants, project and programme cycles, etc.), the result is heavily inflated transaction
costs for both parties. The benefits of subordinating such differences in procedures for
administrative simplicity would be immense for recipients. In the health sector there have
been reports of tinkering at the margins with harmonisation. In some countries, for
example, donors have agreed on common per diem rates and payment of salaries in local
currencies. An ambitious experiment is being tested in Zambia to produce a single set of
planning, budgeting, disbursal, accounting and auditing procedures for donor funds
channelled to the districts.' 32 In Bangladesh, this is already the case for that portion of
donors' funds channelled through the World Bank's Trust Funds.' 33 Cofmancing,
programme aid and consortia achieve harmonisation to varying degrees, yet the greatest
potential lies with the sector-wide approach.
Van Arkadie suggests that a number of donor procedures "reflect little more than
administrative convenience" and "inertia" which should prove amenable to change.'34
Yet, harmonisation of procedures at the sectoral or national level produces a dilemma for
donor agencies. While it may improve aid efficiency for the recipient, how will numerous
national initiatives be reconciled at the headquarters level? Donor agencies naturally
prefer to operate with the same procedures in all countries they assist. These ways of
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doing business have evolved organically over time in response to requirements
established by the institutions to which they are accountable. According to Cassen et a!.
"harmonisation of procedures is one of the oldest problems on the aid coordination
agenda, and one of the most intractable."35
Nevertheless, there is merit to Van Arkadie's assertion that there is scope for change,
particularly in institutions which place positive connotations on the concept of
coordination. Engendering organisational values supportive of coordination has proven
influential in the behaviour of front line agency staff. Donors can demonstrate
commitment to coordination through, for example, the inclusion of coordination in their
mission statement, the creation of incentives rewarding coordination, training field staff
in skills conducive to coordination (i.e., negotiation, communication, etc.), and including
aid coordination as a criterion of project approval. Nolke's analysis of eight major donors
suggests that, in setting coordination as a corporate goal and institutionalising staff
instructions, incentives and procedures in support of this goal, the World Bank has
developed a culture which encourages coordination, albeit not always apparent in the
field.' 36 Nolke acknowledges that attaching organisational value on coordination may be
necessary, but insufficient and suggests that structural changes may also be necessary.
Clift argues that the main organisational change relevant to coordination is
decentralisation.' 37
 Broadly speaking, decentralisation may entail devolving some
decision-making, shifting personnel to the country-level, and increasing staff analytical
capacity at that level. Dec entralisation involves a variety of costs. CIDA, for example,
aborted its experiment with decentralisation, partially because it found it three times as
expensive to maintain an officer in the field as in Ottawa.' 38
 Other structural changes
which would increase the viability of coordination include, among others, extending the
duration of postings and reducing the number of bilateral relationships with countries.
Coordination of inputs will be further served as donors switch from top-down, globally
inspired programming approaches to those which are more country and sector-specific
(e.g., World Bank Country Assistance Strategy). Other reforms which would facilitate
coordination include: longer time-horizons; developing alternative criteria of employee
effectiveness to fund disbursement and implementation rates; and recognition of aid
coordination as a discrete activity requiring adequate resources reflected in a separate
budget line and programme of work. Notwithstanding the apparent success of the World
Bank in affecting structural and value changes which have made the organisation and its
staff more amenable to aid coordination, case studies of CIDA and WHO suggest that
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these agencies found it difficult to implement the types of reforms outlined above which
would enable them to work in greater harmony with other donors at the national
139,140level.
1.3.2.7 Donor information management
Communication is both a strategy and a necessary but insufficient condition for aid
coordination. The gathering and exchange of data is at once a preliminary and an integral
step to all preceding strategies of aid coordination. It can range from formal, chaired,
minuted meetings of all key donors in the sector along a spectrum to informal exchanges
between two representatives over drinks. It can take the form of joint needs assessments,
situation analyses or policy-studies which can serve as the basis for developing a
common donor or ministry-donor platform on issues in the sector. A data base of ongoing
and planned donor interventions and support can provide donors and the ministry with a
fast and easy way of finding out what others are doing, where the gaps lie and whether or
not donor inputs match ministerial priorities.
In the health sector there have been some moves toward joint information management
but there remains considerable scope for improvement. The limitations ofjoint data
gathering are essentially twofold. First, there are the problems related to making the
mechanism work. One experiment in Sudan failed when the majority of donors did not
report on their activities. While a number of reasons for this failure were proposed by the
project executors, it was principally a function of the low priority placed in practice on
coordination.' 4 ' Second, a more fundamental question relates to whether or not such
expensive, time-consuming exercises yield useful information and lead to improvements
in coordination. This is an area which deserves future study.
1.4 The aims and scope of this enquiry
While enthusiasm for, and experience with, health sector aid coordination apparently
abounds, very little has been documented, either conceptually or empirically, about the
process. At the time when this research was conceived, there existed no case studies on
the subject in the published literature and a search for grey material identified only one
desk review, an MSc report,' 42 and one cursory review undertaken by a consulting
firm.' 43
 The review provided a limited description of the intention of the Government of
Zambia to use its Strategic Health Plan as a "framework for all donor contributions to the
sector." When the present study was in its initial stages, a proposal for a four country
study on health sector aid management in southern Africa was being prepared. Its results
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became available earlier this year,X' as did those from a study of five countries in
French West Africa.' 45
 The former concluded that "while difficult, coordination is
attainable, even in the most fragmented settings." Such rather optimistic conclusions were
drawn by researchers who themselves were intimately involved in coordination processes
in the countries under consideration. Based on their experience they proposed a number
of "essential steps in improving aid management." These included the need for the
ministry of health to develop a vision, to devote substantial resources, and to focus early
efforts on a problem on which there is some agreement between donors and the recipient
ministry. The work from West Africa revealed a pattern of weak government capacity to
control external funds, mechanisms which did exist being donor-driven, but "signs of a
growing recognition of the benefits of donor coordination." In addition to these studies
devoted wholly to the issue of health sector aid coordination, other descriptions and
analyses of health sector aid coordination may be found in reports on related issues, such
as that described in a recent study on the rOle of aid in rehabilitation in Cambodia.'47
However, due to the lack of health-sector specific analyses of aid coordination, this
research began with a review of analyses of aid coordination more generally, to
determine how they approached the problem and what they had learned.
1.4.1 Theoretical contributions
Theoretical contributions to the study of aid coordination have been largely provided by
organisational analysts. Mingst, for example, used a resource dependency approach (i.e.,
organisations interact to exchange resources which are scarce) to examine coordination
between the World Bank and the African Development Bank across a number of African
countries. 151
 She argues that the organisations were predisposed towards cooperation by
the fact that they shared largely similar objectives and institutional practices, but that the
actual impetus to coordinate through project cofinancing resulted from their inter-
dependence on each other's resources. Cofinancing could provide the AfDB with
technical knowledge and well-appraised projects to fund, whereas the World Bank would
gain the AfDB's coveted legitimacy among African states as well as attracting fmancial
resources to its projects. As the realm of coordination between the two agencies was
confined to project cofinancing, the study could reveal little about the mechanics of
coordination, about multi-party coordination, nor about the place of the recipient therein.
X The southern Africa study, once commissioned, made use of the conceptual framework
developed for the present study which is presented in the next section.
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Nolke, another organisational theorist, conducted cross-sectional, network analyses of
inter-agency coordination at the global level.' 52
 He argued for the need to move beyond
resource dependency approaches because they do not give sufficient attention to the
context of inter-organisational relationships.' 53
 Instead, he used the notion of network
structure (i.e., "the pattern of interactions between organisations") to explain whether or
not donors coordinate, with whom and why. Nolke suggested that these patterns are
governed by variables such as the origin of the agency's resources as well as its
governing structures. Thus, for example, Nolke contrasted multilateral with bilateral
organisations and hypothesised that the multilaterals will seek more interactions as a
function of their systems of governance based on a large number of member states. His
empirical work involved tracing the degree of interaction among desk officers at
headquarters (as indicated by phone calls, correspondence, etc.), mapping the position of
the agency on the network structure, and relating this position to specific characteristics
of the agency. He assumed that a high level of interaction, coupled with the perception
among operational staff that these linkages are effective, constitutes effective
coordination. While Nolke' s work is useful in high-lighting the organisational factors
which theoretically facilitate and constrain coordination, the static, cross-sectional
approach not only fails to capture relationships as they evolve over time, but does not
accommodate a consideration of the recipient in the analysis. Nolke supplemented his
work with one country level case study of donor perceptions of the effectiveness of their
efforts to coordinate among themselves in Mali.' 54 Here, donors considered themselves
to have been doing a good job, facilitated by the relatively small number of donors and
the fact that the needs were so great that donors did not have to compete for good projects
and local personnel. Network analysis has also been used to explore and attempt to
explain leadership and its central function in coordination.'55
1.4.2 Empirical contributions
Empirical work was found to include two early and substantive over-views of
coordination; one as a part of a broader, multi-country study addressing the question of
whether and how aid actually works to achieve its stated objectives (published in
1986),156 and one commissioned by the OECD and published in l988.' The first of
these studies found that "in several countries the donors not only fail to coordinate, but
actually compete." These studies concluded that the constraints to aid coordination
include: (1) the commercial and political interests of donors (i.e., donors want to keep
options open so as to pursue domestic interests); (2) the fact that donors are aware that
their ideological and technical differences will be made explicit if substantive
coordination is attempted; and (3) that coordination is resource consumptive. Recipients
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were found to be apprehensive about donor coordination due the perception that: (1)
unified donors would be in a better position to leverage economic and institutional
reforms; (2) it would reduce the ability of the recipient government to play donors off
against one another; and (3) it would make conflicts between ministries of finance and
line ministries more explicit. Based on the background studies provided for the first of
these publications, Lipton argued that, although coordination is a 'good thing,' the
barriers to improvement in practice are fundamental.' 58
 This is the case because both
donors and recipients are trapped in a 'prisoners' dilemma.' For their part, although
donors largely recognise the benefits of coordination and the overall costs of poor
coordination, they are constrained from taking the actions which would result in
improved coordination (such as untying procurement, using common management
arrangements, etc.) by the assumption that the effect of such actions would be cancelled
out by 'less scrupulous donors' not doing likewise. A similar logic guides the pattern of
perverse competition among recipient line ministries. Lipton concludes that 'trust or
enforcement' are the necessary but elusive preconditions for effective coordination.
Another paper which approached the topic of coordination through the prism of aid
effectiveness was written by Van Arkadie based on experience in Bangladesh and
Tanzania.' 59 Like Lipton, Van Arkadie argued that the standardisation of donor
procedures was a worthy objective, but that there exist strong incentives on the part of
both donors and recipients to by-pass or pre-empt what are in effect formal structures of
control. In terms of the homogenisation of policy among donors, Van Arkadie warned of
the dangers to the recipients in terms of the loss of legitimate differences of opinion and
strategies.
Whittington and Calhoun published a short paper outlining the factors responsible for
non-compliance of donors with a project monitoring system which they had assisted the
Government of Sudan to establish as a first step to improved donor coordination.'° These
authors pointed first to the role of agency staff who, on the one hand, lack incentives to
engage in cooperation and, on the other, have little room to engage in cooperation at the
country-level because of the centralised nature of decision-making. Whittington and
Calhoun also suggested that perceptions of the likely futility of attempts to coordinate
reinforced the bureaucratic resistance to initiatives in this area. Ross, a senior analyst with
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), contributed to understanding
the constraints to coordination from the perspective of his agency.' 62
 He argued that four
factors impaired CIDA staff from effectively coordinating with other agencies: (1) while
technical experts will often agree to cooperate in a specific area, that the political level
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often overrides them (i.e., non-developmental objectives prevail); (2) bureaucratic
priorities for fund disbursement and accountability militate against use of common
systems; (3) high-level managers think that coordination will take care of itself (i.e. they
do not perceive a problem); and (4) many managers give priority to successful delivery of
assistance, irrespective of the opportunity costs of poorly coordinated aid.
UNDP sponsored two evaluations of aid coordination in the early 1 990s. The first
examined how UNDP might better support capacity building for aid coordination in the
least developed countries.' 63
 It concluded that "aid coordination cannot be set apart from
the LDC's capacity for managing the mobilisation and use of development resources."
The evaluation viewed the development of self-sustaining capacity within recipient
administrations as a "challenging and unavoidable task;" one which should form UNDP' s
"guiding mandate" but in which UNDP's contribution had been lamentably "modest." In
effect, the report argued that UNDP, as a neutral agency, should focus its limited
resources on playing a key role in supporting LDCs efforts to develop sustainable
capacity for resource management. The second UNDP review sought to establish a niche
for IINDP in aid coordination and management by recipient governments.' TM
 The report
argued that UNDP had the mandate, presence and tools to provide aid coordination
services to the donors and to ensure their transfer to national institutions in developing
countries. The study concluded that UNDP was constrained, however, from fulfilling its
mandate primarily by limited in-house capacity and resources at the country level. In the
mid-1990s, a consulting firm was commissioned by the Sida to carry-out four country
case studies to assess operational coordination among UN organisations at the country
level.' 65
 This review found that while inter-UN coordination was seemingly improving,
because the UN was becoming increasingly marginalised in the field of development
assistance, whether or not its assistance was well coordinated was of increasingly limited
relevance.
A short article was published in 1986 on the need for and obstacles to better aid
coordination in Togo.' 66
 Its title suggested that the analysis was from the recipient's
perspective yet, curiously, its authors were staff of the IMF and the World Bank. They
argued that the public sector investment programme was the keystone of coordination in
Togo. In 1988, Clift published an account of aid coordination in Kenya.' 68 His analysis
provides a useful addition to the literature, for he makes the connection between
coordination and control. In particular, he exposes the manner in which the World Bank
sought to 'discipline' other donors (and the Government) to adhere to agreed frameworks
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which were largely inspired and imposed by the Bank's coordination instruments (e.g.,
public expenditure programmes or Consultative Group plans).
Other publications relating to aid coordination do exist, such as the proceedings of a
workshop convened to discuss aid management issues as well as possible coordination
arrangements in newly independent Namibia.' 69
 Yet, these do not contribute a great deal
to understanding the dynamics of coordination. Collectively, the literature described
above, although high-lighting constraints and opportunities to improved aid coordination,
is non-cumulative and contributes only limited understanding of aid coordination
dynamics in the health sector.
1.4.3 Bangladeshi literature
There has been a significant treatment of the aid regime of Bangladesh in the literature. A
number of studies of aid dependence and the role of aid in the political and economic
development of the country have been published. These include, for example, early work
by Just Faaland and his colleagues at the Christopher Michelson Institute in Norway on
the relationship between donors and the government, particularly with the IMF and the
World Bank (see Chapter 2 for an analysis of these relationships).' 7° Two members of
Bangladesh's first Planning Commission, Professors Rebman Sobhan and Nurul Islam,
wrote a great deal on the political economy of Bangladesh's dependence on foreign
aid,' 71 " 72" 73" 74 as have other foreign analysts.' 75" 76 Sohban provided a particularly
radical critique of the aid system which argued, among other things, that aid had placed
undue influence in the hands of the donors and thereby abridged national sovereignty and
thwarted egalitarian development in the country.
A variety of surveys of aid flows to Bangladesh and their influence in economic
development have been reported upon.' 77
 In addition, a number of reviews of the aims
and achievements of individual donors such as Sida,' 78' ' 79 CmA' 8° and ODA' 81 ' 182 have
been undertaken. Some of these have been commissioned by donors and others are
written by academics and critics - yet they do not deal with donor coordination.' 83 One
study on coordination arrangements in the education sector was undertaken by UNESCO,
but it's approach consisted simply of identifying donor-supported projects. The health
sector had not even received such a cursory treatment.
1.4.4 Framework of this study
In light of the limited academic treatment of the topic, this study aims to make a
contribution to knowledge by identifying and exploring what is known about the efforts
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which have been made to coordinate external resources in one particular country setting.
On one level, the study attempts to describe the various arrangements and their
characteristics. Given access to the pertinent documents, this represents a relatively
straight forward task of tracing and recording the history of the processes employed, the
actors involved and the context within which they occurred. The study will, therefore,
make a contribution through synthesis and interpretation. To the extent the research
moves beyond documentary sources and combs the ideas and perspectives of those
involved, it may also 'down-load' some history which has not been recorded.
At another level, the study aims to make a conceptual contribution to both the study and
practice of aid coordination. It proposes to do so by testing and refining a method of
assessing aid coordination arrangements. In so doing, it forces a rigorous examination of
the aims and characteristics of coordination and raises the question as to whether or not
an analysis of coordination is not, in fact, inherently subjective in nature.
The greatest strength of the research may lie in its potential to transcend the narrow self-
interests of the parties to coordination and provide a third party account of the pros and
cons of the processes at stake, and particularly of the politics of aid coordination. It is
acknowledged that enquiry into "questions concerning the nature of facts and values, of
perceptions and observations, of reason and cognition, of science and objective
knowledge" have sparked a lively debate over the nature of policy analysis and lies at the
root of competing policy-analytic approaches (positivistlempincist, Poppenan critical-
rationalist, pre-suppositionist, normativist, inter alia).' 84 Without wishing to become
embroiled in the debate, it is felt that the non-aligned, doctoral student can provide a
unique and objective perspective - not in the value-neutral sense - but in the tradition of
the honest-broker; the disinterested outside observer of interest parties. If the research is
not wholly successful in achieving objective neutrality, it may, at the very least, provide
the forum to counter-pose prevailing and opposing views of stakeholders. It could,
thereby, make a particularly valuable addition to aid management literature in that very
little is known about the views of recipients concerning the processes generally, and of
aid coordination specifically.
Having elucidated the forms, achievements, motivations and stakeholder perspectives
concerning aid coordination in Bangladesh, the study concludes by advancing a set of
principles which could govern and guide the nature of future external investment in
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health sector development, in Bangladesh and in other low- and lower-middle income
countries.
To summanse, the objectives of the study are: (1) to design and test a conceptual
framework for assessing the effectiveness of aid coordination and management
mechanisms; (2) to analyse the effectiveness of aid coordination found in the health
sector in Bangladesh; (3) to determine the factors which facilitate and constrain effective
coordination and management of aid; (4) to elucidate stakeholders' interests and
expectations of aid coordination; (5) to assess the prospects for improvements in aid
coordination practice; and (6) to arrive at a set of principles which ought to govern aid
coordination.
1.5 What should coordination achieve and, therefore, how can we evaluate it?
While the evaluation of coordination arrangements may be inherently subjective (e.g.,
certain parties may equate effective coordination with hegemony over the development
agenda and the compliance of other actors to it, whereas others may view coordination as
a means to improve sectoral functioning), a variety of criteria suggest themselves as a
starting point for this study. First, there are the goals of health sector reform, discussed
above in relation to their coincidence with the broad goals of aid coordination. Second,
one can consider arrangements in light of the principles governing aid coordination which
donors have established, rhetorically or otherwise. A set of principles guiding aid
coordination was agreed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD
along with the World Bank, IMF and UNDP.' 85 When extrapolated to the health sector,
the following five principles emerge: (1) the ministry of health should take the lead in
managing and coordinating external resources; (2) donors should provide technical
assistance to enable the ministry to assume the leadership function; (3) external resources
should be coordinated, managed and deployed as part of a national health plan; (4) the
government should encourage multilateral and bilateral agency involvement in the
formation of the national plan and attempt to achieve genuine consensus on the final
product; and (5) donors should attempt to subvert their administrative requirements,
commercial and other interests in pursuit of the objectives of the plan. It should be noted
that the DAC principles are embedded in the principles upon which the sector-wide
approach is predicated.
These principles, coupled with my working definition of coordination and the goals of
health sector reform, suggest a conceptual framework for evaluating the effectiveness of
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various aid coordination arrangements which has been elaborated in greater detail
elsewhere.' 86
 While built on foundations established and accepted by the aid community,
the conceptual framework underlying this study remains unique to itself. Such a
personalised approach was necessitated by the conceptual underdevelopment of the
theme of aid coordination. The framework (see Table 1) proposes that aid coordination
strategies should be assessed according to the following twelve criteria.
* The institutional leadership and ownership of the coordination arrangement. Does the
mechanism belong to one donor, a group of interested donors, is there joint donor-
recipient ownership? Has the mechanism been institutionalised in the recipient's
administration?
* The scope and quality of participation in the arrangement. Is it an exclusive club of two
or three dominant actors, is the recipient administration fully involved and does civil
society have a voice? What procedures are in place to ensure that the weaker participants
are listened to?
* The periodicity of the instrument. Is it, for example, a one-off meeting on a particular
subject? Is coordination sporadic, periodic or continuous?
* Integration. To what extent is the mechanism and its products embedded in the recipient
policy, planning and resource management processes?
* The realm of coordination. Is the mechanism concerned with consultation, concertation
or operational coordination?
* The breadth of coordination. Does the coordination mechanism attempt to take a sector-
wide approach or is it geographically- or issue-specific?
* The authority of, and adherence to, the decisions taken. Is there strong adherence to the
rules and decisions by all parties, by only some actors, or do decisions have no binding
authority?
* Costs. What are the opportunity costs associated with the mechanism? Does the
arrangement consume a great deal of limited recipient time and other resources and
achieve few of its goals?
* The impact of coordination on sectoral efficiency. Does the mechanism reduce service
duplication and harmonise aid delivery and management procedures, etc.?
* The influence of coordination on sectoral effectiveness. To what extent, for example,
does the coordination mechanism diminish donor-induced fragmentation? To what extent
is aid marshalled through coordination mechanisms in support of a sector-wide policy
framework?
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* The effect of the mechanism on equity. Does the mechanism correct some of the
geographic and other inequities exacerbated by current aid practices, or does it have
minimal or no effect?
* Sustainability. Does the mechanism promote or detract from the goal of sustainability?
Does it ensure that resources are used to enhance the functioning of the system over time?
Table 1: Characteristics & criteria for assessing the effectiveness of aid coordination
arrangements
Process criteria	 Process indicators & questions
Ownership	 Does the mechanism belong to one donor or a group of donors?
o Is there joint donor-recipient ownership?
O Is the mechanism institutionalised in the recipient administration and, if not, what
________________	
steps are being taken toward this end?
Participation	 0 What proportion of the key stakeholders are involved?
O Are the recipient administration and civil society involved?
o Do all members participate regularly?
o How are the views of less influential members considered?
Periodicity &	 0 Is the process a one-off event, sporadic, periodic or continuous?
continuity
Integration	 0 Is the mechanism integrated with the policy and budgeting processes?
Realm	 0 Are the purposes of the instrument consultation, concertation, or operational
coordination?
Breadth	 0 Does the mechanism focus on one aspect of the health sector or is it
________________	 comprehensive and sector-wide?
Authority &	 0 Do stakeholders adhere fully, partially or not all to decisions taken in the
adherence	 coordination forum?
Costs	 0 What are the human, institutional, and other costs involved in maintaining the
mechanism?
Outcome	 Outcome indicators & questions
Criteria
Efficiency	 0 Does the mechanism serve to: (1) reduce duplication; (2) enhance harmonisation
of procedures; (3) increase use of evidence-based decision tools?
Effectiveness	 0 To what extent does the mechanism: (1) diminish sector fragmentation; (2)
decrease conflicting policy signals; (3) allow donors to support a coherent sector-
______________	 wide plan?
Equity	 0 Does the mechanism: (1) correct inequities in targeting of assistance; (2) correct
inequities in payment for services; (3) increase parity of benefits and perks for
aid-supported staff?
Sustainability	 0 Are the costs of the mechanism sustainable?
o Are institutional arrangements and national skills developed?
0 Are incentives for participation and sanctions for non-participation established?
This framework provides broad-brush criteria against which aid management
arrangements may be evaluated. It is not suggested that there is a single, best model for
aid coordination, for this would depend on the context, among other things, but rather
proposes a number of questions which may help to measure the effectiveness of
particular arrangements found in the field. While such a 'technocratic approach' has
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value as a comparative tool, it is limited in that it leaves implicit the power balance
between the players and does not reveal their aspirations. Consequently, the research tests
the utility of the framework using a political- economy approach and makes reference to
additional dimensions to coordination which the framework fails to capture.
1.6 Research strategy and methods of enquiry
1.6.1 Comparative historical policy analysis
This research employed a case study approach. Case studies are thought to be well suited
for the exploration of complex questions in which the problem is ill-defined and there
exist competing and contradictory interpretations.' 87
 A case study permits an
impressionistic analysis of a situation and allows for the identification of variables which
might not have been expected to be related to the problem. It is particularly valuable to
policy analysis because it provides an opportunity to examine process issues. The logic of
the case study method, and its qualitative selection of cases (non-probabilistic sampling),
lies in its power to explain particular relationships of which it is representative. In other
words, it can demonstrate the operation of some identified theoretical principle.
Generalisability, in the case study context, refers to the ability of the study to expand and
refine existing theory.
In light of the complexity and poorly understood nature of aid coordination, an empirico-
inductive approach was followed. Adopting, a priori, one particular explanatory theory
for the research was rejected on the grounds that it might unduly limit the investigation.
Smith warned "adherence to particular theoretical biases can lead to investigative
ethnocentrism." 88
 Anderson concurs, arguing that "the main purpose of political enquiry
and analysis [should be] the explanation of political behaviour, rather than the validation
of a given theoretical approach." Analysis began, therefore, with a broad historical policy
framework and data collection, which was later followed with further development of the
conceptual and explanatory frameworks in an iterative process.
A comparative approach, in the sense of contrasting experience in different countries,
was considered and rejected after a reconnaissance trip to a selection of possible
comparison countries identified overwhelming constraints (mainly relating to the time
and financial resources required for adequate analysis). In its place, an in-depth study in
one country, Bangladesh, was chosen. The criteria for country selection included the: (I)
relatively high level of aid dependency in the health sector; (2) large number and
heterogeneity of donors; (3) relative political stability; (4) availability of an historical
record (i.e., documentation related to aid coordination); (5) presence of a long-standing
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and concerted effort among a number of key donors to maintain an aid coordination
instrument in the health sector - one which has been frequently cited by its proponents as
a success story' 89
 and a possible model for social sector support in other countries' 90 and
would, therefore, likely provide lessons; and (6) interest among some Government and
donor agency officials in facilitating a study of aid coordination so as to improve its
practice.
The logic of comparison, however, which allows for the exploration of diversity, held
considerable appeal. Consequently, the original study design intended to compare aid
coordination in a small number of policies or programmes (tracer policies) within
Bangladesh's health sector so as to avail itself of some of the features of a comparative
study. During initial stages of the field work, this approach was abandoned as it became
apparent that studying individual policies and programmes would not yield insights into
the overarching challenges faced by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
(MOHFW) in managing the donors in toto and of integration of all external resources in
the sector. Instead, it was decided to examine and compare the various approaches and
instruments which have been utilised to coordinate aid in the sector over time.
The study is informed by policy analysis, a field of enquiry concerned with both
prescription and description.' 9 ' While there exists considerable debate on the meaning
and methods of policy analysis, the present study adapts, for its simplicity, a framework
proposed by Walt and Gilson.' 92
 In drawing eclectically upon a number of theoretical
disciplines, the authors propose that policy analysis focus on four dimensions: content;
context; process; and actors. Policy content can be thought of as the substance of policy
(i.e., the details of the mechanisms of coordination). The context surrounding policy
making and implementation is the second dimension of policy analysis. For the purpose
of this study, two distinct contexts as well as their interface required consideration:
namely, the Bangladeshi political, economic and social context; and the context
governing the operation of the aid agencies (e.g., the introduction of internal policies
which encourage staff to cooperate with partner agencies, etc.). In keeping with
Leichter's' 93 work on context, the study considered the influence of situational factors
(e.g., the transfer of a particular official who had acted as a lynch-pin for coordination),
structural factors (such as extent of decentralisation in the development agencies, the
effect of the bifurcation of the ministry of health), cultural factors (such as acceptability
of rent-seeking, views on cooperation, or even whether languages posed barriers to
coordination) and exogenous factors (such as changes in the impact of the end of the cold
war on aid volume, or the changing mandates of UN agencies subsequent to global
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agreements) on aid management and coordination. The process by which policy is
formulated and implemented forms the third dimension. Process is typically concerned
with agenda setting and decision-making in relation to particular policies. This study
focused on processes involved in aid management and coordination. In particular, the
manner in which disparate donor ideologies, values, ideas and priorities were reconciled
and coordinated with those of other donors and the GOB. Two sets of actors were of
particular interest to the study; personnel from donor institutions (working at the
headquarters or country-based offices of multilateral and bilateral agencies) and
bureaucrats working in the Bangladesh civil service (mainly at the national level in the
MOHFW and the oversight ministries). The analysis, therefore, followed those who view
policy as a product of the environment from which it evolves, the mechanisms of
decision-making, the actors making and affected by it and, particularly, the inter-
relationships between these variables.'94"95"96
An historical perspective was adopted. The policy process demands such an approach
because, as Gorden et a!. point out, policies do not crystallise at a particular point in the
decision process but evolve, over time, through complex interactions among various
interest groups.' 97 The historical context is crucial since we are not only interested in
policy decisions, but also want to understand their genesis and long-term ramifications. A
cross-sectional approach would not provide that understanding. If the research is not
merely to inform but to improve practice in aid management, then the sequential model of
"historical prediction" should be utilised. Tosh asserts that efforts to manage social and
political change can be informed by this model.' 98 He sees it as a systematic analysis of
trends which attempts to separate those features which are ephemeral from those which
are enduring so as to help understand how feasible certain reforms may be. As Maines
states, "studies.. .that do not take into account fundamental differences in temporality will
always produce misrepresentative conclusions." 99 The study covers the period from the
independence of Bangladesh in 1971 to developments at the end of 1997 when data
collection was completed.
1.6.2 Methods
It has been asserted that "no comprehensive methodology for policy research exists."200
According to Jenkins "the nature of the policy problem is such that a variety of
approaches are required to deal with the complexity of the process." 20 ' The potential loss
of data and misinterpretation arising from the adoption of a singular approach can be
great when dealing with a multidimensional problem such as coordination. Others have
observed that "policy researchers frequently find themselves at the fringes of existing
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social science methodology - adapting, combining and improvising as they go."202
Moreover, because the empirico-inductive approach did not lend itself to rigorous
advanced planning of methods, nor did the challenging environment from which data was
to be extracted, the methods were exploratory, innovative and iterative. Quantitative and
qualitative methods were used to complement one another, to corroborate results and to
provide insights that either approach on its own would not have yielded. The following
methods were employed: (1) network and stakeholder analyses; (2) document review; (3)
semi-structured interviews; (4) observation; and (5) administration of semi-structured
questionnaires.
1.6.2.1 Mapping stakeholders and networks
The research began with a stakeholder analysis. Such analysis has been traditionally
employed by project designers so as to identify primary and secondary stakeholders and
to assess their resources, interests and influence with respect to the viability of the
intervention under consideration. 203 '204
 In this research, the intervention was the process
of coordination. Here, the stakeholder analysis was overlaid with a network analysis.
Networks have been defmed as "a patterned set of relationships among actors or groups
in a social space."205 It is assumed that networks of organisations (and individuals
therein) are formed so as to trade in scarce resources, such as financial, analytical or local
knowledge.206 In this study I was mainly interested in why networks, such as the
Consortium, are formed, who and why agencies seek participation in networks, as well as
the influence of networks on policy process issues, for example, how networks function
to promote coordination and how networks are used to influence decision-making. The
research aimed to map the principal networks established to coordinate external resources
in the health sector, identify the participation and location of actors in various networks,
gauge the level and intensity of interactions. In addition, it sought to assess the influence
of particular networks on policy process and examine the relationship between the nature
of networks and the coordination outcomes they produce. In effect, the use of these tools
was not dissimilar to the process of political mapping, 208 except that the units of analysis
were not "the political dimensions associated with changing health policy"209 but those
associated with coordination.
As the study was primarily designed to address the question of how the MOHFW
manages and coordinates external resources, it was limited to an analysis of the networks
involving Government, bilateral and multilateral agency stakeholders. NGOs were
explicitly excluded. Although NGOs greatly complicate the picture of external resource
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management and coordination in Bangladesh, their resources are small relative to bi- and
multilateral and not channelled through government budgets.
1.6.2.2 Document review
An extensive review, synthesis and interpretation of primary and secondary sources,
published and unpublished, relating to health sector planning and aid management in
Bangladesh was undertaken. Documents were obtained from a variety of sources, the
most prominent being the archives of the World Bank in Washington, where particular
use was made of the correspondence files relating to five consecutive Bangladesh
population and health credits. An effort was made to determine the original purpose of
the documents so as to facilitate their interpretation. The major types of documentation
reviewed included the following:
• Government policy, planning and project documentation, particularly MOHFW
generated documents (e.g., health chapters of Five Year and Annual Plans, policy
statements, etc.) and project documents (e.g., Project Proformas, project status
reports, etc.);
• Minutes of most meetings of the donor Consortium held between 1992 and 1997 as
well as ad hoc meetings of donors concerning the health sector between 1973 and
1997; and various inter-agency meetings held in Dhaka including meetings of the
United Nations 'Heads of Agencies,' the Joint Consultative Group on Policy;
• Correspondence, primarily between the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and the
World Bank, but also between the GOB and other donors and among donors;
Memoranda, primarily World Bank intra-agency memos regarding its projects in the
health sector in Bangladesh;
• Mission aide-memoires, mainly pre-appraisal, appraisal, supervision and mid-term
review missions for World Bank-led health projects, as well as most World Bank
Back-to-Office reports on these missions;
• Donor project documents, such as, World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports, UNICEF
Master Plans of Operations, UNFPA Programme Review and Strategy Development
Reports, etc., as well as consultancy reports.
1.6.2.3 Semi-structured interviews
Due to the fact that processes of policy-making presented in formal structures and public
documents often differ from how decisions are made in practice, coupled with the truism
that much decision-making remains unrecorded, this study employed semi-structured
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interviews with key ministerial and donor personnel to substantiate and complement data
collected through other means. The sample was primarily of serving personnel involved
in aid management selected on the basis of organisational position, but proceeded with
'chain' sampling (i.e., the initial sample provided further contacts). Some informants
were identified through historical records. Government officials (past and present) were
interviewed from the MOHFW, the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry
of Finance, and the Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning. Officials from
headquarters and field offices of numerous bilateral and multilateral agencies as well a
number of their consultants were interviewed. A list of those consulted forms Annex 1.
1.6.2.4 Semi-structured questionnaire survey
Well into the process of field research, after preliminary meetings had been held with key
stakeholders and consultations had been held on the nature and intent of the research, a
semi-structured questionnaire was administered under the auspices of a Government-led
Task Force on Sector-wide Management. A questionnaire-type survey instrument was
drafted and shared for comment with the Task Force and donors not represented on the
Task Force. Based on feedback from the stakeholders, three separate questionnaires were
drafted for officials of: (1) Government; (2) donor agencies located in Dhaka; and (3)
donor headquarters. Attempts were made to pilot-test the questionnaires on the three
target groups, but only the Government responded positively.
The finalised questionnaire prepared for Government officials was sent to the Secretaries
of the following departments: (1) ERD, Ministry of Finance; (2) Finance Division,
Ministry of Finance; (3) Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning; and (4) MOHFW.
Each Secretary was asked to nominate two officials who could meet with the researcher
independently and respond to the questions in the survey instrument. The same
questionnaire was also sent directly to another six Government officials who were
identified as being particularly knowledgeable on aid coordination. Meetings were
arranged with these officials so as to complete the questionnaire. It was repeatedly
stressed that the Task Force was not seeking definitive positions nor commitments from
the officials, but was interested in support for andlor concerns relating to health sector aid
coordination. Separate questionnaires were sent to officials in 19 donor headquarters
agencies and to officials of local offices of the donors (21 agencies) for self-completion
(the Task Force targeted the most influential donors in the sector; 21 out of 31).
Questionnaires for local donor officials were sent to two officials who had recently
transferred out of Dhaka to WHO's SEARO and Sida's Stockholm office. Annex 2
contains the questionnaire sent to local donor agencies.
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Completed questionnaires were received from eight Government officials, mainly senior-
middle management staff of the MOHFW. Responses were received from 14 donor
officials/agencies, mostly single respondents, and usually the most senior, field-based,
health professional in the agency with input from headquarters.
1.6.2.5 Participant observation
It has been suggested that participant observation is less a method than a strategy for data
collection. 21 ° It was envisioned as a useful approach because it might reduce problems of
reactivity and provide the opportunity to gain an intuitive understanding of the 'aid
culture,' thereby allowing for the collection of more reliable data and for improved
insights into the data collected. In particular, it offered a chance to gain an appreciation of
the informal mechanisms of coordination. Three strategies were used to take advantage of
participant observation. First, to inject myself into the social circuit where much informal
coordination takes place. Second, opportunities were sought to participate in various
donor management and coordination fora (for example, aid negotiations, Consortium
meetings, etc.). Here, I was more of an observer than a participant, with an overt presence
and the aims of my research widely known. Third, to undertake studies commissioned by
the stakeholders relating to the coordination machinery which would provide first hand
knowledge of the processes and issues at stake.21'
1.6.3 Validation techniques
The quantitative information obtained was not always reliable and the qualitative aspect
of the study drew heavily on the interpretation of events by both key-informants and the
researcher; it is, thus, subject to significant bias. Examining points of complementarity
and diversity of opinion, and interpreting their meaning, presented an integral yet
challenging component of the study. The reliability of the findings were validated in two
principle ways. Triangulation was used to counterbalance the merits and demerits of a
particular method, to corroborate evidence and develop a more clear picture of the issue
at hand. Triangulation refers to seeking data from a wide range of independent sources
and the use of a variety of research methods. 212 The second method, peer checking,
provided a further means to validate the findings. Preliminary results were shared with
key stakeholders, in the form of two draft reports, 213'214 to check for factual accuracy and
to probe for alternative interpretations. In addition, views and preliminary conclusions
were shared in seminars for feedback, further refinement and verification of validity.2t5
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1.6.4 Caveats, limitations and biases
An in-depth, single country case study can make an important contribution to knowledge,
particularly given the significance of context in uniquely distinct policy environments.
However, a multiple country study may have allowed for comparisons and for the testing
of hypotheses beyond what is capable here. Moreover, even within the single case, what
may have been desirable in terms of application of methodology and collection of data
was not feasible. A note setting out the process, barriers and milestones involved in the
field research forms Annex 3. One constraint related to the fact that not all agencies and
officials were equally willing to share information on their programme or their
perspectives and knowledge. As a result, data sets remain incomplete and patchy. It also
introduces a potential selection bias in that, perhaps, conclusions were largely drawn from
information provided by those agencies which were amenable or most active in
coordination. Another issue was that officials were, on occasion, unwilling to participate
in various proposed methods in which their participation was essential for success.
Encouraging officials, for example, to maintain telephone diaries to provide proxy
indicators of network position and intensity failed. These failings of application of
intended methodology may have partly related to the tendency prevalent among many
officials to show great interest in the concept of improved coordination, but be averse to
any scrutiny of their current practice, particularly where this was undertaken by an
outsider. It may also have been a reflection of the low priority placed on health sector aid
coordination by many officials or, alternatively, an indication that they were too busy.
Attempts to become an insider (through participant observation) meant, inevitably, to be
perceived as affiliated with one or another agency and, thereby, losing ones status as
'neutral observer,' thus introducing further bias (due to the need for sponsorship). There
was also the problem of dealing with revisionism and dishonesty. Documentation often
revealed discrepancies between what was put forward to different audiences, thereby
suggesting that all documentation be treated with caution. Likewise, there was a
proclivity for respondents to voice views which they wanted to have others hear,
irrespective of whether or not these represented their actual views or intentions. With
reference to the limitations of the survey, described above in section 1.6.2.4, the fmdings
are derived from a very small sample of officials. It is, therefore, difficult to draw hard
and fast conclusions. In addition, it should be noted that the sample also suffers from a
particular selection bias. As was to be expected, donors more 'committed' to coordination
responded to the questionnaire and were, by and large, also members of the present
Consortium. On the Government side, most of the respondents are officials of the
MOHFW as opposed to other relevant Government departments.
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Finally, it may be necessary to state that it is beyond the scope of this research to consider
whether or not the Government and donors, to the extent that they do coordinate and
manage external resources, are pursuing rational and effective policies in the health
sector. Here, I am, concerned with the 'how and why' of coordination not with the
appropriateness of policy content.
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CHAPTER TWO
The context of aid coordination in Bangladesh: the anatomy of aid
dependency
2.1 Introduction
The objectives of this Chapter are two-fold: (1) to situate the analysis of attempts to
coordinate aid in place and time; and, more specifically, (2) to draw attention to those
contextual factors that are likely to have had some influence on coordination
arrangements. The Chapter focuses on those factors that help to explain why aid
coordination was placed on the health policy agenda and why its practice remained
externally-driven for so long. As such, it explores donors' perceptions of Government
integrity and capacity, ownership of the policy agenda, and the interests sought by
stakeholders through their participation in coordination processes.
2.2 Politics in Bangladesh
Ever since its inception in 1971, Bangladesh 's urban-based, political,
bureaucratic and military elites have dominated the political process and have
been accountable to no one but themselves.
S. Kochanek, 1996
2.2.1 Pre-independent Bangladesh
The political history of Bangladesh is characterised by governance which is neither
representative of, nor accountable to, the people. In 1947, after nearly two centuries of
British colonial rule, the present day territory of Bangladesh became East Pakistan. It has
been asserted that, during the period of Pakistani rule, Bangladeshis were by,
constitutional design and political practice, effectively excluded from national power.2
Those who exercised political and administrative power in East Pakistan were regarded as
accountable to President of Pakistan and unresponsive to the interests and needs of the
people of East Pakistan. In the 1970 elections, the Awami League (a Bangladesh
nationalist political party) won a landslide victory in the provincial election and a
majority in the Pakistani national assembly. When the Awami League was blocked from
forming the Government, a civil war erupted which was to last nine months and claim
approximately one million lives - mainly Bengali.
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2.2.2 The 'honey-moon' days ofpost-independence (1971-1975)
On 16 December 1971 Bangladesh gained its independence. The Awami League, which
had acquired a pre-eminent role as the vanguard of the nationalist movement in the 1 950s
and 60s, assumed power. At its helm was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who rode on a wave
of populist sentiment unleashed by the success of the war. The socialist-oriented
Govemmentu
 set to work rebuilding a country immobilised by war, de-linked from the
central institutions which had dominated its development for decades, bereft of its
entrepreneurial class, faced with the necessity of repatriating ten million refugees from
India and Pakistan, beset with 20 million internally displaced persons, and a heavily
armed, factious population with heightened expectations following emancipation.3
The new regime was to face a number of set-backs to its dirigiste programme. The global
economic crisis and world-wide inflation of 1973 drove down Bangladesh's terms of
trade and resulted in high domestic inflation, which precipitated a series of economic
problems. A succession of bad harvests, two droughts in 1972/73 and severe flooding in
1974, contributed to wide-spread famine and appreciable loss of human life (250,000).
The protracted show-down between the Government and the World Bank over the
assumption of Pakistan's external debt led to a deceleration of aid commitments and
4,5	 .disbursements. This was exacerbated by the American administration s decision to
withhold food aid shipments in 1 974•6 The action was ostensibly taken on account of the
GOB' s decision to enter into a trading relationship with Cuba; yet this rationale provided
a subterfuge for US hostility toward the new Government in general (Pakistan was a close
ally of the US), and particularly to Bangladesh's stated programme of nationalisation,
socialism and international non-alignment. The Government's problems were
compounded by severe internal dissension and infighting within the Awami League,
which led Sheikh Mujibur to purge the leadership of the party and later his cabinet.
Allegations of corruption and incompetence were increasingly levelled at both the Awami
League and the bureaucracy.7
Collectively, these events prompted a climate of political and social destabilisation, which
Sheikh Mujibur attempted to counter through an increasing centralisation of power and
by taking an ideological volte-face. On the economic front, his commitment to socialism
was wholly reversed as he was eventually forced, by the near collapse of the economy, to
a The Awami League stated its commitment to a socialist economy. In practice, this was limited to
nationalisation of most of the large manufacturing industries (particularly jute) and banking. Most
of these assets had been abandoned by Pakistanis and fell into Government hands defacto. The
very unequal distribution of land was left unreformed.
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turn to the Americans, the IMF and the World Bank for financial help in the autumn of
974. In October 1974, after two years of resisting a World Bank-styled aid consortium
and IMF advice, the Government acquiesced to both in exchange for renewed aid
pledges. A precedent was, thereby, set by which donors sought to influence domestic
policy through the aid regime. In Januaiy 1975, the constitution was radically amended to
establish a presidential form of government under one-party rule. Having done so, Sheikh
Mujibur removed any vestige of democratic governance. As the first of many political
leaders to use proclamations to supersede the authority of the constitution, Sheikh
Mujibur also set the stage for a continued pattern of compromised state accountability.
2.2.3 The 'bureaucratic-military democracies' (1975-1 990)
In August 1975, Sheikh Mujibur was assassinated and a tumultuous period of
authoritarian rule was ushered in. 9 A series of coups d'etat began in November at the end
of which General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) emerged as defacto leader of Bangladesh. Zia
assumed the dejure title of President in April 1977. Thereafter, he established the
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) through which he contested elections in June 1978
(presidential) and in January 1979 (parliamentary). It has been alleged that these were
held to satisfy the requirements of western donors, particularly the US. 10 It was reported
in the Far Eastern Economic Review that "A senior Bangladesh army officer recently told
a visiting foreign journalist in Dacca: 'The West, especially the US Congress, likes it if
we can be called a democracy. It will make it easy for us to get aid. That is the main
importance for the election." The victories of the BNP in these elections, which were
judged neither free nor fair, enabled Zia to boast of civilianising his administration.'2
When this failed to produce the desired legitimacy, Zia turned to the ideology of
Bangladeshi nationalism and national unity.' 3 Under his rule, corruption was reported to
have been institutionalised, the material gulf between those with access to power and
those without widened, politically inspired killings spiralled and law and order
deteriorated.' 4 After being the target of a reported 20 mutinies and coups, Zia was
assassinated in May 1981.
Zia was succeeded by Justice Sattar, his Vice President, but only until March 1982 when
General Ershad launched a bloodless coup d'etat. Ershad appointed himself Chief Martial
Law Administrator and later, in December 1983, President. Ershad then followed Zia' S
example of using electoral means to legitimise his rule. He established the Jatiya Party
and, through victory in elections in May 1986 that were boycotted by much of the
opposition and described by a British observer team as 'a tragedy for democracy,"5
emerged as another military President in civilian garb. The opposition parties formed a
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short-lived coalition and, through the use of mass action, succeeded in forcing Ershad to
hold fresh elections. These took place in March 1988 and, as they were boycotted by the
opposition, resulted in the installation of an unrepresentative parliament.' 6
 Under Ershad,
the successive parliaments remained weak and democratic institutions did not flourish.
Having failed to gain legitimacy through democratic means, Ershad turned to clientelism
to generate support. He dispensed patronage through the distribution of foreign aid and
greatly increased spending on the armed forces. According to local scholars, Ershad's
neo-patrimonial rule "turned the state apparatus into a mere private government, where he
established a kind of personal rule based on material interests and rewards for loyalty and
support. . .rule was maintained through bribery, socio-political patronage and various
kinds of rewards to his clientele."7
2.2.4 The paralysis ofpartisan democracy (1991-1997)
Opposition to the Ershad regime, which had been active since the early 1980s, intensified
in November 1990 and led to a popular uprising that resulted in the restoration of formal,
if limited, democracy. The leaders of the BNP and the Awami League, who generally
despised and opposed one another and had failed to coordinate their opposition to Ershad
during the 1 980s, finally agreed to co-operate in order to depose Ershad and set up a
neutral, interim administration which would oversee parliamentary elections.
Consequently, both the military' 8 and foreign donors' 9 withdrew their support from
Ershad, and he was forced to resign in December 1990.20 An interim Government was
sworn in and presided over what was considered to be a relatively free and fair election in
February 1991.21 Although both parties won approximately 32% of the vote, the BNP
won the greatest number of seats and formed the Government. The constitutional
provision for the election by parliament of an additional 30 seats reserved for women,
enabled the BNP to obtain a majority by horse-trading with the smaller parties. The
entente cordiale between the Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina did not, however, last
22long.
Complaints by the Awami League of Government vote-rigging in a by-election in March
1994 set off a process in which democracy was caught between a Government whose
credibility was questioned (by both the opposition and outside observers) and an
opposition which resorted to extra-parliamentary and non-constitutional means to press a
series of ultimatums. When the Government refused to capitulate to demands for, among
Begum Khaleda Zia, the head of the BNP, is the widow of former President General Zia, who
was assassinated in 1981. The Awami League is headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajid, current Prime
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other things, the installation of a neutral care-taker Government to oversee elections, on
28 December 1994 all opposition members of parliament resigned. After eleven months
of parliamentary grid-lock, on 24 November 1995, Khaleda Zia dissolved parliament and
set elections for 18 January 1996. The opposition maintained its position that a neutral
administration supervise the elections and made use of political agitation to cause the
repeated postponement of elections. One analyst, reflecting on 1995, commented that "the
unprecedented deterioration of law and order created a high level of public insecurity and
risked the survival of democracy" 23
 (i.e., risked a return to military rule).
When elections were eventually held in February 1996, the BNP claimed a 'landslide'
victory - yet the major opposition parties boycotted the polls, voter turnout was less than
10%, charges of 'widespread rigging' were levelled, and "independent monitors
denounced the process as flawed." 24
 The impasse continued and opposition to the 'new
Government' intensified. In March 1996, the civil service entered into the fray by issuing
an ultimatum to the Government demanding the installation of an interim government
with the threat of an indefinite strike. The 25 month stalemate came to an end on 30
March when a care-taker Government was sworn in and elections set for 12 June.
Despite an attempted army revolt just preceding the poll, the June 1996 election was
considered a triumph for democracy in the country; international observers declared it to
be 'free and fair' and voter turnout was over 70%.25 Sheikh Hasina's Awami League
narrowly won the election and formed the Government. Nevertheless, the politics of
confrontation continued in the parliament, press and streets. According to one observer,
the defeated Begum Khaleda Zia spent 1997 "attempting to design a viable strategy to
topple the government."26
 Opposition members routinely walked out of, and boycotted
the parliament, charges of conspiracies and corruption continued, and politically
motivated hartals persisted through the period to the end of 1997.
2.2.5 Political lfe in Bangladesh: a synthesis
It has been demonstrated that politics in Bangladesh revolve around
personalities, not ideas or institutions.27
L. Zirling, 1992
Minister, and daughter of She ilth Mujibur Rahman, who led Bangladesh from independence until
his assassination in 1975.
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Although democracy was restored in 1991, and there are now over 125 political parties,
limits remain to the extent to which the state can be said to be representative of, and
accountable to, the population. 28
 Political events in Bangladesh have served to debase the
principles and institutions of representative government. Prolonged military rule
(accounting for 15 of the country's 26 years) and recourse to force for the resolution of
political conflict, have negatively influenced democratic institution building. Martial law
was imposed for 3 years and 8 months by Zia and for 4 years and 4 months by Ershad.
The fact that two of the three leading political parties (BNP and Jatiya) have a military
legacy raises questions about their democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, tendencies
towards divisive and corrupt partisan politics militates against democratic norms.
The manner in which non-military regimes assume power is one source of concern. One
commentator has written that "incumbent government parties in particular and
parliamentarians in general have tended to misuse public resources in order to remain in
power. As a result, most parliamentary and presidential elections have been orchestrated
by the party in power with serious violations of campaign finance rules and questionable
use of government functionaries and facilities, often including coercion, fraud and
resulting in political violence." 30 As a result, prior to the June 1996 election, no sitting
government had lost an election. One analyst has asserted that all "successive regimes
have been preoccupied with setting up arrangements for their own survival."3 ' The voter
registration process and the electoral rolls have been described 'highly suspect,' and the
violation of election laws 'common' by those in power.32
Fractured, divisive and confrontational partisan politics are the norm in democratic
Bangladesh. The opposition parties are continually looking for issues with which to
confront the Government at a great cost to social stability. In 1989, there were 247 hartals
(closing of offices, shops and blockading of streets due to political agitation) called by a
spectrum of social and political groups. 33 During the constitutional impasse of 1994-95,
there were reported to be 175 days during which political disturbances took place,
including 92 days of country-wide hartal and 22 days of continuous non-cooperation. 34 In
1996, 54 working days were lost due to hartals. 35 According to Rashiduzzaman, the
hartal represents "uncompromising politics" and the "hollowness of conventional party
politics in Bangladesh" and undermines the constitutional process. 36 In so far as "it is an
open secret in Bangladesh that paid mercenaries, demonstrators and armed activists, hired
by both the opposition and pro-government groups, make up the street mobs [hartals],"37
few observers view them as a healthy democratic response of a blossoming civil society.
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Sohban contends that "the survival of absolutism in democratic politics leads to the
resurfacing of the presidential culture where a strong chief executive finds it more
convenient to operate with the support of a coterie of civil servants or personally loyal
political associates." 38 Such tendencies might be explained by social relations in
Bangladesh which are "dominated by a network of patron-client relations.. .This patron-
client system is based on a hierarchically structured, complex maze of mutual obligations
and personal ties.. .These. . .contribute to the highly personalised, factionalised character
of patrimonial politics in Bangladesh. They are reinforced by a strong sense of
individualism, low levels of trust and a lack of commitment to abstract objectives and
ideology."39
 Others concur, suggesting that the political culture of Bangladesh is shaped
by three structural factors: atomism; patron-clientism; and neo-patrimonialism. A less
sophisticated analysis has focused on the 'ego-mania' of the politicians.4'
2.2.6 Donors 'perceptions
Whatever the causes of the political culture of Bangladesh, donor governments have
likely questioned the legitimacy of the Bangladeshi leadership for most of the country's
history. The perceived illegitimacy of successive administrations has presumably
coloured the views of donors with respect to: (1) the adequacy of accountability within
Government; (2) the relationship between the state and its citizenry; and (3) the
conviction and vision applied by the Government to the economic and social
development of the country. In particular, it may account for the low levels of trust and
confidence placed by donors in the GOB and predisposed them to exercise great caution
in the aid relationship. Paradoxically, the dim view held by most donors of successive
political and bureaucratic administrations within Bangladesh has not tempered their
proclivity to provide massive amounts of aid to Bangladesh (see sections 2.4 & 2.5).
Donors have opted, instead, to tighten their grip over the management of their assistance.
However, recent events in Bangladesh led the aid community to express cautious
optimism with respect to political developments. First, the decision by the military to
refrain from becoming involved in the constitutional problems during 1994-95 was seen
as a positive step. It has been argued that donors themselves had a hand in ensuring this
outcome. According to Murshed and Chowdhury, "world opinion, expressed strongly
through the aid mechanism, played an important role in encouraging the soldiers to
maintain a posture of pragmatism and restraint." 42 Second, provision for the routine
installation of an interim care-taker government preceding elections has been written into
the constitution, which may subvert the tendency of incumbent governments to tip the
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playing field in their favour. Third, the elections of June 1996 were deemed to be free and
fair by the large contingent of international observers. 43
 These achievements were widely
lauded by the aid group in 1996 and cautiously suggested that the road to a more
representative and accountable government was being traversed.
There was optimism on the economic front as well. The average annual growth of the
GNP for 1995-96 was 5.5% and 5.7% for the year ending 30 June 199745 The
discovery of large reserves of natural gas in the Bay of Bengal attracted dozens of oil
companies and prompted The Economist to write an optimistic piece about Bangladesh's
economic prospects. Yet the politics of intransigence, re-introduced in late 1996,
suggested that the honeymoon, particularly with donors, may already be over. When the
Bangladesh Development Forum met in Dhaka in 1997 and was confronted with a BNP-
sponsored hartal, donors warned that "Bangladesh's development appeared likely to be
substantially undermined by the politics of intolerance, violence and mtimidation."47
2.3 The rationale for aid to Bangladesh
Given the extent to which Bangladesh has been riven by internal dissension and beset by
political corruption, it would appear difficult to explain why donor agencies took up the
challenge of assisting the country and why they have continued to allocate large
quantities of aid. Donor involvement can be explained by geo-political and strategic
interests which prevailed during the Cold War, humanitarian motives, economic and trade
interests in the donor countries as well as the desire to influence domestic and foreign
policies of Bangladeshi regimes.
2.3.1 Geo-political and strategic objectives
The major powers with a geo-political interest in Bangladesh were India, China, the
USSR, and the US. However, due to a variety of considerations, only India and the US
provided Bangladesh with any significant amount of aid, both in return for the possibility
of influence. India played a major role during the war of independence as it had an
interest in emasculating Pakistan, its rival and Islamic neighbour. In the immediate post-
war era, India was the paramount donor to Bangladesh; and during the first six months of
independence, India alone accounted for 67% of aid disbursed to the country. 48
 India's
interests, it has been suggested, included: (1) the promotion of internal stability so as to
ensure that an anarchical situation would not once again develop and spill across its long
land border with Bangladesh; (2) the consolidation of a secular state in the region; and (3)
This is in contrast to an estimated annual per capita growth of 1.8% during the period 1990-92.
Chapter 2: Context 	 68
49the creation of a land barner with China. Although Bangladesh has been descnbed as
having been strategically important to China, 50
 China made its first aid commitment to
Bangladesh only after belatedly recognising the country following the change of regime
in August 1975. China remained a peripheral donor, presumably because it did not expect
to gain much influence in the country.
Within the context of the global cold war, Bangladesh would not have been a front-line
player. Nonetheless, both the USSR and US acknowledged Bangladesh's strategic
importance in the region. Both superpowers were equally interested in expanding their
sphere of influence to the exclusion of one another and China. Given US hostility to
Bangladesh during its liberation war and the support Bangladesh had garnered during the
war from the Soviet Bloc, Sheikh Mujibur's first state visit outside of the sub-continent
was to the Soviet Union. 5 ' From the American perspective, although there was initial
opposition to the formation of the country, once Bangladesh had secured independence
there was an interest in ensuring that stability was restored and a presence established, so
that rival powers could not do the same. As a result, the Americans rapidly established
themselves as the single largest bilateral donor country to Bangladesh (although, as
mentioned above, commitments and disbursement dried up in 1974 as the Americans
applied pressure to the Mujibur regime).
2.3.2 The humanitarian case for aid: poor socio-economic status and extreme
vulnerability
Bangladesh is not a country of strategic iPnportance to any but her immediate
neighbours...If aid is to cone for development ofBangladesh it is more likely to
be for economic reasons or on general humanitarian grounds.53
J. Faaland & J.R. Parkinson, 1976
Today no country compares with Bangladesh in the concentration ofpoverty
among so many, in so small an area and with so bleak an outlook.54
M.M. Ahmad & J.G. Townsend,1998
Not long after independence, Henry Kissinger is attributed with having referred to
Bangladesh as an 'international basket case.' 55 Nevertheless, an humanitarian case for aid
has persisted over the ensuing decades. There has been a degree of economic stability
over the past decade, attributed by the World Bank to a programme of economic
adjustment and structural reform, launched in 1990. Although this aimed to establish a
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liberalised, market-based, and private sector-driven economy, with a GNP of US$ 260
per capita (in 1 996),56 Bangladesh remains among the poorest of low-income countries.57
UNDP's composite Human Development Index has consistently ranked Bangladesh
towards the bottom of the non-OECD countries (i.e., usually around 145 of the 177
countries listed). 58 Despite a widely hailed successful population programme, 59
 with an
estimated population of 123 million in 1996, it is the world's most densely populated
country. 6° Bangladesh remains a predominantly rural country (approximately 80%).
Consequently, the structure of the GDP is dominated by the agricultural sector, but there
has been recent growth in manufacturing, particularly in ready-made garments. The
nation is ethnically relatively homogeneous and 88% of its population is Muslim. It has a
remarkably under-educated population - with women particularly disadvantaged by a rate
of illiteracy estimated to be 78%.
There have been some notable improvements in health related indicators since
independence. The infant mortality rate, although still very high, fell from 148 per
thousand live births in 1971 to 77 in 1993; and under-five mortality fell from 239 to 122.
Life expectancy at birth is thought to have increased from approximately 44 in 1971 to 58
years at present. During same period, the total fertility rate fell from an estimated 7 to 3.5,
which is primarily explained by an increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate from
approximately 2% at independence to a current estimated level of 45%. Immunisation
coverage (EPI), which was approximately 1%, in 1981, increased to over 70% by 1993.
Microbiologically safe water, notwithstanding current concern relating to arsenic
contamination, is reported to be accessible to 98% of the population.
Despite these achievements, a number of health problems persist and new challenges are
emerging. The main causes of death, particularly in children, are reported to be diarrhoeal
diseases, acute respiratory infections, malnutrition, and accidents and injuries. The adult
population still suffers from high rates of tuberculosis, chronic hepatitis B and
reproductive morbidity, yet cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, diabetes, accidents and
violence, are now also frequent causes of morbidity and mortality. With social and
economic change and rapid urbanisation, sexually transmitted infections, and
environmental and occupational concerns, have recently appeared on the health policy
agenda.
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In Bangladesh, poverty, inequality, low educational attainment, malnutrition and ill-
health provide a compelling case for aid. The rationale is reinforced by the natural
adversity to which the country is subjected, which includes recurrent flooding, periodic
cyclones and tidal surges. A retired World Bank official suggested that "all donors
wanted to be seen to be doing something to ease the poverty in the country."6 ' While
most donors to Bangladesh have couched their rationale for aid in humanitarian language,
Thomson's analysis suggests that those countries which have provided aid primarily upon
humanitarian grounds were the Scandinavians, the Netherlands, West Germany, Canada
and Australia, although in the latter two, trade considerations were also of considerable
importance.62
2.3.3 Economic objectives of aid: trade & export promotion
In light of the poor economic standing of Bangladesh, it would be untenable to suggest
that domestic economic objectives were paramount among the motivations for the
provision of aid by donor countries. Nonetheless, in so far as aid was tied and benefited
the domestic economies of the donors, export promotion can not be ruled out as a
complementary incentive. An evaluation of Canadian aid to Bangladesh provides some
evidence:
In 1979, when Bangladesh awarded the procurement contract for 30 diesel
locomotives fmanced by the Saudi Fund for Development to a Japanese rather
than a Canadian firm, there was much displeasure in Canada. Thus in 1980, when
Bangladesh requested financing for 50 additional locomotives, Canada indicated
that it would be willing to fund 25 locomotives, but only if Bangladesh would
find another source of funds for the other 25 and purchase all 50 from a Canadian63
nrrn.
Tied aid is pervasive in the development establishment. According to World Bank data, in
1995 100% of aid from Australia, Belgium and the US was tied, while more than 75% of
aid from the UK, Germany and Canada was tied. Among the large donors to the health
sector in Bangladesh, Sweden stood out for tying only 40% of its aid.M It has been
argued that "France and Japan and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, Canada and the
Federal Republic of Germany, have allowed trading interests to dominate, or at least
influence, their programmes" of assistance to Bangladesh.65
2.3.4 Aid as a lever over recipient policies
In addition to the reasons listed above, the motivation to provide aid can also, in part, be
attributed to the desire of some donors to influence decisions regarding economic, social
and foreign policies in Bangladesh. For example, American aid to Bangladesh has been
described "as a reward for Bangladesh's continuing moderate stance and gradual return to
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a more capitalist economy." 66
 Sohban has demonstrated that, during 1974, the US
withheld commitments of aid to Bangladesh until Bangladesh suspended all trade with
Cuba and that after the a pro-American regime was installed in 1975, aid disbursements
rapidly escalated. 67 The World Bank has been more explicit than any other donor in
linking its lending to the adoption of specific domestic policies.
2.4 Aid dependence
The leverage of the regime whose survival, both as a regime and as a class, is
dependent on external donors, is nominal and must remain subservient to those
who keep it alive.68
R. Sobhan, 1982
Former Planning Commission Member
The socio-economic indicators enumerated above make Bangladesh a particularly aid
worthy country and, consequently, it has been a priority recipient of many donors. It has
been argued that Bangladesh's favoured status began in its early post-independence days
when it "was treated with unparalleled generosity by donors."69
 In the first seven months
of the country's independence, 14 countries had committed aid. 7° During the next year,
the number of agencies either committing or disbursing assistance had grown to 21
bilateral agencies (13 DAC; 6 Eastern Bloc; 2 non-aligned) and 7 United Nations
organisations. By March 1973, when UNROD (the initial UN relief operation) wound up,
more than US$ 1,300 million of external assistance had been mobilised. 7 ' Although aid
commitments and disbursements slowed during 1974/75, aid has formed a significant,
although declining, proportion of public outlays during the country's history.
Annual aid commitments during the 1990s have fluctuated between US$ 1.5 and 2.4
billion, disbursements between US$ 1.2 and 2.1 billion, and the pipeline has always
contained more than USS 5 billion.73
 Lagging disbursement and utilisation are blamed by
donors on cumbersome government programming and administrative arrangements. The
Government concedes partial responsibility for slow utilisation but also points to the
complex and disparate rules governing donor agency procedures. During the 1990s, aid
disbursements have declined in absolute terms, on a per capita basis and as a percentage
of the GNP (Table 2). During this period, the country's public debt has increased
considerably, in absolute terms and as a percentage of the GNP (Table 3).
Table 2: Official Development Assistance to Bangladesh (current dollars)
Year	 ODA	 I ODA per capita I	 ODA as a	 I
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________ US $ millions 	 US $
	
percentage of GNP
1990	 2,100	 19	 9.4
1991	 1,889	 17	 8.1
1994	 1,758	 15	 6.8
1996	 1,254	 10	 3.9
Sources: World Bank. World Bank Development Indicators, 1997, 1998. 74
Table 3: Bangladesh's Public Foreign Debt (1995 dollars)
Year	 Debt	 Debt as a % of	 Debt service
________ US $ millions 	 exports	 % of GNP
1980	 4,230	 360	 2.1
1990	 11,464,	 -	 -
1995	 16,370	 298	 2.5
Source: World Bank. World Development Report, 1996.
In the health sector, there is insufficient data to provide a meaningful time-series analysis
of aid dependency. In the 1983/84 Revised Annual Development Plan (i.e., capital
budget) project aid constituted 33.4% of the total allocation for health and 78.5% of the
allocation for population. An analysis of five Annual Development Programmes (ADPs)
from the early 1990s (Table 4) suggests that: (1) population activities remained more
dependent on external resources than health activities; (2) health has became more
dependent on external assistance (compared with the 1983/84 level); and (3) aid accounts
for a significant proportion of the ADP in the sector, although there is considerable
annual variation. 76 However, these figures do not present an accurate picture of the true
extent of aid dependence. First, a number of donors do not report their funds in the
Annual Development Programme (e.g., WHO) which renders the ADP incomplete.
Second, the ADP figures do not include the monetised value of food and commodity aid
allocated to the MOHFW which was estimated to have accounted for almost 20% of aid
to the sector in 1994/95. Consequently, the true level of aid dependence is higher than
Table 4 suggests. In light of the rOle donors play in the capital section of the budget,
Islam and Wahid wrote, in 1996, that "economic growth in Bangladesh, to a large extent"
is conditioned by what "donors decide to finance."78
The influence of donors in the national affairs of Bangladesh has been extensively
analysed.79'80'8 82,83,84,85,86 Their use of aid as a political lever has been implicated in
profound changes in the political-economy of Bangladesh. As noted above, it has been
argued by those close to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country's first President, that the
shift of his regime from a socialist and non-aligned position towards a neo-liberal
economy, more closely integrated with the western capitalist world, was in response to
the promise of a resumption of aid by the western donor community in 1 974 87,88,89 The
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carrot of aid is said to have been dangled before military rulers to encourage elections, for
example, those held under General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) in I 97990 Withdrawal of donor
support has been argued to have been a contributory factor leading to the resignation of
President Ershad in 199O.'
Table 4: GOB & donor funding of health & population in the ADP (1990-1995)
Financial Year
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
Averace 1990-95
tding of Health
GOB
45.9%
63.4%
52.0%
48.0%
61.4%
54.1%
ts in ADP
Donors
54.1%
36.6%
48.0%
52.0%
38.6%
45.9%
ng of]
GOB
29.7%
3 1.5%
38.3%
3 1.3%
33.5%
32.9%
jects in ADP
Donors
70.3%
68.5%
61.7%
68.7%
66.5%
67.1%
Source: adapted from GOB
Donors have also been intimately involved in economic and social policy making in the
country. Even the World Bank admits that "most people perceive government policy
announcements as a response to donor conditionality rather than a genuine commitment
to change."93
 Donor involvement in the country's decision-making processes has early
beginnings. Reflecting on the preparation of the country's First Five-Year Plan (1973-
78), Nurul Islam, then Deputy Chair of the Planning Commission, said it was the rule
rather than the exception for donors to involve themselves in administrative,
organisational and management matters, to the extent of vetting staff appointments.94
Conditionality, he asserted, was not limited to the design of specific projects and
programmes but encompassed issues of development policy and priorities within the
sectors themselves - even when the donor investments constituted a small fraction of
investment in the sector.
In a more general sense, it has been argued that aid has played a part in the continuity of
social relations in Bangladesh. As noted above, the political economy of Bangladesh is
marked by complex patron-client relationships. To an extent, the system of patronage has
been sustained by the influx of foreign assistance. Observers, such as Haque, have argued
that the government's utilisation of aid has prioritised "the construction of infrastructure
which could contribute concrete proof of the regimes efforts to help the rural poor. Such
programmes also allow successive regimes to distribute patronage and win the support of
local power holders."95According to the foreword to a report written by a former member
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of the Bangladesh Planning Commission for the Like-Minded Group, the "picture which
emerges is that of a vicious circle in which the government seeks legitimacy through a
patronage system, aided by external assistance, but which merely strengthens the self-
preserving ruling coalition who is content to contain the discontented majority."96
 It has
been further argued that aid has perpetuated the dependence. For example, Westergaard
asserts that "in order to sustain the structures of power and prevent changes in the social
structure, the various regimes in Bangladesh have relied heavily on foreign aid which has
strengthened the structural dependence of the country."97
Whether or not aid is somehow responsible for the arrested development in the social,
political and economic sphere of Bangladesh is outside of the scope of this enquiry. Here,
it is sufficient to note that the budget of the country has been marked with significant, if
decreasing, dependence on external resources. This contextual factor has three axiomatic
implications: (1) there has been a compelling case for aid coordination; (2) donors have
had the potential to exercise significant leverage over Bangladeshi policy making; and (3)
aid has provided a cushion for the Government by reducing pressure on it to undertake
difficult reforms. Moreover, there are those who argue that donor influence is not only
related to the volume of resources which the donors dispense but that "their power to do
so [exercise leverage] has been further enhanced by the utter mismanagement of the
economy by the political, administrative and business elite of the country." 98
 It is to the
question of the administrative machinery to which we turn next.
2.5 Weak government capacity: a justification for external management of aid
The old Bengal, Bihar and Orissa Province was an impossible charge and the
Eastern Districts [Bangladesh] were the least favoured portion
thereof ..altogether this d(ficult country, the most thickly populated rural part of
India, was administratively starved.
District Administration Committee Report, 19 13-14
2.5.1 Perceptions of government performance and capacity
Since independence, the number of ministries have doubled to 36, the number of civil
servants has risen to over a one million (which represents an increase in real terms
' The Like-Minded Group is an infonnal body, established in 1984 by the heads of aid of Canada,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, which sought to take a coordinated stand against
the style and orientation of World Bank activities in Bangladesh, particularly the perceived neglect
of poverty issues.
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relative to population growth), and between 1980 and 1994 the number of directorates
and departments in government increased from 109 to 220. This has led some
organisations, such as the World Bank, to question whether or not there is too much
government in Bangladesh.1 ° Nevertheless, numerous reports on public sector
management and economic development in Bangladesh have found it 'administratively
starved' in a qualitative sense. Consequently, it is the nature of governance within the
administration which is of greatest concern to most observers.
Government performance is typically criticised by academics, donors, senior civil
servants, business leaders, and the public-at-large, as weak, slow, and unresponsive. Its
capacity to undertake basic functions is questioned, as is its aim of serving the people.
Criticism has also been levelled at the government's use of aid. For example, a doctoral
dissertation concluded that "despite many errors and failures, foreign aid did make an
undeniable contribution, though not an optimal one, to the economic development of the
country."°' He lays responsibility for poor aid efficacy on the recipient: "It is a fact that
countries [sic] achievement could have been much greater and more effective if the
Government's efforts in planning and resource mobilisation had been more appropriate,
planned and systematic. These shortcomings automatically call for the formulation and
implementation of the right type of commercial, monetary and fiscal policy." Another
PhD dissertation concludes that without "sound administration.., increasing inequity and
dependence are bound to result."°2
Negative perceptions of government capacity provide the pretext for: (1) aid programmes
which routinely circumvent government administration; (2) the establishment of parallel
administrative and organisational structures within government to manage external
resources; and (3) aid coordination arrangements which are externally-driven. The
following sections examine issues of accountability, decision-making, civil service
management and corruption which have served to create the dismal impression of
Bangladeshi government in the eyes many observers and have served to undermine their
confidence in its abilities.
2.5.2 Accountability and transparency
Inadequate accountability pervades government life in Bangladesh. Although democracy
has, in recent years, provided a potentially important framework for enhancing
accountability, in practice however, parliamentary accountability does not yet work very
well. Problems include the non-observance of parliamentary norms and procedures (e.g.,
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no parliamentary question time, inadequate debate on policy and legislation, lack of
consultation in policy development, weak committee structures, etc.), poor facilities (e.g.,
the lack of offices, equipment, research facilities, staff) and political corruption.'°3
Central to effective accountability is a robust and timely system of fmancial
accountability. In Bangladesh, financial monitoring of government activities rests with
the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), whose office verifies all expenditure,
including those externally financed, ex-post. The CAG is criticised as being
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons: (1) inadequate skills (i.e., no chartered
accountants on staff); (2) outmoded practices and foci (e.g., focus on compliance with
expenditure rules and procedures as opposed to value-for-money, or performance audits);
(3) dual responsibility for accounting and auditing which compromises the integrity of the
office; and (4) delays in issuing reports and following-up on audit observations.'04
Donors, who require timely annual audited project accounts, were extremely critical of
this aspect of government capacity - as delays beyond the covenanted agreements were
common. For example, with respect to the World Bank's First Population Project, the
annual accounts were reported as "always being late" and project financial statements had
105
still not been audited two years after the project closed. The follow-up project fared no
better: "GOB compliance with audit requirements are seriously lagging" and in 1987,
audits for 1983/84 had still to be completed.'° 6
 Of greater long-term significance to donor
confidence in GOB accountability was the fact that serious material audit objections were
the norm rather than the exception. During the course of World Bank/co-financier Third
Population and Family Health Project (TPFHP), a total of 907 observations were
eventually raised by the auditors, of which 97 were of a serious material nature. These
observations could take years to resolve. For example, although the TPFHP closed in
1992, in 1997 only 75 of the serious irregularities had been resolved.' 07
 Once resolved,
the responsible officers have usually been transferred and it becomes difficult to take
disciplinary action which further undermines accountability. Aide-memoires of the
consecutive health and population projects of the Bank contained lists of outstanding and
serious audit observations which carried over from one project to the next.
As mentioned above, one of the criticisms with the CAG' s work is that it fails to
undertake performance audits. Yet, this would be a difficult task given that ministries and
departments (other than the Ministry of Finance) do not specify goals, key objectives,
performance targets and prior year achievements which would allow for performance-
based auditing. According to one study, when attempts are made, "the goals and
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objectives as set out in government documents are not clearly spelled out. ..Some items
are so broadly or vaguely listed that it is not possible for anyone to discern what it is
supposed to mean." 108
 Performance-based auditing is further constrained by weaknesses
and peculiarities in the planning and budgetary processes which do not facilitate the link
between objectives and expenditures (this is dealt with in Chapter Three). The inability to
judge performance erodes government accountability.'09
Accountability is further impeded by the lack of transparency and openness in
government. Officials are bound, by oath, to rules and laws which make it a criminal
offence to disclose various types of information. One set of regulations even forbids civil
servants, unless authorised "to disclose directly or indirectly to government servants
belonging to sister organisations . . .the contents of any official document, or
communicate any information which has come into his possession in the course of his
official	 Civil servants are further inhibited from information-sharing as a result
of a number of additional considerations: (1) they lack confidence in their decision-
making capacities and, thus, operate according to a maximum safety rule; (2) they are
unsure of their responsibilities and jurisdiction; and (3) information is viewed as an asset
which may have a significant market value. As a result, the label 'confidential', 'secret'
or 'restricted' is applied to the most mundane of documents. Limited access to public
documents by civil servants, donors and the general public, renders government action
and inaction opaque. One study of public administration carried out by independent
international and Bangladeshi analysts reported that "a conclusion that may be drawn
from the data collected for this Study ... is that government organisations are not held
accountable financially or for programme performance." Perceptions of inadequate
government accountability are reflected in donor reluctance to accord the administration a
substantive role in the management and coordination of aid resources.
2.5.3 Decision-making in government
A highly centralised structure without adequate delegation of authority and
responsibility down the hierarchy, superfluous paperesserie, archaic record
management, procrastinated decision-making, intricate communication patterns,
non-familiarity with rules and procedures and other stumbling blocks are the
principal causes that impair [government of Bangladesh] efficiency. 112
H. Zafarullah, University of Dhaka, 1994
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Since the British colonial period, the national secretariat (i.e., conglomerate of civil
service institutions) has been the pivot around which the entire public management
process works (See Annex 4 concerning administrative arrangements). In the absence of
effective government,' the secretariat has further entrenched itself." 6
 Studies of the
secretariat's capacity to make decisions have criticised the processes as too slow, too
unpredictable, too centralised, too secretive and too prone to rent-seeking." 7" 8
 Such
studies have provided some empirical basis to the criticism, noting, for example, the
excessively long time that is required to hire a consultant, procure a service, complete
tendering processes and take other decisions. Slippage is generally attributed to the
proclivity of government officers to avoid decision-taking. "When a case is placed before
an officer for his/her decision, the most usual response is to provide a guarded opinion
and forward the file to the next higher officer. Each higher officer follows the same
pattern until the matter reaches top. Few officers take risks that are involved in making a
decision even if the position he/she is occupying authorises him/her to do so." 19
 One
reason why dispersed decision-making has not occurred in the administrative process is
the absence of clear definitions of positions which renders officials uncertain of the extent
of their authority. The constraints to decision-making have long been recognised and
solutions proposed,' 2°
 yet these have yet to be acted upon. Poor decision-making has
implications for the aid relationship, including: (1) anxieties for donor staff; (2) increased
transaction costs; (3) delayed government approvals for projects; and (4) slippage in
project execution and fund disbursement. While government officials are maligned for
their sloth and inefficiency, part of the problem rests with the system of human resource
management in the civil service.
2.5.4 Human resource management in the civil service
Prior to independence, the civil service was generally regarded as a prestigious
institution. A career in the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CPS) was an aspiration held by
many competent job seekers and, consequently, the CPS attracted the cream of society.
Over the decades, the quality of the civil service has deteriorated and it no longer holds
such high esteem. t21
 Public administration is plagued by a number of problems which
mitigate against good performance by its officials. Pay in the civil service is low and has
diminished substantially in real terms since independence. For example, in 1994 the basic
salaries of secretaries and joint secretaries were Tk. 10,000 and 7,800 per month (i.e.,
US$ 250 and 195 respectively). The salary of a secretary has declined by 87% in real
K Power has been centralised in the executive, parliaments have been weak and governments
unstable. Between 1971 and 1991, the cabinet was reshuffled 97 times (Khan, Islam, Haque,
1996).
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terms during the period.' 22 It is reasonable to expect that low and eroding salaries can, at
least in part, account for low efficiency, low morale, absenteeism, rent-seeking and the
deteriorating quality of new entrants into the system.' 23
 However, other aspects of human
resource management are also likely at play.
Career plans do not exist and serious constraints are associated with performance
evaluation and promotion. "For most if not all government positions, position
descriptions do not exist. In the absence of position descriptions, evaluations of individual
performance can not be made on an objective critena." 24
 Although merit-based
personnel rules do exist, they are routinely circumvented and "more often than not,
certain individuals either with political connections or because of their closeness to the
chief executive have been favoured, while those with proven competence were ignored
,,125
when it came to deciding promotions. 	 This situation has been exacerbated by the nse
in inter-cadre tensions and rivalries which have developed in post-independent
Bangladesh and result in "intensive and excessive warfare."26
Another problem with human resource management in the public administration concerns
the area of specialist training. A random survey of personnel data sheets concluded that
training is not effectively employed. 127 One of the cases of mis-utilisation of training
cited an officer who had received three graduate degrees in health service administration
from three different countries, but his postings with 11 different departments had never
included any that were health-related.
Frequent transfers of senior officials between ministries and departments further impairs
the performance and accountability of the bureaucracy. One study found that only 10% of
deputy secretaries, joint secretaries and additional secretaries complete two years in the
same post, and that eighty percent of these officials stayed in the same post for a year or
less.' 28 In the MOHFW, the 'permanent' secretary was changed four times between 1992
and 1996. If one considers the time required to traverse the learning curve, develop
working relationships adequate to manage and supervise staff, acquire ownership and
commitment to a programme and see though the implementation of decisions, it could be
argued that such frequent transfer does not encourage efficient performance. This is a
particularly pertinent consideration in the case of donor management, where personal
relationships and continuity play a particularly strong role in building trust and the
confidence that one's counterpart will handle resources with integrity.
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Patronage and clientelism, the failure to apply criteria fairly in the appointment and
promotion of civil servants, and the absence of esprit de corps has likely adversely
affected the morale and efficiency of public servants thereby eroding the performance of
the public sector. Donors frequently blame weak personnel management for problems in
project implementation and respond to this risk by establishing dedicated project
implementation units with expatriate, as well as seconded government officials, who are
not liable to work through normal channels of bureaucratic control.
2.5.5 Rent-seeking and aid
Appropriation and corruption in Bangladesh have flourished because well-
meaning donors have continued to pour money in with little regard for how it is
129
used.
P. Thomson, 1991
Former CIDA official, Dhaka
Rent-seeking, the act of illicitly "seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of the
state," 130 is a specialised form of corruption. According to Transparency International, an
international NGO, "corruption is widespread in Bangladesh" and "corrupt practices have
,,•	 131become institutionalised in public office. Findings of a national study of 620
households, conducted by the national branch of the organisation, provide an indication
of the scale of rent-seeking. For example, 68% of complainants reported having made a
payment to the police to file a complaint; 96% of respondents expressed the view that it
was 'almost impossible to get help form the police without money or influence;' more
than three-fifths of those households involved in a court case reported bribing court
officials - more than a quarter did so through their lawyer; almost 90% of respondents
expressed the view that 'it was almost impossible to get quick and fair judgement from
the judiciary without money or influence.' Respondents also reported paying a variety of
informal fees to get public services or exempt themselves from paying the state
sanctioned prices. For example, in the health sector, 20% of households who had
frequented an out-patient department during the preceding year reported making extra-
payments for services, while approximately one-third of those seeking in-patient
treatment did so through some extra-normal process. Seventy percent of households
agreed that 'there existed unethical practices in the procedure for admission into the
hospital' and 81% held similar views with respect to the supply of drugs and treatment.
Systems losses were also widespread: a third of households reported obtaining reduced
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water and electricity bills through private arrangements with their meter readers and
almost 50% reduced their municipal taxes through the payment of informal fees.
Other sources corroborate the findings of Transparency International. For example, a
report of the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank stated that
"Government intervention and rent-seeking have corroded the judicial, administrative and
commercial machinery of the country. Access can, and frequently does, have its price.
Officials simply do not take action or refuse to take action without sufficient
encouragement." 32
 Although rigorous estimates of the cost of corruption to the
Government are not available, one indicative study suggests that the Treasury loses about
three times the amount of revenue to corrupt practices than it collects.' 33
 There are
accounts of corruption under every administration in Bangladesh.'34"35"36"37
Given the major role which aid plays in the economy, corruption has likely entrenched
itself in this sphere of activity as well. Although concrete evidence is difficult to obtain,
anecdotal accounts are available. These include admissions from Government officials
themselves. For example, one former member of the Planning Commission is reported to
have declared that "aid is not so much about helping others, as it is about helping
yourself' (cited in Thomson' 38). Some go as far as venturing that "There is evidence that
the growth in corruption paralleled the increase in development assistance;" 39
 yet such
evidence is not cited. Referring to Zia, Franda remarks that "despite his admission that
corruption has increased significantly during his five years in power, and his realisation
that this increase is due precisely to the massive amount of international aid flowing into
the country, Zia is convinced that 'aid from all countries should be increased."40
Within the health sector, there have been and continue to be concerns about corruption.
Although there have not been systematic reviews of the issue, a number of recent studies
suggest it may be wide-spread and operates at a number of levels. For example, one
study, published jointly by the MOHFW and CIDA, estimated that over a twenty month
period, 30% of oral contraceptives 'leaked' out of the system at a cost of US$ 3.5
million.' 4 ' UNFPA suggested that, in 1993, the cost of purchasing "excess condoms" was
almost US$ 4 million as a result of what has been called "systems losses," although
another study estimated that it was closer to US$ 3 million.' 42 A study undertaken by
officials in the MOHFW found that informal fees are prevalent at all levels of the system
and can amount to up to eleven times the amount which is officially charged.'43
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The actual and perceived levels of rent-seeking have surely 5layed a role in the extent and
manner in which donors have entrusted aid to their recipient counterparts.' Moreover,
some donor officials perceive that Government officers may be averse to effective
coordination because the transparency it behoves would reduce the room for political
manoeuvring and rent-seeking. 144
2.6 Health care services
The health service market in Bangladesh is highly pluralistic and a plethora of treatment
options exist. Non-governmental (for profit and not-for-profit) provision predominates.
The first site of access for most services, other than maternal and child health (MCII) and
family planning, is non-governmental, with choice of provider dependent on the
symptom, sex, socio-economic standing and geographical location (urban/rural) of the
individual. Although 'allopathic' practitioners are consulted in approximately 80% of
cases when treatment is sought, the existence, length and quality of allopathic
practitioners' training is as variable as the quality of treatment they provide. A significant
proportion, in some instances the majority, of treatment is sought from non-allopathic
practitioners.' 45 Indigenous systems of medicine constitute a considerable proportion of
the market.
For fiscal year 1994/95, total expenditure in the sector was estimated at US$ 855 million
or approximately US$ 7.1 per capita (not including food and commodity aid
contributions).' 46 Of this, 47% was accounted for by household out-of-pocket
expenditure, while the Government contributed 27%, and donors the remaining 26%.
2.6.1 Private sector health care
Private health care facilities have proliferated in Bangladesh since 1982 when restrictions
on private laboratories, clinics and hospitals were relaxed. Between June 1995 and July
1996, one new facility was officially registered every 30 hours (not including non-
allopathic medical facilities, physicians' chambers or pharmacies).' 47 The latter,
particularly small chemist's shops and indigenous practitioners, are profuse - even in
rural areas. The sector remains poorly regulated and lacks systematic monitoring; as a
result violations are widespread. Financial incentives often militate against good medical
practice.
It has been argued that donor concern over levels of corruption have not always been in direct
proportion to the actual level of corruption prevailing. For example, Sobhan suggests that USAID
was very critical when allegations of corruption surfaced in the Mujibur regime, but was less vocal
in its criticism when a more friendly, albeit more corrupt, government was installed under Zia.
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2.6.2 NGO sector in health
With donor support, NGOs have become extremely active in the population sector and,
increasingly, the health sector. NGOs were estimated to have accounted for up to US$ 50
million of sectoral expenditure for fiscal year 1994/1995 (i.e., approximately 6% of total
expenditure on health and population).' 48
 Under its previous programme (1987-1997),
USAID provided approximately 75% of its support for population and health activities to
the NGO conmrnnity directly, increasing to 100% under its current programme.'49
Although estimates vary, one survey found approximately 250 NGOs active in the sector,
providing MCH-FP services (75%), EPI (40%) and clinical services (35%). 150 Others
suggest that the true figure is around 400.
In 1990, the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) was set up in the Prime Minister's Office to
provide NGOs with a one-stop registration, project approval and fund disbursement
facility. By 1995, almost 1000 NGOs had registered. While NGOAB has reduced some of
the red-tape under which NGOs operate, it still applies a plethora of rules. As a result,
NGOs perceive the Bureau to place undue emphasis on control and regulation at the
expense of facilitation, strategic oversight and harnessing and coordinating NGO
activities towards sector priorities and goals.'5'
Although individual projects need approval from NGOAB, the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare will not necessarily always be consulted over decisions pertaining to
health activities; consequently, this mechanism does not ensure NGOs contributions to
MOHFW-established sector goals. Many NGOs have tended to work independently of
the MOHFW. Therefore, in some areas, parallel systems exist while in others, services
are provided in a patchy manner. There have been recent attempts by the Government to
sub-contract delivery of MCH-FP services to some NGOs in remote areas and there have
been a number of high profile NGO-MOHFW partnerships, predominantly in EPI,
disease control programmes (notably TB and leprosy), and nutrition. A large initiative to
improve PHC in urban centres is planned by the AsDB, under which the delivery of some
service centres will be tendered out to NGOs (and private groups).'52
To improve, among other things, GOB-NGO coordination in the MCH-FP programme,
the MOHFW, with strong encouragement and support from USAID, established the
National Steering Committee on Future Challenges confronting MCH-FP in 1994. The
Committee, chaired by the Minister, produced a Plan of Action and constituted nine
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working groups with NGO representation to work together to improve the programme.'53
Efforts have also been made by NGOs to coordinate among themselves through, for
example, the Voluntary Health Services Society. In spite of these efforts, there remains
much competition among NGOs for funds, as well as a geographical overlap of services
and catchment areas and duplicate activities.
2.6.3 Government's health programme
The Government has a vast physical and human infrastructure to provide health services.
These are predominantly, and ostensibly, cost-free to the consumer, particularly at the
Thana level and below; however, informal fees are prevalent at primary, secondary and
tertiary facilities.' 54
 Family planning services form part of a comprehensive, multi-sector,
multi-ministry population programme. Primary health care services have focused
narrowly on MCII, provided mainly through the Family Planning Directorate, and a
limited number of vertical programmes including EPI, CDD, ART and the control of
micronutrient deficiencies through the Directorate of Health Services. Broadly speaking,
while the GOB has directed its resources towards the hospital sector, donors have
directed aid towards PIIC, particularly family planning and MCII. The MOHFW is
responsible for service provision in the rural areas but is joined in the urban settings by
the City Corporations under the Local Government Directorate. There has been a bias
towards the development of infrastructure for the rural population.
Immediately after the war of independence, there remained few public sector facilities.
By 1997, there were six post graduate teaching institutions with five attached hospitals
(2825 beds) and eight medical colleges with their hospitals (6002 beds). Other public
sector hospitals exist for the treatment of specific conditions (e.g., TB and leprosy). In
addition, the country's 64 Districts have general hospital facilities with 50-250 beds in
each (4750 beds in total). Almost 400 of the country's 467 Thanas have a 31 bed Health
Complex with eight doctors and one sanctioned dental surgeon's post (each with a
catchment population of approximately 1/4 million). These Complexes also provide
outpatient services. Of the 4,800 Unions in the country, approximately 3,500 have Family
Welfare Centres which are staffed by a (male) Medical Assistant and a (female) Family
Welfare Visitor. In addition, there are also some 1,275 rural dispensaries at the Union
level which are operated under the Directorate of Health Services and have posts for
Medical Officers. Ninety seven Unions have Mother and Child Welfare Centres which
are similar to the dispensaries but do not have a doctor. At the community level, door-to-
door services are provided by approximately 20,000 Health Assistants (previously male
posts but, in recent years, retirees have been replaced with females) and about 23,000
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(female) Family Welfare Assistants who collectively also organise some 30,000 satellite
clinics each month for MC}I-FP. In addition, there are some 108,000 outreach sites to
deliver EPI-Plus. There are approximately 130,000 personnel of different categories
under the two service delivery Directorates of the MOHFW. Despite massive investment
in infrastructure and personnel, the limitations and dysfunctions of the sector are
numerous (see Box 1).
DIJA 1; LIIIIILaIIuII ul tue wJD uieaitn prugiiiuuiine
bias towards rural service provision;
- bias towards family planning and maternal and child populations (until the 1 990s);
poor quality of care due, among other things, to: (1) shortages of essential drugs; (2) poorly trained and
supervised staff; (3) poor staff morale and low staff attendance; (4) provider orientation to service
provision;
bifurcation of MOHFW into two directorates which renders seamless provision of health services
difficult;
>- wide-spread inefficiency due to: (1) centralised decision-making; (2) low utilisation of facilities; (3)
'systems' losses (i.e., theft); (4) overlapping staff deployment in two separate Directorates; (5) low worker
productivity; and (6) expensive doorstep family planning service delivery mechanism;
> poor equity in public provision and fmance (e.g., middle class capture subsidy for urban health services,
the provision of free services is offset by informal charges in most public facilities);
the effectiveness of the system is impaired by: (1) inadequate capacity for planning and management;
(2) fragile support for, and ownership of, the reform agenda; and (3) poor prospects for fmancial and
managerial sustainability;
>- preoccupation with the development of a plethora of independent project activities and implementation
units has led to fragmentation and distortion in the allocation of resources; and
the availability of large amounts of health sector aid, and the imperative to disburse it rapidly, has
contributed to inefficiency and waste, institutionalisation of prematurely made decisions, lack of
consideration of alternatives, lapses and compromises in service quality, and erosion of incentives to make
more efficient use of resources.
Between 1985/86 and 1994/95, the Government, with considerable foreign assistance,
increased its funding of health and population activities by 6% and 8.5% respectively, in
constant dollar terms (not per capita). In 1994/95, the GOB budget (capital and recurrent)
for the health and population sectors was US$ 374 million, comprising $ 222 million for
health and $ 152 million for population. An examination of the Annual Development
Programmes (broadly speaking capital investment budget) and Revenue Budgets (mainly
recurrent) between 1990/9 1 and 1994/95,A suggested that the share of health and
X The ADP and revenue budgets do not include the 'defence and public order' spending of
government. An analysis of expenditure between 1989 90 and 1993/94 according to the
Classification of the Functions of Government System (of the IMF), which included defence
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population spending as a proportion of the GOB budget rose from 5.9% to 6.9%, as a
portion of GDP from 2.1% to 2.4%, and in real terms from US$ 2.40 to 3.10 per capita.
Much of this expansion has benefited primary health care activities.155
Donors have heavily underwritten the country's public health investment, although
figures, particularly earlier ones, are neither accurate nor complete (see Tables 4 and 5).
At least 13 multilateral and 18 bilateral organisations committed funds to the MOHFW
between 1992-1996 for operational activities in the sector (these are listed in Table 6).
Major donors include the World Bank and the Consortium of nine bilateral donor
agencies (discussed in Chapter 5). These collectively disbursed approximately US$ 75
million a year through the IDA Fourth Population and Health ProjectX (most cofinanciers
also provided additional funds outside of this large project). Other major donors include:
USAID (US$ 30 million/year - primarily for family planning); UNICEF (US$ 14
million/year, including supplementary funds, for children's and women's health through
EPI-Plus, ORS, CDD, AR! and nutrition programmes); AsDB (US$ 10 million/year -
primarily for curative care); UNFPA (US$ 7 million/year for reproductive health); and
WHO (US$ 5 million/year for technical assistance). The EC and JICA are relatively new
players in the health programme and are poised to become major donors. In 1994/95, the
country's bilateral and multilateral development partners financed approximately one half
of the budget in the health and population sector. In addition, there are a large number of
international NGOs which provide support to health and population activities; however,
the volume of these resources is difficult to estimate. Donor support is currently provided
through a profusion of projects and project units, but a shift from project to sector-wide
financing has been considered in the 1990s (see Chapter 6).
There is considerable agreement among donors that they have paid insufficient attention
to capacity building and institutional development, and that much effort in this area has
been relatively ineffective due to systemic problems in public administration. These
include training-posting mismatches, frequent staff turn-over, poor incentives and non-
transparent promotions, etc. In particular, while a significant number of staff have
outlays, found the category 'health affairs and services' roughly static, declining from 6.9% to
6.8% of the budget during the period.
X The project includes activities such as family planning, MCH, control of communicable and
poverty-related diseases, organisation and management development, quality of care, and human
resource development, inter alia.
o These are indicative figures derived by dividing the amount of each agency's approximate
programme commitment by the number of years of the programme period.
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received specialist training, incentives, accountability structures, and access to resources
are lacking for proper deployment of acquired skills.
Table 5: Annual commitments of major donors to the MOIIFW (1 992-96)
Donor	 US $ commitment per annum
World Bank and cofinanciers of FPHP
	 75 million
USAID	 30 million
UNICEF	 14 million
AsDB	 10 million
UNFPA	 7 million
WHO	 5 million
Table 6: Donors having committed or disbursed funds to the MOHFW between
1992-96 (in alphabetical order)
	 _______________________________
Bilateral agencies / Donor countries
	 Multilateral Agencies
1. Australia's AusAid
	 1. AsDB
2. Belgium's BADC
	 2. EC
3. Canada's CIDA
	 3. IDA
4. China	 4. 1DB
5. Denmark's DANIDA	 5. ILO
6. Netherlands's DGIS
	 6. OPEC
7. France	 7. UNAIDS
8. Germany's GTZ
	 8. UNCDF
9. Italy	 9. UNDP
10. Japan's JICA	 10. UNESCO
11. Germany's KfW
	 11. UNFPA
12. Norway's NORAD	 12. UNICEF
13. United Kingdom's ODAIDFID
	 13. WHO
14. SaudiFund
15. Switzerland's SDC
16. Sweden's Sida/SIDA
17. South Korea
18. USA's USAID	 ____________________________
2.7 The donor health sector agenda: from a war on population to sector reform
Chapter One discussed the many factors which converged to raise the salience of aid
coordination in health policy debates (see Section 1.2). One of the striking features in
Bangladesh, which is likely to have influenced the extent to which coordination was seen
by donors to be a high priority objective, was the changing agenda which they pursued in
the health and population sectors. Early, fervent pursuit of the control of population
growth gave way to attempts to leverage health sector reforms in the context of a neo-
liberal economic approach to development and the state.
Until the late 1980s, very little emphasis was placed by donors on the health sector per Se.
In an analysis of donors' preferences within the country's First Five-Year Plan (1973-78),
Nurul Islam has illustrated that health was a low priority, indicated by the lack of
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reference to the issue by donors.' 56
 By contrast, donors were so worried about the
consequences of population growth that, in early 1974, UNFPA wrote "there are so many
external organisations involved in the family planning programme in Bangladesh that it is
almost impossible to give a complete picture of external assistance available to the
Government in this sector over the next three to four years." 157 At about the same time,
the Bank commented upon the significant level of funds available for population control
in Bangladesh which were "far in excess of specific projects." 58
 A Gennan mission to
Bangladesh also noted the abundance of aid for population activities. 159
 Even the
Government, which was facing a balance of payments crisis in 1974, asked that certain
donors interested in investing in the population programme, refrain from doing so.' 60 By
the late 1 970s, it was becoming increasingly clear that funds for population control
outstripped the ability of the Government to effectively utilise them. USAID was
forthright in its suggestions that it, and other donors, scale back their investments in the
sector.' 6 ' The Bank also communicated to Government its intention to reduce funding for
its Second Population and Family Health Project, in light of the difficulties the
Government was experiencing in utilising funds available through its First Population
Project.' 62
 Despite the general concern among most external agencies to check population
growth, the pace of the programme was set by three of the largest donors in the sector:
the World Bank, USAID and UNFPA.
Population control has been of central interest to the World Bank since independence. For
example, during the first of the annual meetings between Bangladesh and the Bank, held
in Washington in September 1973, the only project to which Robert McNamara, Bank
President, explicitly referred was the population project. This was under appraisal and
needed to be 'pushed ahead." 63
 A 1974 Bank memorandum notes that, in its dealings
with the Government and other donors, "our [Bank] insistence on the overriding priority
of population problems to the country's future" was made clear.IM The three volume
report Bangladesh: Development in a Rural Economy, published in September 1974,
provided a neo-liberal alternative to the Government's First Five-Year Plan (1973-78).
The first of the three central elements of the Bank's strategy for Bangladesh was an
emphasis on population planning.' 65
 According to the Bank, "family planning is one of
the most vital elements associated with economic development in Bangladesh and must
be seen to succeed." Pressure continued to be exerted upon the Government even after
the Bank had convinced it to elevate population control to priority number one. 167
 For
example, in a letter written on June 30, 1983, David Hopper, Bank Vice-President,
instructed AMA Muhith, Minister of Finance and Planning, "to outline necessary
measures to strengthen the program so that agreed national population objectives could be
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met on time." 68
 According to a 1991 Bank document, concerning its involvement in the
population programme in Bangladesh, "much of the culture of urgency remains. Project
size has at least doubled every five years, constantly threatening to overwhelm
implementation capacity, with little thought being given to internal efficiency or long run
financial sustainability."69
USAID was even more resolute in its preference of population control over health
activities and in achieving rapid results in this field. The high priority placed by
Americans on family planning was reflected in their attitude towards proposals to
integrate family planning with the MCH programme. In 1979, Tim Ravenholt, the
Director of USAID's Population Office in Washington, thought that a merger would be a
'disaster.' "If this were done additional years would be lost before it again became clear
that effective family planning services had been swallowed and lost in the general morass
of a grossly inadequate general health care system." 7° When the same issue was
considered in 1983, USAID warned that integration "requires unnecessarily costly and
long-term efforts to establish a PHC system instead of focusing on quick delivery of birth
control services to meet the unmet demand.. .A population control program does not
depend on a functioning primary health care system."7'
The sense of crisis, urgency and single-mindedness of purpose regarding the control of
population growth also pervaded the work of the UNFPA. UNFPA took the attitude that
donors could not "afford to limit their financial contributions" to efforts to control
population growth in Bangladesh, even if the country was saturated with funds for
population	 72 Some donors did, however, indicate their concern to UNFPA in
1978 "about UNFPA making a commitment for $50 million over five years with no
indication of how the money would be spent." 73 In terms of strategy, UNFPA, like
USAID, advocated extreme measures. In a letter to TJNFPA headquarters, the UNFPA
Representative in Dhaka wrote:
Most donor representatives here greatly admire the Chinese for their
achievements; a success story brought about by massive compulsion. . . It is time
for donors to get away from too nanow an interpretation of voluntarism and
certain governments in Asia using massive incentive schemes, including
disincentives and other measures of pressure, still deserve international
74
support.
Although the Bank, USAID and UNFPA may have been the leading advocates of
population control, they were joined in their crusade by most other Western donors.
These agencies demonstrated their preoccupation with population issues during the
annual Bangladesh Aid Group discussions in Paris. An analysis of reports from these
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meetings (1978-84) found that population consistently elicited considerable attention;
population control was the third most frequent issue raised, accounting for over 17% of
all interventions during the period.'76
Coordination may have been further constrained as a result of differences of opinion
among donors as to how to best approach the population issue. These differences
mirrored two unresolved debates at the global level: one over whether contraceptive
supply or 'beyond family planning' programmes (e.g., legislation, women's employment,
education, etc.) would be most effective in reducing fertility;' 78" 79
 another over the
efficacy of vertical campaigns in comparison with integrating family planning services
within comprehensive primary health care programmes.' 80" 8 ' In Bangladesh, there were
additional disagreements over specific operational and technical matters (e.g.,
organisation and management of the programme, supervision of field workers, etc.).
These differences were acknowledged by the various agencies themselves182"83"84"85
and, according to the World Bank, provided one of two major obstacles to inter-agency
funding of one single large project or programme in the sector.'86
Over time, and for a variety of reasons, most donors, with the notable exception of
USAID, began providing funds for health as well as family planning initiatives.
Consequently, whilst much donor support during the 1 970s and for much of the 1 980s,
focused largely on construction, field staff deployment and procurement to blanket the
country in contraceptives, health activities during the 1 980s began to attract a larger
proportion of aid funds. At the time, emphasis was placed predominantly on selective
MCH services. Thus, for example, while the major objective of the World
Bank/cofinancier's Third Population and Family Health Project (1986-92) was "to assist
the GOB to achieve the fertility, infant and maternal mortality reduction goals of its Third
Five-Year plan," 88
 in terms of actual expenditure, family planning accounted for
approximately US$ 200 million while the MCII component accounted for only US$ 10
million.' 89
 The 1991 Staff Appraisal Report of the World Bank for the Fourth Population
and Health Project, draws attention to the fact that "Bangladesh has been so preoccupied
with the pressing problem of its population explosion that the general health situation has
not received enough attention. Only in family planning does the Government appear to
have established an effective system of providing services," 9° while singularly failing to
acknowledge the role of external investors in this imbalance. In 1990, Bank staff had
themselves commented upon "the dichotomy between on the one hand a significant
number of donors who prefer the Fourth Project to be primarily a 'health' project, and on
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the other both GOB, the Bank and 2 or 3 major donors who prefer to put population first
and health second."9'
Despite differences as to the relative emphasis donors placed on health, as opposed to
family planning, as well as their motivations for funding health-related activities, by the
early 1990s donors accounted for 54% of the expenditure on health projects in the
country's Annual Development Programme (i.e., approximately US$ 52 million in
1990/91). 192 While this amount was still dwarfed by donor participation in the population
budget (i.e., 70% of population project expenditure amounting to US$ 113 million),
health was receiving considerable donor attention.
Heightened donor investment in health in Bangladesh loosely coincided with global shifts
in the policy agendas governing development assistance in general, and health in
particular. The former was increasingly oriented towards creating a favourable climate
for economic development through the promotion of improved governance, market
193hberahsation, and structural adjustment, inter alia. The latter encompassed a raft of
policy initiatives under the rubric of health sector reform.' 94
 In the health sector in
Bangladesh, donors pressed for a range of systemic reforms' 95
 and, as a result, efforts
were made to develop a comprehensive Human Resource Development Master Plan for
the health sector, as well as a plan for institutional reorganisation of the MOHFW, etc.196
In addition, a Public Expenditure Review for health and population' 97
 and, later, an
analysis of the Flow of Funds in the sector (both firsts in Bangladesh) were undertaken to
provide reliable information "for successful sector reforms." 98 While agreement among
donors on the necessity and timing of introducing these complex issues in Bangladesh
would have required a significant level of policy coordination, the outputs of these
exercises would have made the failure to coordinate aid in the sector significantly more
explicit. Moreover, in the mid- 1 990s, the donors, led by the World Bank, introduced a
sector-wide approach (see Chapter 6); the effectiveness of this was premised upon
hitherto unprecedented levels of donor and aid coordination. Thus, in comparison with
the l970s and 1980s, the context in which aid was deployed and the objectives which it
sought to achieve were remarkably different and, at least in theory, much more amenable
to coordination.
2. 8 Aid coordination: some foreshadowing
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While subsequent chapters will deal with specific instruments of aid coordination in the
health sector, the following remarks touch on some broader issues as well as provide the
context in which to situate these instruments. First, there is an apparent paradox with
respect to the efficacy of health sector aid coordination in Bangladesh. Aid agency and
Government officials, with some responsibility for aid coordination in the health sector,
report devoting significant time to aid coordination activities. The survey described in
section 1.6.2.4 found that respondents reported spending between 20 to 50% of their time
on such work. Nevertheless, they are unanimously dissatisfied with the results. There
was agreement that: (1) although government structures and processes exist which aim to
coordinate aid, in practice, their ability to do so is wholly inadequate; (2) the tools which
have evolved by donor effort are piecemeal and, therefore, inadequate to provide an
overarching framework within which aid can be harnessed to meet national goals; and (3)
there is too much duplicative micro-level coordination (e.g., in the early 1990s there was
an MCII coordination cell in the MOHFW, an MCII Working Group set up by the
National Steering Coinmittee on Future Challenges, an MCII Coordination Group set up
by UNICEF/OGSB and an MCH Forum organised by HNFPA).'99
Second, it is important to understand that aid coordination mechanisms have tended to
play more than the technical rOle ascribed to them in terms of rationalising the aid
relationship. Indeed, coordination has exhibited a markedly political dimension in
Bangladesh. Both the Government and the donor agencies have regarded coordination as
a means to exert leadership and control over the development agenda and over the
decisions and actions of other stakeholders. Coordination has accordingly been used as a
subterfuge towards such ends. The struggle to be the coordinator of aid efforts is
demonstrated by two case studies presented below.
2.8.1 Establishing an aid group for Bangladesh
The formation of a regular donor consortium was not welcomed by Bangladesh;
it was the donors who felt the need for coordination of their activities and who
from the first pressed for the establishment of a consortium. 200
Faaland, World Bank Chief, Dhaka, 1981
It would appear that both the first Government of Bangladesh as well as the World Bank
understood the influence which a consortium of donors could exert over the development
process. As a result, its establishment became a serious point of contention. During the
course of 1972, the Bank, the Government and potential members of an aid consortium
met on a bilateral basis to discuss the pros and cons of a consultative group process to aid
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coordination. It was hoped that, through such an approach, a suitable mechanism could be
designed which would meet the needs of aid coordination as well as be acceptable to all
participants. In the course of these discussions a number of differences of opinion
surfaced.
The Bank took the position that a consortium should be reactivated along the same lines
as the Pakistan consortium, in terms of: (1) its membership; and (2) annual meetings held
in Paris which would be chaired and serviced by the World Bank. 20 ' In contrast, the
Government wanted to manage and chair the proposed meetings, to hold them in Dhaka,
and to invite non-DAC countries to participate as well. All three of these changes would
have represented precedents to Bank procedures. The Bank argued that the management
of the consortium had to be left to the Bank because, it reasoned, it had both donor and
recipients as members and was, therefore, in an uniquely impartial position. In addition,
the Bank drew attention to the practical difficulties of holding discussions in Dhaka.202
The Government countered that the Bank could not be impartial in that it was dominated
in terms of ownership, control and management by the donor countries, particularly the
US and, as a function of its aid programme, was a vested player like any other donor.
Rehman Sohban, a member of the Planning Commission at the time, noted that from the
Government's point of view, it was obvious that a consortium controlled by the Bank
would "merely infuse less conscious donors with the Bank's particular ideology... If
donors came together under the auspices of the Bank a collective pressure point would be
provided for the Bank to impose its ideology and policies. . .on Bangladesh." 203
 Given the
nationalist and socialist orientation of the regime, this represented an unacceptable
situation.
The Government sought the support of friendly donors for its decision to hold the
meeting on its terms. It allayed donor concerns with reassurances that the meeting's
agenda would not vary in great detail from the standard format prescribed by the Bank
and that the option to hold subsequent meetings outside the country remained open.
Eventually, it was agreed that a two-day meeting would be held in Dhaka in March 1973.
It would be chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and invitations
extended to nineteen international agencies and countries, including a number of Socialist
ones. The first day of the proceedings would be formal in that there would be no
discussion of the set statement which each delegate was invited to make. Instead, the
Government would respond to those issues it considered important. The second day
would be reserved for discussions and pledging.
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Accounts provided by two participants, suggested that the meeting went according to the
prepared agenda with the exception of the question of the debt. The issue illustrates the
manner in which coordination through the consortium proved to be a powerful tool.
According to Rehman Sobhan,204 the Bank intended to use the meeting to mobilise DAC
donors to exercise collective pressure on the Government to accept its liability for a
proportion of Pakistan's external debt. As the Government became aware of this strategy,
it explicitly excluded the issue from the agenda. It advised donors that debt was not for
discussion in the forum, but would be negotiated bilaterally with creditor countries once
the sovereignty of Bangladesh was recognised by Pakistan. Nevertheless, nearly every
donor is reported to have commented upon the debt issue during the first day of the
meeting. 205 The Government learned from friendly donors that, at the concluding session
of the meeting, some donors intended to make their pledges conditional upon
Bangladesh's accepting a settlement of the debt question. The chair pre-empted this
outcome by announcing that the meeting would not seek aid pledges and that donors
should, therefore, not make pronouncements on pledges. "Notwithstanding this clear
renunciation of the pledging component of the meeting, a number of donors, in a unique
breach of diplomatic etiquette and with crass political insensitivity, went ahead and
announced conditional aid pledges.. ,,206
This incident of coordinated donor pressure, orchestrated by the Bank, confirmed the
Government's fears over the use to which a consortium could be put. Nevertheless, it also
pointed to the advantages that leadership over the consortium could bring. First, the
Chairman declared, on behalf of the Government, that Bangladesh would forego further
development assistance rather than accept conditional pledges. Accordingly, the Chair
declined to take cognisance of the conditional pledges and had them expunged from the
record of the proceedings. Second, the Government took advantage of its responsibility
for preparing the aide-memoire, and used it to expose how aid agency officials had
publicly attempted to manipulate the Government to accept a political settlement in
exchange for aid. According to Sobhan, the President of the World Bank almost
immediately sought to distance himself from events in Dhaka, writing to the Government
of Bangladesh and members of the consortium to indicate the Bank's intention to back
down on the issue and urge other donors to do the same.207
Rehman Sobhan, Planning Commission (1972-74); Just Faaland, World Bank (1974-75).
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Due to a range of factors, the Government proved unable to maintain control over this
mechanism for the next meeting of the group in 1974. Flooding, socio-political
destabilisation, as well as the need for balance of payment support following the global
economic crisis left the Government in a precarious situation. Under the circumstances,
the ability and importance which the Government attached to mobilise internal support to
counter external pressure had waned. After two years of resistance, the GOB succumbed
to the Bank's pressure to reactivate a 'traditional' style consortium.208
In July 1974, the Government requested that the Bank form a donor consortium and call
an emergency meeting of donors in August in Washington as well as a regular meeting
later in Paris, to discuss medium-term requirements. 209 The Bank obliged and a
traditionally styled 24-nation Bangladesh Aid Club was fashioned. It was reported in the
Far Eastern Economic Review that "critics of the new aid consortium argue that
Bangladesh has had to barter away the last vestiges of its original commitment to the
ideals of 'socialist planning' in return for short term relief.. .The outlines of the 'reform'
programme are said to have been made clear to the Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, and his economic entourage during their recent Washington visit."210
 According
to the Bangladesh representative of the Bank in Dhaka, by the June 1975 meeting of the
consortium, "Bangladesh had accepted the rOle apparently expected of her by the
international aid community of an attentive and accommodating supplicant of assistance."
211 Clearly the ability of donors to persuade Bangladesh to accept the orthodox economic
reforms was, in part, a circumstance of need; yet in part it was also due to the reinforcing
nature of coordinated donor leverage exercised through the consortium mechanism. In
addition, the creation of the Bangladesh aid consortium served to institutionalise the
leadership of the World Bank in this dynamic. 212
2.8.2 Aid coordination and health sector leadership
I have demonstrated above that donor concern for population control was at the expense
of aid coordination. It was also speculated that, as the policy agenda shifted to encompass
systemic issues within the MOHFW, the benefits of improved coordination came into
stronger relief. Nevertheless, it bears making reference to an intense rivalry between the
World Bank and UNFPA over the position of lead coordinator of aid in the sector, which
was, arguably, viewed as a covert means to exercise hegemony over other actors.
Senior staff of the two organisations met in January 1973 to discuss their support to
population control efforts in Bangladesh. According to Bank minutes of the meeting, "it
was thought desirable that the Bank and UNFPA combine their efforts in developing the
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project and exercising leverage for effecting the needed institutional changes and efficient
implementation of the project."213
 Consequently, the Bank joined other multilateral
organisations in a joint mission to Bangladesh led by IINFPA. The overriding aim of the
mission was to develop "a broad framework for family planning activities over the next
3-5 years in which external donors... might find an appropriate role of assistance..." 214
 In
early March, after completion of the mission, the Bank proposed to UNFPA 'joint
sponsorship by the Bank and TJNFPA of a major multi-donor financing effort once we
could determine the size of the package."215
 Later that week, when UNFPA officials met
with Bank staff to discuss, among other things, "the modus vivendi of various donor
agencies to provide assistance to the Bangladesh program," cooperation had given way to
competition. 216 Although there was agreement on the need to coordinate their assistance
and to "decide on the rules of the game much in advance of their [both agencies]
involvement in the program (i.e., (1) division of responsibilities; (2) mechanism for
coordination and communication; (3) management of program)," tension was expressed
over how this was to be achieved.
Apparently, the Government's Planning Commission had proposed to the multi-agency
mission that a sub-group of the Bangladesh Aid Consortium be formed. UNFPA was
ready to formalise the suggestion, but the Bank stated that it was not yet in a position to
participate in such an initiative because it had yet to define its role in the sector. 217 In the
above-mentioned meeting, convened to discuss donor coordination, the Bank informed
IINFPA "that if the rules of the game implied no communication on the project except
through one channel (i.e., IJNFPA) this would be a non-starter." 218 Moreover, the Bank
wanted to discuss donor coordination arrangements only after it had appraised a specific
project. 2t9
 However, what was really at stake was expressed in a separate Bank
memorandum. This memo alleged that "Dr Sadik [of UINFPA] was trying to indirectly
suggest that IJNFPA be treated as the 'sole channel of communication' between the
government and the donors for a joint project financed by different agencies."22°
According to the memo, the proposition was unacceptable as "the Bank would like to
have direct influence on the development of the program as well as on the operation of
the project through its project package and agreements." 22 ' The Bank was also irked that
UNFPA would provide funds "for the preparation of a longer-term plan for financing by
UNFPA and other donor agencies.. .This type of proposal might conflict with the Bank's
overall approach and fmancing plan already discussed with the Government. As UNFPA
has little control over other donors or agencies of the UN System, their planning will tend
to be lopsided and be the result of responses to agency pressures."222 The memo
concludes with the suggestion that Bank experts prepare a national population plan for
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Bangladesh so as to pre-empt the UNFPA initiative. 223
 Accordingly, the Bank wrote to
the Government one week later proposing a Bank mission to Dhaka which would "offer a
financing plan that may serve as a basis for assistance by interested bilateral and
multilateral agencies."224
In March 1973, there were differences of opinion over aid coordination arrangements for
the sector. While the Government proposed that donors be coordinated in Dhaka through
a consultative group arrangement, which was supported by UINFPA, the Bank was
opposed since it was not yet in a sufficiently strong position to be assured leadership and
did not trust this task to UNFPA. Both agencies, however, foresaw the potential of a
national plan to provide a vehicle for coordination and leverage and were, therefore,
competing to have their own consultants assist the Government with its preparation of
such a plan. By July 1973, when the Bank's sector-cum-appraisal mission had taken
place, UNFPA and the World Bank had more or less decided to go their own separate
ways. UNFPA had made recommendations to the Government concerning which projects
it would assist and the Bank was considering a three-year project. According to the
Bank's project issue paper: "since the project period is short and the country needs
immediate financing of large magnitude, it is proposed to postpone a formal aid
coordination between different agencies for a longer (second phase) project.. .Therefore,
during the next three years the GOB may receive aid from donors for items not financed
by IDA but no formal effort for aid coordination would be made." 225 The report went on
to suggest that there may still, however, be scope to involve donors in a Bank project over
the longer term: "a sector report that will follow the appraisal report may form the basis
of funding by different donors for a longer term project."
For a variety of reasons, including inflation-related cost escalation, the Bank's original
project grew in size, duration and expense, leading the Bank to propose to the
Government that cofinancing be sought from other bilateral funding agencies. 226 This
decision was to set the stage for donor coordination through the Consortium mechanism
(discussed in Chapter 5). The Bank explained to prospective cofinanciers, such as the
IDRC in Canada, that "we would be playing the role of honest broker and coordinator
and would not in any way be 'telling individual donors what they would be expected to
,,,227do.	 Yet this tack put the Bank on a collision course with the Government and
UNFPA. First of all, the Government wanted only those external agencies with funds ear-
marked for population activities, such as USAID and UNFPA, to provide aid to its
These are short internal documents which justify lending operations to senior management.
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population programme. Therefore, the Government informed the IDA that its
involvement in the program should be minimal, that the Bank should seek to cofinance
the project with UNFPA and USAID, and that aid from SIDA, NORAD and CIDA and
other donors be used for purposes other than population control. 228
 Second, UNFPA
continued to reiterate to Government its desire to coordinate activities in the sector.229
The impasse was resolved over the short-term by the Bank and UNFPA agreeing to
coordination exercised by the population planning section of the Planning Commission as
proposed by the Government. 230
 For its part, the Government conceded to UNFPA and
the Bank the prerogative to support initiatives in the sector through distinct projects. It
provided all other agencies, irrespective of whether or not they had dedicated funds for
population, the freedom to support population activities. In practice, this arrangement
resulted in minimal coordination of donors provided nominally by Government. The
Bank's project officer suggested in an interview that the GOB was reluctant to assume a
high profile role in donor coordination in the sector at the time because it felt itself to be
too weak to coordinate donors effectively and because GOB officials were very
concerned about taking decisions which might displease their superiors or any of the
donors. 23 ' Given the prevailing vacuum, the World Bank achieved a modicum of
coordination through its project which was cofinanced by five donor agencies (although it
was unequivocal in its insistence that its financial contribution be of sufficient magnitude
to permit it a leadership role in the project). 232
 Both UNFPA and USAID continued to
operate relatively independently of each other and other actors in the sector. Referring to
disagreements among donors during the protracted preparations and negotiations over the
first World Bank and IINFPA projects, Jack Parkinson (then IMF representative) writes,
"the inter-agency bickering among external donors and organisations resembled a
situation of the blind leading the blind in comparative ignorance."233
Although an uneasy truce had been agreed, problems remained. On the 25th of January
1974, UNFPA convened what it intended to be the first of a series of annual meetings in
New York for donors interested in the population programme of Bangladesh. At the
meeting, IINFPA announced the appointment of a resident UNFPA coordinator to be
posted to Dhaka by March 1974. This officer would meet frequently with Government
and donor representatives to "clarify the funding picture for population activities in
Bangladesh."234
 That the UNFPA coordinator "play a central rOle in coordination of
assistance" was supported by donors such as SIDA.235
 Presumably by some pre-
arrangement, at the meeting, the Ford Foundation proposed the formation of a local
technical committee which was endorsed by USAID and UNFPA. The Bank, while
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agreeing in principle to field level exchanges of information, cautioned that the
committee's formation be subject to Government support and prior approval due to
"GOB sensitivities to donor coordination and the known desire of it to be the central
,,236
coordinator.
The Government was indeed opposed to regular meetings of donors. According to a
back-to-office report from a Bank mission to Dhaka in April 1974, Nurul Islam, Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission, informed the Bank that it saw "no special reasons
for regular meetings of representatives of donors in Dhaka as suggested by the Ford
Foundation." He argued that the office of population planning in the Planning
Commission provided sufficient coordination of donor involvement in the programme.237
Despite Government sentiments, the report continues: "It seems that Ford Foundation has
strong views on such a meeting and suggested that it might organise and chair these
meetings if the Government fails to do so." UNFPA decided to pre-empt the Ford
Foundation and took the lead with respect to organising local meetings. The report of the
acting UNFPA country director on the first six months of work (i.e., from May to
November 1974) notes "an informal donor's meeting, now to be held every month on a
rotating basis among donors to the Government's programme, was organised, in
,,238
cooperation with the Ford Foundation and USAID in Dhaka.
Although IINFPA was, by virtue of having a member of staff on the ground, in a position
to initiate informal donor's meetings, its monopoly over these meetings did not last very
long. While the Bank had intended to postpone organising meetings for the sector until it
was able to station an official in Dhaka to handle population issues, appointing a suitable
candidate became a protracted process. Consequently, the Bank convened, purportedly at
the request of several donors (only USAID is explicitly named), on 25 November 1975,
the first meeting of a 'population sub-group' under the Bank's Local Consultations
Group. 239
 In contrast to the TJNFPA meetings, which included only a very narrow range
of donors (i.e., UNFPA, USAID, Ford, and the Bank), the population sub-group of the
Bank's Local Consultations Group included both a much larger group of interested
donors' as well as Government officials. What further differentiated these meetings from
those organised by the UNFPA, according to the Bank's perception, was that the latter
were "informal shop talk" in style, with a "random exchange of information" and with
"relatively little organised
The population sub-group included UNDP, IDA, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, USAID, Australia,
Canada, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Iran, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Ford Foundation.
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Shortly after the first meeting of the population sub-group, the Washington office of the
World Bank informed its Dhaka office that it had received an "informal complaint from
UNFPA re Bank usurping their role through calling this meeting. Another donor also
asked questions."24 ' Given the very different nature of the two fora, the Bank was readily
able to justify the purposes that its meetings served. When the Dhaka-based UNFPA
coordinator affirmed the value of the meetings and provided her support for their
continuation,242 Nafis Sadik, of the UNFPA headquarters, conceded "that since a decision
has been made by the IBRD to hold inter-agency meetings regarding the implementation
of its own programme, UNFPA welcomes and appreciates the invitation extended to our
Coordinator to participate."243 What it is important to note, however, is that Sadik only
conceded to the Bank the holding of meetings regarding 'its own programme,' not the
entire population programme.
This case suggests that coordination may be less concerned with the purported aims of
rationalising external assistance to the Government's programme, than with the desire
among competing agencies for hegemony over sectoral developments. It could be argued
that this two year rivalry used aid coordination as a pretext for gaining leadership and
control. Indeed, the Bank's own Performance Audit Report of its First Population Project
issued in June 1986 commented "While the need for coordination was clearly recognised,
agencies such as USAID, TJNFPA, WHO and later UNICEF, funded their own projects,
as differences of opinion arose between the Bank and these agencies about.. .who was to
provide leadership." 2
 In their struggle, the organisations used a number of mechanisms,
nominally designated to facilitate aid coordination, to serve their cause, including: (1)
preparation of national operational and financing plans; (2) establishing a presence at the
country level; (3) taking a lead agency role vis-â-vis other donors; and (4) organising
formal and informal meeting arrangements.
2.9 Chapter summary
Since independence, aid has formed an integral component of the country's public
expenditure programme. This has provided donors with an influential voice in
consideration of the Government's internal affairs and has necessitated the evolution of
aid and donor coordination instruments.
> The political and administrative arrangements prevailing over the course of the
country's history are likely to have given donor agencies the impression that the
Government did not know its own affairs best, that it served interests and objectives other
than those of the aid agencies, andlor could not be trusted to use the external resources
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placed at its disposal to their most judicious advantage. These considerations are likely to
have influenced donor thinking in relationship to the desirability and feasibility of
relinquishing leadership in the management and coordination of aid to the Government.
)- Weak Government capacity has provided a long-standing and ongoing justification for
strong external leadership over aid coordination. Attempts to improve Government
capacity to manage aid have neither been sufficient nor effective in adequately
augmenting the capacity of the Government to displace the negative perceptions held by
donors.
Civil servants represent a primary beneficiary group of donor assistance. They tend to
adhere to protectionist attitudes toward the existing power configuration, which usually
benefits special interest groups, themselves included. Any reforms to aid coordination
which might reduce their discretionary authority, privilege and/or rent-seeking
opportunities would likely be resisted.
There has been a shift in the donor agenda in the health sector from a preoccupation
with population control at-any-cost (including duplication or blanketing of services) to
sectoral reform, with an emphasis placed on efficiency, effectiveness, systemic concerns
and systems losses. This shift has likely changed donor attitudes and expectations with
respect to aid coordination.
The fact that the agenda in the health sector has been influenced and, often, largely set
by donor interests and priorities is likely to have undermined the perception that
Government could lead donor coordination.
- Both aid agencies and the Government of Bangladesh have understood from the very
beginning of their relationship that aid coordination is a powerful tool with which to
exercise leverage over the development process. This consideration has likely coloured
their desire to lead coordination processes and conditioned the extent and manner of their
preferred involvement in various coordination arrangements.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Government and aid coordination: unable, unwilling or undermined?
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter describes the principal Government-led instruments through which attempts
were made to coordinate external assistance between 1972 and 1997. An overview of the
responsibilities held by the overarching institutions is presented along with how these
have changed over time. In addition, the modalities of policy-making, planning and
project approval are discussed in relation to the contribution they make to aid
coordination. The limitations faced by the Government are explored from both donor and
Government perspectives. Emphasis is placed on identifying the behaviour and
exigencies of external agencies which have impaired the ability of Government-led
initiatives to fulfil their potential.
Although policy and planning is at the centre of this Chapter, it does not follow that
effective policy and planning necessarily leads to improved aid coordination. In
particular, the 'rationalist' notion that a linear and sequential policy making and planning
process will lead to the development of 'optimal' plans 2
 into which all parties will
contribute resources in an orderly manner is not being acclaimed. Indeed the thesis is
informed by the school of thought which argues that policy-making is in practice
'incremental' and about 'muddling through.' 3 Moreover, this research acknowledges the
perils and frustrations of policy implementation 4
 and the failure of much health sector
planning in practice. 5
 Despite these limitations, the Chapter is concerned with policies
and plans for two reasons: (1) they constitute the principle arsenal at the disposal of
Government to coordinate aid; and (2) according to the principles upon which the
conceptual framework of this thesis is constructed, they ought to provide the basis for aid
coordination.6
3.2 Government institutions for aid coordination: the Planning Commission and the
ERD
When the Planning Commission was constituted in January 1972, it was conceived of as
a 'super-ministry.' The Prime Minister selected its leadership from among "those who
were his closest advisers during the liberation struggle."7 Consequently, the top echelon
of the Commission, the Deputy Chairman and its three academic members, was drawn
from outside the civil service. The Minister of Planning served as the Chairman of the
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Planning Commission and the other members enjoyed the status State Ministers. The
Chiefs of the ten divisions of the Commission were granted the designation of Secretary
(i.e., the highest ranking civil servant). At the outset, the posts of Minister of Finance and
Minister of Planning were filled by the same individual, which vested great authority in
the chairmanship. In early 1973, the Prime Minister took over the Planning portfolio,
thereby assuming the Chair and elevating the status of the Commission higher yet.
The delineation of the functions and organisational structure of the Commission was left
to the leadership of the Commission. According to the Deputy Chairman, these were
approved by Cabinet "without any serious discussion or debate," presumably because the
Ministers and the bureaucracy felt that the composition of the Commission was imposed
by the overwhelming authority of the Prime Minister himself. 8
 Among its functions, the
Commission was "to prepare national plans, annual, five-year and perspective [i.e., long-
term], ... in accordance with the socio-economic objectives of the Government" and "to
determine external aid requirements and negotiate the total quantum and composition of
aid required."9
 The Planning Commission was thus vested with exclusive responsibility
for aid coordination.
Executive responsibility for aid negotiation and management was vested in the External
Resources Division (ERD), one of the ten divisions of the Commission. It was reasoned
that an administrative arrangement, wherein the ERD was situated within the Planning
Commission, would provide good links between the related processes of planning,
budgeting and external resource mobilisation and allocation. The ERD assumed a high
profile during the era of President Mujibur Rahman by virtue of the fact that the Chief of
the ERD exercised a dual role as Secretary, Ministry of Planning (and thus also Secretary,
Planning Commission) and as Secretary of the ERD. Substantive knowledge of the
sectors resided within the other divisions and sections of the Commission which
facilitated the linkages between domestic planning and aid allocation by the ERD.
During the course of the Mujibur administration, aid coordination for the population sub-
sector was delegated to the Chief of the family planning section of the Planning
Commission. It performed this function, at least in the eyes of the Commission's
members, satisfactorily.' 0
 During the period a number of attempts were made by the
section Chief to promote donor coordination. The record states, for example, that the
Chief made repeated requests to both the Bank and IJNFPA that they consider inclusion
of one anothers' staff in their respective project appraisal and supervision missions, that
other donors join in these as well, and donor consensus be forged through the production
Chapter 3: Government machinery	 113
of joint aide-memoires. "He [the Chief] feels that this will lead to better coordination
between the two agencies in project identification, funding and implementation. He has
stressed the need for such meetings held during McNamara's visit." Yet, the authority
which the section could wield over the donors to ensure coordination was undermined by
the views and interests of the aid agencies themselves.
3.2.1 Donor challenges to the Planning Commission 's authority over aid coordination
First, while the donors acknowledged, at least rhetorically, the pre-eminent role of the
Planning Commission in aid coordination, the perception persisted among donors that the
Commission had a limited ability and willingness to coordinate. The second factor which
undermined the Commission's ability to coordinate donors lies in their constant meddling
in the organisation of the Government's machinery. For example, while the Bank "agreed
that any IDA financing needs to take place within the framework of the Government's
policy of being sole coordinator of external assistance in the field of population," 3
 it had
its own ideas about how this should take place. The Bank proposed, as a negotiating pre-
condition for its First Population Project, that a new division within the Planning
'4Commission be established for donor coordination. The Government, however, decided
against setting up a new division in the Commission and opted instead to establish a
'population planning division' within the Ministry of Health and Population Planning and
to delegate to it some coordination functions previously held by the Commission. The
Bank informed other donors that it saw "no alternative but to accept this decision for the
present; we will, however, propose the establishment of a small project unit in the
Planning Commission which would carry, intentionally, rather fuzzy terms of
reference." 5
 Consequently, following a meeting of the prospective cofinanciers, the Bank
informed the GOB that: (1) all donors agreed with the IDA proposal to establish a unit in
Commission; and (2) its head be appointed only after consultation with donors.' 6 These
became key issues during project negotiations which were eventually resolved with the
donors backing down on both.' 7
 The example illustrates the extent to which donors
attempted to dictate to Government the administrative arrangements which should govern
aid coordination. Given the internecine warfare which prevailed within the public
administration at the time,X such interference must have placed tremendous pressure on
For example, according to a Bank memorandum regarding a conversation between Bank staff
and a high level SIDA official in 1973, SIDA expressed concern that "the Planning Commission
has played a passive rOle in either developing the program or obtaining assistance from the
donors."
X Rivahy and factionalism in the three major institutions in post-independent Bangladesh (i.e.,
bureaucracy, political parties and army) have been widely acknowledged (e.g., R Jahan, 1980).
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the individuals and institutions which were not favoured by the donors which in turn may
have limited their abilities to carryout their intended briefs.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Commission's ability to coordinate donors was the
direct one posed by donor interest in taking over the coordination arrangement from
Government. Section 2.8.2 of the preceding Chapter provided a brief account of how
UNFPA and the Bank jostled to attain a leading rOle. Although both donors conceded
leadership to the Government, both envisioned a substantive rOle for themselves.' 8"9
 The
Bank emerged as the convenor of a population sub-group of the aid consortium as well as
the lead donor for a large multi-donor project and thus the defacto coordinator. In light of
the resources and leverage which donors commanded relative to the beleaguered
Government, it is not surprising that the Government's role fell victim in the process.
3.2.2 Internal challenges to the Planning Co,nmission: the ERD takes over aid
coordination
The Planning Commission's role in aid coordination was challenged from within
Government as well. Towards the end of the Mujibur regime, the vanguard position of the
2021Planning Commission as a super- ministry was under threat.
	 In 1976, after the
assassination of Mujibur Rahman, the privileges of rank were removed from the Planning
Commission and the ERD was taken out of its executive jurisdiction. The reorganisation
saw the Ministry of Planning separated into two divisions: Planning; and External
Resources (ERD). This separation made the ERD a more autonomous division,
effectively severing its close ties with the members and divisions of the Planning
Commission. Through this process the ERD's commitment to policies and programmes
arising out of the planning process diminished while enabling the ERD to enforce its own
priorities through the aid negotiation process. 22
 The bifurcation of responsibilities was
reinforced in 1978 when the ERD was moved from the Ministry of Planning to become a
division under the Ministry of Finance. This surrender of control of the ERD removed, in
the eyes of Bangladeshi academic, Rehman Sohban, "a major sanction from the arsenal of
the Planning Commission.. .with which to influence the effective utilisation of aid and to
see that development priorities decided at the time of the Annual Development Plan were
adhered to."23
In the 1990s, formal responsibility for aid coordination continues to be vested in the
ERD, Ministry of Finance. Its main responsibility involves mobilising and negotiating aid
flows with donors to ensure that aid is provided on terms that are in the best interest of
the economy. In addition, the Division prepares the GOB's memorandum for the Annual
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Consultative Group meeting in Paris and is the contact point for the Local Consultative
Group of donors in Dhaka. The ERD is involved in the negotiation of individual projects
at the request of the concerned line ministry.
The extent to which the ERD is involved in sector-level aid coordination is, however,
minimal. First, the ERD is less concerned with sectoral programmes than with traditional
project finance. Second, because the ERD's organisational structure corresponds to the
source of aid, as opposed to line ministry functions, knowledge of sector needs and
priorities is at a premium. Limited understanding of the sector constrains the ERD's
ability to assist the MOHFW in coordinating aid in support of a sectoral strategy.
Moreover, ERD' s aim of maximising aid has predisposed it to supporting all external
investment regardless of whether or not it might be duplicative of other assistance. In the
study's survey, the ERD was thought to perform an adequate function with respect to aid
coordination by only 2 of the 9 donor respondents and none of the Government officials.
The ERD is also concerned about the lack of aid coordination, but considers itself
relatively powerless to effect it. For example, in a meeting between senior ERD and Bank
staff, the Secretary commented that the design of the Bank's Third Population and Family
Health Project was "faulty.. .because the project was put together on the basis of ideas
developed by different donors." Moreover, according to the Secretary, USAID's
contribution to the sector should also have been incorporated into the larger umbrella
project. 24
 In discussions in 1988 preceding the formulation of the Bank's Fourth
Population and Health Project, the ERD again expressed its desire that the Bank
incorporate USAID's contribution under the project, but the Bank wrote: "for the moment
we declined this request." 25
 Eventually American assistance took place outside of the
coordination of the Consortium initiative.
3.3 Policy frameworks and aid coordination
Governnent decision-makers are responsible to no-one and do not have to
just, defend, or explain their actions. Decisions are taken in secrecy by a small
group ofpeople and then announced in the form of an ordinance. 26
S.A. Kochanak, 1993
Policy can be thought of as "determining the routes to be travelled and the destinations,
while planning establishes the means whereby the terrain is to be traversed." 28 As such,
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policy frameworks may ideally provide a number of potential avenues through which aid
can be coordinated - for policies may be developed through consultative processes
whereby consensus among stakeholders on priorities and goals emerge, they may be
linked to decisions regarding aid allocation, and they may set out the instruments and
institutional arrangements which governments and donors alike will employ to achieve
the broad policy objectives.
These ideals have not obtained in the health sector in Bangladesh. A well-articulated
health policy has never existed. Instead, the sector has been governed by priorities which
have been set by default - driven, in an ad hoc manner, by domestic interests and donors
acting individually or collectively. These priorities have rarely been widely ascribed to. A
number of attempts have been made to arrive at a comprehensive national health policy,
but none has yet succeeded.
The processes of policy making in Bangladesh have been criticised on a number of
counts. First, too little appears to be known about how it works. One Bangladeshi
academic noted that "...it is difficult to find a well researched case study of the processes
underlying policy formulation in the country. Who makes policies and how is a mystery
even to the most well-informed citizens. The mystery breeds suspicion, allegation, and
misinformation."29
 Others question the quality of decision-making. Quality suffers, in
part, because those designated to formulate policy are seemingly too busy or averse to
doing so. "Empirically, it has been observed that the ministries in the Secretariat are often
busy with administrative and regulatory issues - the issuance of a licence or the posting
and transfer of a clerk or peon. As a result, relatively less time is spent on policy
formulation and planning." 3° It has also been argued that decision-makers are not
adequately equipped for the task. The World Bank, for example, cautioned that: "policies
are likely to fail since they are not underpinned by sufficient analytical evaluation. Those
engaged in formulating policy often lack the technical skill, and fail to carry out the
painstaking research needed to explore the potential impact of alternative policy
directions."3 ' In light of the constraints imposed upon and by the civil service which were
described in Chapter Two (sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4) the deficiencies in policy formulation
could be expected.
Implementation of policies is similarly problematic. Hogwood and Gunn propose ten
preconditions which must obtain if a policy is to achieve its objectives. 32
 In the health
sector in Bangladesh, few of these are present (e.g., objectives are widely agreed to; those
in authority can demand and obtain compliance, etc.). In part, slow or inadequate policy
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implementation can be traced to the concentrated nature of the decision-making circle
which results in shallow support or resistance to policy uptake. It has also been suggested
that because the policies which do emerge are generally set so broadly, their
interpretation and implementation can be easily manipulated to suit the needs of powerful
individuals and groups.33
 Another problem relates to the "widely held belief in the lack of
integrity of Government, [which makes it] difficult to muster support for its policies or to
generate the conviction that they were not conceived in the personal interests of
individuals."34
 Others have noted that "the donors, especially the World Bank, appear to
be in the driver's seat" in so far as policy formulation is concerned. 35
 The Bank
acknowledges its dominant role in the policy process and specifically that "most people
perceive government policy announcements as a response to donor conditionalities rather
than a genuine commitment to change."36
 Foreign sponsorship and ownership of policy is
likely to weaken the loyalty held by the administration towards it. Variants on all of these
issues are evident when the defacto policies of the health sector are examined.
3.3.1 Whose population policy?
The country's first population policy (1976) provides a fitting illustration of donor
involvement in initiating a policy, playing a significant rOle in defining its content, and,
consequently, forming its primary constituency. During the course of formulating the
initial World Bank/cofinancier population project, the donors became increasingly
concerned about the Government's low level of interest in fertility control. As the time of
project negotiations drew near, the Bank felt that Government commitment was "the
over-riding concern on the part of most other donors." 37
 As a result, at the final meeting
of the cofinanciers prior to project negotiations, "the donors wanted IDA to tighten up on
several of our [Bank] proposed negotiating conditions, in order that the Government's
agreement could be taken as a sign of commitment." 38
 This in spite of the fact that the
Bank noted that it and other donors were concerned that they were 'committing' the GOB
to a population programme which "they may be both unwilling and unable to sustain."39
Upon completion of negotiations, the donors were pleased that their objectives had been
seemingly met; the new administration had demonstrated its commitment through signing
the credit agreement (i.e., taking a loan to curb population growth) and had declared
population as the country's number one problem. 4° The Americans, although not party to
the IDA project, attempted to take some of the credit, by claiming that "USAID agitation,
among other things, has prompted a welcome series of actions and statements on
population by the Bangladesh Government... These beginnings need to be pressed
forward vigorously and continuously both as imperative for Bangladesh and as a
necessary demonstration to the donors."4'
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One of the actions for which donors pressed was the promulgation of a national
population policy. The donors, therefore, were pleased when President Sayem
reconstituted the National Population Council after the change of Government. At the
third meeting of the Council, on 25 June 1976, with the President in the chair, the
Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health, Population Control, Labour and Social Welfare,
presented "an outline of a proposed population policy for Bangladesh.. .the proposals
were based on a draft policy paper prepared for him jointly by me (Dr Pisharoti, Resident
Population Expert, Dhaka, World Bank), Dr Penny (IJNFPA), Sathianathan (WHO
advisor to Ministry of Health) and M Jordan (USAID)."42
 Notwithstanding the fact that
the donors had written the draft policy outline on behalf of the Government, the Bank
made it clear that it additionally expected that its expert would continue to work "closely"
with the Ministry to finalise the "details" of the policy.43
Despite enactment of the national population policy in 1976, donors, unsurprisingly, were
anxious over the degree to which the Government was committed to its implementation.
This concern was expressed in terms of questioning the adequacy of the fmancial
allocation made by the Government to population activities (raised explicitly by the
World Bank, IJNFPA, USAID, Australia, and Germany and perhaps others as well),'45
threats by the Bank to withhold "resources to the population program, unless the current
trends observed in the decline of dedication, lack of discipline and inadequate
performances are reversed," 46
 repeated complaints about inadequate implementation of
the programme, 47
 and, in particular, over poor implementation and disbursement on the
first Bank cofinanced project. 48
 Concern persisted into the late 1980s over the perceived
lack of strong political commitment to the population programme, 49 so much so that the
Bank observed that "we [the Bank] need to walk carefully to avoid giving the impression
the program is more important to us than to the Government."50
It is unlikely that the country's population policy had any great influence on aid
coordination at the time or subsequently. Donors' decisions regarding strategy,
investment priorities and favoured organisational design had preceded the articulation of
the policy and, as indicated in Chapter 2, had been made relatively independently of each
other and the Government. Moreover, foreign sponsorship of the policy had the effect of
dampening domestic interest in utilising it as a common framework for joint action. The
development of a health policy was beset by similar problems, limiting again any utility
which may have been served as far as aid coordination was concerned.
Chapter 3: Government machinery
	 119
3.3.2 A national health policy or a donor health strategy?
The first official statement of health policy appeared in the First Five-Year Plan (1973-
78).51 It emphasised a shift from curative urban-based care to a comprehensive rural-
oriented system. Ten broad, ambitious, and, with hindsight, unrealistic objectives were
set. By December 1978, as implementation of the First Population Project of the Bank
and its cofinanciers floundered, the Bank commented on the "urgent need for a health
policy statement taking the changes since 1973 and the current socio-economic and
political environment into account."52
 At the time, other donors, such as Sweden,
concurred with the need for the Government to formulate a health policy.53
In 1982, the expert committee established to develop a National Drugs Policy indicated
that its implementation should only take place within the context of an comprehensive
national health policy. 54
 However, it was not until five years later, in March 1987, that a
four-member presidential committee was appointed to formulate such a policy. The
committee did not include any serving MOHFW officials but did include Dr Zafrullah
Chowdhury, the principle architect of the country's radical drugs policy, and Professor M
Yunus, the economist-founder of the world-renowned Grameen Bank. 55
 In August 1988,
after 16 months of deliberations, the committee presented its report to the President. The
proposed policy was not debated in Cabinet until almost one year later, in July 1989, and
only after another six month delay was an outline of the policy presented to Parliament, in
January 1990. The health policy was finally introduced as a bill in Parliament in July
1990 - to be enacted on October 17th if the bill was passed.
As the proposed policy threatened the interests of the medical establishment, the
Bangladesh Medical Association called an immediate national 72-hour strike by all
physicians against what it termed 'an anti-people policy.' The Association had refused to
meet with the committee during the earlier consultation period and had chosen instead to
put forward a 23 point charter of demands as its contribution to a national health policy.56
According to the World Bank, these amounted to little more than a list of job-related
demands aimed to improve the lot of the physicians themselves, not the health of the
country. Nevertheless, given the wide-spread and, increasingly, violent opposition to the
eight-year old regime of President Ershad, the medical profession was not only able to
sabotage the national health policy, but was thought to have been an important element in
the political equation which resulted in the toppling of the Ershad Government in
December 1 99Ø57 Consequently, on the first day of the interim Government, the national
health policy bill was cancelled by the acting President.58
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By the early 1990s, donor calls for a national health policy became more frequent and
insistent. Donor interest in the existence of such a policy took on a new dimension
presumably as a result of three factors. First, as noted in Chapter 2 (section 2.7), aid
agencies had by this time become more involved in health activities as they made the link
between contraceptive uptake and the quality and availability of MCH services. Second,
donor involvement in the sector began to encompass systemic issues (e.g., fmancmg
reforms), which required broader analyses and interventions across the breadth of the
sector. Third, it had begun to dawn upon donors, particularly the Bank and not
exclusively in Bangladesh, that aid was highly fungible - which meant that their
investments in the sector were not necessarily additional to what Government might
invest, but more likely substituted for Government spending (in practice, donor
investment in primary health care enabled the Government to finance activities which
were of lower priority to the donors). The recognition of these factors led to donor
demands for comprehensive, sector-wide policy and spending plans. Donor concern was
expressed to the Government in statements such as the following from a Bank/cofinancier
supervision mission of their Third Population and Family Health Project (TPFHP) in
1991: "The Mission considers the absence of a declared National Health Policy in
Bangladesh a serious setback to the development of the population and health sector. It
urges the Government to evolve a comprehensive health policy. . .
In October 1993, the Government of Khaleda Zia began formulating a National Health
Policy (NHP). The donors, as represented by an IDAlcofinanciers mission expressed their
support because of "the fact that the sectoral strategies and investment priorities have
been evolving over the last two decades dictated by circumstances."60
 A group
established by the donors to review the IDAlcofinancier Fourth Population and Health
Project (FPHP) went so far as to acknowledge that "the absence of a health policy to
guide strategies and pnontisation of activities fosters a situation in which the donor's
priorities and inputs to the sector, in practice, become the health policy."6'
As had been the case with the population policy, donors wanted to ensure that their
interests were reflected in the N}IP. Therefore a supervision mission of the FPHP
proposed to the Government that "a preliminary mission from the Bank.. . initiate a
dialogue on a detailed review of the sector, which would provide the technical basis for
carrying the policy forward." 62
 By December 1993, the Government reported that its
thirty member, "high powered committee had met twice."63 'M
 The Bank provided the
committee with a policy framework which it had drafted for the Government's
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consideration and informed the MOHFW that "in order to translate the policy into a
program of action, the application of the guiding principles outlined in the framework
would require a robust base of valid and relevant information about the sector."65 Hence,
the Bank proposed that it carry out a sector review which would provide
recommendations on prioritisation of investments, inter alia. It was the Bank's opinion,
that "in the absence of the review, the policy, even if it incorporates the guiding
principles contained in the [Bank's] suggested framework, may not have a substantial
basis for becoming a reality." 66 By this the Bank presumably referred to the fact that the
policy would not enjoy donor confidence and, therefore, support unless donor views were
adequately incorporated in the policy. The MOHFW had, however, unspecified
67
reservations concerning the conduct of the review. By February 1995, the Bank-led
Consortium expressed its concern over the delay in formulation of the NHP - and was
informed that the Government had changed its strategy and was now opting for a "health
programming exercise conducted through holding of workshops with technical people."68
Time was, however, running out for Khaleda Zia's Government which, facing a
protracted show-down with the opposition groups, forestalled, among other things,
progress on the health programming exercise.
Donors continued to feel the need for an overarching document setting out the
Government's goals and priorities for all investment in the sector, yet they had become
more aware of the difficulties inherent in putting a policy in place. For example, a CIDA
official wrote that the Canadian High Commission was "concerned with lack of clear
GOB health and population policy but felt that much of this resulted from conflicts
between medical association and former Ershad regime."69 The doctors had been on
strike again in early 1 99470 According to an interview with a Bank official, the donors
increasingly viewed the formulation of a health policy as too volatile, complex and time
consuming for their participation. 7 ' Hence, the Bank opted to explore the idea of a sector
strategy instead. Its annual supervision mission in November 1995 "informed the
Government that a well thought out sector strategy needs to be developed and that the
Bank will undertake to do the work in partnership with the Government." 72 The existence
of a Health and Population Sector Strategy (HPSS) became a pre-condition for further
Bank lending to the Government in the sector.
In November 1996, the new Government of Sheikh Hasina established yet another
committee to prepare a National Health Policy. The donors had some reservations
regarding the manner in which the policy was to be formulated. WHO, for example,
expressed its opinion that the time frame was unrealistic (i.e., 6 months) and that
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membership of policy group was unduly balanced towards hospital physicians.73
 The
FPHP Consortium was apprehensive because 4 out of the 5 members of the committee
were clinicians and that the Secretary, MOHFW, was not a member. 74
 However, the
donors' approach to the issue differed from their previous reactions; instead of making
great ado over these problems, the donors chose instead to impress upon Government that
the NHP should be modelled on the strategy document for the sector which the Bank was
taking the lead in developing. 75 Minutes of one Consortium meeting urged that "the
Consortium should take a pro-active approach in ensuring that the National Health Policy
is consistent with the Health and Population Sector Strategy."76
While the Government's exclusive committee articulated a National Health Policy, the
parallel exercise of strategy development became the principal focus of donor and
MOHFW attention. The major concern of many donors was that the Bank's strategy
should not substitute for a Government vision and policy for the sector. Within a FPHP
Consortium meeting "an anxiety was expressed that unless the GOB was at the centre of
the process [of HPSS preparation], and not merely consulted at the draft stage, the
Consortium may again end up with a project/program which contains donors driven
strategies, that without adequate Government ownership made for poor implementation
The Consortium should not run faster than the GOB as such an approach could be
"77detrimental to the process of sustained development. The European Union members of
the FPHP Consortium, alarmed that the Bank was usurping Government leadership over
policy formulation, took the unusual step of expressing their opinion to senior Bank
management that exclusive focus on the HPSS would entail "that the lack of [health]
policy.., will not be seriously addressed."78 CIDA also wrote to the Bank: "We are
preoccupied first and foremost with the ownership of the HPSS which must be with the
GOB."79
Thus as it dawned upon the donors that there may come to exist, for the first time, an
overarching document governing the allocation of their collective investments in the
sector, they became less sanguine about how it should be developed. Even USAID, which
operated outside of the Consortium, (see Chapter 5) informed the Bank that "we would
like to reiterate our concern that the development of the HPSS remain as open and
collaborative as possible with maximum GOB involvement and leadership of the process.
This is critical since the HPSS will guide the development of the Bangladesh population
and health sector for the next five years by all development partners." 8° Under pressure
from most donors, the Bank evolved a more participatory process to develop the sector
strategy which included senior MOHFW participation. According to a participant of the
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multi-donor HPSS reconnaissance mission, "it was apparent to most that the Government
is prepared to go along with this sector strategy in order to develop the next project as
quickly as possible." 81 By August 1997, the Government had officially endorsed the
Strategy as its own.
The Secretaiy, MOHFW, gave the Bank and its cofinanciers the assurance that elements
of the HPSS would be incorporated in the national health policy. 82
 When this research
was completed at the end of 1997, the donors were still asking to review the yet
unreleased draft NHP 83 Donor investment decisions had, by then, however, already been
made on the basis of the HPSS document. The policy was, therefore, increasingly
superfluous to them and of little utility to the cause of aid coordination. It remains to be
seen the extent to which the donor inspired health strategy is of any greater value in so far
as coordination is concerned (see Chapter 6).
3.4 Planning processes and aid coordination
Donors are critical of many aspects ofBangladesh administrative performance,
but are insufficiently sensitive to the administrative consequences and costs
resulting from the complexities of the aid system itself84
B. Van Arkadie & K. de Wilde, 1984
The planning process can, and should, provide a powerful instrument through which
external resources can be harnessed in support of a country's policy objectives. In
Bangladesh, the absence of a formal health sector policy further elevates the potential
role of the planning machinery . Under the direction of the Executive Committee of the
National Economic Council (the highest political authority for development activities,
chaired by the Prime Minister), the Planning Commission prepares the country's
development plans. Based on these plans, the Commission is responsible for allocation of
resources between sectors and for an assessment of external aid requirements in
consultation with ERD and the line ministries. In addition, the Commission reviews all
externally aided project proposals formulated by the line ministries, recommends
allocation of funds to projects within each sector, and prepares a list of 'aid worthy
projects' for presentation to the donor community.
The General Economic Division of the Commission is responsible for organising and
managing plan preparation activities. This Division writes the plans' macro chapters,
whereas the sectoral chapters are the responsibilities of the sector divisions of the
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Commission. These divisions establish task forces of relevant experts, drawing upon the
concerned ministry and directorates as well as outside bodies, to provide various inputs
into the planning process. The sector chapters tend to follow a set formata and are each
followed by a lengthy portfolio of projects envisaged to enable plan targets to be met.
In 1973, the Commission developed a 20 year Perspective Plan covering the period 1975-
95 and the first of a series of Five-Year, and Annual, Plans (Table 7). "The broad outlines
of strategies and policies enunciated in the Five-Year Plan became matters of hard choice
and policy decision jn the course of the Annual Plans. They specified, appraised and
evaluated projects and programmes for inclusion in the annual development
programme."85
 The Annual Development Programme, formulated by the Commission in
conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, specified, within the financial envelop set in the
Five-Year Plan (FYP), expenditures on items and projects approved for inclusion as
development expenditures. In theory, spending on externally aided projects could only
take place once an activity was included in the Annual Development Programme.
Table 7: Bangladesh's Five-Year Plans
Plan	 Period	 Comments
First Five-Year Plan	 1973-78	 * overly ambitious given poor implementation capacity,
______________________ ____________ political turmoil, floods and world-wide inflation
Interim Two-Year Plan	 1979-80	 * planning undermined by spill-over of 1374 projects from
First Five-Year Plan
* ambitious targets not met
Second Five-Year Plan	 1980-85	 * Bank found health and population chapters of plan
'unviable' and 'impractical.' Therefore, Bank proposed
_____________________ ___________ priority investments for donor funding
Third Five-Year Plan	 1985-90	 * Bank 'takes the lead' to 'translate plan into a national
______________________ ____________ program'
Fourth Five-Year Plan	 1990-95
Fifth Five-Year Plan	 1997-2002	 * health and population sections overshadowed by HPSS
_____________________ ____________ document (developed independently and mainly by donors)
There was no shortage of plans to guide the deployment of aid in accordance with
Government priorities. In addition to the Five-Year and Annual Plans, in 1990, a Three-
Year Rolling Investment Plan was introduced. When the Fourth Five-Year Plan lapsed in
1995, a new FYP was not formulated, instead the Government embarked upon another
planning exercise: the 'Participatory Perspective Plan for Bangladesh 1995-2000.' Shortly
after Sheikh Hasina's Government came to power, the decision was taken to reintroduce
the FYP process beginning in July 1997.
a The general format was: introduction; review of past performance; fmancial progress; goals;
strategies; programme components; other issues and measures; fmancial implications.
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At times, the Planning Commission did attempt to utilise its plans to facilitate donor
coordination. F-or example, World Bank correspondence records that "At Government's
request, a meeting of local consultations group was held today to hear presentation by Dr
Sattar of Government's population plan for the period 1978-85.. .This is the first attempt
of the Government to sensitise the donor community of the character and extent of the
plan proposal with view to encouraging their support."86
Generally, however, there has been dissatisfaction with the planning process and, in
particular, a consensus appears to have emerged between donors and the MOHFW that
the Commission has yet to produce a sufficiently clear strategic policy framework and
explicit expenditure plan to guide external investment towards nationally-defined needs
and priorities. Government officials expressed the unanimous view that the Planning
Commission was either irrelevant or inadequate in aid coordination in the health sector, a
conviction which was shared by all but one donor.87
Donor, particularly World Bank, criticisms of Bangladeshi plans began early in the
history of the population and health programme. Shortly after the Commission began
work on the First FYP for population in 1972,88 the Bank sent a mission to Dhaka. This
mission found the Commission's plan 'unsatisfactory,' 89 and a later mission informed the
Commission that "the Bank mission may have to assist [the Government] in preparing a
detailed plan of action."90 The implication was that the Government's plans were
inadequate. Only months later, after the Bank's First Population Project had been largely
designed, the Bank reported that it would develop a 'sector report' which could form the
basis for coordinated funding of the population programme by different donors. 9 ' The
Population and Nutrition Project Division of the Bank prepared such a report. 92 In effect,
the Bank not only found Government plans deficient, but adopted the stance that it could
and should usurp this function from the GOB in order that aid could be programmed in a
coherent fashion.
Close donor involvement in plan preparation continued during the subsequent planning
cycles - partially as a reaction to donor perceptions of weak Government planning
capacity, and partially because of the recognition of the power of plans over investment
directions. 'B The dissatisfaction of the Bank with the Government's Second FYP, led it to
inform other donors that "we are in the process of preparing a detailed assessment of the
requirements and constraints of the Bangladesh population program as a basis for judging
which priority investments should and could be undertaken during the next seven years,
irrespective of sources of financing."94 Similarly, in respect to the Government's Third
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FYP, the Bank noted that it had "taken the lead in helping the GOB develop and translate
it into a national program."95
 Later at a meeting convened by the Bank in Paris to discuss
the Third FY Population and Health Program, the Norwegian delegation confessed
confusion as to whom to address its concerns; the Bank or the Government.96
These donor responses to the FYPs set a precedent whereby donors found fault with
Government plans and consequently worked together with the MOHFW, either bilaterally
or as a small group, to develop plans which were suited to their own needs and purposes.
It was, therefore, not unusual that in 1995, "The Chairperson [of the FPHP Consortium]
made a reference to deficiencies in the perspective plan of the Government and said that a
sectoral analysis was being undertaken for the next [Consortium] project." 98
 Nor was it
remarkable that the donors would invest a relatively large amount of assistance (US$ 1
million) to establish an expatriate-led project preparation cell (PPC) within the MOHFW
to expedite planning of the IDA/cofinancier Fifth Health and Population Project (HAPP-
5). One of major tasks of the PPC was to prepare a 'Project Implementation Plan' (a
detailed plan covering all public sector activities under the purview of MOHFW for a five
year period) so as to translate the donor-inspired Health and Population Sector Strategy
into a set of concrete activities - some of which the donors would fund. The PPC
undertook this work in isolation from the Planning Commission. The limited reference
which donors made, in practice, to the Commission's FYPs in shaping their own activities
is reflected in the Bank admission that "both the first and second [Bank population]
projects experienced problems because they came on stream a year before the Five-Year
Plan allocations were made."99
Yet the donors encountered problems when they attempted to circumvent the Planning
Commission and forge their plans directly with the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare. These were principally due to the perceived lack of ability and willingness on
the part of the MOHFW to undertake the time-consuming and difficult planning
processes. The lacklustre response of the MOHFW may have arisen because formal
responsibility for planning remained in the Planning Commission while that for donor
coordination rested with the ERD. Inadequate MOHFW ownership of what it described
as a donor-driven programme may have also been at play. Moreover, it was also widely
held that the lack of human resources in the MOHFW was a limiting factor to effective
planning. Although all 20 officer level staff of the planning cell of the MOHFW had a
masters degree, and many of these from foreign institutions (see Annex 5), and despite
the fact that a Health Economics Unit was established in the MOHFW under the FPHP,
there remains a notable dearth of health planners and economists.
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In recognition of the impediments to MOHFW leadership in planning, the donors adopted
a two track approach but disagreed amongst themselves on which should take
precedence: capacity development or encouraging symbolic MOHFW participation in
planning exercises. Numerous aid agency missions, such as that for the mid-term review
of the FPHP, recommended "strengthening MOHFW planning capacity." '°°Another
mission noted that "a number of specific recurrent problems need to be addressed in the
medium-term: the overloading of the planning cell of the MOHFW with a lack of
conscious grooming of competent people to provide continuity and institutional capacity
in the long run; the planning departments in the Directorates of health and family
planning are weak and their planning roles are not clearly understood or discharged.. •,,b03
Yet, despite acknowledging the limitations to the MOHFW's planning capacity, when
HAPP-5 was under identification, the Consortium "felt it necessary to make a strong
representation at this stage to GOB, to ask for the chief of the planning cell, with two
senior representatives from the planning cells of the two directorates, to fully lead the
planning process."°4
 During a later meeting of the same group, some donors felt that
"GOB' s participation in the planning process needs to be more visual and the donor
members should not be prescribing the nature and content of HAPP-5 105 The Bank took
the view that "if the donors and technical advisors are providing support to articulate and
,,106
make the project more sound, this should not be looked at as lack of ownership.
	 Other
donors, however, insisted on the primacy of capacity development within the MOHFW:
"The World Bank might rightly argue that it took the initiative to develop a draft HPSS in
the absence of initiative from the MOHFW and its lack of capacity, as demonstrated by
the MOHFW's inability to keep active the HPSS technical groups in-between World
Bank Missions. If we accept this lack of initiative and capacity, then surely the priority
issue for GOB is to augment capacity in MOHFW so that it is able to lead the process of
development of the reform-filled HPSS and to plan the major HAPP-5."°7
While the aid agencies differed over whether the MOHFW should have a more
'prominent' or 'substantial' rOle in the planning process and how best to bring about
either; a more consequential issue was largely ignored. It is apparent that donor interest
lay involving the MOHFW in planning donor-driven initiatives (e.g., HPSS and HAPP-5)
as opposed to enabling it to make a greater contribution to the government's long-
established and on-going planning instruments (e.g., Fifth FYP). Hence, donors persisted
In stark contrast to the short tenure of most officials in any one post, the joint-chief of the
planning unit in the MOHFW served continuously in his post for 18 years (under the protection of
Bank influence it is rumoured) until being transferred in 1996.
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in applying pressure on the stretched planning capacity of the MOHFW to devote
resources to the donor planning processes with the attendant opportunity costs to the
GOB's system.
Close donor involvement in the planning process could have provided a useful basis
through which consensus was forged on strategies and resource allocation, which, in turn,
could have been beneficial in terms of coordination. The benefits of donor engagement in
the planning process were not, however, fully realised as two factors intervened. First,
because donors recognised the potential of plans to shape the orientation of spending
programmes - and the potential of their advisors to shape the nature of these - a
competitive, rather than cooperative, dimension prevailed over the process. Donor rivalry
was particularly evident in the area of technical assistance which was ostensibly offered
so as to reinforce the Government's capacity to plan. The point is illustrated by events
leading up to formulation of the Second FYP. In March 1976, the newly appointed
Additional Secretary, PCFPD, of the Planning Commission (Dr Sattar), sought assistance
from the Population Council for a long-term resident advisor for his planning unit.' 10
 He
later advised the Bank that he wanted a full-time, expatriate advisor for this unit but,
having reconsidered his request to the Population Council, now favoured assistance from
an international organisation. The Bank chief in Dhaka informed headquarters that "it is
this unit which has to be guided so as to help the government maintain a continuity of the
policies evolved by them jointly with the Bank." He suggested "that the Bank promptly
assure Sattar that the technical assistance needed to develop his planning unit would be
made available by the Bank. . .A representative from the Population Council is already in
Bangladesh. . .It is therefore essential that we move promptly if we wish to offer Sattar the
necessary assistance." 2
 The Bank impressed upon Sattar "the importance of the GOB's
being particularly circumspect in the choice of technical assistance having possible
,,113implications for existing programs and future policies and strategies of the GOB.
	 In
due course, the Bank provided technical assistance and later established, within the
Commission, a special unit as well. UNFPA then announced its "intention to provide
support to the Government of Bangladesh in building up capabilities of the Planning
Commission. This will occur through the establishment of a unit in the Planning
Commjssjon." 4
 To which the Bank responded, "as you know, under the First IDA-
supported project an External Evaluation Unit at the Planning Commission was
established. Could this external evaluation unit also undertake the function of the new
unit you are	 15
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Second, it is possible that the nature of donor involvement in the planning process had the
unanticipated effect of dampening GOB commitment to the effort and its products. There
are indications that a reactive element obtained. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission recorded, for example, that "another important, though unpublicised, reason
for the preparation of the Five-Year Plan was its use as a basis for negotiating foreign
economic assistance. There was a widely-held impression that the donors expected a
recipient country to have a Plan setting out a consistent framework of investment
priorities and policies, which would enable them to assess the needs for assistance and the
form it should take." 6 Such expectations on the part of donors were evident within the
health sector. 117 Bank documents reflect the prescriptive tone of many donors with
respect to planning: "Responding to the request from the GOB for early action for the
development of a second project, the Bank advised the FPW [a division in the Ministry of
Health] to formulate the second plan proposals for the population sector (1978_83).118
Donor's procedural exigencies (e.g., producing a plan document according to agency
processing schedules) and agendas, particularly those of the Bank, may, among other
things, have diluted Government commitment to its own plans. One Consortium member
remarked that "the donors' worry about the lack of GOB participation and ownership in
the face of World Bank pressure to implement the project (disbursement of this loan and
pulling next one in place)." 9 Nonetheless, despite wide-spread acknowledgement of the
folly of their approach, the donors persisted in dominating the planning process.
If forceful donor involvement in the planning process weakened the credibility of the
plans within Government circles, so too did the nature of plan formulation. On one hand,
officials of the Planning Commission were "technocrats who saw their role primarily as
economic advisors. There was no effective dialogue between them and the political
leadership.. ,,120 As a consequence, there would have been a limited understanding on the
part of planners as to the political feasibility of their intentions and potentially limited
political backing for the plans which emerged. On the other hand, plans were formulated
in a most restrictive manner. Islam writes that "although the Plan [First Five-Year] was a
socio-political document, there was no public debate or discussion about its objectives,
priorities and strategies. It was never presented to Parliament for debate or discussion.
Nor was it exhaustively debated by the Cabinet." The latter was "very limited, haphazard
and disjointed." 2 ' This set the stage for a circumscribed planning process largely
confined to the Commission which had the effect of marginalising the planners from the
realities confronting, among others, the executing agencies and donors. Overtime the
locus of power shifted from the Five-Year and Annual Plans to the project design and
approval process.
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Currently the day-to-day activities of planners at all levels are directed towards
formulating projects, gaining their approval and renewing existing ones. As a result,
planners are largely reactive to the interests and demands of the donor community and
operate within highly fragmented context. For example, the proposed health and family
welfare programme for the Fourth FYP consisted of 211 distinct projects; 76 under the
Directorate of Family Planning (DFP) and 137 under the Directorate of Health Services
(DHS).
3.5 The project process: a disjointed approach to aid deployment
The Government's PP process, as currently structured, serves bureaucratic
control, rather than development planning objectives and its purposes and
contents should be
re-examined. 122
P. Osinski, KfW Consultant; 1990
Had the planning processes produced widely shared plans, which presented vision and
priorities, linked these to spending programmes, and thereby identified resource needs
and gaps, the project process could have worked as a sanctioning tool which ensured that
only those activities which supported plan objectives were designed and allocated
resources. In the absence of such plans, investments in the sector have been made in an
ad hoc manner in accordance with interested party priorities and proclivities. These
investments are not necessarily linked to any agreed set of priorities (as priorities have
not been precisely nor explicitly articulated) nor are they appraised in relation to other
actual or anticipated spending plans.
Although the project formulation and approval process is not embedded in a strategic
planning framework, it is governed by complex and time-consuming procedures. The
process differs depending on the size of the proposed investment and whether or not the
activity consists solely of technical assistance or whether capital investment is involved.
Hypothetically, project ideas may be conceived by any entity in Government but, in
practice, donors and domestic constituencies (such as the medical establishment or
contractors) play the dominant role. Project ideas are formalised into a prescribed format,
the Project Concept Paper (PCP), submitted to the planning units in the Directorates and,
depending on the volume of resources involved, forwarded to the planning cell in the
MOHFW, the appropriate sectoral division of the Planning Commission, and/or
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ultimately to the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC). In
theory, each of these bodies considers whether or not the concept is fmancially viable
within the framework of the FYP and ADP and in accordance with the governments'
policy thrusts (although the latter are open to interpretation). Each of these bodies may
suggest that the sponsoring agency modify the proposal or alternatively recommend its
approval to the relevant executive official (i.e., Director-General of the Directorate, the
Minister of Health and Family Welfare, the Minister of Planning, and/or the Prime
Minister). As the PCP is prepared, the MOHFW holds informal discussions with
interested donor(s). In practice, donor-funded consultants often provide considerable
inputs into the preparation of the PCP on behalf of the Government. The Bank itself noted
that "The Bank leadership in project formulation should be maintained; however, efforts
should be made to transfer this responsibility to GOB in an increasing measure."124
Once a PCP is approved, the sponsoring entity develops either a Technical Assistance
Project Proforma (TAPP), in the case of consultancy services or training, or a Project
Proforma (PP), if the project comprises predominantly capital support. Both of these
documents are subject to similar but distinct approval processes depending on their value.
Once the PP or TAPP is examined by the appropriate planning unit at the Directorate
level, it is passed on to the planning cell of the MOHFW for processing. If the project is
favourably considered by the Joint-Chief of the planning cell, and is worth less than Tk.
20 million (US$ 500,000) it is passed to the Departmental Project Evaluation Committee
which can recommend approval to the Minister, MOHFW. If the value of the project is
between Tk. 20 and 50 million (up to US$ 1.25 million) it is processed by the health or
family welfare division of the Planning Commission and submitted to the Project
Evaluation Committee (PEC) of the Commission which in turn passes its
recommendation to the Minister for a judgement. Decisions regarding approval of PPs
with a value of more than Tk. 50 million are, on the recommendation of the PEC, placed
before the Executive Committee National Economic Council (ECNEC) for approval. At
any of these stages, the PP may be returned to the sponsoring agency for modification.
Upon approval by the appropriate authority, a Government Order for project
implementation is issued; dedicated project implementation offices are established and a
Project Director appointed (often after approval by the sponsoring donor). The Project
Directors often follow the PP/TAPPs unyieldingly, thereby introducing additional rigidity
into this drawn out approach to activity planning.
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The entire approval process takes between one and two years, which donors considered
time consuming, expensive and counter-productive in terms of facilitating aid
disbursement.' 25" 26
 Donor frustration was such that it was taken up by the UN Heads of
Agencies in their first meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.' 27
 Over the course of
project design and approval, the ERD leads the formal aid negotiation with donors -
although these are largely pro forma since the donors have usually discussed details with
the implementing agency throughout. Indeed, donors are so involved in initiating PPs that
the Bank found it necessary to remind its staff that "the involvement of the Planning
Commission, in addition to the implementing ministries, right from the early stage of
project identification and appraisal, is necessary for getting PPs approved early." 28
 Yet,
despite donor involvement, they remained irked by the time it took to gain project
approvals, as illustrated by the following exchange surrounding the Third Population and
Family Health Project:
At the Paris Aid Group meeting, Mr Hopper [Bank Vice President] told Secretary
Karim [Health] and Planning Commission member Huq in no uncertain terms
that he wanted this project declared effective by that date [the terminal date of
effectiveness by which time all conditions of effectiveness have to be met]. This
seems unlikely because.. of . .approval of project proformas. . .Planning
commissioner Huq nearly sent Hopper into orbit when he said that one project
proforma needed to be rewritten now that Sweden is no longer cofinancing the
project. Hopper reminded Huq that Sweden had withdrawn as a cofinancier some
seven months earlier, and asked why no action had been taken to revise PP in the
a129interim.
Of course donors held an effective sanction over project approval which made a mockery
of the entire processing machinery. The power donors exercised was already evident to
planners as the First Five-Year Plan was being implemented. According to the Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission, "there were two constraints on the choice of
projects for inclusion in the annual development programme. One was the need to
accommodate ongoing projects. The other was the availability of foreign financing.. .The
donors could determine the pattern of development expenditure by the exercise of their
choice amongst the list of projects presented to them for financing. Even when the donors
selected from within the list of projects presented by Government, they could affect
significantly the composition of the development programme in a given year by delaying
commitment for some projects and accelerating commitment of funds for others. Thus
Eventually the Government had to ask that credit effectiveness be delayed for a further 6 months,
arguing that, in part, the delay was due to ". . .conditionalities put forth by the cofmanciers [which]
require in-depth examination by the government.." In that loan effectiveness was contingent on
approval of 22 PPs as well as signing cross-agreements with all the cofinanciers, numerous
conditionalities would have been involved.
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they could change the priority of individual projects over time within the list of projects
agreed upon by the Government."30
Donors undermined the Government's attempt to utilise the project approval approach as
a lever over coordinated investment in the sector in another manner. As noted above,
inclusion of a project into the Annual Development Programme (ADP) was theoretically
intended to serve both to rationalise projects into a coherent set of activities and to act as
the green light for spending. However, the ADP never comprised a complete list of
projects, as certain donors, for example WHO, 131 operated outside of this mechanism. As
a result, the utility of the ADP as a planning tool was seriously compromised.
There were additional barriers which constrained the Government from engaging in
strategic planning. One barrier involved the amount of time officer level staff were
required to devote to project managerial and administration which left little time to
consider macro issues. This was due, in part, to the culture of decision-making described
in Chapter Two (section 2.5.3). The costs of tying up senior decision-makers in mundane
matters of administration was exacerbated by the onerous task of managing numerous aid
relationships and responsibilities. One health sector donor warned that "the constant
stream of foreign visitors, if continued, might divert staff time and resources from core
activities." 132 Ironically, by core activities, the donor referred to its own project activities
and not the Government's broader programme of work.
The over-riding emphasis within the bureaucracy on the processing and approval of
PCPs, PPs, and TAPPs and the preoccupation with administration may have been
reinforced by the excessive focus among donors on the specific projects which they
supported. By way of illustration, the UNDP Resident Representative in Dhaka voiced his
concerns to the GOB over the slow rate of implementation of UNFPA projects: "it is one
of the lowest of any national programme." 33
 To remedy the problem, UNFPA proposed
that the Government utilise UNFPA funds to hire national or expatriate advisors to assist
the responsible Project Directors to hasten project implementation. 134 The implications of
this solution raised concerns for the Bank: "most of the Project Directors for UNFPA
projects will be those handling our project funds too. And when the Project Director has
the national/expatriate advisor and staff putting pressure on him on daily basis for
executing UNFPA projects, it is likely that implementation of our project components
might get neglected." 35
 As a result of such donor competition, pressure was brought to
bear on the MOHFW to concentrate resources on project implementation as opposed to
ensuring that project activities took place within a coordinated environment.
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The constant barrage of conflicting advice from donor agencies may have also made it
difficult for ministry officials to coordinate aid. In one of the many instances when such
conflict arose, the Bank acknowledged that "resolving [i.e., reconciling] these two sets of
recommendations may be a problem for the PCFPD. This illustrates the need to defme as
precisely as possible the terms of reference of future advisors to avoid possible overlaps
and conflicts." 36 Yet, it proved difficult to avoid the differences among donors which
existed across a broad range of issues. The effect that this had on an over-stretched and
under-resourced bureaucracy was predictable - more projects were spawned so that all
approaches could be accommodated.
Two project-related issues further impaired Government's ability to coordinate aid: (1)
the magnitude of aid projects; and (2) donor tendencies to set up ring-fenced project
implementation structures. The value of donor projects are massive in comparison to the
US$ 2 per capita, annually available from the public purse for health (in 1995).' For
example, the IDA/cofinancier projects doubled in value with each successive project; the
FPHP disbursed over US$ 770 million during its six years of implementation.' 38
 The
Bank conceded that "at least some of the pressure for a large scale project in Bangladesh
relates to 'lending pressure' within the Bank." 39
 As a Swedish evaluation of its aid to
Bangladesh noted with respect to the FPHP, "With programmes of this size, it is rather
self-evident that the Government's coordinating role falls victim to interests of efficiency.
The nature of the programmes as gigantic by-pass operations, set to avoid the negative
influence of the bureaucracy tends to be perpetuated."'° The 'by-pass operations' entail
the establishment of project implementation units, which create special interests of their
own. In the words of a WHO official, "the FPHP put a large amount of resources into the
hands of 66 Project Directors without thought of how these individuals would impact on
the sector as a whole. They are in powerful positions and have ambiguous loyalties - no
clear lines of authority nor career plans. This makes it difficult for higher GOB
authorities to exert control."4'
To a large extent aid, particularly that programmed outside of the Consortium, obviated
the management procedures embedded in the Bangladeshi administration. Instead donors
opted to establish exclusive bilateral arrangements; allegedly to meet their accountability
requirements but equally to expedite project implementation. This created two problems.
First, the projectised approach favoured interactions between Project Directors (who were
outside the control of the MOHFW chain of command) and their sponsoring donors at the
expense of wider interactions between line staff and all concerned donors. Second, the
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problem of duplication arose. Ironically, although donors were concerned about
duplication of aid management systems, they suggested that their own ought to remain
and those of the Government be phased out. For example, "The mission
[IDA/Cofinanciers supervision mission of FPHP] is concerned with the multiplicity of
project monitoring instruments, and stresses the need to streamline these, e.g., the p1,+
the IMED reports, etc. The PIV should be used as a monitoring tool by the Project
Directors, higher management in the Directorates and Ministry."42
One of the most intractable coordination problems involved harmonising the funding
cycles of the projects with the Government's allocation system. For example, the German
delegation involved in preparation of the FPHP observed that "at pre-appraisal, Fourth
Project preparations were by about one year behind the time schedule that would have
been required for good coordination with GOB's own PP preparation process and macro-
planning for the Fourth Plan. This coordination would have been essential to secure
adequate Government counterpart financing for, e.g., adequate staffing of the MOHFP
for its expanding functions	 However, as another Mission reported:
the approval and funding problems which the population and health sector is
currently suffering from, are not instances of occasional or ad hoc failure to plan
properly or manage the budgetary process correctly, but rather reflect a structural
weakness in the Government procedures when dealing with large scale
programmatic support from donors. This structural weakness is a direct
consequence of the difference in the time requirements of the appraisal and
approval process of the Consortium members on the one hand and the time
requirements of the planning and budgeting process of the Government on the
other.. .The problem, as the Mission sees it, is not only the Consortium's cycle is
not harmonised with the Government's Five Year Plan cycle, but also that
currently the Government and Consortium procedures are incompatible in their
timing of preparation and approval requirements, thus making it impossible to
144have the two fully coincide.
Although the mission proposed an in-depth analysis of the problem so as to arrive at
"suggestions aimed at harmonising the planning and budgeting process," progress in this
area does not appear to be promising given the pressures which dictate donor funding
cycles. For example, with respect to the FPHP the Bank "decided to accelerate the
processing of the project, in order to bring it to the Board within the current fiscal year,
when more IDA resources are likely to be available because of slippage of other projects
in the FY91 lending program for Bangladesh."45
• The Project Implementation Volume (PIV) was introduced by the Bank because it considered the
GOB's Project Proforma and IMED reports inadequate for project management and monitoring.
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The foregoing discussion suggests that the project preparation and approval process did
not ameliorate the problems of aid coordination which arose as a result of the absence of
policy and planning frameworks capable of governing investment in the sector.
Notwithstanding these limitations, it should be noted that project cofinancing did provide
a significant measure of coordination over certain donor-supported activities in the sector.
One prominent example of cofinancing, that supported by the Bank-led Consortium, is
considered in Chapter 5.
3.6 Aid coordination through the budgetary process
The government's budgetary process provides yet another means through which aid can
be coordinated - for the budget, among other functions, acts to allocate resources.0 In
Bangladesh, the development (mainly capital) and revenue (mainly recurrent) budgets are
prepared and presented separately. The former is largely funded by foreign assistance
supported by counter-part funds and the latter from domestic sources. The Finance
Division of the Ministry of Finance has overall responsibility for the budget preparation
process. However, as described above, the Planning Commission, through the preparation
of the Annual Development Programme, is in effect responsible for the preparation of the
development budget - as the translation of the ADP into the development budget is a
mechanistic process which does not involve decisions regarding resource allocation.
A number of factors prevent the budget from achieving its potential as a coordination
tool. These relate to the procedures themselves and to donor compliance. Resource
estimation provides an example of both. The ADP has to be finalised by the Planning
Commission in early May so that it can be forwarded to the ECNEC for approval in May
prior to its submission to Parliament as the budget for the new fiscal year (which starts in
Bangladesh on July 1). Yet estimates of aid availability for any one year can not be made
until the Paris Aid Gioup Meeting in April at which donors make pledges for the
forthcoming fiscal year. The uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that donors make
pledges, as opposed to commitments (which differ significantly from disbursements). In
practice, according to an evaluation of the process, pledges made in April at the Paris Aid
Group meeting were "unlikely to be disbursed during the forthcoming year, due to delays
in project approval and mobilisation."46
 The budgeting process is further weakened by
the practice of donors providing equipment and technical assistance directly to their
projects (e.g., WHO which does not operate through the ADP process because, it has
Neither the Secretary nor Minister are involved in budget formulation as this is done by the
Directorates which forward the budgets to the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission
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•	 •	 147
argued, WHO is a multilateral techrncal agency not a donor ). The evaluation cited
above noted that "the ERD attempts to obtain details of the equipment and technical
assistance provided direct to the projects from the donors, but many do not provide these
figures promptly enough for their timely inclusion in the actual expenditure columns of
,,148the budget and some to not comply at all. 	 As a result the budget remains a weak tool
in relation to aid coordination.
3.7 Government-led donor coordination consultations for health sector
Respondents in the survey undertaken for this study unanimously endorsed the notion of
some form of Government-led, Government-donor coordination arrangement in the
health sector. No such arrangement currently exists although, for a brief period in the late
1980s, the Secretary is said to have convened meetings of donors 149 (although no
substantiating documentary evidence was found). During the formulation of HAPP-5, a
concerted effort was made to merge a number of apex committees into one Government-
led apex body to undertake aid coordination. At the time when this research came to a
close, these efforts had not yet borne fruit (see Chapter 6). Most donors conclude that the
Government is not only unable to coordinate aid in the health sector, but also lacks the
willingness to do o150 According to a WHO official, "the Government is not very
interested in aid coordination." Hence, WHO "would not invest a dollar in aid
coordination until the Government is clearly interested in taking up the challenge and is
willing to try some alternative to the Consortium."51
The Government also utilises informal methods of coordination. For example, by hosting
luncheons for potential donors or having ad hoc meetings with donor officials. While
informal dialogue between Government and donor officials is a necessary but insufficient
condition for effective aid coordination, it is impossible to pass comment on the
effectiveness and actual contribution of such approaches to the desired ends.
3.8 Chapter summary
The Government has concluded that "in the absence of a well planned and systematic
aid negotiation and coordination arrangement for the health and population sector,
piecemeal aid allocation and donor pressure for assistance in particular areas have
resulted in duplication of efforts in some areas and inadequate attention to other
areas..." 152 The GOB has thus recognised the problem, while only superficially
diagnosing its causes and doing relatively little to take remedial action on these.
directly. This limits the extent to which budgets truiy reflect sector priorities and enjoy the
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The absence of an over-arching sector policy and, until very recently, an agreed
strategic plan setting out the Government's priorities, provided interested parties with a
virtual tabula rasa for investment. This tended to be allocated on a project-by-project
basis, in an ad hoc manner, largely uncoordinated from other planned activities in the
sector.
Broad policies which have been endorsed by the Government, such as the population
policy and the health and population sector strategy, have been largely driven by parties
within the donor community. Shallow Government ownership of these policies has
limited the extent to which the Government and certain donors are willing to deploy their
resources with reference to these frameworks.
The over-arching institutional arrangements for Government-led aid coordination are
inadequate for sector level coordination: (1) the ERD because it is organised according to
source of funds, largely severed from the planning process, and aims to maximise aid
mobilisation; and (2) the Planning Commission because it has been gradually
emasculated, many of its responsibilities devolved to the line ministries, and because
donors have tended to operate relatively independently of its plans. These institutions
may have been further constrained from fulfilling their aid coordination functions by the
competition among donors to establish fiefdoms within them as well as donor moves to
usurp coordination functions from them.
The Government-led planning machinery has not proven effective at coordinating and
managing aid because: (1) it places excessive emphasis on project formulation and
approval to the detriment of strategic planning for the sector as a whole; (2) there exists
an inability, or unwillingness, on the part of high-level decision-makers to delegate
lower-level decisions which results in a preoccupation with routine tasks at the expense
of strategic planning; and (3) at the sector level, planning skills are in short supply,
inadequately developed, and overwhelmed by the exigencies of project processing and
administrative demands.
> A Government-led, sector-level, apex body for coordination of external resources has
yet to be established.
>- Some culpability for the relative absence of GOB leadership, and the weakness of its
institutions, in aid management rests with donors themselves. Particularly with their
proclivity to operate behind closed doors, by inundating Government officials with
foreign visitors and other donor demands, and by inducing confusion through advocacy
of contradictory policy prescriptions.
authority of the Principal Accounting Officer - the Secretary.
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- Government commitment to policies, plans and projects, and their use to coordinate
aid, may be eroded by Government perceptions that these have been formulated primarily
to satisfy donor demands and requirements.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Coordination of United Nations health sector support: necessary, insufficient
& irrelevant?
In the first few years of its existence Bangladesh undoubtedly benefited from
donor coordination through the United Nations.1
Faaland, World Bank Resident Chief, Dhaka 1981
4.1 Introduction
In the early 1 990s, 18 United Nations (UN) organisations were active in Bangladesh,
disbursing approximately the same amount of external assistance as all the bilateral
organisations, the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) and the European Community
combined.2 Thirteen of these agencies provided operational assistance to the Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare and as a group provided approximately 45% of external
assistance. 3 The UN agencies thus formed an important feature of the aid regime and
coordination among them would, therefore, have been necessary in its own right. Yet the
UN agencies tended also to occupy a special niche as a function of their normative
authority (i.e., knowledge-based competence) and perceived neutralitf which bestowed
upon them a potentially unique position in aid coordination arrangements.
This Chapter assesses the implementation of a series of global initiatives of the United
Nations System designed to coordinate the operational activities of its member
organisations at the country-level. The rationale and intent of each of the mechanisms is
described, as is the manner and nature of their adoption in Bangladesh. Emphasis is
placed on the extent to which these instruments have impacted upon aid coordination in
the health sector and an argument is constructed as to why the mechanisms have been
largely ineffectual. As the organisations form part of a system, theoretically conducive to
coordination, an analysis of their 'failure' to coordinate is instructive for the lessons it
offers this study.
4.2 Resident Coordinator System: is it a system?
Since its establishment in the 1940s, the United Nations has evolved into a web of4l
institutions. It currently consists of 18 Funds and Programmes (such as UNDP, UNICEF
a WHO's neutrality derives from its one-country, one-vote system of governance. In general,
multilateral organisations are perceived to be more neutral than the bilaterals.
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and UNFPA), 18 specialised agencies (e.g., WHO and the development banks) and five
regional economic commissions. Notwithstanding the number of these organisations, the
propensity for them to coordinate their action should have been facilitated by two factors:
(1) they do not face the same pressures as their bilateral counterparts to situate their
programmes within the rubric of national political or economic objectives; and (2) they
were established as part of a system through which coordination could have been
imposed by command. Such a system, however, has not evolved. The Funds and
Programmes are sub-organs of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The
Executive Boards of these organisations report through ECOSOC to the General
Assembly of the UN and are in this manner responsible to the UN Secretary-General. The
specialised agencies, in contrast, are independent, inter-governmental organisations with
their own governing councils. Their Executive Heads, therefore, act in a relatively
independent fashion from the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. Within these
constraints, and under external pressure to do so, efforts have been made to establish
instruments which might facilitate improved coordination among these organisations.
The responsibility to coordinate the UN family was formally vested in UNDP by the
4General Assembly m 1970. During the mid-1970s, a number of changes were made to
the position of the IJNDP Resident Representative to solidify its coordination capacity.
This led to the creation of the resident coordinator system (RCS) in 1978 which sought to
raise the status of the individual coordinator to "first among equals" among
representatives of UN organisations. The Resident Coordinator (RC) would be appointed
by the UN Secretary-General, rather than the IJNDP Administrator, and would have
"over-all responsibility for, and coordination of, operational activities for development
carried out at the country level." 5
 Despite nominal Secretary-General sponsorship, the
RCS remains closely affiliated to UNDP. A survey in 1995 found that over 95% of
Coordinators were from UNDP, while the remaining 5% were seconded to UNDP from
their respective organisations for the duration of their assignment.6
The resident coordinator system incorporates a variety of instruments to facilitate the
integration of UN assistance into the development programmes of recipient countries.
Documentary instructions from UNDP headquarters on how the RCS should function are
numerous and comprehensive. The system has, however, remained fragile, in part
because the responsibility vested in UNDP has never been matched with adequate formal
authority and, in part because the system has lacked financial support and credence of its
member organisations. Until 1995, it is debatable whether the RCS could be properly
described as a 'system' per Se.
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Recent steps have been taken to further bolster and formalise the RCS. In July 1994, the
Secretary-General appointed the Administrator of UNDP as the Special Coordinator for
Economic and Social Development and transferred managerial functions of the RCS to
UNDP. 7
 The UNDP Executive Board took the decision to allocate 1.7% of its core budget
(beginning in 1996) to the RCS and established the Office of UN System Support and
Services to facilitate country level coordination. 8
 UN General Assembly resolution
50/1 20, passed in 1996, requested that the Secretary-General: (1) develop common
guidelines for performance appraisal which included an assessment of the contribution
made by UN staff to coordination; and (2) urge Executive Heads of the UN organisations
to direct their country representatives to promote the RCS. The resolution also invited the
organisations to provide appropriate support to the system and reaffirmed the need to
enhance the authority of the resident coordinator to propose amendments to the
programmes of the various UN organisations prior to submission of these to their
respective governing bodies.
In Bangladesh, the RCS has been led by consecutive IJNDP Resident Representatives.
Participants include the UN organisations as well as the World Bank, AsDB and, to a
lesser extent, the IMF. The preparation of annual RCS work plans and budgets began in
1995.'°" The budget for the RCS (exclusive of salaries) was US$ 60,000 for 1997.12
With the exception of UNDP,a none of the organisations provides direct financial support
to the RCS. Some joint activities, however, have been undertaken on a cost-sharing basis
(e.g., commissioning advocacy documents). Given the increasing workload of system
coordination, most UN organisations recognise the need to provide increased human
resource support to the RCS. Consequently, WFP seconded one of its staff to UNDP for
RCS-related tasks for three months during 1996.13 The idea of recruiting additional staff
was floated, but post cost-sharing was resisted by a number of agencies.' 4 The following
sections analyse the progress achieved in system coordination in Bangladesh, and its
relevance and impact on coordination of external resources to the health sector.
4.3 Meetings under the aegis of the Resident Coordinator System
A variety of groups and committees have been proposed and/or established within the UN
system to enhance system-wide coordination at the country-level, although not all of
these instruments have been instituted in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, these include
meetings and a programme of work by the Heads of Agencies, the Joint Consultative
a These include a full-time National Programme Officer and Secretary.
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Group on Policy, the UN coordination committee, thematic groups, and programme
review groups.
4.3.1 Heads ofAgencies Meetings
The Heads of Agencies (HOA) meeting is the principal coordination tool of the UN in
Bangladesh. The chiefs of the entire UN country team, including the development banks,
are invited to monthly HOA meetings which they usually attend (the Government is not
represented). Currently, the meetings are called and chaired by the Resident Coordinator,
who sets the draft agenda and writes the minutes, although the chair rotated during the
early 1 990s. Discussions in this group are wide-ranging: from whether or not to
undertake a particular system-wide activity (such as the preparation of a 'Country
Strategy Note');' 5 to developing a common UN position on a specific issue; to issues such
as the security of staff. 16
 The forum has served to formulate joint UN positions to present
to Government at, for example, the annual Consultative Group meeting in Paris.' 7
 Joint
stands have also been taken on operational issues, such as bottle necks to project
implementation. HOA meetings have been used to organise briefings by each of the
organisations on their respective mandates, activities, and modes of doing business so as
to improve mutual understanding and, thereby, the prospects for coordinated action.'8
Although joint reviews of programmes and projects prior to their submission to respective
governing bodies has not taken place, UNICEF presented its proposed programme (1996-
2000) to the rest of the UN family at one of the HOA meetings. The group has used the
mechanism to discuss co-sponsorship of events, such as an NGO-GOB preparatory
meeting for the Beijing Conference on Women, and of joint advocacy documents.' 9
 In
1996 and 1997, this venue provided the UN organisations an opportunity to comment on
the Resident Coordinator's work plan, budget and annual report.2°
In a departure from early ways of doing business, at the time of this research, the group
was discussing how to achieve coordination in a more systematic manner, through for
example, a coordinated UN strategy. Two initiatives were under consideration. 2 ' The first
involved exploring options for intensified collaboration among the agencies at the sub-
national level, in one particular district or Thana, thereby reinforcing the Government's
decentralisation reform process. The other area involved developing a united strategy on
constraints faced in programme execution and implementation. There is a perception
among members that, to date, these meetings have tended to emphasise administrative
issues and have, consequently, provided inadequate opportunities for substantive
programme coordination.22
 Moreover, there is little evidence from the minutes that the
HOA meetings provide an overarching framework for sectoral coordination of UN
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support nor any direct support for coordination in the health
23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43
sector.
4.3.2 The Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP)
As organisations which report to the UN Secretary-General, UINDP, UNFPA, UNICEF
and WFP form the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) at both the global and
country levels (i.e., four of the eighteen UN agencies which provide operational support
to Bangladesh)? Collaboration among members at the country-level has been mandated
by the UN General Assembly in 1 989 and by the governing bodies of the member
agencies. It was decided in 1996 that the implementation of General Assembly resolution
50/120, concerning the strengthening of operational coordination, would become a
principle focus of the JCGP.45
The JCGP constitutes a potentially important group for aid coordination within the UN,
not only because its members collectively account for approximately 40% of the UN's
resource contribution to Bangladesh, including the IFIs,40
 but because they report directly
to the Secretary-General. JCGP representatives meet monthly to discuss substantive,
operational and administrative issues with the chair rotating on an annual basis (the
meetings are not minuted). In 1994, the JCGP articulated a joint mission statement for
their organisations in Bangladesh, which included a series of common goals and
objectives. 47
 Although nebulous, the statement was intended to serve as a first step in
identifying joint indicators and setting time-bound targets. A more comprehensive
declaration was jointly sponsored and published (together with other UN organisations)
under the title "A Fork in the Path: Human development choices for Bangladesh."48
 This
document, according to the JCGP members, served as the basic framework which guided
the articulation of the individual agency country programme s.49
An 'issues' paper commissioned for a meeting of Executive Heads of the JCGP held in
Dhaka in February 1994 provides pertinent findings concerning the potential for
coordination among the JCGP agencies. 5° The report notes that JCGP organisations in
Bangladesh "have been working together on individual projects in a few sectors, but
collaboration options have not been systematically explored." The paper pinpointed a
number of factors which inhibit these organisations from achieving greater collaboration
at the country-level. These included the lack of clarity on the rationale for collaboration
A In 1994, the executive heads of UNCDF and UNHCR requested inclusion in the JCGP. This was
opposed by UNFPA and WFP. The perception was that enlargement would make the Group
unwieldy and would debase the common denominator. (JCGP Briefmg Notes, 5 February 1994).
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among "most UN staff members," coupled with a perception that "few positive outcomes
have resulted from collaboration efforts so far" and that "JCGP collaborative efforts have
resulted more in promoting a 'culture of meetings' rather than a 'culture of action'." The
report concluded that experience suggested that: (1) success depended on the
personalities of heads of country offices; (2) organisations resisted coordination because
they perceived "another organisation to be too bureaucratic, too aggressive in its
individual publicity, too poor to make any financial contribution, or too narrow in its
approach to development;" (3) officials were concerned that collaboration increases
bureaucratic procedures and reduces action; (4) coordination is impaired by the lack of
familiarity with procedures of each other's agencies; and (5) coordination takes time and
increases work-load.
The above-mentioned JCGP meeting recommended a number of steps to overcome the
obstacles to coordination identified in the issues paper. 5 ' The proposals included:
deputation of staff to other member organisations; fielding a joint mission to examine
means for streamlining operations in light of differing programming cultures; and
organising joint staff retreats to promote coordination and system-wide goals. While
follow-up on these issues has been discussed in the JCGP meetings, there has only been
limited progress in practice. Deputation of staff proved difficult, particularly for the less
well represented agencies, since the view is held by most agencies that their staff are
already over-stretched and secondment would seriously impede programme
implementation. To some extent, the team-building recommendation has been taken
forward under the aegis of the larger UN community through, for example, a briefing
series on mandates and a UN staff retreat. Harmonising procedures, however, appears to
represent a more intractable problem (see below).
Some progress has been achieved on two issues pertinent to coordination, one substantive
and one procedural. In an effort to coordinate JCGP follow-up to the Fourth World
Conference on Women, in 1996 the Group commissioned, on a cost-sharing basis, a
consultant to review the work of each of the members so as to identify areas for
collaborative programming. Although a draft report was produced, 52 by the conclusion of
this research, it had not led to tangible coordinated follow-up. Second, in accordance
with directives from their headquarters, the Group examined payment to Government
staff among all UN organisations. 53
 It found significant differences in practice among the
agencies on the types and levels of cash and non-cash benefits paid. Consequently, an
effort was underway to harmonise payments and develop an exit-strategy over the
medium-term for the JCGP, a process which was de-linked from the actions of the other
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UN agencies who would need to seek guidance from their respective headquarters on the
issue. 54
 Whether or not an exit strategy will be agreed among JCGP organisations and
collectively acted upon, remains to be seen.
As a step toward harmonising their diverse programming processes, the Executive Heads
of the JCGP proposed that the RCS undertake a Common Country Assessment (CCA) in
each country where the UN is active operationally. 55
 The idea was that there should be a
common approach to identifying, collecting and analysing a country's basic data prior to
formulating agency-specific programmes. The need for such an exercise was
acknowledged by the Group in Bangladesh,56
 particularly in light of the fact that: (1)
there is limited involvement of the agencies in one anothers' programme formulation; (2)
no common UN framework for programme monitoring and evaluation exists; and (3) the
JCGP recognises that it could play a lead role in consolidating and giving focus to the
indicators that have emerged from the global conferences held in the 1 990s on social
issues (section 4.6). However, given competing priorities and the political environment in
Bangladesh at the time the Executive Heads pressed for the Assessment, initiation of the
CCA was postponed, at least until the country strategy note was finalised (see below).57
In summary, although the JCGP is a small group, relatively homogeneous, subject to
central (albeit distant) authority (i.e., the UN Secretary-General), and its members have
received directives to coordinate their operational activities, progress towards such an end
remains constrained. Coordination remains dependent on the decision of individual
agency representatives who will not necessarily weigh positively the generalised benefits
of coordination against its all-too-apparent costs. Deliberations within this forum have not
touched on the issue of coordination at the sectoral level, which suggests that the JCGP
has limited relevance to health sector aid coordination. Given overlap between the JCGP
and Heads of Agencies meetings, some questioned the very existence of the JCGP. If the
group is limited in size simply because it facilitates consensus building (as indicated in
the footnote above), the prognosis for more agency inclusive, donor-driven coordination
would appear to be poor. The Government contends that the existence of the JCGP, and
its activities, "is not felt in its quarters."58
4.3.3 Other meetings
General Assembly resolution 47/l99 59called for the establishment of inter-agency, field-
level committees to review all proposed substantive activities of each UN organisation
(e.g. draft country programmes and major projects) prior to their submission to the
respective governing bodies for approval. This type of committee has not been
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established in Bangladesh, although UNICEF has utilised the HOA meetings to this end
and other organisations may use less formal mechanisms to sensitise other UN agencies
to their intended programmes. Resolution 47/199 also proposed that 'thematic groups' be
established by interested UN organisations to develop joint strategies for tackling specific
issues of national importance. One such theme group, on HI V/AIDS (discussed below),
has been established. There is a feeling, however, among the UN organisations that there
is presently no need for additional theme groups in light of the many technical sub-
groups, established under the local consultative group (LCG) initiative, which include a
broader range of development agencies.1'°
4.4 Country Strategy Note: not even a paper pretence
In 1989, the General Assembly requested that in order to give greater 'coherence' to UN
programmes at country-level, a "document containing the integrated operational response
61
of the UN system be developed. Three years later, the Country Strategy Note (C SN)
was introduced by General Assembly resolution 47/199 as another instrument for inter-
agency coordination. 62
 The Note is intended to outline the inputs of different UN
organisations in response to priorities and strategies identified in the development plans
of recipient countries. The CSN was to cover a time period consistent with the recipient's
plans so as to ensure effective integration of UN assistance into the country's
development process. CSNs are voluntary in nature and are formulated by national
governments, through a process of consultation between the government and the UN
system. All relevant ministries and UN organisations are to be involved. CSNs are
submitted to the governing bodies of UN organisations to encourage their respective
country programmes to be more responsive to recipient priorities and promote improved
UN coordination.63
In Bangladesh, TJNDP transmitted guidelines for CSN preparation to its counterpart in the
ERD in September 1993. An early decision taken by the Government's Human
Development Steering Committee to embark on the CSN in parallel with the preparation
of the Fifth Five-Year Plan,M was later reversed for reasons which are not clear. As a
result, a number of the UN organisations, particularly the JCGP members, went ahead to
develop their frameworks of cooperation on an individual basis with their counterpart
departments in Government. In September 1995, the Government once again requested
'It is pertinent that since the 1 980s, there has not existed a sub-group on health within the LCG
initiative. This was primarily the case, it was argued by the Bank, because of the existence of the
donor Consortium. As discussed in the next Chapter, the Consortium could, however, not
substitute for a LCG sub-group because, as a cofinancing instrument, it excludes most donors to
the sector.
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support from the UN to prepare a CSN. 65 This decision may have been related to the
Government's embarkation on the Participatory Perspective Plan at that time. However,
as a number of UN organisations had just initiated newly approved programmes (i.e.,
IJNDP, UNICEF, WFP and WHO), the UN suggested an alternative approach to CSN
preparation.66 This involved collating an inventory of ongoing and planned UN-supported
activities and comparing these with the priorities of Government so as to identify gaps
and areas for inter-agency collaboration. 67
 The Government agreed to prepare a modified
CSN and established an Inter-Ministerial Working Group led by the ERD to oversee its
preparation. A retired senior government official was recruited to prepare the document
according to a terms of reference agreed by the UN and the Government's Working
Group.68
Believing that the modified CSN, once completed, would not be very useful as a joint
strategy document, the Resident Coordinator decided instead to use it to obtain the new
administration's (i.e., Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina) endorsement of ongoing UN
programmes of assistance. There were also plans to convene Heads of Agencies meetings
around the 'common themes' identified in the CSN for coordinated follow-up through the
UN system. This second best option was overtaken by events, particularly the
Government's decision in 1996 to reintroduce the five-year planning process (Chapter 3,
section 3.8). Therefore, at the conclusion of this research, the CSN was again being recast
so that it could dove-tail with the GOB Plan (1997-2002) and, in particular, so that it
could serve to incorporate the UN agenda into the FYP.69
As the CSN had not been completed at the close of this research, it was not possible to
assess its effectiveness in improving aid coordination. Nevertheless, a number of
concerns had been raised by stakeholders. Given the halting process of the preparation of
the CSN in Bangladesh, the commitment of the GOB and UN organisations to the
exercise remained in doubt. Some officials questioned the wisdom of introducing yet
another planning and aid coordination instrument, particularly since the CSN suffers from
three substantive weaknesses. First, although the CSN is to be formulated by the
government in partnership with the UN, in Bangladesh the exercise was UN driven.
Moreover, the Note is intended to be responsive to recipient priorities. In Bangladesh, the
UN Chiefs sought to use the CSN "to get our [UN] agenda into the Five Year Plan."7°
Second, coverage of the CSN is limited as it excludes the IFIs, bilateral donors and NGOs
- all significant actors in the health sector. Third, while the consultation and drafting
process may have been useful in sharing information and consensus building at the
macro-level, it is unlikely that the Note would provide the specificity for meaningful
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guidance at the sectoral level. Consequently, the CSN will most likely remain of limited
value to the MOHFW in coordinating external assistance.
4.5 UNAIDS: a little coordination and a lot of expense
The UN Joint Programme on AIDS (TINAIDS) represents an innovative approach of the
UN to provide 'coordinated and rationalised' system-wide support to countries in their
response to HIV/AIDS. 7 ' Through the Programme, the local heads of the cosponsoring
organisations (UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank),
together with those of other UN organisations as well as a national counterpart agency,
are intended to coordinate their support to HI V/AIDS activities in the context of a
government-led HIV/AJDS plan. Inter-agency planning and action were anticipated
72
outcomes.
Although UNAIDS operates as a coordination mechanism under the UN 'thematic group'
initiative, 73 it was heralded by its cosponsors as "an almost totally new approach in the
cooperative efforts of our respective agencies... a new type of cooperative venture."74
UNAIDS is intended to reinforce, not supplant, existing national efforts for HIV/AIDS
coordination.75
 While the initiative functions within the RCS, implying that responsibility
and accountability rests with the Coordinator, the Group is convened and chaired by any
member of the group appointed by the Resident Coordinator. 76
 The selection of the
Chairperson is based on a consensus decision of the Group taking into consideration, not
merely commitment to HIV/AIDS work, but more importantly, the candidate's leadership
skills and commitment to UN coordination. In approximately 60 countries, the Group is
supported by a Country Programme Advisor funded by UNAIDS, but notably, selected
by the Group itself.77
In Bangladesh, a UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS was established in October 1995 and
had met four times, or roughly quarterly, by the close of 1996. As it proved difficult to
convene the heads of cosponsoring agencies for the sole purpose of the Theme Group, it
was decided that meetings would be held monthly, at the tail end of the regular Heads of
Agencies and JCGP meetings. The Group has been chaired by successive RCs but, in
1997, the Group decided to rotate the chair annually. 78 In addition to participation by the
cosponsoring organisations, the ILO and UNCDF were also invited to join the Theme
Group. 79
 The Government had not, at the close of this research, been included in the
Group; primarily, it is argued, because the UN wants to get its own house in order first.8°
In addition, as there is no national AIDS programme and the National AIDS Committee
has no executive powers, it was contended by the Theme Group Chairperson that an
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acceptable national counterpart body did not exist. 81
 Voices within Government argue
that the Director of the National AIDS Project would provide a logical government
representative but the Chairperson did not agree.82
Resources for administrative and logistic support to the Group are provided from
(INAIDS centrally, while at the country-level UNDP provides administrative and
financial services. UNAIDS appointed a Country Programme Advisor to Bangladesh in
May 1996. Small amounts of funds are entrusted to the Theme Group for joint UNA1DS
activities (US$ 90,000 in 199683 and US$ 100,000 was requested for 1997M) In addition,
JICA, provided UNAIDS with US$ 90,000 for strategic planning and other activities.85
Additional activities jointly planned by the Group, as set out in its annual plans, are
funded by the member organisations separately or on a cost-sharing basis outside of the
framework of the UNAIDS operational budget.86
In relation to aid coordination, one accomplishment of the Group was the preparation of
a UN HIV/MDS/STD/RTI Master Plan for 1997 based on an inventory of ongoing and
planned activities of each member in these areas. These activities were found to be worth
approximately US$ 1.6 million for 199787 The exercise alerted the Group to areas where
they could collaborate, where they risked duplication and where gaps remained. 88 In light
of the programme planning processes of at least two of the cosponsoring agencies at the
time (i.e., World Bank and HNFPA), it was expected that the Master Plan would provide
the opportunity for greater coherence and complementarity among some UN-supported
activities. Another coordination-related activity involved the Group joining forces with
the wider donor community in supporting the Government's formulation of a national
HIV/AIDS/STD policy. Subsequently, the Group assisted the Government to develop a
national strategy and plan of action which could potentially enable future donor support
to HIV/AIDS/STIs to be coordinated within the framework of an agreed plan. Initiatives
were also undertaken to increase dialogue between the bilateral agencies and the Theme
Group.
Although UNAIDS enjoyed a measure of success (e.g., level of participation, preparation
of the UN Master Plan, etc.), the Programme faces a number of challenges. These relate
both to the manner in which the mechanism functions and its relevance to sectoral
coordination. In relation to the former, the individual mandates and programmes of work
The development of an AIDS plan had been planned since 1993, with UNDP support, but did not
materialise because of major problems in project design.
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of the member organisations compete with their allocation of resources (time, advocacy
capital, etc.) to UNAIDS which is perceived at the country-level as a 'tack-on' mandate
by some of the heads of agencies. 89
 The Country Programme Advisor suggested that a
number of steps could be taken to bolster coordination through the Programme. 9° The
inclusion of UNAIDS related work in the work plans and performance appraisal systems
of the heads of organisations was viewed a critical incentive to achieve a higher level of
commitment to the Programme. Second, while the decision to rotate the chair among
members may engender wider ownership of the mechanism, it may prove
counterproductive by moving away from the judicious principle of appointing the person
with the greatest commitment and skills for inter-agency cooperation.X Third, given that
regular, monthly, informal, and well-attended donor-Government meetings for
coordination around AIDS had been established in 1995, coordination through the
restrictive Theme Group may have been a retrograde step in the case of Bangladesh.9'
Consequently, success may require the inclusion of Government in the Group. Donor
ownership of Bangladeshi development programmes is pervasive and reinforced by
exclusive donor clubs. Indeed there was some evidence that Theme Group members
viewed UNAIDS as a mechanism through which to exercise collective 'pressure' on the
Government to adopt donor views in relation to HI V/AIDS. 92 The fourth problem relates
to value-for-money. The costs of administering a programme with an expatriate-led
country office amounts to no less than US$ 400,000 per year. While the mandate of
UNAIDS is admittedly broader than agency coordination, it remains that in Bangladesh
UNAIDS can at best, if it is indeed effective, provide coherence to the relatively small
contribution of the UN agencies in the AIDS sector (i.e., US$ 1.6 million).
UNAIDS, as viewed from the perspective of the MOHFW's challenge of coordinating
donor resources for HIV/AIDS activities, is a mixed success. On the positive side, the
inventory-type exercise may serve to reduce duplication and gaps in UN assistance.
However, since UNAIDS is not designed to serve as a funding or project execution
channel, the Programme will not necessarily reduce the burden on the MOHFW of
managing numerous relationships and projects with the individual Theme Group
organisations. To reduce this load, UNAIDS would need to promote project cofinancing
among its members supporting activities within the same ministry. There are no plans for
such an approach.
Heads of agencies may argue that they meet these criteria ipso facto, but this is not axiomatic.
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While UNAIDS marks a step in the direction of improved donor coordination, two further
steps would be required to achieve the Programme's full potential. First, the mechanism
would need to incorporate the resources of bilateral agencies since they provide the lion's
share of aid for HIV/AIDS. However, UNAIDS has no mandate to coordinate bilateral
assistance and it is unlikely that the bilateral agencies would acquiesce to UNAIDS
assuming such a role. Second, ear-marked resources for HIV/AIDS coordination would
need to be transferred to the Government so as to enable it to assume coordination
responsibilities. This raises two issues. First, although it is encouraging that dedicated
resources are available to improve coordination within the UN, some question whether or
not a Theme Group might have sufficed without the creation of another costly
Programme (i.e., UNAIDS). 93 Second, it is not clear that these funds would not have been
better spent in developing indigenous capacity for aid coordination. 8
 The latter would,
however, be dependent upon Government commitment and leadership on HIV/ATDS
which, according to the UNAIDS Theme Group Chair,94
 was lacking, and in many
countries is not forthcoming until the epidemic is in an advanced stage. 95 Finally,
experience with UNAIDS raises the question of whether or not pursuing inter-sectoral
coordination mechanisms is to the detriment of sector-focused coordination efforts?
4.6 Common framework for follow-up to UN conferences in the social sectors
1990 to 1996 witnessed nine international UN conferences addressing social sector
concerns.a These enabled the international community to agree on shared values, time-
bound goals, and strategies to achieve them, and, thereby, provided a vehicle for
'coordination by consensus.' The UN Secretary-General called for integrated UN follow-
up to these conferences, with emphasis placed on the country-level, under the aegis of the
resident coordinator system. A common UN framework was proposed which was to
provide assistance to countries to realise the commitments they undertook at these
Conferences, while reducing the burden on them with regard to implementation.
Moreover, the framework was intended to galvanise the UN organisations around the
agreed goals and to develop mechanisms for coordinated delivery of assistance at the
In the case of HIV/AIDS, developing such capacity within the MOHFW may not be an
appropriate location because of the multi-sectoral nature of the required response.
If one assumes that heads of agencies have a limited amount of time and resources to devote to
coordination activities, and that by extension coordination fora compete with one another to attract
attention, then inter-sectoral coordination activities must detract, ipso facto, from sector-specific
ones.
a The conference themes, venues and dates were: education (Jomtien, 1990), children (New York,
1990), environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), human rights (Vienna, 1993), population (Cairo,
1994), social development (Copenhagen, 1995), women (Beijing, 1995), human settlements
(Istanbul, 1996) and food security (Rome, 1996).
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country level. The latter included, for example, developing common data systems for
planning and monitoring purposes. Consequently, in November 1995, the UNDP
Administrator urged all Resident Coordinators to orchestrate an integrated follow-up to
the conferences held to date. He suggested that thematic groups be established involving
UN organisations and national authorities. Guidelines were issued to the RCs in an effort
to facilitate their support to implementation of conference recommendations. It was
envisioned that these would be drawn upon for planning purposes, for example, in the
preparation of the Country Strategy Note, and would provide a framework for the
thematic groups which emerged.
In Bangladesh, the grand visions forged at the international conferences appeared as
distant as the prospects for coordinated follow-up. The latter has been characterised by
individual efforts of UN organisations to promote the preparation and implementation of
national plans of action according to their respective mandates. Two partial exceptions
pertain to the Fourth World Conference on Women and the International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD). In neither instance has a thematic group been
formed as envisaged by the Secretary-General. In the case of the Beijing conference, the
JCGP commissioned a consultant to write a joint advocacy statement and to identif' areas
for joint programming. Although a draft report was prepared, 96
 no substantive action was
taken by the time the research had been completed. With respect to ICPD follow-up,
TJNFPA assisted the GOB in preparing a plan of action 97 and facilitated the involvement
of the Bank, WHO and UNICEF in the process. 98
 TJNFPA also advocated to ensure that
the Conference goals were reflected in the MOHFW's health and population sector
strategy (1997). Notwithstanding the benefits of coordinated planning, the ICPD plan of
action is so broadly written that it will be of limited value in activity planning and
coordinated follow-up.
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It is, therefore, not clear whether conference goals have furthered UN operational
coordination in a substantive manner.' Thematic Groups were not established and there
was very limited inter-agency follow-up. In 1997, the Resident Coordinator announced
his intention to develop a matrix setting the nine Conference Resolutions against the
planned activities of relevant Ministries and UN organisations, which may provide a
99
starting point for this task.
4.7 Harmonisation of procedures and programming cycles
The onerous and disparate administrative and programming procedures of the UN
organisations have been criticised for diverting scarce recipient resources from priority
tasks and for imposing substantial losses to aid efficiency. Heavily inflated transaction
costs occur for both donor and government, but particularly the recipient, when each
organisation sets individual requirements relating to programme identification, appraisal,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, accounting and auditing, procurement, hiring
and benefits for local staff and consultants, training, and project cycles, etc. A number of
UN General Assembly resolutions have called for rationalisation and harmonisation of
procedures. In response to the resolutions, some initiatives have been undertaken at the
global level, for example, IJNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA agreed in 1997 to harmonise
their budget presentations (i.e., to use the same definitions and break down of costs).'°°
In Bangladesh, in 1994, the JCGP identified the need to simplify procedures and
harmonise programming cultures and cycles. A proposal was made to field a multi-
agency headquarters mission to determine the scope for progress in this area 101
 which did
not materialise. In 1997, an inter-agency Operations Consultative Group was established,
but it will deal mainly with administrative matters of concern to the aid agencies (e.g.,
post adjustments reflecting cost of living, schooling, etc.).'°2 The organisations intend to
undertake a Common Country Assessment, sometime after the CSN is completed, which
may identify areas for harmonisation of data collection. In summary, little progress has
been achieved. Local representatives are of the opinion that meaningful change will need
to be driven from their respective headquarters in the context of system-wide reforms.'°3
UN organisations have not yet achieved much success in synchronismg their programmes
with the GOB's plans nor amongst themselves. The GOB's Fourth FYP concluded in
June 1996 and the subsequent one commenced in July 1997. During 1993-1995, UNICEF
undertook an interim programme so as to bring its cycle in line with that of Government,
' This is not to suggest the Conferences did not seek and achieve other objectives nor that they did
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IINDP and IJNFPA. This was put off course by the Government, which temporarily
suspended its five year planning process, and IINFPA, which extended its programme
due to inadequate implementation. WHO operates under a biennium system and is thus at
odds with the other organisations. As demonstrated in Table 8, the programming cycles
of the major UN organisations operational in the health sector are not well synchronised.
Moreover, the programme preparation processes of the organisations differ to such an
extent that mere hannonisation of cycles may be insufficient to bring about substantive
improvements in relation to streamlining the programme formulation requirements
imposed on the GOB. No common framework for joint planning, monitoring or
evaluation of programmes has emerged.
Table 8: Programme cycles of Government and key UN agencies in health sector
during the 1990s
Agency	 Programme period	 Programme duration
GOB Fifth FYP	 July 1997 to June 2002	 5 years
UNFPA	 January 1991 to December 1998	 7 years
UNDP	 July 1995 to June 1998	 3 years
WHO	 January 1996 to December 1997 2 years
UNICEF	 January 1996 to December 2000 5 years
World Bank FPHP	 July 1992 to June 1998	 6 years
AsDB	 Project by Project Basis
	 N/A
4.8 Performance of UN system coordination: a synthesis
A number of the mechanisms designed for UN system coordination are functional in
Bangladesh. Frequent, regular, and structured Heads of Agencies meetings provide the
dominant mechanism, although, as noted above, a number of other initiatives are also
being pursued. The Resident Coordinator has observed, however, that the GOB does not
utilise the RCS in its efforts to communicate with the UN nor so as to improve the
coordination of multilateral assistance.'°4
 Government officials tend instead to interact
with each of the organisations separately, perhaps as a result of the organisational
structure of the ERD, perhaps because it is perceived as advantageous for them to do so
or perhaps because the UN agencies encourage bilateral as opposed to coordinated
relationships with the Government.
While the Government's non-participation in the system may represent a major short-
coming for the RCS as a whole, limitations to the effectiveness of the individual
mechanisms have also been identified. These relate to the willingness and ability of
member organisations to support joint initiatives in the context of system coordination
not provide value to recipient countries th other respects.
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(see Box 2). The JCGP issue paper, for example, found that UN staff were sceptical as to
the benefits that would accrue to their individual programmes from increased
participation in the coordination instruments, while they were simultaneously aware of
the costs involved.' 05 Many UN staff suggest that a lack of time constrains them from
increased collaboration. This in turn, relates to on-going workload, competing (and
perceived higher order) priorities, inadequate (or non-existent) incentives and insufficient
resources allocated to coordination activities)' According to the present Resident
Coordinator, increased salience would be placed on system coordination if member
agencies were obliged to contribute financially to the RCS.'°6
 The RC's report for 1995
raised the fundamental point, as did agency officials, that the RC lacks the authority to
ensure effective collaboration and as a consequence, the process remains voluntary on the
part of UN organisations and, importantly, their representatives. A107 The report also drew
attention to the lack of staff budget and conflicting agency-specific mandates.
Box 2: Constraints to UN system coordination
Individual UN agency
1. Lack of clarity among staff on rationale for coordination.
2. Differing perspectives and priorities among agencies.
3. Negative perceptions of other agencies.
4. Lack of familiarity with programming cultures of other agencies.
5. Concern that coordination will increase bureaucratisation and reduce action.
6. Officials lack time and resources (i.e., other higher order priorities prevail).
7. Country-level officials lack direction and guidance from headquarters.
8. Competition among agencies for leadership, visibility and resources.
RCS level
9. RCS dependent on personalities and personal chemistries of participating officials.
10. RC lacks authority over system in which participation remains voluntary.
11. RCS lacks resources and impartiality.
Government level
12. GOB has not provided a framework within which to coordinate UN assistance.
13. GOB encourages bilateral interaction with UN organisations instead of working through RCS.
In summary, the RCS is impaired by a lack of authority, incentives, resources and agency
support. The previous RC asserted that almost all agency heads expressed the need to
strengthen the system. 108 Yet, improvement is dependent upon clearer direction from
headquarters coupled with incentives and penalties. It is pertinent to note that although
' Interviews of agency chiefs found that the RC was alone in having coordination listed as a
distinct activity in his job description.
X There is anecdotal evidence that the motivation to coordinate is to some extent dependent on
personal proclivities and the personal chemistry between officials. For example, many officials
complained that one agency chief was particularly difficult to work with and they were pleased
when he did not attend various meetings.
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the most germane General Assembly resolution on coordination was adopted in 1989
(i.e., 47/199), by mid-1993 only one of the UN organisations in Bangladesh "had so far
received a full and clear briefing from its headquarters" on the resolution.'° 9
 Some have
argued that support from member agencies will not be forthcoming while UNDP appears
to remain at the helm of the RCS. They suggest that authority must lie with a neutral or
more representative agency, or that some other mechanism be found to ensure the
impartiality of the RCS. The RC in Bangladesh proposed that impartiality could be
achieved with UNDP management, provided that funding was secured from the UN
110
centrally (i.e., not from member organisations or TJNDP). Nevertheless, even if the
present system can be improved, its sufficiency in relation to coordination of the entire
donor community will remain circumscribed until it encompasses non-UN organisations
in the process. This is particularly the case in the health sector where numerous bilateral
agencies (including the AsDB) collectively disburse approximately 55% of aid to the
MOHFW." Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the RCS will assume any prominence in
coordination beyond the confines of the UN family, even if it aspired to do so.
4.9 The irrelevance of UN system coordination to health sector aid coordination
At the sectoral level, the potential of the RCS to improve coordination does not appear
promising. Accordingly, the RCS does not perform very well against the conceptual
framework for assessing coordination, as summarised in Table 9 below. This is
principally because the tools are too blunt to deal with the specificity of sector planning.
Where more focused coordination initiatives have evolved, such as UNAIDS or joint UN
support for decentralisation reform, the emphasis has tended towards cross-cutting and
inter-sectoral issues, as opposed to coordination within one particular sector or in support
of one line ministry. The RCS may, therefore, be necessary in terms of UN system
coordination, but insufficient from the standpoint of sectoral coordination.
WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA, joined by other multilateral organisations which provide
support to the health sector, might have been expected to utilise the RCS to coordinate
their assistance to the MOHFW. WHO in particular, as the UN's specialised health
agency and as the organisation mandated to provide leadership to UN organisations
involved in health-related activities at the country level, may have spearheaded the use of
RCS instruments to promote aid coordination in the sector. By the time, however, that the
RCS was being introduced, it is generally agreed that WHO was not well positioned to
fulfil this mandate. WHO's potential for leadership was undermined by at least five
factors. First, it is only one of a host of actors in the sector, many of which are more
influential in terms of resources and expertise (see Tables 5 and 6 in Chapter 2). Second,
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the organisation' s modest financial programme (i.e., regular budget funds) is fragmented
into a large portfolio of small technical assistance projects which results in the
programme being spread very thinly.' 112 Third, there is the perception within
Government and other donors that WHO' s main function is the provision of technical
assistance and not leadership. Such perceptions have been reinforced by its inability to
consistently deploy well-regarded professionals with expertise in planning and systemic
reform. Fifth, an evaluation of the organisation suggested that close ties between the
WHO country office and the MOHFW acted as a "hindrance for greater inter-UN agency
collaboration." 13 Yet, paradoxically, WHO has relatively poor access to the Minister and
infrequent access to the Secretary (compared, for example, to the World Bank). WHO
officials conclude that in light of the coordination services provided by the Bank it would
not be feasible for WHO to spearhead a successful initiative to coordinate UN agencies in
the sector.114
There is little evidence to suggest that the multilateral agencies entertained the notion of
using the RCS tools to improve coordination. This did not occur, in part, due to the
general weaknesses of system, but also to the covert (and sometimes open) competition
among the UN organisations for: (1) leadership; (2) bilateral resources; (3) visibility; and
(4) access to MOHFW officials to ensure that their corporate agendas were met. The
tendency among the organisations for rivalry over sectoral leadership has been illustrated
earlier in this thesis (section 2.8.2). The constraint to coordination imposed by the
exigency of multilateral competition for bilateral funding is less demonstrable. What is
clear is that the 14% surcharge on elements of bilaterally funded projects executed by
WHO in Bangladesh acted as a lifeline for the agency at the country level (e.g., funding
the majority of staff). An example of the pressures faced by agencies to remain visible
and how this might militate against coordination is provided by IJNFPA. Its
representative in Dhaka informed headquarters that, in light of the crowded donor
environment in Bangladesh, IJNFPA "was facing a real challenge to remain visible." 15 In
relation to UNFPA's experience in the Consortium, the representative noted that "the
rivalry between the donors, especially the Bank and UNFPA is sometimes rather strong.
The efforts made by UNFPA to be visible. . . are not always greeted [favourably] by the
Bank." 6 Visibility was of similar concern to UNICEF. In discussions between UNICEF
and the World Bank on the possibility of UNICEF participation in the Third Health and
Family Planning Project, the Bank assured UNICEF's Executive Director, James Grant,
a For the 1996/97 biennium, WHO programme budget for Bangladesh amounted to roughly US$ 9
million. With these funds, 35 projects were to be supported which was the equivalent of $ 128,000
per project per year on average each.
Chapter 4: UN Coordination 	 165
and the Dhaka-based representative, that "UNICEF's identity would be fttlly
preserved." 7 The Bank proposed that UNICEF join the Consortium as parallel
cofinancier of the Bank project in a similar fashion as the bilateral agencies. However, in
recognising UNICEF's need for a high profile, the Bank suggested that UNICEF take the
lead on MCII activities and finance key MCII components which would enable it "to
speak on behalf of all agencies assisting the project, thereby giving UNTCEF much more
financial and political leverage." 8 UNICEF was, however, despite assurances to the
contrary, concerned about the risk of being submerged within the Consortium as an
indistinct member. Hence, UNICEF proposed to the Bank that the project be split into
two discreet projects: a family planning project led by the Bank and an MCH project led
by UNICEF." 9 This proposition was rejected by the Bank and as a result UNTCEF opted
against participation in this coordination exercise. 121 Finally, competition over access to
Government officials is likely also to have inhibited inter-agency coordination. Section
2.8.2 exposed how two multilaterals vied for government access so as to expedite the
implementation of their own programmes.' 24 The same section also provided evidence of
a rivalry over the installation of policy advisors in the MOHFW. In conclusion,
competition among the agencies has taken on many guises and has likely played a role in
the ambivalence demonstrated by the organisations to pursue closer relations. As noted
by the UNFPA Country Director: "if it is important to strengthen TJNFPA collaboration
with the Bank and the bilateral donors, it is also most important that UNFPA carry on its
PRSD [programme formulation exercise] as planned in order to identify its proper niche,
,,125independently and without delay. 	 He concluded that overall, the collaboration with
,,126the World Bank has not been beneficial to UNFPA.
The lack of willingness to pursue coordination vigorously at the sector level may also,
however, have been related to the propensity for 'mandate spread.' Mandate spread is
proposed to describe a progressive and cumulative extension of an agency's
interpretation of its formal mandate into a more broadly defined effective mandate. It
will be recalled that thirteen multilateral agencies provided support to the MOIIFW
during the period 1992-96. These organisations were motivated to become involved in the
sector for a number of reasons including, for example, the availability of bilateral funds
for project execution as well as shifts in thinking about development determinants, etc.
Nonetheless, the organisations could readily justify their involvement by the impact of
health-related activities on their organisation's primary raison d'être (be that children,
population, nutrition, women, or labour). The relative importance, however, that these
agencies consequently attached to developments, including aid coordination, within the
health sector may, of necessity, have been diminished by the fundamental concern they
Chapter 4: UN Coordination	 166
held for the primacy of their mandated target group and related GOB partner
organisations. Hence, fulfilling the obligations imposed by their respective formal
mandates, may have taken place at the expense of attention to coordination at the sector
level, irrespective of who led the process.
The impact of mandate spread on the willingness to pursue sectoral coordination can be
illustrated by the cases of UNICEF and UNFPA. UNICEF is driven by the global
consensus on children's rights articulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989) and given greater expression through the goals agreed at the World Summit for
Children in 1990. These are reflected in the Summit's Plan of Action and include not only
a range of health-related goals but also those relating to basic education, water and
sanitation, and rights, inter alia. In Bangladesh, the goals are incorporated in a National
Programme of Action for Children (NPA) which is, appropriately, multi-sectoral in scope
127
and multi-ministerial m implementation. To translate these goals into reality, UNICEF
places much advocacy capital in support of a large number of Bangladeshi civil and state
associations and committees. UNICEF's programme is given expression through a high-
level review and coordination body, called the Joint Government-UNICEF Advisory
Group (JGUAG). This group is chaired, appropriately, by the Planning Commission and
has its secretariat in the Economic Relations Division, not the MOHFW. Consequently,
senior UNICEF officials take greater interest in expending their political resources on
broad, child-focused coordination through the JGUAG and other committees than on
instruments designed solely to facilitate health sector coordination. Although the
MOHFW is not the principal partner of UNICEF, the Fund does make significant
investments in the health sector, in part, through the MOHFW. UNICEF's attention
within the ministry is primarily, however, directed at a limited number of vertically
organised, child-survival interventions (for example, CDD and ARI programmes). Strong
relationships have developed between UNICEF and the MOHFW at the level of national
programme/project directors and significant resources have been invested to ensure that
these programmes yield results, in spite of the relatively dysfunctional health service
infrastructure. Thus from both ends of the spectrum, concern with sector-wide
coordination of external health investments has been passed over in favour of emphasis
placed on higher-level, inter-sectoral bodies and lower-level project implementation.
Mandate spread appears to have also circumscribed UNFPA's interest in health sector aid
coordination. As the Fund's central mandate is to promote population goals, its advocacy
has focused on the National Population Council and, post-Cairo, on the National
Committee for the Implementation of Recommendations of the ICPD (both bodies are
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high level, multi-sectoral, and multi-ministerial). While the MOHFW is a key counterpart
of UNFPA, health (sexual and reproductive) is only one of three main areas of work for
the Fund. Consequently, a regard for the health sector per se and partnership with the
MOHFW is only one of a number of competing interests of the Fund. The UNFPA
Representative made this trade-off explicit in defence of criticisms against his lack of
participation in coordination mechanisms, by drawing attention to the fact that UNFPA
has its own programme to implement which must take priority.'28
For UNICEF and UNFPA, and probably to an even greater extent the other UN
organisations (with the exception of the World Bank), the imperative to realise their
distinct mandates works against their support to mechanisms designed for health sector
coordination. Corroborative evidence is provided by the extent to which the multilaterals
participate in the World Bank-led Consortium, in which WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA
each have some form of association (this is explored in the following Chapter). An
examination of the participant lists of the meetings of the Consortium held between 1992
and 1997 reveals that 41 meetings were held. WHO participated in 92% of these
meetings, but UNICEF and UNFPA only attended 70 and 34 percent respectively.'29
Indeed, the very existence of the Consortium may have detracted attention from the need
to pursue initiatives within the United Nations system to coordinate aid in the health
sector. It is arguably the case that WHO, UNFPA and UNTCEF devoted considerably
more resources to coordination through the Consortium than through the RCS. As is
demonstrated in the next Chapter, however, the Consortium is plagued by a number of
serious short-comings which limit its suitability as a substitute for improved UN
coordination, among them the tendency of the UN agencies to remain relatively
independent of it.
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Table 9: Assessing UN coordination against the conceptual framework for aid
coordination
Process criteria	 Remarks
Ownership 0 Established under the authority of the UN Secretary-General, the RCS is owned by
the entire UN. In practice, due to management arrangements, the RCS is perceived
to be owned more by UNDP than by the other agencies.
O Were individual mechanisms led by UN organisations other than IINDP,
ownership might be more widely shared (e.g., follow-up to the Cairo conference
which was led by UNFPA and involved an additional three agencies).
O There is limited joint-ownership of the mechanisms. UNAIDS provides an
exception: the Theme Group is chaired by the Resident Coordinator while the
Programme has locally-based staff reporting to its HQ in Geneva.
O There is little Government involvement in the RCS. No steps are being taken to
institutionalise the system's activities within the Government - with the exception
of the Country Strategy Note.
Participation	 0 Participation in the mechanisms vary. The JCGP is a very restricted group of UN
agencies as is UNAIDS. The Heads of Agencies meetings attract a larger group of
agencies as does work on the Country Strategy Note.
O The JCGP and HOA meetings appear to be well attended, UNAIDS less so.
O Involvement in the mechanisms is limited to select UN agencies and therefore
excludes bilateral donors, the Government as well as civil society.
Periodicity &	 0 The meetings of the system are regular, frequent (mainly monthly or quarterly) and
continuity	 continuous.
O The Country Strategy Note and the Common Country Assessment are intended to
be on-going processes, yet completing either as a one-off exercise has not yet
occurred.
Integration 0 To the limited extent that the JCGP and HOA groups make contributions to the
Annual Consultative Group meetings as well as make joint statements on policy
issues, they are reactive, as opposed to being integrated, to the policy process.
O The RCS has not effectively harmonised member programmes and thus these are
not well integrated into the GOB planning cycles.
Realm	 0 Emphasis is placed on consultation and, to a lesser extent, concertation while
operational coordination is very limited.
Breadth	 0 The focus of the RCS is mainly on the macro-level with emphasis on inter-sectoral
linkages.
________________ O Most instruments lack specificity for sector-oriented coordination.
Authority &	 0 The authority and legitimacy of RCS instruments are eroded in the case of the
adherence	 specialised agencies by virtue of these agencies reporting to their own autonomous
governing bodies and to a lessor, but still appreciable, extent in the case of the
Programmes and Funds which operate relatively independently of the Secretary-
General.
o Very few agencies bind themselves to commitments made under RCS auspices.
O The programmes of the individual organisations are developed relatively
independently of the RCS.
Costs 0 Compared to the US$ one million annual cost of the Population and Health Office,
which coordinates aid associated with the FPHP, the RCS budget of US$ 60,000 is
modest. However, this does not include the staff costs.
O UNAIDS presents poor value-for-money.
Outcome Criteria Remarks
Efficiency	 0 In that UN system coordination does not emphasise operational coordination nor
the use of common implementation/management arrangements, few efficiency
gains are achieved through the RCS.
0 Little progress has been made in harmonising programming and administrative
procedures.
O UNAIDS may potentially reduce duplication of activities but it is not clear that the
other instruments serve this objective at the level of the health sector.
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Effectiveness	 0 There have been limited attempts to harmonise some policy signals among the
agencies - but these have been very few.
O The UN coordination instruments have not been particularly useful in encouraging
UN agencies to pursue common objectives nor do its agencies use the mechanisms
to engage the MOHFW in dialogue over sector priorities. Consequently, it would
not appear that the RCS improves sector effectiveness.
Equity	 0 Recent initiatives may harmonise remuneration for GOB staff under UN-sponsored
programmes which would improve equity in a limited manner.
o No impact on the equity in terms of payment for services or targeting of assistance.
Sustainability	 0 The mechanisms are driven and owned by the UN without any indication that GOB
participation is intended; thus national capacity development for coordination is
not under consideration and sustainability unlikely.
0 The existing system is financially dependent on UNDP which places the RCS in a
vulnerable position.
O There appear to be few incentives/sanctions for compliance, participation and non-
_______________ 	 participation in the RCS.
4.10 Chapter summary
Due to the significant share of external assistance in the health sector provided by the
large number of UN agencies, the need for coordination among them is incontestable.
'- A range of global initiatives of the UN to promote enhanced coordination at the
country-level have been introduced in Bangladesh under the aegis of the Resident
Coordinator System. While these tools provide, to varying degrees, a measure of
increased consultation, concertation and very limited operational coordination, the tools
remain constrained by numerous factors enumerated in Box 2.
- Notwithstanding the general weaknesses of the RCS, its instruments were not
designed, nor do they appear to have been adapted, to facilitate coordination of activities
at the sector level. Consequently, the tools are largely irrelevant to aid coordination in the
health sector.
The UN agencies involved in the health sector have not pursued coordination through
the RCS. This can be traced to the factors which weaken the system generally and, more
specifically to competition among these agencies for leadership, resources and visibility.
- There is evidence that RCS mechanisms were employed to 'pressure government' to
adopt specific policies and 'get the UN agenda' into government plans.
- Hence, while coordination of UN assistance would arguably have been beneficial, if
not necessary, the systems which were designed to achieve it are not only relatively
ineffective in their application, they are also largely irrelevant at the sector level. A
number of characteristics of the UN system should have predisposed it to facilitating
coordination (i.e., central authority within a loosely coupled system, directives to
coordinate, similar operating procedures, absence of political and economic motives in
programming decisions, etc.). Therefore, that the tools of UN coordination 'failed' does
Chapter 4: UN Coordination	 170
not bode well for coordination of bilateral assistance as it is not governed even by these
basic facilitating elements.
)'- The entrenched donor Consortium, which pre-dated attempts to bolster UN
coordination, has diverted attention from UN agency coordination and thereby further
undermined the potential of the RCS.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The World Bank's health sector Consortium: coordinator or controller of
aid?
The notion of 'Consortium' in this case refers to working together as true and
equal partners in development in Bangladesh.
C. Pannenborg, FPHP Task Manager, 1991
5.1 Introduction
The Consortium, established by the World Bank to coordinate donors around a series of
population and health projects, has been described by its architects as 'unique,'2
'remarkably effective,' 'a high point in donor coordination,' 3
 and worthy of replication in
other countries.4 The Consortium unquestionably represents a lengthy and concerted
effort on the part of a number of donors to accommodate differences in policy and
operational practices so as to more tightly integrate a proportion of their aid to the sector.
This Chapter describes the evolution of the Consortium, its features and how it operates.
The factors which account for its success are identified so as to assess the prospects for
similar achievements, particularly those which are led by Government, elsewhere. Also
set out are the types of interests which donors, including the Bank, pursued through their
association with the Consortium as well as the factors which led other agencies to
programme aid independently of the initiative. The exploration of the rationale for
membership is pertinent as it offers insights into stakeholder expectations and concerns
with respect to aid coordination. Similarly, problems internal to the functioning of the
Consortium are analysed for their implications for coordination more generally. In
addition, the contributions made by the Consortium are analysed on the basis of
stakeholders' views in the context of the impact which it may have had on the ability and
willingness of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to assume a more active role in
aid coordination and management.
5.2 Evolution of the Consortium approach
A pattern of leadership and assertiveness was established in the First Project that
continues to this date.5
World Bank, 1991
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Although it was not until the late 1 980s that the World Bank began to talk in terms of a
'consortium approach' to aid coordination in Bangladesh, elements of the approach arose
out of the Bank's First Population Project in the mid-i 970s. The project was appraised by
the Bank independently, which hoped through it to coordinate all, or most, external
support to the sector. 6 Consequently, the Bank approached other donors for cofmancing;
six agreeda while three major donors decline& because of differences of opinion over
technical issues and who would provide leadership in the sector. 7
 Nonetheless, the use of
a cofinanced project, with attributes such as shared objectives, a common fmancing plan,
the limited use ofjoint cofinancing, and some common disbursement, procurement,
supervision, and reporting arrangements, 8 represents an essential element of the
consortium approach.
An additional aspect of the consortium approach involved convening regular meetings of
the project's interested parties. The 0DM (now DFID) made it clear prior to supporting
the First Population Project that it wanted to "see a local project review committee set up,
representing all interested donors and chaired by the Bank, which would meet
regularly."9 On 3 April 1975, the Bank convened the first such meeting. Participants
included a visiting Bank mission, the six cofinanciers, and from the Government, an
official from the Planning Commission and one from the Population and Planning
Division of the Ministry of Health. According to the Bank, "we intend to hold meetings
from time to time of local representatives of donors to the IDA population project and to
invite officials of the Government" 0
 as part of an ongoing effort to improve coordination
of development assistance to Bangladesh.
The third feature of the approach involved establishing an institutional presence in Dhaka
so as to provide support to the coordination effort. The benefit of stationing a staff
member in Dhaka to coordinate donors associated with the project (as well as those
outside) was expressed in a back-to-office report from a Bank mission to Dhaka in April
1974 and couched in terms of the "need for close project supervision." The Bank
considered three possible options for its field presence: (1) the project coordinator could
be a member of the Resident Bank Mission (RBM) whose cost could be met out of the
IDA administrative budget; (2) the coordinator could be a member of the IDA staff
seconded to the Government and financed out of the IDA credit; or (3) a member of the
a These were AIDAB, CIDA, KfW, NORAD, 0DM (later ODA then DFID) and SIDA.
These were USAID, UNFPA and WHO.
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RBM and financed by the cofinanciers on a pro-rata basis. While the third option was
favoured, one staff member anticipated problems in reaching consensus among donors on
the appointment of an appropriate individual and in securing contributions from them,
thereby presaging a number of problems which would arise through the shared financing
of World Bank aid management services.' 2
 Although the Government raised its concern
over the precedent and principle of using funds granted from bilateral donors to hire and
place personnel on RBM staff, as opposed to within the Government service, 13 its views
were ignored as donors agreed amongst themselves on a financing arrangement.
According to the formula, the officer's salary and expenses were to be shared by
Australia (7%), CIDA (7%), KfW (25%) and NORAD (27%) while the Bank would
contribute 34% and the cost of office space, secretarial help, telephone and postage. 14
SIDA did not contribute towards these costs as it was cofinancing the project jointly with
the GOB not with the IDA.
In terms of accountability, the Bank's view was that the incumbent should "represent the
interests of IDA and the other external donors, and should be responsible to them, not
directly to the Government. He should therefore be considered a member of the resident
mission, administratively responsible to the resident representative." 5
 Final responsibility
rested, however, with the Bank's headquarters in Washington.
The Bank went to great lengths to reinforce and expand these arrangements with each
successive project. In the late 1980s, when the Fourth Population and Health Project
(FPHP) was being formulated, a new Task Manager (TM) took up the challenge with
renewed vigour. At one stage, it appeared that he might convince 20 agencies to join the
Consortium.' 6
 In a discussion between a Bank official and the afore-mentioned Task
Manager, he reflected upon the effort to establish a large consortium as 'resource-
intensive,' 'entrepreneurial' and 'time-consuming.' According to a memorandum' 7
 of the
discussion, the TM "lobbied over a period of years with the numerous donors and forged
a consensus that coincided with the GOB's; this involved hopping to the capitals in
Europe and Japan and lobbying with every conceivable national agency that had any
say..." He also "convinced his Division Chief and Department Director to fmance his
travel expenses, conference costs, etc. for quite a duration until the bilaterals began to
chip in. [The TM] felt that allocating a reasonable 'war chest' to finance all the
coordination work with the donors and the Government for at least two years (to ensure
'P The agencies which were described as potential and current members of the IDA Consortium
were AsDB, AIDAB, BWZ, CIDA, EC, DANIDA, ECB (Japan), FINNIDA, GTZ, ICDA
(Belgium), .IICA, KfW, DGIS, ODA, NORAD, SDC, UNICEF, UNFPA, and WHO.
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continuity) was important." It was also crucial that "the TM should be allowed to dedicate
himself full-time on this enterprise. In [the Task Managers] case, [his Chief and Director]
gave him the time and the resources necessary. It was clear that, in the case of
Bangladesh, it was a labour of love from a TM who went beyond the normal boundaries
of project design/initiation..." The memorandum provides an insight into the institutional
support provided by the Bank to its staff in their pursuit of coordination through the
Consortium arrangement.
The Consortium, which has evolved over a period of 23 years, still revolves around a
cofinanced project, with common secretariat support and a regularised system of joint
monitoring led by the Bank. Although alternative options have been proposed for the
organisational arrangements,dS the Bank has been remarkably successful at maintaining
its position at the fulcrum of Consortium. As described below, intense differences have
arisen among members over, for example, roles and responsibilities. Tremendous effort
has, however, been expended so as to overcome these difficulties through the incremental
adaptation of practice, yet the basic elements of the Consortium approach have remained
essentially unchanged.
5.3 The Consortium and its secretariat office in the 1990s: functions & functioning
5.3.1 The functions of the Population and Health Office
The Terms of Reference (TORs) for the first Population Project Officer, written when the
incumbent was to commence duties in March 1976, were established as four-fold: (1) to
monitor project execution on behalf of the cofinanciers; (2) to assist the GOB in defming
population policies and operational strategies; (3) to liaise with other donors participating
in population-related activities; and (4) to perform demographic analyses.' 9
 It was
therefore envisioned that through its Population Program Office (PPO) the Bank intended
to play a significant coordination role both within the project and the sector as a whole.
While each additional staff member recruited to the PPO worked according to a specific
TOR, it was not until the FPHP was under preparation that a TOR was drafted for the
office as a whole. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for the FPHP framed the TORs as
follows:
For example, alternative organisational structures for the support unit were discussed between the
Bank and WHO late in 1988. At that time they were seen to include: "(1) implementation unit in
the MOHFP; (2) in RBM in Dhaka; (3) in the Bank in Washington; (4) a Bangladesh population
and health consultative group or a consortium with annual meetings in Paris and a secretariat in
Washington etc."
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The Population Program Office has operated since 1976 in the Bank Group's
Resident Mission in Dhaka to monitor, report on and assist GOB in finding
prompt solutions to issues of population and family planning. Because of the
increased prominence of health care with the Consortium, the PPO will be
expanded as a Population and Health Office (PHO) supported by a technical
committee consisting of resident professional advisors from the Consortium
members. The supervisoly office at the Bank in Washington, DC which
coordinates and oversees PHO's activities, will continue its function as under the
Third Project. One of the lessons of the earlier projects was that this strong IDA
presence provides a Consortium mechanism to promote a cohesive and consistent
donor dialogue with the GOB on both policy and operational issues of the
national population and health programs. Moreover, the IDA's presence helps to
bring about project monitoring and provides technical assistance to the GOB.2°
Although the TORs are rather vague a number of points bear drawing out: (1) the purpose
of the P110 was to monitor, report on and assist the GOB to find prompt solutions, which
could be interpreted as assisting the Government 'to get things done' or even 'doing
things on its behalf; (2) both operational and policy dimensions were envisioned; (3)
there was a clear distinction between the Dhaka and Washington offices, with
responsibility resting with the latter; and (4) the unit, by virtue of its Bank pedigree,
provided a means through which to ensure a cohesive policy dialogue with the GOB.
The one-paragraph statement of mandate in the Staff Appraisal Report led to considerable
confusion and dissatisfaction among the cofinanciers as to the role, accountability and
ownership of the PHO (see section 5.8 below). Hence, the Bank drafted a more detailed
TOR for the Dhaka-based support unit which, although not formally adopted, illustrates
the Bank's view of the functions of the unit. 2 ' The TORs are set out in three sections: the
first covering the rOle of the PHO in relation to the Bank; the second its functions vis-à-
vis the Consortium; and the third the accountability arrangements. Under the function of
the PHO in relation to the Bank, four tasks are delineated: (1) supervising procurement,
disbursement and end use of IDA credits and cofinancier grants placed in World Bank
Trust Funds (i.e., joint cofinancing); (2) monitoring compliance with project credit
agreements, contracts and covenants; (3) facilitating implementation by helping
Government respond to the donors' requirements; and (4) providing technical assistance
to the Government in policy, planning and other priority areas. The Bank notes that the
first two activities are mandatory as a function of its rules and/or agreements with the
GOB while the latter two are discretionary and largely made possible due to financial
support from the cofinanciers.
In terms of the PHO's function, as "the leader of the Fourth Population and Health
Consortium," four areas are described in considerable detail. (1) Under the heading
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'coordination,' a series of tasks are set out: the P110 is responsible for managing regular
meetings and ensuring the necessary exchange of information at the country level to
ensure that all parties are kept abreast of developments in the sector; liaison with agencies
contracted by the GOB to implement components of the project (i.e., WHO, UNFPA and
UNICEF) and with the numerous implementation offices established by the donors to
execute the parallel-fmanced project components so as to seek information and
communicate the agreed views of the Consortium; liaison with actors in the sector who
are not members of the Consortium; and the conduct of two annual project supervision
missions. (2) In terms of 'steering,' the P110 assists the GOB in developing and
reviewing sector policy and strategy and acts as a 'spokesperson' for the Consortium in
communicating with GOB; and undertakes analyses of sector issues to inform
Consortium views. (3) With respect to 'monitoring and reporting,' the P110 reports on
both the implementation of all aspects of the project as well as GOB compliance with
covenants and agreements. (4) The PHO also had a mandate in 'conflict management' in
relation to the affairs of the Consortium, provided that the parties concerned agreed to
this role.
The section on accountability reaffirms that PHO staff are directly accountable to the
Chief of the Resident Mission. Functional guidance was to be provided from Bank
headquarters in areas where professional advice was not available in Bangladesh or
where changes were required to existing agreements. Thus the TORs make no reference
to the cofinanciers in relation to accountability. As discussed below, this arrangement led
to frustration among the cofinanciers who, while largely financing the P110, had no direct
input in terms of providing guidance, reviewing its plans or assessing its performance.
The P110 was involved in all of the activities outlined in the draft TORs and thereby
made a significant contribution to aid coordination and management. In terms of
coordination, a large measure was achieved by engaging other donors in the Bank's
lending cycle. Subsequent to the First Project, project identification, appraisal and
negotiation were led by the Bank, according to its procedures, but included the
participation of all members and prospective members of the Consortium. Thus, for
example, the pre-appraisal of the Fifth Health and Population Project (HAPP-5) included
73 participants representing 15 agencies. 22
 During the preparation of HAPP-5, a Local
Working Group consisting of representatives of the Consortium, donor agencies not
present in the Consortium, as well as Government officials was convened by the P110
and met frequently and regularly. In addition, a log-frame exercise was conducted by the
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P110 with 120 stakeholders to translate sector goals (as articulated in the HPSS) into
HAPP-5 activities.
The PHO managed two, 2- to 3-week, supervision missions annually for each of the
projects. Although one of the annual missions was composed entirely of Bank staff, the
other was open to all Consortium members and often included donors not in the
Consortium as observers (particularly USAIEI)). Thus, for example, a typical supervision
mission of the FPHP included 43 representatives from 13 donor agencies. 23
 From the
Bank's perspective, "large and frequent missions served as incentive to get on the spot
decisions and actions taken that otherwise might have been delayed. And, given the
number of donors involved in this sector, these missions were and are certainly effective
in ensuring excellent aid coordination and avoidance of redundant, duplicative or
•	 ,,24interfering activities.	 These missions were instrumental to the Bank in terms of
advancing its corporate policy objectives and an explicit function involved building
consensus among the cofinanciers. 25 The projects' mid-term reviews also included
representatives from all the cofinancing and implementing donors. Multi-agency
participation in Bank project cycles certainly contributed to increased integration of
donors, at least around the cofinanced projects: consensus would have developed around
project goals and strategies; some complementarity of inputs would have been achieved;
and some coherence provided to what otherwise would have been a stream of
independent appraisal and supervision missions.
Coordination was also served through the regular system of meetings established in
Dhaka as an integral component of the Consortium approach. The first of these was held
not long after the First Population Project commenced. Under the FPHP, the meetings
were to be held every two months, yet they were often more frequently convened. The
P110 managed the meetings, i.e., set the draft agenda, chaired the meeting and wrote the
minutes. With the exception of two meetings held in late 1997, the Consortium met
during the FPHP without Government representation and did not formally circulate
meeting minutes to Government officials. Instead, the Bank would meet with the
Government on a bilateral basis to represent the collective views of the Consortium. The
meetings served primarily to share information and discuss project implementation issues
although some limited attention was directed to policy issues.
The donors entrusted a wide set of aid management responsibilities to the P110. The
increasing use under the successive projects of World Bank Trust Funds resulted in
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centralised disbursement according to common rules, GOB reporting only to the Bank
(which in turn reported to the donors), centralised accounting and consolidated financial
reports. In 1975, the Bank established a Project Finance Cell in the MOHFW to
monitoring procurement and disbursement. The P110 supervised the work of the Cell
which processed all claims for reimbursement from donors centrally for all components
of the project. 26 Later the terms of reference for the cell were broadened to include the
monitoring of all claims for reimbursement of expenditure and procurement under the
IDA project as well as those made by the GOB with assistance from UNFPA and USAID.
The Cell also provided a central facility for following up on the audit observations
pertaining to the IDA projects. In the area of reporting, the PHO provided the donors with
bi-annual reports on each sub-component of the project as well as statements on the
's compliance with legal covenants and agreements reached in the aide-memoires.
Through the institutionalisation of these procedures, donors within the Consortium were
enabled to utilise joint aid management systems for a proportion of their assistance to the
FPHP. Nevertheless, some donors, notably the EU and GTZ provided parallel financing
and relied on exclusive bilateral financial monitoring systems.
5.3.2 Staffing, costs and finance of the PHO: a fat and bloated bureaucracy'?
The project office in Dhaka, first the Population Project Office (PPO) and later the
Population and Health Office (PHO), was strengthened in line with the increasing size
and complexity of the successive projects. During the First and Second Population
Projects, the office consisted of one expatriate and one Bangladeshi professional. An
MCII specialist was added in 1986, both to support the workload associated with the
expanded volume of resources, and also to reflect the changed content of the Third
Population and Family Health Project (TPFHP). For the FPHP, the staff complement
increased significantly. There is, however, some ambiguity over who comprises the P110
staff. One definition, held by many cofinanciers, includes only those staff fmanced from
the Consortium members resources, with the exception of the specific allocation from the
Bank to the P110 budget under the FPHP. This would not, however, include the
significant contribution made by Bank core staff to the project. At times, the Bank took
the view that the PHO included all staff who were directly engaged by the Bank and
working on the project irrespective of their funding source and location of duty. At other
times, the P110 referred only to the project support office in the RBM. In 1997, there
were eleven professional staff working in the Dhaka and Washington offices of the Bank
on the FPHP (Table 10). In that the PHO is managed by the Bank, its staff are recruited,
contracted and evaluated according to Bank procedures and rules.
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Table 10: Staffing of the Population and Health Office in 1997
Dhaka-based staff	 _____________________ Washington-based staff
1.PHO Chief + FPHP Task fanager (international) 	 1. Task Manager for HAPP-5
2. Population Specialist (mtc national) 	 2. Population Specialist
3. Public Health Specialist (i Lternational) 	 3. Operations Specialist
4. Health Consultant (nation 1) 	 4. Health Economist
5. WID Consultant (nationa and added late in FPHP)
6. Operations Specialist (flat
7. Senior Procurement Speci
Support Staff	 Support Staff
Three secretarial staff 	 Two secretarial staff
In contrast to the modest cost of the PPO for the TPFHP, budgeted at US$ 1.3 million for
its five year duration, 27
 the cost of the PHO was set at USS 6.003 million for the
envisioned five year life of the FPHP. 28
 The budget of the PHO was, therefore, just over a
million dollars per year, which represented approximately 1% of the total expenditure of
the project. While the lion's share of the PHO's expenses were associated with salaries
(i.e., US$ 4.5 million), approximately US$ 1.5 million consisted of 'discretionary costs'
such as travel, consultants fees and communication. It is likely that the availability of this
large pool of discretionary funds was of utmost importance to the relative effectiveness of
the Consortium in that it provided the convenor with great flexibility in responding to
crises as they developed.
As with earlier projects, the cost of the P110 during the FPHP was shared among the
cofinanciers and the Bank. Table eleven presents the financing plan for the PHO at the
time of pre-appraisal. The Bank's contribution was met out of its central administrative
budget and fees earned from administering Trust Funds on behalf of the cofinanciers,
while the cofinancier's contributions were apportioned from their grants to the GOB.
5.4 Financial coordination through the Consortium
Participation in the First Population Project was limited to the Bank and 6 bilateral
agencies (see Annex 6 for a list of cofinanciers for each of the four projects). During the
FPHP, nine bilateral donors were members of the Consortium. Two significant donors to
the sector, USALD and AsDB, and a host of smaller ones did not cofinance the project
and, therefore, did not affiliate themselves with the Consortium. None of the UN
organisations channelled their regular funds through the cofinanced projects of the
Consortium, although three of the major health-related agencies had some form of
association with the Group. WHO gained membership by virtue of executing a number of
sub-components financed by the bilaterals. UNILCEF became involved as it was
implementing and/or supporting a number of health programmes which received
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assistance through the FPHP. The status of TJNFPA's association with the Consortium,
although unclear in the eyes of the Consortium members (see below), comprised assisting
the Government to implement activities financed by the FPHP.
Table 11: Financing of the PHO for FPHP29
Donor	 % of total cost
Australia (AIDAB)	 3.0 %
Belgium (BADC)	 1.6 %
Canada (CIDA)	 20.0 %
EC	 13.0%
Netherlands (DGIS) 	 8.0 %
UK(ODA)	 8.0%
Norway (NORAD)	 13.0 %
Sweden (SIDA)	 5.0 %
Japan (JICA)	 1.6 %
Germany (KfW	 13.0 %
JcLI1I4IIy !'.J1L)
	 --
IDA	 11.0%
TOTAL	 97.2%
Does not equal 100% due to rounding
The extent to which the Consortium managed to coordinate aid in the sector was far from
complete. Table 12, although not providing a comprehensive picture, suggests that the
Consortium coordinated the disbursement of almost US$ 78 million per year but that
other donors committed a large amount of aid to the MOHFW independently of the
Consortium initiative. The Table only reflects, however, the resources of the major
agencies and, therefore, does not take into consideration the aid of all 31 agencies known
to have committed andlor disbursed funds to the MOHFW between 1992 and 1996. It
proved impossible to obtain this data, as the funds provided by the smaller agencies were
particularly difficult to ascertain. Even the Health Economics Unit of the MOHFW was
frustrated in its attempt to paint an accurate picture of the flow of funds in the sector due
to the lack of readily available information and the failure of certain donor agencies to
provide the data when requested to do so. 30 It is important to stress that the Table also
fails to include those resources provided by the Consortium members to the sector outside
of the FPHP. In the case of a number of members, their support to the health sector,
directly to the GOB or to NGOs, outside the FPHP was substantial. For example, DGIS
provided approximately US$ 4.1 million annually to the FPHP while it channelled US$
4.5 million annually through other mechanisms to the health sector. 31 In the case of Sida,
only approximately 50% of its health sector aid was allocated to FPIIP activities. 32 The
ODA (DFID) provided approximately US$ 3 million outside the FPHP over the course of
the project (i.e., 10% of its support). 33
 The EC, 34 JTCA,35 and CIDA36 all provided some
funds to the sector which were additional to the FPHP. Given these caveats to Table 12,
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and in keeping with estimates provided by the MOHFW, the Consortium likely
coordinated approximately one third of external resources in the sector.
Table 12: Rough annual disbursement/commitment by major donors to MOIIFW,
through Consortium and outside Consortium (US$ millions)
Consortium donors (disbursements) 	 ______ Non-consortium donors (commitments) _____
World Bank
	
31.4 American USAID
	 30.0
German GTZ	 2.1 UNICEF	 14.0
German KIW	 13.1 Asian Development Bank
	 10.0
Canadian CIDA	 6.3 UNFPA	 6.0
Norwegian NORAD	 4.8 WHO	 5.0
UKDFID4.5 ______________________ ___
DutchDGIS	 4.1 ______________________________ _____
SwedishSida	 2.5 __________________________________ _____
AustralianAusAid	 0.8 _________________________________ _____
EuropeanCommunity	 8.3 _________________________________ _____
TOTAL77.9 ____________________________ 65.0
5.5 The World Bank's interests in the Consortium
As the founding member and lead agency within the Consortium, the World Bank
believed that the benefits of the Consortium outweighed its costs. While the language
used to describe these benefits changed over time and with respect to the intended
audience, one can discern four distinct objectives sought by the Bank through the
Consortium: (1) to maximise resource mobilisation; (2) to make more effective use of
aid; (3) to promote a coordinated approach to policy; and (4) to reduce the burden of aid
management devolving to the GOB. A fifth, largely unstated, benefit lay in the
Consortium's ability to bestow upon the Bank leverage over the sector.
For the Bank, donor cofinancing of its successive projects provided a mechanism to
ensure that more resources were available to support the policy objectives which it
pursued in the population and health sector in Bangladesh. Population control has been a
high priority corporate objective of the Bank since its leadership under McNamara37
which coincided with the first two Bangladesh population projects. The consortium
enabled it "to maximise external aid" 38 and to "increase the flow of funds for this field
from small donors who would have been unable otherwise to formulate projects."39
Not only did the Consortium capture bilateral aid for deployment within Bank initiatives,
it also provided tools to increase this aid's effectiveness and efficiency - thereby
furthering the Bank's policy interests. The Consortium made 'aid go further' in five
ways. First, there were savings to be made from pooling resources and operations. As the
Bank argued, "having each donor pushing separate proposals is counter-productive,
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leading to diffusion of financial and administrative resources." Second, through the
arrangement, bilateral grant funds were combined with the IDA credit "allowing greater
flexibility in project planning"4 ' making possible what might have otherwise not
obtained. Third, the deployment of aid from a large number of donors within one project
avoided duplication of activities. Fourth, the Bank claimed that multi-party financing
encouraged, to some extent, organising donor contributions on the basis of cost-
effectiveness considerations. 42 Fifth, it prevented some competition among donors which
would have otherwise inflated the costs of local resources, dissipated resources through
duplication of some activities while less appealing ones remained without aid.
The third benefit of the Consortium to the Bank was its ability to filter conflicting donor
signals and amplify those which it sought to advance to the Government. In reflecting on
the first two population projects, the Bank maintained that it "has succeeded to
considerable extent in harmonising the frequently conflicting views of cofinanciers
regarding program emphasis and strategy. Through its leadership role, IDA has promoted
better Bangladesh policies and a steadier national course than would have taken place if
each cofinancier had sought to press its own views on the Government without regard to
the broader perspective of other donor concerns and interests."43
 Hence, the Bank
enthused that the 'continued' use of the Consortium during the TPFHP would "ensure
consistent, rather than mixed, signals to Government on important policy issues.M The
Bank suggested that policy consistency resulted from two factors associated with the
Consortium. First, the PPO "provides a mechanism to promote a cohesive, consistent
donor dialogue with GOB on the national population and family health program."45
Second, the Bank drew attention to the importance of cofinancing. For example, the
Project Completion Report for the Second Population and Family Health Project
concluded "Looking back, it is doubtful whether the commonality of approach now
prevailing would have been possible, but for the cofinancing arrangements worked out by
the Bank during the first project and continued thereafter for the subsequent projects.
Coordination by other means, without cofinancing, might not have produced the same
degree of results. It is quite possible that ideological considerations might have been the
predominant factor governing the choice of their project, if the ten major donors had dealt
with the Government separately."46
 In the survey conducted for this research, two thirds
of respondents agreed that policy dialogue and consensus building within the Consortium
had resulted in a diminution in the amount of conflicting policy advice provided by
donors independently to the Government.
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The Consortium, and more specifically the overwhelming presence of the Bank therein,
also served to influence donor thinking with respect to policy. For example, the Bank
asserted that the Government "did not get conflicting advice from various donors
[because] during IDA missions many of the donors get [a] proper briefmg that changes
their perspective. This would not be the case if they visited individually and did not have
the chance of checking their perceptions with others [i.e., Bank staff] having knowledge
and background of the program." 47
 In other words, the Consortium provided the Bank
with the means to keep the cofinanciers 'on message.' It is important to bear in mind that
while the Bank spoke in terms of the benefits extended by the PPO/PHO to the
Government, achieving policy consistency among the donors served the Bank's interests
as well. In the words of one agency representative, which after protracted negotiations
with the Bank decided not to finance the FPHP, the Consortium was used by the Bank to
"exercise leadership" and "influence donors" with respect to policy in the sector.48
Lessening the burden of aid management which fell upon the Government was one of the
objectives of the consortium approach49
 and the Bank often made assertions that it was
successful in this regard. For example, the Bank claimed that "it saved a lot of time for
Government officials in dealing with donors individually both in the formulation and
implementation stages of the program."5° In particular, the Consortium "minimised
GOB' s aid management burden" through, for example, the "drastically reduced number
of supervision missions" the Government had to prepare for. 51
 Indeed, a central function
of the PPO/PHO entailed aid management. The cofinanciers were willing to channel
funds through Bank systems (as opposed to through categorical ones they might have
otherwise established or those of the GOB) because they presented the possibility of cost
savings and because confidence could be placed in them. The arrangement also suited the
Bank because, through the PPO/PHO, the cofinanciers subsidised a Bank lending
programme, facilitated the deployment of a large number of Bank staff to the field and,
thereby, increased the control the Bank had over a significant proportion of the fmance
available in the sector and, thus, its influence more generally. In the Bank's words: "The
Bank led the Consortium and coordinated the mobilisation of grant resources for the
sector as also program planning and aid administration. Establishment of a cofinanciers
funded PPO/PHO was necessary for the Bank to play this rOle effectively."52
The four benefits of the Consortium described above were widely proclaimed by the
Bank in a non-self-serving manner. According to the Bank, the effort represented "a
sincere and honest attempt on the part of all the parties to work towards the common
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good of Bangladesh." 53
 Although it can be inferred that the Consortium was of benefit to
the health sector in Bangladesh, the arrangement was equally beneficial to the Bank. The
Consortium bestowed leverage upon the Bank enabling it to steer developments in the
sector according to its precepts and interests.
Although the Bank suggested that it sought a position of equality with other donors in the
Consortium, in reality premus inter pares was its true objective. Thus, on the one hand,
the Bank "explained that it was not part of IDA's intention to play the role of
coordinator.. .The only reason for our seemingly visible rOle has been the need to discuss
the technical details of the project with various donors on the request of the
Government."54 On another occasion, the Bank assured SIDA "that we certainly are not
looking for pre-eminence of the Bank as such, but rather are working as a group of
completely equal partners to increase the effectiveness of all our investments." 55
 In its
correspondence with potential cofinanciers, the Bank spoke of assuming a share of the
costs of the project "sufficient to carry respectable weight in total project financing." 56
 On
the other hand, internally the Bank maintained that its "contribution should be sufficient
enough to permit a leadership rOle in the project." 57
 When Bank management weighed in
favour of a smaller Bank contribution for the First Population Project (i.e., US$ 15
million as opposed to US$ 20 million), project staff were anxious about a "possible
reduction of leverage." 58
 Consortium leadership positioned the Bank at the epicentre of
sector developments. As the Bank, for example, pointed out: "As leader of the
Bangladesh Population and Health Consortium, IDA is in a strategic position to carry out
the sector review. . .The review process can be used to continue the policy dialogue with
the Government and thus is likely to strengthen the role of the Bank in the sector."59
The Bank justified its role as leader of the Consortium in terms of its comparative
advantages. The first advantage being the leverage it achieved through the volume of
resources it had at its disposal. For example, the Bank argued that "as the largest donor,"
it had the "capacity to help pull other donors together for a common stance in regard to
program priorities and content." 60
 Second, the Bank suggested that if it did not organise
cofinancing, the MOHFW would not receive the volume of funds that it did from other
donor agencies. "Alternative mechanisms.. . [would be] possibly threatening to the
resource needs of the program." 6 ' Third, the Bank highlighted its alleged neutrality as a
key factor differentiating it from other donors:
It is clear that no alternative to the Bank's mechanism for donor coordination is
acceptable to the GOB at this time: Senior GOB officers welcome the role of the
Bank as a coordinator... The Bank, as a lending agency, is viewed less as a donor
than as a collaborating agency. The notion that any donor could somehow replace
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the Bank as a coordinator of donors is unacceptable, since donor coordination
could evolve into a mechanism for external direction and control of the program.
This is a reasonable concern given the fact that nearly all resources for the
program derive from external assistance. The Bank style of relating to the GOB
as a borrower makes its role as a donor-coordinator acceptable as a neutral
partner in decision making. If the Bank did not exercise a coordinating role, some
other less effective and less acceptable mechanism would emerge.62
Moreover, as noted above, there was no clear alternative among the Consortium members
in terms of leadership. Consequently, the cofinanciers agreed to the Bank's leadership
and hoped that it would continue under HAPP-5, should a donors-only coordination
mechanism persist (see next Chapter).63
5.6 Concerns within the Bank over the Consortium
Although the Bank successfully pursued a number of objectives through cofmancing and
the Consortium, there were concerns within the Bank over the actual and potential costs
associated with sponsorship of the arrangement. A Bank Vice-President, for example,
reminded staff working on the Bangladesh programme that coordination carries costs in
terms of administrative complications, staff time and relations with the borrower
country. TM
 Four distinct concerns were aired: (1) the possibility that Bank leadership of
the Consortium might conflict with the principle of recipient leadership in aid
coordination; (2) the possibility that the role of facilitator and honest broker might erode
or conflict with Bank corporate policies; (3) the costs of maintaining the P110 exceeding
Bank norms; and (4) the detrimental effect that reliance on the RBM for project
implementation might have on MOHFW capacity.
In relation to the principle that recipient leadership be observed, staff preparing the
Second Population and Family Health Project were instructed by their management that
the Bank "is not to undertake any coordination on behalf of the Government in regard to
program activities not directly associated with our project." 65 And although the Bank did
not aim to provide coordination services for the entire sector, through its central position
in the Consortium, it nonetheless assumed significant influence. Such was its pivotal role
in the sector that a Division Chief in the Bank expressed his concern that the FPHP Task
Manager "was replacing the Minister of Health in importance and clout in this area." It
is not clear if senior management was more concerned about the perception or the
practice that its staff may be usurping the rOle of the chief executive in the health sector.
Another concern harboured in some Bank quarters was that the process of negotiation
required within the Consortium to arrive at consensus decisions might dilute the Bank's
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corporate objectives. As early as January 1974, in consideration of pre-negotiations for
the First Population Project, the Bank raised the question of whether or not the
cofinanciers would go along with the "tough stand" of the Bank and "whether their
involvement in the project was more important than putting pressure on the GOB." 67
 The
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the Bank maintained that the pursuit of
cofinancing had led to trade-offs and the "sacrifice of program interests." Although the
nature of the "program interests" are not defined, it is likely that the OED interpreted
these as Bank interests. Country-level donor negotiation and horse-trading raised another
concern with Bank headquarters. This related to the possible impact of conflict within the
Consortium on donor relations at the global level. Hence, it was argued that ". . .it is
extremely important that we [the Population Projects Department in headquarters]
coordinate from a central point. Any problems with respect to our donors will affect our
ability to attract grant funds for Bank-supported population projects."68
Questions also arose over the resource implications of the PHO. In considering whether
or not the Bank should use the consortia approach to coordination more widely, the Task
Manager of the FPHP warned that "Personally, I think the Bank has a fairly large
problem on its hands in this respect, but doesn't realise it yet." He considered the need to
"spell out the wider implications of the consortia approach for the Bank: hiring and
recruitment, staff incentives, travel, cofinancing policy, etc." 69
 Due to the costs and
strategic interests served by the Consortium, Bank management stressed that "improved
coordination does not mean complete control over every possible externally financed
population activity. What is important is to have a coordinated approach among the
principal donors who are likely to have views on policy and management and whose
programs could have a significant impact on the implementation of the national
effort... .and nothing we do should give the impression that we seek to involve every
donor that expresses interest in family planning activities in our project." 7° In effect, the
Bank was concerned about the human resources required to provide coordination services
in the context of the weak public sector in Bangladesh. In preparing the FPHP, Bank staff
observed that "The Bank's structure provides for supervision coefficients which truly
reflects supervision needs and not implementation needs. Over the last 15 years, however,
the Bank and the cofinanciers have become involved in implementation assistance; not as
a plan or future commitment, but as a present-day matter of fact."7'
The impact of the day-to-day involvement of the P110 in implementation assistance on
the development of Government capacity for aid management was the Bank's fourth area
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of concern. The Completion Report for the Second Population and Family Health Project
concluded that "Bank leadership in project formulation, financing and donor coordination
should be maintained; however, efforts should be made to transfer this responsibility to
GOB in an increasing measure." 72 Despite such recommendations, the Bank faced the
dilemma that if it were to scale-back the level of supervision, it "would put the large
investments made so far at risk."73
Despite misgivings about the costs of the Consortium, the general attitude in the Bank
was that "while cofinancmg did place burden on our staff, the efforts were worthwhile
considering the advantages accruing from a coordinated effort."74
5.7 To join or not to join? Membership in the Consortium
Unlike that which might be expected from a Government-led aid coordination
arrangement for the sector, the Consortium was not designed to include all donors which
provided support to health-related activities. Its stated purpose was aid coordination and
management for the Bank's cofinanced projects. And whereas numerous donors were
invited to join the Consortium over the course of successive projects,' 1' a sentiment existed
within the Bank that it should not seek to provide coordination services for all donors in
the sector. Nonetheless, an exploration of the rationale for membership in the Consortium
remains relevant to the study of coordination, for it offers insights into stakeholders'
expectations, objectives and concerns with respect to participation in coordination
initiatives. The common and varied reasons for joining the Consortium are listed in Box 3
while the reasons for not so doing so are summarised in Box 4.
5.7.1 Reasons advanced for project cofinancing and Consortium membership
In addition to the ostensible reason for joining the Consortium, i.e., to improve aid
coordination, donors hoped to pursue additional interests through membership. These
ranged from increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of their aid transactions to
enhancing their position in policy dialogue. The following examples provide the
rationale, and sometimes the language, put forward by the bilaterals in their decision to
join the Consortium.
Box 3: Rationale provided by donor agencies for Consortium
1.To place or keep corporate policy issues on GOB/donor policy agenda.
2. To strengthen policy influence vis-à-vis GOB and other donors.
3. To reduce costs of programming individual contributions (i.e.. shared mana gerial & administrative
' Agencies which were courted by the Bank but declined from joining included at least the
following: AsDB, BADC, DANIDA, ECB, FINNIDA, the Ford Foundation, the Population
Council, the Government of New Zealand, SDC, UNFPA, UNICEF and USAID.
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costs).
4. To improve the impact of bilateral contribution (e.g., complementarity of mputs).
5. To improve prospects for fund disbursement.
6. To improve the quality of monitoring and auditing of contributions.
7. To share responsibility in handling controversial issues.
Working through the Consortium enabled a number of donors to programme aid at a
significantly reduced cost and with greater efficacy than would have otherwise been the
case. By way of example, in reference to the First Population Project, a review of
Norwegian aid to Bangladesh noted
For Norway, with its small ODA administration, a cofinancier role in this multi-
bilateral arrangement was particularly attractive because it made it possible to
commit large sums for family planning without tying down commensurate
technical and managerial resources. IDA, in addition to lending a substantial
share of the required funds under stringent auditing procedures, supervises the
project and coordinates disbursements for the purposes specified by donors." The
report continued: "At the end of 1982, after the three, one-year extensions that
were necessary to bring the first phase of the project to a close, one fifth of the
original allocation of NOK 45 million still remained unspent. Throughout 1983,
efforts were made to disburse that money. Finally it was allocated to..." a
construction activity. "This experience nevertheless strengthened NORAD's
position concerning the choice of strategy for assistance to family planning in
Bangladesh: what a multi-bilateral arrangement under the sponsorship and
supervision of the World Bank could not achieve would be even less likely to be
achieved through bilateral program support."75
For the Norwegians, the primary interest in working through the Consortium lay in
programming NORAD funds with a maximum amount of accountability for the lowest
cost to the organisation. Other donors similarly spoke of the benefits of the Consortium to
their agencies in terms of reduced costs for project planning and monitoring sector
developments.76
Many donors put forward the view that because the consortium approach builds upon the
comparative advantages of the distinct parties involved, it thereby improved the synergy
of individual donor investments. Japan's rationale for participation in the FPHP is a case
in point. Japan informed the Bank that it had a large amount of funds available for
construction, supplies and equipment for the health sector in Bangladesh, but lacked local
knowledge about how best to utilise these. Through the Consortium it was able to "secure
software support for Japan's hardware input.a77 At times, however, donor interest in
improving the complementarity of inputs belied domestic motives. For example, NORAD
& Japan did not become an active member of the Consortium as it was unable to conclude a
bilateral agreement with the GOB under the umbrella of the FPHP and, therefore, did not disburse
any of its committed funds.
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described one of its objectives for working through the Consortium as: "to try to make
Norwegian expertise available."78
Perhaps donors' foremost consideration was the effect that Consortium membership
would have on their policy influence. NORAD's TORs, for example, for participation in
the Consortium explicitly established its intention to "influence the Consortium, World
Bank, and the overall programme [i.e., sector] to be to the highest possible extent in line
with the basic principles for Norwegian development assistance and NORAD's
strategy."79 According to a CIDA participant in the FPHP negotiations, membership
"strategically allows CIDA to influence the GOB's sector programming at a policy level,
key for many of CIDA's priorities." 80 CIDA officials believed that the basis of their
enhanced policy influence through the Consortium was two-fold: (1) "Because of
[Canada's] long-standing presence [in the Consortium], CIDA has now positioned itself
to influence policy directions within the GOB and the Consortium; and (2) the activities
selected for the proposed CIDA contribution are critical to achieving the goal of the
overall cofinanced project, and would allow CIDA to further strengthen its policy
influence."8 ' An ODA official suggested, "donors stay in the Consortium, despite its
difficulties, because through its leverage, they can use it to push reforms." 82 In effect, the
Consortium provided its members with an instrument to affect 'assertive multilateralism'
- to make bilateral concerns more widely shared and to enhance their influence with
respect to advancing these.
Due to the Consortium's influence over the policy process, membership provided a
mechanism for getting and keeping corporate concerns and interests high on the policy
agenda. Its potential was expressed by the Bank to James Grant, UNICEF' s former
Executive Director: "participation in the project [TPFHP] would provide a powerful
forum through which to keep Government attention focused on MCII development over
the next five years and to ensure a cohesive donor approach to those issues."83 The Bank
also suggested that as a formal cofinancier, UNICEF would enjoy "much more financial
and political leverage" to realise its goals in the health sector.84
For some donors, membership provided a communal shield from behind which to
advocate bilateral views as though they were widely held. The Bank acknowledged that
the Consortium might be used in such a maimer. "We might find that several donors
would welcome an 'IDA shield' to bring some needed pressure on the GOB, pressure
which they might be reluctant or powerless to bring individually and which they can
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'leave to the IDA.' But presumably even sympathetic donors would resent our making it
clear to the GOB that their aid (and its formal commitment) would be conditional on
fulfilling certain IDA pre-negotiating conditions, even though they might privately go
along with the action provided their approval of it were not revealed. ,,85 The Consortium
could also shield donors from special interest groups in their domestic constituency. For
example, during the formulation of the TPFHP, "USAID expressed interest in
considering a cofinancing role, particularly if the project were to include aspects of the
voluntary sterilisation program currently excluded from project cost estimates."86
According to the Bank, USAID considered joining the Consortium so as to support
sterilisation while simultaneously "reducing bilateral exposure" on this sensitive issue.87
In effect, through the Consortium, USMD hoped to gain an international stamp of
approval for a bilateral policy objective which was encountering hostility from critics at
home and abroad.
After a lengthy involvement in the Consortium, some donors questioned the impact of
stepping out of the project on their credibility in donor and Government circles - and
therefore, indirectly on their influence. Thus CIDA staff recommended that their Minister
approve the Canadian contribution to the FPHP, for not doing so "would jeopardise
Canada's credibility and influence within the donor community and with the Government
,,88
of Bangladesh.
While donors may have been pursuing multiple objectives through their association with
the Consortium, it is equally the case that the Bank invested considerable resources in
making and reiterating the case for membership and applying pressure on donors to join
and stick with the Group. When the Norwegians considered withdrawing from the FPHP,
the Bank wrote that "despite obvious difficulties and costs... .we all need to be as flexible
as possible. . .rather than retreat to the inter-donor fragmentation and competition of
earlier days."89 In part, Bank fear of donors leaving the Consortium was based on the
impact which this might have on the membership of other donors. Such concern is
reflected in a Bank memorandum: "a German withdrawal will undoubtedly have an
unsettling effect on other donors."9° It was not an idle concern, for according to the Bank,
"the Swedish decision [to pull out of the TPFHP] was followed by efforts to exert
pressure on other donors to pull out and caused a number of them to reconsider their
support to the Project."9'
X The Bank accepted USAID's motivation for participation but ultimately USAID decided against
joining the Consortium for other reasons.
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In terms of encouraging new entrants, the Task Manager for FPHP reported "that our
investments over the last two years to convince the Japanese Government to play a more
active role in the population and health sectors in Bangladesh are starting to pay
dividends." After Japanese "participation in the pre-appraisal... decisions were made to
(1) discontinue interest in the proposed hospitals;... and (3) seek participation modalities
with the Bank-led Consortium."92
 In other words, after Bank lobbying, the Japanese
Government reversed its decision over the content of its assistance to Bangladesh and the
bilateral nature of its provision in favour of participation in the Bank's project.
5.7.2 Reasons for not joining the Consortium
The rationale held, if not articulated, by some donors for their hesitation to join the
Consortium arose from the leadership ambitions which they harboured. Chapter Two
provided an account of the competition between the Bank and UNFPA to assume the pre-
eminent position; each hoped to develop a financing plan into which other agencies
would contribute and to establish a venue for donor coordination under its aegis. The
Bank's analysis suggests that similar aspirations held by WHO, USAID and later
UNICEF account for their reluctance to participate as cofinanciers in the Bank projects.93
The rationale offered by the dissenting agencies was not couched in the language of
leadership but in terms of more palatable pretexts, such as those which follow.
Box 4: Reasons advanced for not ioinin Consortium
1.Membership would reduce agency's visibility.
2. Membership would reduce agency's autonomy.
3. Agency's resources insufficient to influence decisions in Consortium.
4. Membership would reduce agency's access to Government officials.
5. Agency dissatisfied with decision-making style in Consortium.
6. Agency dissatisfied with policy decisions taken by Consortium.
7. Agency concerned that World Bank uses leadership to advance its corporate agenda.
8. Concern that membership would reduce plurality of views in the sector.
9. Agency unable to fund and execute favoured project sub-components.
10.Agency sufficiently influential to effect policy agenda without Consortium membership.
11.Proclivities of individual staff.
12.Legal, administrative and/or accountability reasons.
13.Agency dissuaded from joining due to potential impact on dynamics within Consortium.
14.Reasons not associated with the functioning of the Consortium (e. g .. domestic crisis).
The possibility that Consortium membership would reduce an agency's visibility with the
GOB and/or domestic constituency presented a problem for a number of donors. For
example, with respect to the First Population Project, the Bank noted that after review of
the appraisal document, USAID informed the Bank that it could not joint cofinance the
project as USAID "required identifiable components 'on which they could put their
flag."94
 Similarly, part of UNFPA's dissatisfaction with the FPFIP and its desire to
Chapter 5: The Consortium	 197
disassociate itself from the Consortium in the 1 990s arose from the perception that it lost
visibility by virtue of participating in Consortium activities. In the words of the UNFPA
Representative, "The efforts made by UNFPA to be visible as well as the trust given by
the Government to it are not always greeted [favourably] by the Bank which would
probably prefer UNFPA becoming a full and - indistinct - member of the Consortium
under its leadership."95
Over the life of the Consortium, numerous agencies decided against cofinancmg the
projects because they felt that they had had insufficient involvement in project
formulation. The First Population Project was designed by the Bank before it approached
other donors for funds. As a consequence, the Bank learned that in the case of the
Americans, "USAID is lukewarm to participation in project on grounds that... [they]
were not consulted enough." 96 Chapter Four described how UNICEF, after
unsuccessfully exploring the possibility of hiving off the health components of the
TPFHP into a separate project, decided not to participate in the Consortium project.
UNICEF informed the Bank, that "we are certainly keen to work with you, particularly
when we can be associated together at the early stages of a project's development and
thus ensure that the project which emerges is one in which all parties have full
confidence."97
In a similar manner, the non-concurrence of some donors with the policy thrusts or
certain objectives of the projects presented a barrier to their participation. Indeed, a
USAID official argued that a mechanism which included most donors in the sector would
be disadvantageous to the development of the sector. 98
 The case was buttressed upon the
assumption that submerging differences so as to arrive at a common donor position would
result in a "puerile coimnon thread .. . and the Government would not benefit from the
plurality of viewpoints of different donors." In relation to the TPFHP, the Bank
commented that "the main issue will be to maximise other donor participation while
obtaining their commitment to submerge some of their particular preferences in favour of
a unified cofinancier approach to the program." 99 Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish support
was made contingent upon an expanded maternal and child health focus; about which the
Bank, CIDA and the Germans were less than enthusiastic.'°° Other contentious issues
also led to threats of non-participation. For example, just after negotiations for the
TPFHP, NORAD informed the Bank that there was a risk that Norway would pull out of
the project because the Norwegian development minister "is a leading figure in the
Christian People's Party which opposes abortion."°'
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A policy which led one cofinancier to withdraw from the Consortium was the decision to
furnish family planning providers, motivators and clients with incentives in an effort to
increase the contraceptive prevalence rate. During the appraisal of the TPFHP, the Bank
was of the opinion that "The referral fees issue is a potential break-point with most of the
cofinanciers. Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK are convinced that
they have more negative than positive consequences.. .Making an assumption that a
referral fee system is essential would not reflect our considered views and probably
would lead to withdrawal of several prospective cofinanciers."° 2
 SIDA eventually
withdrew from the Consortium as the incentives debate was not resolved to its
satisfaction. SIDA informed the Bank that "instead Sweden hoped to achieve a more
direct impact by financing health care in Bangladesh on a bilateral basis." Yet the Bank
was also provided "less 'open' reasons including: (1) there were several African countries
in which Swedish financing of family planning efforts would afford an opportunity for
more leverage than possible in Bangladesh; and (2) recent negative publicity about the
Bangladesh population program which had an effect on both public and Government in
Sweden."°3
 The Bank considered that "the Swedish decision was based primarily on an
unwillingness to face anticipated public criticism of the Project, whether merited or
not." 04
 The foregoing suggests that SIDA, as a small contributor to the Consortium
project, felt that it did not have sufficient clout in policy dialogue to ensure outcomes
acceptable to its domestic constituency. Consequently, SIDA decided to pursue its
corporate policy objectives on a bilateral basis; unfettered by the position adopted by the
Consortium as a whole.
To some extent, the differences in policy orientation among Consortium members could
be accommodated, and their fear over loss of visibility countered, by providing donors
the opportunity to parallel finance, execute or be associated with those sub-components
of the projects which appealed most closely to their mandates and values. For example,
during the TPFHP, Germany provided parallel financing for capacity development of the
National Institute for Population Research and Training' 05 and during the FPHP, ODA
parallel financed and executed the Health Economics Unit.'°6 Where this type of
accommodation was not possible, due to competition among the donors, the threat and
eventuality of non-participation arose. For example, during appraisal of the TPFHP, the
Bank commented on "an undercurrent of feeling among some donors, particularly
NORAD and the Dutch, that the components earmarked to them for funding do not fit
with their preferences."°7
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The importance attached by some donors to the content and nature of their involvement in
the project and the impact which this had on their decision to participate in the
Consortium is illustrated by the circumstances which resulted in DANThA and the
108Belgians backing out of the FPHP. According to DANThA, the scope and content of
the TAPPs (i.e., the GOB's project planning documents) of sub-components of the FPI-IP
which DANIDA was to have funded were changed by the Bank and Government without
adequate consultation. In particular, DANEDA wanted to parallel-finance and execute two
components, which, without the concurrence of DANIDA, had been assigned to WHO
for execution with financial support from NORAD and SIDA (with joint cofinancing
which was preferable to the Bank). DANIDA insisted that if the original TAPPs were not
reinstated and the terms for participation not honoured it would withdraw from the
FPHP.'°9 The Bank deftly responded that the "GOB holds the primary responsibility for
implementing all its activities. In areas where external assistance is felt necessary, GOB
may choose agencies with relevant expertise to provide such assistance. In line with this
practice, GOB asked WHO to be executing agency for this sub-component. . .Hence,
transferring the role of executing agency from WHO to DANIDA is a decision that could
only be taken by GOB, in consultation with the other donors involved." It went on to
encourage DANIDA's participation in the Consortium under "the current
For DANIDA, however, "The course of events in recent months has
convinced us that there is no scope in the FPHP for Denmark to play the rOle of fully
fledged partner within the parameters envisaged by the other partners for Danish support
to the FPHP. In addition, the coordination and transparency of the preparation phase has
been nebulous to an extent where we find the process to have become administratively
just too burdensome.. .It is thus with regret that we now inform the World Bank.. .that
DANIDA withdraws from the Consortium."
The Belgian decision not to cofinance the FPHP also revolved around the perception that
its freedom to support activities of its choice would be too greatly constrained.
Subsequent to a request from the GOB that the Belgians (ADGC) finance specific
activities in the sector under their existing framework of cooperation, the Bank invited
ADGC to join the Consortium. Belgian officials responded positively to the idea of
contributing to the FPHP and informed the Bank that the "problem now is to convince the
GOB that Belgium could be most effective in aid provision by joining the IDA and
existing cofinanciers." 2 Later Belgium learned from the ERD that if it wanted to join the
FPHP, its contribution would have to be additional to the funds committed under the
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existing bilateral country programme. The Belgians informed the Bank that they were
unwilling to contribute to the FPHP on the basis of additionality and that the ERD
remained the main 'hurdle' to their participation in the Consortium. The Bank responded
,,113that this hurdle is not msurmountable and subsequently prevailed successfully upon
the ERD to drop its condition.
In terms of participation in the Consortium hinging upon the freedom of donors to fmance
activities of their choice, Belgian support to the FPHP raised a problem for the Bank. In
the words of the FPFIP Task Manager: "Strong preference was expressed for support to a
specific geographical area. In view of the nature of the Fourth Project and its multiplicity
of cofinanciers, I argued against this preference. I believe it may take some more
convincing to have ADGC abolish the idea of 'a Belgium piece' of the project." 114 The
Belgians eventually decided against participation in the project. The ERD was informed
that the decision was the result of a "retrenchment policy" of the Government of
Belgium.' 15 Funds did, however, subsequently become available for a geographically-
defined, integrated rural development project which included a health component as
envisioned by the Belgians for the FPHP. This suggested that other factors influenced
Belgian decision-making. According to the Belgian aid representative in Dhaka, the real
reasons were: (1) the amount of aid Belgium was willing to place in the FPHP was too
small to influence decisions within the Consortium; and (2) membership would have
reduced the agency's flexibility and inhibited it from pursuing its favoured strategy.116
The fear of circumscribed autonomy conditioned the attitude of most donors with regard
to joining the Consortium. Coordination would impinge upon donor control over project
content, aid procedures and time horizons, inter alia. Hence, when asked why UNICEF
did not join the Consortium, one of its staff baldly stated that it "wanted to retain its
independence." 7 The attitude of the AsDB was similar. When the World Bank learned,
for example, that the AsDB was considering financing a project in the health sector, the
Bank asked the AsDB "if it would be profitable to explore systematically the possibility
of a joint or more fully complementary approach to Bank and AsDB population/health
assistance?" The Bank suggested that this would "simplify project preparation,
negotiation and implementation for the Government while continuing to provide the
advantages of a unified donor approach in respect of key policy and implementation
This raises two issues which are taken up elsewhere in this dissertation: (1) that donors have
reinforced the difficulties faced by the Government in planning and coordinating aid by, in this
case, clawing-back funds committed for specific activities; and (2) the power which the Bank
could exercise over GOB decision-making.
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issues." 118 The AsDB responded that it preferred a 'complementary' approach which
would allow it to pursue its own project ideas according to the time plan it had already
established." 9 Later, when the appraisals of the AsDB's second project and the FPHP
coincided, both parties agreed that the projects would benefit from "parallelism in
timing." However, in terms of complementarity of substance, the Bank complained that
"not much willingness to accommodate was forthcoming... The AsDB proposals simply
remain unaware of the involvement of other 	 120
In justifying USAID's decision to remain outside of the Consortium, the Director of the
Office of Population and Health in Dhaka conceded that although "USAID is driven by
its own philosophy - it is for administrative, legal and accountability reasons that it
wishes to work outside of the Consortium.. .All organisations should work within the
broad parameters towards joint sector goals, but with their own modalities." 2 ' An official
from USAID ' s headquarters provided different reasons including the perceived inability
of the PHO to disburse funds and implement activities as well USAID's interest in
working outside of the public sector apparatus.' 22 However, as the second most powerful
donor in the sector, it is likely, as suggested by a number of informants, that USAID did
not join the Consortium as it was sufficiently influential to affect the policy agenda
without the backing of the Consortium.
It appears that, at times, the decision of whether or not to join the Consortium rested as
much on the proclivities of individual officials with the authority to influence the decision
as it did on organisational interests and needs. In reporting on SIDA's renewed interest in
joining the Consortium in 1987 (after dropping out of the TPFHP), the FPI{P Task
Manager intimated that the change in mind-set may have been partially a function of
change in Directorship of SIDA's Health Division at its headquarters.' 23 In the case of
UNFPA, its representative in Dhaka informed the Bank that: "I have, in principle,
considerable hesitation about being a participant in a project with another funding
agency. We have experienced a good deal of difficulty in the past in mixing our funds
and other inputs with other donor agencies. For this reason, all things being equal, I
would prefer to avoid such involvement in the future."24
At other times, decisions on membership in the Consortium were taken on very different
grounds. For example, the British dropped out of the Second Population and Family
Health Project because the newly elected Conservative government was seeking spending
cuts, and the Bangladesh population project became one casualty.' 25 Another reason for
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non-participation, which was similarly unconnected with the manner in which the
Consortium functioned, resided in bilateral relationships between the donors and the
GOB. Japan, for example, committed funds for the FPHP but was ultimately unable to
join the Consortium as it proved impossible to reach a bilateral agreement with the ERD.
Germany's rOle in the Consortium was almost scuttled for a similar reason. According to
a Bank official, the "participation of Germany remains doubtful due to numerous
conditions set by Germany appraisal mission which GOB can not realistically meet prior
to negotiation. 'I have sent letter to German Charge d'affaires with the hope that he will
encourage his Government to be more reasonable."26
Finally, it is instructive that the Bank did limit membership in the Consortium. In 1993, a
communication between two CIDA officials records that it was "interesting that SK [i.e.,
the Head of P110] would recommend a much smaller Consortium in the future. Does this
suggest that only those who agree with the Bank would be invited? Certainly we get the
,,127impression out here that he is unhappy with the Consortium arrangement.
	 Earlier, the
Bank made the decision to deny membership to USAID. Chapter 3 noted that the GOB
requested that USAID's contribution to the sector be included in the FPHP. In a
memorandum, the Task Manager for the project informed Bank management that "for the
moment we declined this request; our management structure would not be able to run
such a large operation." 28 In private, the TM stated that he feared that USAJD would
dominate and that, as a result, a number of smaller agencies would pull out of the
Consortium.' 29
 The Bank was thus concerned about the possible influence of USAID and
that the mechanism would not be able to withstand the policy differences among the
donor agencies. These points raise important considerations regarding the potential for
more inclusive aid coordination: (1) is it possible to reconcile the differences of all donors
in the sector; and (2) what would be the administrative and managerial costs of
attempting to coordinate their disparate aid delivery systems? We will return to these
questions in the final Chapter, as well as to the possibility that an unstated reason for the
Bank's reluctance to include USAID in the Consortium may have been its concern the
balance of power would be tipped away from the Bank in an uncertain direction.
5.8 Problems internal to the Consortium
It has been dfJIcult to naintain donor coordination in the Consortium
130
arrangement.
G. Roedde, CIDA, 1994
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Any system seeking to submerge differences in policy objectives and accommodate the
distinct procedures and accountabilities of large agencies operating in an international
environment is likely to encounter difficulties. As such a system, the Consortium and its
project office faced ongoing threats from within, which tended to be particularly acute
during periods of project formulation yet could be precipitated by other events as well.
According to the Task Manager for the preparation of the FPHP, the goal at the time was
to maximise the amount of resources available for population control in Bangladesh.
"The donors were brought in without sufficient and explicit agreement on the rules of the
game; we were first interested in gaining access to their funds, difficulties would be
resolved during implementation." 3 ' This section examines some of the chronic problems
which plagued the Consortium, because they portend the difficulties which will be faced
by national authorities when they assume the mantle for aid coordination and because
they may offer lessons for overcome such obstacles.
While somewhat arbitrary in categorisation, it is useful to consider these difficulties in
terms of those arising due to: (1) conflicting policy objectives; (2) inadequate
communication; (3) disputes over roles, responsibilities and accountability; and (4)
differences in expectations of the coordination machinery. In practice the concerns were
often closely interwoven. Problems became particularly pronounced during the FPHP
which resulted in a number of ameliorative actions: (1) the formation, at the instigation of
cofinanciers,' of a sub-group of the supervision mission of AprilfMay 1994 to perform a
SWOT analysis on the Consortium;' 33 (2) an externally facilitated retreat of Consortium
members in August 994;" (3) the preparation of a draft Terms of Reference for the
PHO; and (4) a series of high level meetings in Dhaka in 1996 to reiterate and address the
persistent grievances.' 35" 36" 37 Pursuant to these discussions, and again at the request of a
bilateral agency,' 38 a 'Code of Conduct' for the Consortium was drafted by the PHO in
1996 (Box 5)•139 The Code was seemingly never subsequently discussed in the
Consortium nor formally adopted and was considered, by some members of the
Consortium, as simply 'innocuous.' 1 ' It certainly did not resolve many of the
dissatisfactions held by the Consortium members - perhaps because there was a
perception that other parties were not abiding by it.
Box 5: Code of Conduct for Donor Consortia in Bang1adesh"
1. All members will be treated as equal partners.
2. ROles and responsibilities of each member of the Consortium will be defmed and agreed by the
Consortium and each member will endeavour to perform its rOles and responsibilities.
3. Consultation will be held within the Consortium before engaging in dialogue with the GOB on important
issues.
4. Equal respect be shown for the views of each member of the Consortium; if there are differences in
viewpoints. stens will be taken to resolve those. Final nositions on issues where differences persist will be
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taken on the basis of consensus.
5. Decisions arrived at on the basis of consensus will be supported by all members of the Consortium.
6. Transparency will be observed in dealings within the Consortium. Grievances will be first aired within
the Consortium group at Dhaka.
7. All members will seek to promote cohesion within the Consortium.
5.8.1 Policy conflict
Ofien major differences of approach have occurred, particularly between the
World Bank and the donors. 142
G. Roedde, CIDA, 1994
According to the Bank, "it would be divisive and counterproductive for individual donors
to cofinance in the hope of using that leverage to steer the program toward their own
particular objectives. The last several years have demonstrated how uncoordinated
approaches can send mixed signals to the GOB, cause borrower confusion and impede
effective coordination." 143
 Nonetheless, it was the very possibility that the Consortium
would enable the cofinanciers to advance their individual corporate policy objectives
more successfully that many sought membership in the Group. Over the course of the
successive projects numerous policy differences arose and are far too numerous to
record; these ranged from differences over appropriate institutional arrangements within
the Government, to discord over priorities, to variance over strategies, etc. The point
which bears making is that differences did exist and these created a host of problems for
the participants. At the root of these problems lay three issues relevant to donor
coordination, namely: (1) how policy dialogue was conducted in the Consortium; (2) how
decisions adopted in the Consortium were communicated to the Government; and (3) if
and how individual members should undertake bilateral policy dialogue on population
and health issues independently of the Consortium. The TORs covering the PPO/PHO, as
articulated in the SAR for the FPHP, provided scant guidance on these questions; and the
resultant ambiguity created significant tension.
In relation to policy dialogue within the Consortium, it was envisioned that the annual
project supervision missions as well as the regular meetings of the Consortium would
provide a venue for the resolution of policy differences. In practice, these proved
insufficient and tensions persisted. At the heart of the issue lay the question of how to
weight the influence of each member. The Task Manager for formulation of the FPHP
conceded that this difficult issue was not explicitly addressed. Three options existed: by
contribution; equality; or by placing a premium on expertise. The attempted to invoke a
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mixture of the latter two so as to appease the smaller members. At the Consortium
Retreat (1994), the issue was flagged by the cofinanciers who felt that the process of
policy development within the Consortium was unclear, as was the origin of PHO
policies communicated to the Government. It was recommended that more time be
accorded within meetings of the Consortium to the consideration of policy issues so that
consensus could be achieved. However, the underlying issue of how policy decisions
were to be arrived at was not tackled.' 45 In 1995, the Preparatory Review Group Report
for the Mid-Term Review of the FPHP proposed an ideal approach to 'policy
development and coordination." This involved 'an evaluation of the policies of
different donors;' 'an assessment of their similarities and differences;' the development
of a 'joint policy;' and representation of this as 'Consortium policy' to the GOB. While it
is not clear whether or not this process was seriously considered, it was certainly not
formally adopted. In turn, the Code of Conduct proposed that "equal respect be shown for
the views of each member of the Consortium; if there are differences in viewpoints, steps
will be taken to resolve those. Final positions on issues where differences persist will be
taken on the basis of consensus."147
Frustration also presided over policy dialogue with the Government. While it was
generally agreed (and formally proposed by the Bank in the draft TORs for the PHO) that
the Bank, as leader, would represent the views of the Consortium to the Government
(thus reducing the amount of time taken up in bilateral dialogue and also reducing the
number of conflicting signals), ambiguity remained which bred suspicion. It was, for
example, unclear whether or not the PHO presented to the GOB only the areas of
agreement or also disagreement within the Consortium (i.e., played down differences to
suit Bank interests) and whether or not the P110 communicated the Consortium's agreed
views or distorted these to reflect Bank thinking. While it was difficult for the donors to
confirm or dispel their fears, they were aware of the tendency of the PHO to gloss over
differences, even in official policy papers, and to misrepresent the views of the
Consortium members in other ways. For example, a Norwegian delegation complained
that "During the Paris meetings in 1985 several conditions for participation in the whole
five year period of the project were specifically mentioned. This is not reflected in the
official bank documents (credit agreement, report and Recommendation to the President
of IDA)." 48 On a separate occasion, a member of the Consortium in Dhaka informed his
agency's headquarters that the "Minutes prepared by the World Bank of Consortium
meetings frequently do not reflect accurately the discussions. Expressions of donors'
viewpoints, especially of dissatisfaction, are omitted or minimised."49 In discussions
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convened to address the weaknesses in the Consortium, it was proposed that areas of
agreement and disagreement within the Consortium should be recorded while the Code of
Conduct suggested that "decisions arrived at on the basis of consensus will be supported
by all members of the Consortium." Adherence to these suggestions would have reduced
the room the PHO had to manipulate the articulation of the Consortium positions to the
Government.
Even if accurately communicating Consortium decisions could be resolved, there
remained the dilemma of how donors could maintain their association with the
Consortium when the group was advancing positions at odds with their particular
corporate values. In addition to the option of withdrawing, donors could distance
themselves from policy positions andlor articulate, in private, contrasting positions to the
Government. The pursuit of three options was evident. As mentioned earlier, a number of
donors reversed their decision to join the Consortium when the gulf in policy between
themselves and other donors became apparent. The second option also entailed
difficulties for donors. This was expressed by a CIDA official over support within the
Consortium for NORPLANT research. CIBA did not agree with, nor fund such research,
"but must spend considerable time and effort communicating the rationale of other donors
in financing this activity." 50
 Although not formally a Consortium member, UNFPA
provides the most consistent example of an agency participating in Consortium meetings
while simultaneously advancing contradictory policy positions to the Government, an
action which caused considerable resentment among Consortium members. For example,
when UNFPA approached CIDA with respect to the possibility of the latter channelling
additional support for health activities in Bangladesh through HNFPA, CIBA responded
that "this could not be considered if UNFPA was not at the [Consortium] table and more
importantly was in conflict with other partners." CIDA went on to "express concern
regarding the overt public criticism UNFPA was making about the Consortium and
,,151World Bank and that the dialogue should occur at the table.
The draft Code of Conduct proposed that "decisions arrived at on the basis of consensus
will be supported by all members of the Consortium." It remains to be seen how realistic
this aspiration turns out to be. Differences among agencies over policy and strategy are,
of course, inherent in the development enterprise, arising at times from uncertainty over
best practice and at others to the pursuit of non-developmental objectives through the aid
regime. Nonetheless, it is clearly in the interest of coordinated assistance to minimise
these differences as far as possible. Consequently, it is necessary to develop ground rules
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for discussing and communicating differences to the Government in such a manner that
does not threaten the stability of the coordination arrangement. It would appear that more
forethought was required with respect to the systems of communication within the
Consortium as problems of communication remained a constant friction to the
maintenance of good relations within the group.
5.8.2 Communication dfJlculties
Not surprisingly, the diversity of donors with disparate interests and philosophies
has posed diplomatic challenges to the Bank.'52
World Bank, 1991
Donors were annoyed with the style of the functioning of the Bank and its first
among equals attitude.'53
N. Gerein, CIDA, 1996
It was asserted in the Completion Report for the TPFHP, that the success of the
Consortium was "primarily attributable," among other things, to "an effective leadership
provided by the Bank, in an informal atmosphere facilitating frank discussion of issues
leading to consensus solutions." 54 Yet, it was also true that inadequate communication
presented ongoing challenges to the maintenance of the Consortium arrangement. Despite
the regular meetings, joint missions and the production of a biannual report on project
implementation, donors held four concerns related to communication: (1) inadequate
reporting on project implementation; (2) insufficient consultation by the Bank prior to
decision-taking; (3) misrepresentation of donor viewpoints by the PHO to Bank
headquarters and the GOB; and (4) suspicion that the Bank pursued its own objectives in
the sector without transparency. At one point, donors demanded that "the communication
problem be addressed urgently" 55 and one donor proposed that "a facilitator might be
engaged to work with the donors and World Bank ... to develop processes to ensure
improved partnership, participation and communication among the Consortium, PHO and
World Bank, Washington."56
The perceived inadequacy of reporting could be viewed simply as a question of
expectations and level of detail required by the funding agencies of reports produced by
the P110, which it undoubtedly was. Nonetheless, the issue was also one of
communication, in that it begged the question of how effectively the Consortium worked
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to communicate expectations and resolve these. Agreement was not reached prior to
implementation of the FPHP on reporting details and thus had to be negotiated in mid-
stream. At the Consortium Retreat, the problem was identified as lack of agreement on
reporting format and content. The meeting agreed that the reports would be recast to
satisfy both Bank and donor needs, and in particular that these would be more analytic,
devote greater attention achievement (instead of inputs) and to problems. Complaints
from donors tapered off after amendments were made to subsequent reports and aide-
memoires, suggesting that, with respect to some issues, communication was adequate to
resolve differences of expectation of the coordination machinery.
The issue of consultation within the Consortium proved less tractable. In May 1996, at a
meeting of heads of aid agencies of Consortium members, the donor's major concerns
were described as "poor communication between the Bank's HQ and the donors
representatives in the field; [and] the inadequacy of Bank's consultation with donors on
,,157key issues before engaging with GOB on such issues.	 Even the World Bank
acknowledged that the "Cofinanciers feel excluded from this dialogue [Bank and GOB]
and unaware of critical exchanges until it is too late in the project cycle to contribute
substantively to what is going on." 158 A subsequent meeting of heads of agencies
suggested that "regular consortia meetings [be convened] locally with adequate notice,
followed by accurate recording of minutes to be circulated for correction to participants.
If the minutes do not adequately reflect any of the concerns raised in the meetings, this
,,159
should be pointed out and the minutes amended. 	 This practice was adopted by the
PHO but frustrations persisted. At one level, some Consortium members complained that
the regular meetings did not allow for meaningful discussion of policy as they were mired
in the minutiae of micro-management.' 6° At a more substantive level, as argued by one of
the cofinanciers, the problem of inadequate consultation or partnership was structural
rather than procedural. "This level of inconsistency from the Bank is not occasional only.
While the Bank has its own extensive document on participation, in practice it interprets
participation as sharing with cofinanciers and GOB documents or TORs or scheduled
events that have already been finalised by the Bank as part of an internal process... These
internal processes are stopping the Bank from actually practising participation." 6 ' The
bilaterals were frustrated by what they saw as the imperative within the Bank to disperse
its loan and steer the policy agenda according to its corporate objectives which militated
against consensus building with its 'partners.'
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Where consultation within the Consortium elicited opinions contrary to those held by the
P110, cofinanciers feared that these were brushed under the carpet so that they would not
come to the attention of Bank headquarters or the Government. The officer-in-charge of
the PHO attributed tension in the Consortium in 1996 to a "lack of communication
between [Bank] headquarters and the PHO which results in the cofinanciers receiving
,,162
conflicting messages and becoming agitated. 	 The minutes of a meeting of donor staff
in June that year, confirmed that "insufficient communication.. .between the Dhaka offices
and HQ, was mentioned as the key issue." 63
 Others suggested that it was simply a
personality dispute between officials in the Bank.IM Nonetheless, the "breakdown in
communication" left the cofinanciers with two concerns: (1) that "the World Bank
Washington is receiving an inaccurate view of donor activity and viewpoint;" 65
 and (2)
about who was ultimately responsible within the Bank for taking decisions regarding
developments which were of concern to all parties. Consortium members were
particularly frustrated when agreements reached in Dhaka were subsequently overturned
in Washington.166
Bank misrepresentation of donor views to the GOB marked a longer-standing concern.
The communication systems of the Consortium did not provide sufficient transparency to
confirm or dispel donor anxieties. Donors were aware that the Bank did pursue its own
objectives through the Consortium mechanism, in terms of its policy agenda and its
concentration on disbursement. One member stated that "Cofinanciers experience the
Bank pursuing its own activities and deadlines without transparency about its ultimate
objectives. This leads to suspicion among cofinanciers about the Bank's own agenda."67
It appears that the members had cause for concern. For example, upon completion of the
first supervision mission of the First Population Project in 1975, the Bank proposed that
"A sanitised version of the supervision mission report should be sent to donors." 68 This
set a precedent which was followed by subsequent Task Managers. Thus, with respect to
a later mission, headquarters instructed its field staff: "please do not repeat not distribute
supervision report of February 20. Separate donors report is near completion and we will
despatch copies of it soon." 169
 This brings us back to the question of whether it is the
systems which are inadequate or whether institutions will obviate these to pursue their
individual objectives?
5.8.3 Differences of opinion over roles, responsibilities and accountability
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The Consortium has had many discussions on the issue of roles and
responsibilities but the ambiguity continues. 170
P. Thorpe, CIDA, 1995
As noted above, the TORs for the Consortium and its project support unit were not
defined with any degree of precision until 1994. There is no evidence to suggest that the
lack of specificity regarding roles caused cofinanciers many difficulties until the early
1990s. Such may have been the case because the earlier projects entailed a greater
amount of parallel financing than the later ones, which would have reduced donor
reliance on the Bank for aid management.a Alternatively, the relatively smaller number of
donors in the arrangement may have caused less contention. Nonetheless, by 1989 the
Task Manager for FPI-IP preparation commented with prescience: "it is quite clear that it
will not be easy to find an organisational and administrative form that will be effective
with so many donors and executing agencies in one project."7'
In light of the envisioned problems, a day was set aside during the FPHP start-up mission
to address "the functional and organisational relationships of the Population and Health
,,172Office vis-a-vis the Government and the Consortium s representatives in Dhaka.
Despite this effort, a considerable amount of confusion and dissatisfaction arose over the
appropriate functioning and ownership of the Consortium and the PHO. Consequently, in
November 1992, a special meeting of the Consortium was held to discuss roles and
responsibilities.' 73 Minutes from this meeting record that the Bank described its role in
similar terms to the draft terms of reference it proposed for the PHO in 1994 (see section
5.3.1). At the meeting, one of the complaints was that the PHO staff were involving
themselves in issues unrelated to the implementation of the FPHP. The Dutch delegate
stressed that the "PHO staffs are over-burdened, FPHP is not yet in place, and on the
other hand P110 staffs are over-burdened with the Inter-sectoral Population Project and
the Nutrition Project."74 CIDA, and perhaps other donors, felt that "as overall project
coordinator, the P110 ought to: (1) increase their information sharing with donors; (2) set
in writing their rOles and responsibilities; (3) consult with donors on P110 candidates and
yearly staff appraisals; and (4) agree to PHO mid-term review and end-of-project
evaluation of P110." 75 In response, the Bank agreed that as a supplement to the
description in the SAR, "a written note on the functions of the P110 will be cjrculated."76
a In the First Project all but one cofmancier channelled funds exclusively through parallel
arrangements which entailed separate fmancial and operational reports and additional independent
supervision missions. By the FPHP, seven of the cofinanciers channelled all or a part of their
assistance to the project through Tmst Funds held by the World Bank.
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Later in the year, the head of the P110 in Dhaka told a meeting of the Consortium that the
note "would be made available to the Consortium after consulting with World Bank
,,177headquarters.
The promised details on the functions of the P110 were not forthcoming and
dissatisfaction resurfaced. Consequently, by early 1994 the bilaterals began to meet
independently of the Bank on the issue of how the Consortium functioned. At one of
these meetings, it was decided that a working group be formed to discuss, among other
things, the rOles and responsibilities of Consortium members.' 78
 This recommendation
was taken forward in the form of a SWOT analysis during a supervision mission.' 79
 The
analysis drew attention to the difficulties caused by different agendas and expectations
among the members, but also the power imbalance between the Bank and the
cofinanciers. It was suggested that the problem lay in "a gap between the perceived and
actual goals and objectives, roles and responsibilities of each participant." In turn, the
working group recommended, among other things, that a retreat be convened so as to
address the perceptions of the parties as the rOles and responsibilities of all members and,
more specifically, to narrow the gap between what the cofinanciers expect and what the
180PHO delivers.
The Retreat revealed a number of differing perceptions regarding 'who should be doing
what,' and that a variety of expectations were not being 	 81 Participants were
arranged into three groups according to their institutional affiliation (i.e., PHO,
cofinancier, or executing agency) and asked to comment upon four questions: 'how do
we see ourselves?'; 'how do we see others?'; 'how do they see us?'; and 'what do we
expect?' Some of the differences are illustrated by the following examples. The
'executing agencies' expressed their expectation that other members would have 'greater
confidence in their technical capabilities.' In marked contrast, the P110 expected that the
multilaterals would 'execute more and advise less,' while the donors noted a conflict
between these rOles and expected that 'clearer guidelines be developed.' Both the Bank
and the donors wanted the executing agencies to keep them better informed of their
activities. The executing agencies, however, saw their responsibility for reporting to be
primarily to the Government, not to the PHO or donors. Whereas the P110 understood
itself to be accountable to the World Bank, the cofinanciers complained that this
arrangement resulted in the P110 being "not accountable to the donors who fund them."
WHO and UNICEF were referred to as executing agencies at the retreat. UNFPA did not attend
which led to criticisms of lack of cooperation.
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The executing agencies reflected the prevailing ambiguity by reporting that they were
accountable to the GOB, donors and to their Executive Boards.
While the bilaterals conceded that they constituted a diverse group with 'inconsistent,'
'demanding' and 'unrealistic expectations,' they charged that the Bank was 'driven by
disbursement' and that its officials, although paid by the cofinanciers, were 'busy with
non FPI{P matters.' They demanded that the Bank be 'more open in its dialogue with
donors,' 'represent donor views as one voice,' and 'undertake more critical reporting' so
as to appraise the cofinanciers of the true situation. There was agreement on the need for
'greater transparency,' 'greater information flows,' and the development of a 'Code of
Conduct.' It was acknowledged that part of the problem which they were experiencing
arose from the fact that the expectations had not been clearly reflected in the formal
agreements covering the project. A number of specific recommendations were put
forward at the Retreat aimed at clarif'ing the rOles of the PHO and the executing
agencies, and strengthening accountability, reporting and communication.
The Bank described the Retreat as "a useful starting point for further development and
improvement in the unique coordination and collaboration being developed by the
Consortium." 82
 At least one donor, however, complained that the Bank's mode of
participation had frustrated the resolution of a number of problems: "while cofinanciers
were extremely frank in their exchange of views on the expected roles and
responsibilities of Consortium members, participants from the World Bank Dhaka were
their usual cautious, guarded and polite selves. This inhibited development of the
expected action plan from some of the working groups for strengthening the
Consortium."836
Although the Retreat may have served cathartic purposes, the underlying structural
problems remained. The participants' frustrations re-emerged when the Bank was
perceived as riding roughshod over their expectations regarding donor and GOB
participation in the preparation of the Health and Population Sector Sfrategy' and
HAPP-5.' 85 The Swedish Ambassador reflected the dominant mood among the bilaterals
when he wrote to the Bank: "We frequently hear the FPHP referred to as a 'World Bank
project' with a PHO reporting to Washington, whilst in our view, the proper terminology
and order lines should have been, a 'GOB project' with the World Bank as the donor lead
This statement suggests that members themselves perceived that differences in corporate culture
led to problems in coordination.
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agency and as such responsible to the donor Consortium. It is, after all, cofinanciers who
share the costs of the P110. We would in no way argue for a change of the World Bank
being the lead agency in the Consortium but would simultaneously encourage GOB's
coordination role and responsibility.. .Is there a need for a 'new' P110 and, if so, what
role and responsibilities should it be given?"86
Disagreements over responsibilities dragged into 1996. It was the Bank's opinion that due
to the "diverse accountabilities and procedures of participating members, a certain
amount of tension is inherent." 87 In May 1996, at a meeting convened to discuss
concerns with the Consortium, the minutes record that "some donors felt that there was a
conflict in the Bank's 'lending and leadership' role. One was driven by wish to come to
closure quickly on lending decisions followed by prompt disbursements while the other
required methodically building donor consensus and Government ownership which was
inevitably a slow drawn out process. This resulted in the Bank "pushing projects on the
borrowers without adequate consultation with relevant stakeholders in the planning
process..." 88 Elsewhere donors had remarked upon the differences between the two
approaches, particularly that, as grant-givers, they were concerned with 'accountability',
whereas for the Bank, the "major concern is project implementation and loan
disbursement. This 'cultural difference' in the institutions needs to be recognised and
dealt with explicitly." 189 In reality, the P110 was wearing one additional hat which further
complicated matters - namely that of advancing the Bank's corporate policy agenda.
The Bank proposed that "The most effective way to resolve the tension is to develop
shared values and objectives, and a clear understanding (recorded in writing) covering
respective roles of the different partners, their responsibilities and the modalities for
working together. Further, all aspects of the working relationship should be periodically
revisited." It was, therefore, recommended that "the local heads of donor agencies meet
to work out 'mutually acceptable rules of the game." 9° The rules of the game were
subsequently unilaterally proposed by the Bank in its draft Code of Conduct. The point
worth considering, however, is that despite considerable and ongoing attention to the
delineation of roles, responsibilities and accountability, the differences were never
satisfactorily resolved. Thus the question remains as to whether or not it would be
possible to draw up sufficiently detailed legal agreements to minimise differences of
perception and interpretation and thereby militate against conflict over these issues. Or is
it the case that the ambiguity, although at times frustrating to the participants, has been
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purposely built into the system so as to allow the parties to pursue their individual
interests through the arrangement?
Criticisms surrounding roles, responsibilities and accountability within the Consortium
were naturally primarily directed towards the Bank, as it was in the maelstrom. Yet there
was also confusion and dissatisfaction over the role played by the multilateral agencies
with respect to the project. The GOB entered into contractual arrangements with WHO,
UNFPA and UNICEF to provide assistance in the implementation of almost half of the
sub-components of the FPHP. Criticisms centred primarily around UNFPA and WFIO
and were essentially three-fold: (1) the quality of the support provided by these agencies
to sub-component execution; (2) the nature and direction of accountability of the
agencies; and (3) the manner and extent to which the agencies were able to bridge the gap
between playing a normative role (i.e., providing technical advice to GOB) on one hand
and of undertaking project execution on the other (i.e., ensuring implementation). The
problems manifested themselves largely in the realm of aid management, not
coordination.
The responsibilities which WHO assumed under the FPHP were far greater in scope,
financial value, and complexity than had been the case for the TPFHP (essentially a
family planning project); in that the organisation was commissioned by the GOB to
execute 21 of the 66 sub-components of the project. It was suggested in confidence by
both Bank and WHO officials that the Bank had put pressure on the GOB to seek the
services of the WHO to execute such a large number of projects so as to provide a
financial and substantive life-line to WHO which might otherwise have become
marginalised in what was to become the world's largest externally financed health and
population project. Agreement was reached on the precise rOle of WHO prior to project
start-up and detailed in agreements with both the World Bank' 9 ' and the GOB. 192 As part
of the arrangement, the managerial capacity of the local WHO office was strengthened so
as to cope with the increasing work load.
Despite attempts to clearly specify WilO's role and to take steps to enable WHO to
successfully discharge its commitments, dissatisfaction surfaced. Some donors were
concerned with the ability of WHO to effectively execute some of the activities for which
it took responsibility. For example, WHO was criticised for its inability to recruit suitable
According to the agreement, WHO received 4% of the actual cost of all supplies and
procurements made and 14% for all other costs.
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expertise for the components relating to Health Care Quality Assurance, STIs, Cancer
193and the Rational Use of Drugs, inter alia.
	 In addition, donors complained of
inadequate monitoring and reporting, and delays in approvals and procurement. For
example, an AIDAB review of its contributions to the FPHP executed by WHO found
"that the biannual report from WHO to GOB, and shared informally with the Bank and
relevant donors, inadequate in detail for ATDAB requirements." 94
 AIDAB also pointed
to "inadequate human resources in the Dhaka office to manage the execution role
effectively." In more general terms, the reviewers argued that "a lack of financial and
operational autonomy in the Dhaka office led to a major impediment to successful
performance of WHO's rOle." The review recommended that the autonomy of the local
WHO office be increased and that WHO report with greater specificity on project
execution - failing this, it was recommended that an Australian contractor be appointed
to manage the sub-components. The Preparatory Review Group Report for the Mid-Term
Review of the FPHP also traced problems with WHO execution to the "organisational set
up of WHO which does not allow for flexible operation... The response rate is impeded
by their having to obtain approval through a series of administrative channels that are
WHO standing procedures." 95
 Some criticisms were countered by the WHO
Representative who wrote: "While we acknowledge some delays in the past. . .WHO rules
and regulations, however, must be followed to implement these activities, which is also
clearly stated in the GOB/WHO agreement."96
The Government signed agreements with the Bank and WHO, indicating that it could
comply with the procedures of both agencies. When contradiction arose, WHO found
itself in a difficult position. For example, the Bank sought to ensure that WHO, when
executing activities financed with funds channelled through its Trust Accounts, abide by
rules to which IDA resources were bound and agreed by Government in the DCA. In one
case, Bank rules specified that purchase orders worth more than US$ 200,000 be put up
for international tendering. According to WHO sources, WHO resisted the application of
Bank procedures and only at the threat of its withdrawing from project execution was a
compromise found through which large purchase orders be broken down into smaller
units to circumvent the Bank's rules.'97
Another problem lay in the area of accountability. Whereas the project execution
agreements made WHO directly accountable to the Government, donors were concerned
about the limited accountability that the organisation had towards them as 'funders.'
Although the agreements contained clauses about sharing information with donors, the
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funding agencies considered this insufficient and demanded greater leverage over WITO
in relation to sub-components which they financed. Was frustration over 'inadequate'
accountability an inevitable outcome of the Consortium arrangement in which the
cofinanciers had agreed to fund the project, but over which the GOB had ultimate
responsibility for project implementation (including the subcontracting of project
execution)? In other words, is it possible to set bench marks with respect to financial and
operational reporting that will satisfy donors or will they only be truly satisfied in meeting
their accountability requirements by directly managing aid themselves?
In the case of UNFPA, confusion about its responsibilities focused mainly around
misunderstandings over what it had agreed to do with respect to implementation of the
FPHP and over which rules and procedures should govern IJNFPA actions. During
project preparation, UNFPA, as well as WHO and UNICEF, were almost always referred
to as 'executing agencies.' In April 1992, for example, at a meeting of the Consortium,
not long after the FPHP start-up and at which three UNFPA staff were present, UNFPA
was reported as undertaking project execution for two named sub-components of the
project.' 98
 A supervision mission aide-memoire, from the same period, records that
agreement had been reached in principle among all parties as to the role of UNFPA and
that the mission would recommend that the MOHFW formally request UNFPA
participation in sub-component execution. 199
 Differences, however, arose over what
would be involved. NORAD, the financier of one of the sub-components, wanted
UNFPA to assume a purely administrative role (i.e., recruitment of personnel and
,200payment of salaries), whereas UNFPA envisioned something more substantive. There
were also differences over the fee provided to IJNFPA for its services: the Fund wanted
to charge 13%; while the Government was only offering 5%20I Negotiations got further
bogged down over whose procedures would prevail. In the Development Credit
202Agreement, the Government had committed itself to ensunng that all goods and
services procured with IDA funds, or those of the cofinanciers passing through Bank
Trust Funds, follow IDA procedures, whereas UNFPA insisted that its own rules apply.203
While the Fund was able to reach an agreement with the Government on its rOle and
remuneration, problems arose during project implementation due to the lack of
understanding among cofinanciers of the nature of UNFPA participation; relating to their
inflated expectations of what the Fund would deliver.
Misconceptions emerged, among other things, over monitoring and reporting channels.
For example, when it surfaced that there were, and had for some time been, serious lapses
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in the quality of oral contraceptives, financed by CIDA and procured by UNFPA, CIDA
launched its own enquiry. A CIDA report noted: "unfortunately most of the UNFPA
actions were unknown to the Bank or to CIDA. . .Between September and December
minimal correspondence from TINFPA was copied to Bank or CIDA. The UNFPA
Representative stated that he considered his role is to support Government, not the Bank
or Consortium and, therefore, his responsibility is to communicate with Government. The
current system for communication among the various parties involved may not be
adequate when such serious issues arise." 204 As was the case with WHO, donors were not
satisfied with reporting and accountability systems to which they were only indirectly
linked with the MOHFW as the intermediary. Where confidence in the GOB capacity to
facilitate the linkage was found to be lacking, donor frustration was vented upon the
executing agencies.
For much of the remainder of the project, UNFPA worked to portray its role as a
supporting, as opposed to executing, agency, in part because the confusion over its
responsibilities had resulted in it being "unfairly criticised and its reputation harmed vis-
â-vis the donors."205 Hence, in response to a report issued by the Bank, the UNFPA
Representative stressed to the RBM Chief that "according to the Memorandum of
Understanding signed with the Government of Bangladesh, IJNFPA is only 'assisting the
Government in the execution of financial and administrative aspect of the MDU sub-
component' and shares no responsibility in the implementation of the project. Therefore,
the designation of UNFPA as executing agency will be deleted."206 The Representative
reiterated the same position to the RBM later in the year, insisting that as the Fund merely
assists the GOB it could, therefore, assume 'no responsibilities for delays' and had thus
been criticised unfairly by Consortium members for what were essentially GOB
(in)actions.207
 The Fund also convened a special meeting of the Consortium at which it
provided a detailed explanation of its rOle according to its agreement with the
Government, namely: (1) to procure commodities for a variety of sub-components; and
(2) to 'facilitate' implementation of the two named sub-components. 208 As the donors
continued to draw attention to what they saw as failures on the part of IJNFPA project
execution, it was necessary for the UNFPA Representative to restate the nature of the
contractual arrangements at another meeting of the Consortium. 209 From the USAID
perspective, UNFPA was charactensed as a 'unilateral actor,' 21 ° while a World Bank
official less generously referred to the Fund as the "problem player... which does its own
thing and manages to be damaging despite its small budget."21'
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It is unclear if the Fund wished to stress its role as a mere 'supporting agency' so as to:
(1) distance itself from the control the Bank exercised through the Consortium; (2)
distance itself from perceived shortcomings with project implementation; or (3) to retain
a greater normative role in the sector vis-à-vis the GOB than would be possible if
UNFPA assumed a prominent part in project execution. As a UNICEF official remarked:
"UNFPA has had a negative experience with execution, and now asks itself 'why be
subservient to the World Bank, cofinanciers and Government?"212
The issue of the appropriate rOles of the UN technical agencies in the Consortium
provoked considerable disagreement. The Bank encouraged the Fund to "function more
as executing than advisory." 213 In contrast, although the WHO Programme Manager for
FPHP conceded that the WHO did not speak with a technical voice at the Consortium
meetings, he thought that it ought to. 214
 CIDA, among other agencies, agreed with the
WHO position that the multilaterals should play a greater role in policy leadership in their
respective areas of expertise within the project. 215 The DGIS officer for the Consortium
consistently argued that all three multilaterals ought to make a greater contribution in
terms of policy, with each assuming a leading role according to their mandates. 216
 The
Bank was said to be opposed to re-assigning rOles in such a manner, as it argued that the
Bank had, or could access, technical expertise as needed. 2t7 ODA posited that the
multilaterals were not in a position to take on leadership roles as they did not possess the
ability or influence to bring about the necessary reforms required of the GOB - "they
would cave in to Government pressure."218
The bilaterals expressed the need to develop clearer guidelines for the multilaterals which
differentiated between these two possibly conflicting roles: executing and advisory.219
The WHO manager for the FPHP acknowledged the difficulty reconciling these two rOles
as conflicts often arose between "the analysis of problems and recommendation of
solutions based on WHO norms and procedures" on the one hand and the exigencies of
project management on the other. 22° According to WHO headquarters officials this
transpired when "the contractors asked WHO to perform tasks in a manner inconsistent
with scientific best practice, which was often the case when, for example, WHO was
asked to procure goods and services from the sponsoring country."22 ' The GOB hoped
that the multilaterals could perform both tasks. According to a MOHFW view, expressed
in a status report on the FPHP, "while it is felt that the executing agencies [i.e., the
multilaterals] may still be required, their rOles should be clearly defined and be expanded
beyond the existing boundaries of procurement, recruitment, training and fellowship
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arrangement. Technical assistance from the executing agencies should not be just limited
to the provision of consultants, it must include transfer of technology, provision of
appropriate managerial assistance and capacity building."222
The central questions raised by the involvement of the multilaterals in the Consortium
were: (1) whether or not their rOle in project execution compromised their normative
functions; (2) whether or not their role within the Consortium should have included acting
as lead technical agencies for areas within their respective technical capabilities - a role
often seen by the bilaterals to have been usurped by the World Bank; and (3) given the
criticism levelled at the multilaterals for their alleged inability to manage funds properly
on behalf of the bilateral organisations, was it simply the failure to adequately specify
expectations, and if not, what prospects are there for the GOB to meet donor expectations
in this regard?
5.8.4 Different expectations of the Consortiu,n arrangement. missions, meetings,
monitoring
There are a variety of animals in the garden, each with a dfferent expectation of
the PHO.223
K. Hagstrom, SIDA, 1996
Hagstrom was correct when he portrayed the differences among the Consortium members
as the underlying factor for dissatisfaction with the arrangement. The different
characteristics and distinct needs of the agencies made it difficult for the PHO to
reconcile the cacophony of demands. The agencies differed in a host of ways. For
example, in response to donor complaints over "slow and sometimes unclear processing
of claims," the Bank responded that it was "difficult presenting the true picture of
expenditures and disbursements. ..of all seven cofinanciers and executing agencies."224
For they operated according to "9 different fiscal years and 6 different cash flow and
Fiscal Year carryover systems... etc."225
 The agencies also differed in relation to their
representation at the country-level. KIW functioned without any resident staff, 226 the EU
227had one official covenng health as well as projects in 6 other sectors, while CIDA
employed three professional staff to monitor its investments in the FPHP. 228 The
authority vested in the resident representative also varied widely. ODA delegated almost
total responsibility and decision-making authority to its aid management office in
Dhaka,229
 while AusAid appeared to lie on the other end of the spectrum. Donors also
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differed with respect to their interest in delegating responsibility for aid management to
the GOB. SIDA, for example, advocated for ever increasing MOHFW participation and,
therefore, against parallel financing (and its accoutrements such as project
implementation units and dedicated financial and operational reporting systems) while the
EU, GTZ and ODA took an opposing tack in principle and in practice. The Bank also
noted that there were tremendous differences in the abilities and knowledge brought to
the project by the individual officers of the different agencies which exacerbated
problems arising out of institutional differences.23°
To a remarkable degree, it proved possible to accommodate the divergent needs of the
parties within the coordination arrangement. Thus, for example, the projects enabled
some agencies (such as the EU) to parallel finance and execute components of their
choosing; while simultaneously accommodating the wish of SIDA to joint-cofinance part
of the project with the GOB. Nonetheless, despite general agreements to work
collectively under the banner of the Consortium, at times the different expectations
proved vexing to reconcile. Examples of the frustrated expectations are provided as they
reflect the demands which the Government will face if and when it assumes a more
pronounced rOle in aid coordination and management.
The focus of the supervision missions proved contentious as donors were interested in
different aspects of performance. This pulled the PHO in opposing directions. 231
 Some
donors were concerned only with the sub-components of the projects which they financed
while others, less concerned with micro-management, wanted to consider the implications
of their investments on the macro-issues in the sector. According to one view, "the
Consortium functions mainly to share information on what [donors] are doing and how
'their' sub-components are progressing. Ultimately each donor is mainly interested in the
sub-components which they fund."232
 Yet some agencies were interested in the bigger
picture. The SIDA officer responsible for FPHP found it "odd that during supervision
missions, each donor's specialist digs deep into individual sub-components, yet no-body
takes stock of overall progress of the project."233 In 1986, Norwegians complained to the
Bank that a supervision mission was "less satisfactory than previously... It is essential
that the annual reviews function as a useful instrument in the monitoring sector
progress."234
 One resident EU official found: "the missions too superficial."235 The
official observed that due to the preoccupation with the sub-components, there was little
time to deal with the policy issues. Yet because the "World Bank's and the Mission's
understanding of the sub-components was shallow," the missions were not able to make
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insightful recommendations on these either. Such was the price of attempting to
accommodate the divergent interests.
Similar discord presided over the regular Consortium meetings. An EU review noted that
while the meetings may be useful to members, they are "particularly unsatisfactory for
policy discussions" as they are too short and too focused on micro-issues surrounding
implementation.236
 At the Consortium Retreat, it was recommended that the format be
reviewed. Later the Consortium agreed that its "bimonthly meetings in the present form
were observed to be inadequate for policy dialogue so they would be modified."237
 The
meetings were not recast, presumably due to the pressing day-to-day problems which
kept the Consortium focused on micro-management.
The balance between monitoring process and impact was also controversial. Most donors
complained that the Bank was more interested in disbursement than the quality and
impact of its investments. Some observers suggested that this was a hypocritical charge;
as many agencies were equally interested in disbursement. According to a WhO official,
as there was "significant underspending in FPHP (and previous projects) the bilaterals
were not pleased with the Bank which introduced an additional tension in the
Consortium."238
A litany of unmet expectations of the Bank emerged over the course of the projects. For
example a KfW report recommended "stronger emphasis on sector dialogue and on
program policy," 239
 while another considered "the Bank's advisory role with respect to
sequencing and timing not very strong, it should have been more proactive in
coordination, a more analytical approach should have been adopted."2 More
importantly, different views obtained over the P110 itself Whereas some donors
considered it insufficiently funded and staffed (e.g., NORAD), 24 ' it was also described as
a 'fat and bloated bureaucracy.' Over the years, there were calls to evaluate the
effectiveness of the PPO/PHO and at times plans as well. 242 According to SIDA, the issue
was raised at the Consortium retreat, but was "not strongly supported by the cofmanciers
and was in any event blocked by the Task Manager."243 The P110 was eventually subject
to its first external review in 1998 which focused, however, more on the options for a
project support unit for HAPP-5 than the problems associated with meeting the needs of
donors under the FPHP.2'
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5.9 Performance of the Consortium with respect to aid coordination: excellent,
but...
It is not correct to evaluate the Consortium against a theoretical gold standard
which does not exist in reality.245
J.S. Kang, World Bank, 1997
Despite Mr Kang' s legitimate concerns over the validity of the exacting evaluative
framework employed by this study, the Consortium performed very well with respect to
aid coordination and management (Table 14). Although the financial costs of the P110
may seem high, as a proportion of the total volume of resources channelled through the
mechanism, they were in practice modest. While the mechanism failed to incorporate
some major donors and a significant share of aid to the sector, it should be borne in mind
that the Consortium was ostensibly designed to coordinate donors around Bank projects,
not to provide coordination services to the sector as a whole. The Consortium's most
fundamental shortcoming lay in its relationship with the recipient administration; it
reinforced the dependency of the MOHFW and did too little to make use of Government
systems and to encourage recipient leadership.
5.9.1. Ownership, participation and periodicity of coordination through the Consortium
Theoretically all the cofinanciers had a stake in the Consortium. In practice, it was owned
by the Bank in whose institutions it was housed. Significantly, the Government had no
ownership in the mechanism and there were no plans to enable it to assume any.
If one discounts the fact that the Government, two major donors and several smaller ones,
as well as civil society, did not gain membership in the Consortium and, therefore, only
rarely took part in events organised by it, participation by members of the Consortium in
its activities was impressive. This is true for their involvement in the annual IDA-
cofinanciers project missions and the meetings of the Dhaka-based representatives. The
Bank and, with very few exceptions, all the cofinanciers were represented in all of the
supervision missions during the successive projects, albeit some better than others. With
respect to participation in the regular meetings of the Consortium, evidence is only
available for the FPFIP as minutes and a participant list were only produced from 1992
onwards. Between April 1992 and May 1997, at least 44 regular meetings of the
Consortium were convened, which represents an average of about 9 meetings per year.
For 41 of these meetings, a participant list was available. These records illustrate (see
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Table 13) that the majority of the agencies participated in more than two-thirds of the
meetings called; with the exception of the EC, Japan, UNFPA and KIW.W As noted
above, occasionally other parties were invited to discussions of the Consortium.a The
World Bank was well represented at all of the meetings and on one occasion sent 12
delegates. The other agencies sent only one or two officials each.
Table 13: Participation of members in 41 meetings of Consort mm 1992-1997
Agency	 No. of meetings Average no.
______________________________ attended
	 staff/meeting
World Bank	 41	 6.3
GTZ	 40	 1.2
WHO	 38	 1.3
CIDA	 36	 1.6
ODA	 35	 1.5
NORAD	 34	 1.0
SIDA	 34	 1.0
UNICEF	 29	 1.4
AusAID	 28	 1.2
DGIS	 27	 1.0
EEC	 16	 1.9
Japan	 16	 1.4
IINFPA	 14	 1.6
Federal Republic of Gennany	 7	 1.0
KfW	 2	 2.0
There were mixed opinions over the desirability of Government participation in the
Consortium. While donors such as Sweden called for "more direct participation by
Government," others questioned whether or not the time of Government officials should
be expended in discussions among donors. Most GOB officials argued passionately for
Government representation in the Consortium and that donor-only arrangements were not
in the interests of the country. The Bank maintained that Government participation in
supervision missions was inappropriate as their purpose was to review GOB
performance.2" As discussed in the next Chapter, under the SWAp there is wide-spread
support for a Government-led aid coordination arrangement as well as Government
leadership of annual sector reviews. Nonetheless, certain donors wish to maintain an
arrangement through which they can meet independently of Government officials, as has
been the case with the FPHP Consortium.
KfW did not have country level representation in Bangladesh and relied on the missions for
project monitoring.
a Of the 41 meetings: USAID, DANIDA and AsDB participated in three, officials from the
MOHFW attended two, as did two consultants.
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In that successive projects ran without interruption and the supervisory missions and
meetings of the Consortium were frequent and regular, periodicity of coordination
through the Consortium was excellent. There were complaints that activity levels in the
MOHFW waxed and waned in response to the schedule of visiting Consortium missions.
Yet the emergence of a 'mission culture' reflects less the intermittent nature of
coordination through the Consortium than the overwhelming demands placed on the
administrative machinery of Government by missions themselves.
5.9.2 The realm, breadth and integration of aid coordination through the Consortium
The Consortium provided tools through which to promote consultation over policy issues
and strategies (through the missions and meetings), the Bank with some means to
encourage the concertation of donor opinion and action, as well as opportunities for the
pursuit of significant operational coordination through the cofinancing arrangement and
use of common aid management systems. In terms of the breadth of coordination
achieved, the Consortium focused mainly upon the sub-sector in which its projects were
active. During the FPHP, this involved approximately 35% of aid in the health and
population sector. With emphasis placed on the SWAp, the Consortium is taking an
interest in systemic and cross-cutting issues beyond the confines of its investments.
The systems of aid coordination and policy dialogue established by the Consortium are
only partially integrated with their indigenous counterparts. In aid management tenns,
although many common systems are used by Consortium members, these are often
grafted upon or parallel to Government systems. More complete integration occurs in the
policy dimension where the Consortium discussions are an integral and agenda-setting
feature of the domestic policy process.
5.9.3 Authority and adherence to decisions made in the Consortium
The legal agreements governing the cofinanced projects provided the basis for donor
adherence to commitments they made to aid coordination and management. Less explicit
rules, for example those relating to the conduct of meetings of the Consortium, were
gradually formalised as the need to do so arose. Even the formal agreements broke down
on a recurrent basis where specificity was lacking and differences of opinion over
interpretation came to light. Often it proved difficult to resolve these differences as
limited authority was vested in the Bank as arbiter and no agreed or effective sanctions
had been developed. The Team Leader of the Preparatory Review Group of the Mid-
Term Review of the FPJ{P (a former staff of the World Bank's OED) suggested that "the
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problem with the Consortium is that the responsibility to coordinate has been vested in
the P110 but it really doesn't have the power to fully carry out this responsibility." 247 This
analysis was echoed by a P110 staff who complained that there are "no real sanctions
over bilaterals who won't play ball." 248 Yet despite the absence of an entity which
wielded absolute authority in the group, for the most part, decisions which were made
with respect to project financing and implementation were subsequently honoured.
5.9.4 Outcome criteria: efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability
The efficiency of the deployment and management of aid in the sector was improved as
the Consortium served to reduce the duplication of activities, to harmonise procedures,
and to encourage donors to use common aid management tools. In the survey conducted
for this study, there was support from all respondents for the proposition that the
Consortium had reduced the burden faced by the MOHFW in relation to aid management.
Respondents stressed the contribution of consolidated expenditure reporting and common
disbursement in the case of Trust Funds. Donors were largely appreciative of the
initiative to rely on single biannual reports prepared by the executing agencies and
MOHFW, but Government officials did not agree that this reduced the reporting demands
of the agencies. Whereas 5 of 8 donor officials suggested that joint missions had had a
beneficial impact, only three of the five Government officials, which responded, agreed.
Many cited the persistence of numerous additional missions fielded by donors,
particularly by those providing parallel financing. The majority of respondents felt that
the Consortium had satisfactorily reduced the number of bilateral meetings required
between the agencies and senior Government officials. A third of donor officials felt that
the Consortium had resulted in cost-savings and increased efficiency of resource use,
while the remaining respondents were uncertain.
Two factors likely contributed to the Consortium playing a positive role in increasing the
effectiveness of the deployment of aid. First, roughly two-thirds of donor respondents
suggested that the Consortium had resulted in improved project design, a sentiment
generally shared by Government officials. Second, in that conflicting policy advice was
diminished as a result of consensus-building, the arrangement would have contributed to
more coherent programme development.
While the Consortium may be financially sustainable in that its supporters appear willing
to establish a comparable arrangement for HAPP-5 (see next Chapter), the mechanism
would not flourish if it were transferred to the MOHFW for management. In relation to
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the Third Project, the Government already noted that "a negative aspect is the possibility
of the GOB's growing dependence on IDA & cofinanciers for maintaining a vast
,,249
complement of field staff on a permanent basis. Under the FPFIP, the PHO was
enlarged and little was done to develop indigenous capacity to assume the responsibilities
performed by the PHO to manage aid and coordinate donors.
In addition to considerations of the performance of the Consortium according to the
study's conceptual framework, a couple of points deserve consideration. First, there were
undoubtedly additional benefits of the Consortium in terms of aid coordination. For
example, one Consortium member highlighted its utility in orienting new expatriate staff
to the sector, providing continuity among the group of donor representatives, and, during
the FPHP, providing an institutional memory of donor decision-making. 25° Yet, the
experience also raises concerns which cannot be discussed within the conceptual
framework. For example, did the Consortium encourage an unbalanced approach to
reform of the aid relationship in that it was used to leverage changes in the MOHFW,
while doing little to put pressures on donors to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of
aid, through, for example, modifications of their procedures? In addition, the PHO and
the numerous project offices established for project implementation undermined the line
authority in the MOHFW. In the same vein, the scale of the Consortium had an
overwhelming influence on policy development. While none of the donors surveyed
rejected the idea that the Consortium had increased the leverage of their agency over the
Government on policy dialogue, only half stated categorically that it had done so. Most
Government officials took a contrary view. One official stated that as a result of the
strength of the Consortium, the Government had "lost control over developments in the
sector" and two-thirds of Government respondents felt that the Government was
disadvantaged in the face of a united donor front on policy dialogue. One donor
questioned the legitimacy of the Bank using the Consortium as a forum for policy
dialogue as the Bank was not a neutral player and the Consortium does not include all
donors and excludes the Government.25'
Table 14: Assessing the Consortium against the conceptual framework for aid
coordination
Process criteria	 Remarks
Ownership	 0 Belongs to cofmancing donors including the World Bank. In practice, as the
manager of the Consortium and PHO, the Bank has greatest ownership.
0 No steps are being taken to institutionalise the Consortium, or the project support
unit, in the MOHFW.
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Participation	 0 While a significant number of donors are not part of the Consortium, all major
bilateral agencies, with the exception of USAID, and the key health-related
multilateral organisations, with the exception of AsDB, participate in the
Consortium.
O Excludes numerous donors, the GOB, and civil society, although there are
formalised and increasingly regularised linkages with them.
O Concern has been expressed that the specialised UN organisations and Funds do
not contribute sufficiently to the group in their normative capacity.
0 High degree of participation in missions and bi-monthly meetings.
O Decision-making is on a consensual basis, within the framework of a Code of
________________	 Conduct. The World Bank brokers consensus-building and conflict resolution.
Periodicity &
	 0 Regular, frequent and on-going.
Integration	 0 Systems for aid management are partially integrated into recipient administration.
0 Consortium policy positions are very well integrated into the policy process - at
times these set the pace and content of the sector agenda.
Realm	 0 Promotes in equal measure consultation, concertation and operational
coordination.
Breadth	 0 Focuses mainly on those activities within the sector supported through the FPHP
(i.e., approximately 35% of external investment in the sector).
0 The Consortium has had limited oversight of broader systemic issues. This
changed with the preparation of a SWAp.
Authority &	 0 Members generally abide by decisions taken in the group. However, many
adherence	 instances of the failure to do so have come to light and the Bank complains that it
does not have the authority to prevent members from acting unilaterally.
0 Procedures established do not appear to be by-passed although certain
________________	 arrangements are duplicated (e.g., appraisal and monitoring missions).
Costs	 0 In addition to the significant human resources devoted by each member agency to
participation in the Consortium, the cost of the PHO is approximately 1% of
project investment. This appears to represent nood value-for-money.
Outcome Criteria I Remarks
Efficiency	 0 Appears to improve the efficiency of aid in the sub-sector supported by FPHP by:
(1) reducing duplication of activities; and (2) diminishing burden on recipient
_______________	 administration through hannonisation of procedures, etc.
Effectiveness	 0 Appears to improve the effectiveness of the sub-sector supported by FPHP by: (1)
reducing conflicting policy signals sent to MOHFW; and (2) rationalising a
proportion of external investments.
Equity	 0 Unclear if the mechanism serves to correct inequities in targeting of assistance and
in payment for services.
________________ 0 There is no evidence that it increases parity of benefits for aid-supported staff.
Sustainability	 0 The arrangement is well institutionalised within the donor community and it
appears that staff (perhaps with the exception of the multilateral organisations)
have adequate informal incentives to participate actively.
0 Costs appear sustainable while the mechanism remains under donor ownership.
0 Development of national skills and institutions to handle these tasks not evident.
O Project support units and PHO undermine line management in MOHFW.
5.10 Chapter summary
- The Consortium represents a remarkably long-lived initiative which has enabled
disparate donors to accommodate differences in policy and operational practices so as to
improve the coordination of a proportion of their aid. During the FPHP, this involved the
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resources of ten donors covering approximately 35% of external investment in the sector
as well as the participation of three health-related multilateral agencies.
The ingredients which made the Consortium relatively successful appear to be: (1) an
ongoing and concerted effort to address threats as they arose and to adapt practices and
formalise procedures; (2) the availability of a significant amount of ear-marked funds for
aid coordination as well as considerable flexibility in their deployment; (3) an explicit
financial investment and, hence, ownership in the mechanism by all parties (save the
multilateral agencies which may account for their erratic and problematic participation);
(4) specific characteristics of the lead agency which included the perception of relative
competence and neutrality (i.e., not belonging to any one donor country), institutional
support and internal incentives for aid coordination coupled with the dedication of
particular staff (5) tangible benefits for the lead agency (i.e., access to more aid and
enhanced influence to pursue its policy objectives); (6) material benefits for all members
(i.e., cost-savings and policy leverage); and (7) an operational component in the form of a
project to coordinate around.
Despite the achievements, there was significant disenchantment with the manner in
which the Consortium functioned, particularly with respect to differences of opinion over
policies and strategies as well as roles, responsibilities, accountability, expectations and
communication. The cofinanciers laid the blame on the dual and conflicting rOles of the
Bank as lender and consensus builder.
- The persistence of difficulties raises the question of whether or not it would have been
possible to mitigate against the possibility of dissatisfactions by providing greater
specificity to agreements and placing greater emphasis on process issues? Alternatively,
do specific and changing institutional interests of members override their general
commitment to coordinate when differences arise? From the evidence provided by the
Consortium, it would appear that the latter generally occurs.
- It was agreed that no donor in Bangladesh could have substituted for the Bank as
leader of the Consortium. Yet, the lack of absolute authority and, consequently,
a The role of personalities in the success of the Consortium is illustrated by the following concern:
"some questions were raised [by SIDA officials] as to the long-term prospects of the Consortium,
whether its nature would change drastically once other persons would staff the offices in Dhaka
and in Washington..
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legitimacy of the Bank to lead donors in the sector provided donors with the option of
whether or not to join the Consortium, to participate actively, and to abide by the
decisions and rules of Consortium. Would donors vest the required authority in the
Government if it were adequately strengthened to take on the role of aid coordinator?
Similarly, if it has been difficult for the Bank, arguably well resourced, and seen by many
observers as managerially competent, to provide coordination services with which the
bilaterals are satisfied, what hope is there that the GOB or another donor could meet
these?
- The establishment within the donor community of a large expatriate capacity for aid
management and donor coordination is likely to have diverted resources from the task of
developing recipient capacity for these tasks.
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CHAPTER SIX
Coordination and the sector-wide approach: a watershed or faddish
chimera?
6.1 Introduction
This Chapter analyses the introduction of a sector-wide approach (SWAp) in Bangladesh.
As the SWAp remained more aspirational and theoretical than applied during this
research, the Chapter begins with an explication of the concept. The manner and interests
served by placing the SWAp on the health sector agenda are then explored. Given the
limited application of the approach in practice, this Chapter does not provide an
assessment of the results of the SWAp per Se, but rather describes the intentions of the
key players with respect to their participation in this innovative approach to assess the
prospects that the SWAp may improve aid coordination. A number of reasons are given
to suggest that the introduction of the SWAp may mark a potential watershed in relation
to aid coordination in Bangladesh. However, despite the fact that the approach brings the
need for aid coordination into strong relief and provides a number of powerful tools to
facilitate aid coordination, the SWAp may simply be the latest in a history of donor-
inspired fads in the sector.a
6.2 What is a SWAp?
We have been put under great pressure to adopt the SWAp, but have no idea what
it is we committed ourselves to, each visiting consultant tells us something
different.'
Chair, MOHFW Task Force on Sector-wide Management, 1997
During 1996-97, disagreement over the meaning of a SWAp was not limited to visiting
international consultants, but was shared by donor staff, stationed in headquarters and
field locations. This resulted in considerable confusion among Bangladeshi officials, who
obtained the bulk of their understanding of new aid management instruments from these
sources. Given the nascency of the term and the nature of the ideas which it tries to
capture, ambiguity over the attributes and aims of the SWAp was predictable. In January
1997, aid agency delegates to a global strategy meeting on SWAps in Copenhagen2
employed varying terminology to describe the many characteristics and objectives which
a Such as 'Health for All' through Primary Health Care; GOBI-FFF; UCI-90; etc.
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they were seeking to achieve through changed practice at the aid interface. The World
Bank used the nomenclature 'Sector Investment Programs' (SIPs) and 'Sector
Expenditure Programs' (SEPs) to describe the generic attributes of a sector-wide
approach as well as legal lending instrument of the Bank (in the case of the SIP). Both
Sida and DANIDA used the term Sector Programme Support, with Sida placing emphasis
on common implementation arrangements3
 and DANIDA according salience to recipient
ownership of the programme.4
 USAID favoured the term 'Sector Program Assistance' in
reference to budget support which sought to highlight the link between aid and host
5
country policy and mstitutional reform. According to Cassels, the term SWAp was
adopted at the Copenhagen meeting to accommodate the plurality of approaches to
sectoral development under consideration.6
A sector-wide approach centres around a medium-term partnership between various arms
of the recipient government and donors. Current consensus holds that the SWAp's aims
are to bring about better health, in the context of a coherent sector (as defmed by an
appropriate institutional and financing structure), through concentration on four
substantive areas of collaborative work: (1) the development of sectoral policies and
strategies; (2) the preparation of medium-term and annual sector financing and
expenditure plans; (3) the establishment of common management systems; and (4)
institutional reform and capacity building in line with the policy framework and
supportive of the proposed managerial and financial arrangements.
As framed, the definition of the SWAp touches on an enormous range of issues. In
relation to aid coordination, the SWAp suggests a number of practical tools which could
potentially improve coordination (such as jointly-held priorities, plans, budgets and
management systems). Implicit, however, is the requirement of unprecedented levels of
coordination among donors and between donors and government.
6.3 The introduction of the SWAp in the health sector in Bangladesh
Although the term was not applied, the Bank promoted one element of the SWAp, the
pooling of donor funds, as early as 1988. Preceding the Fourth Population and Health
Project (FPHP), Bank staff visited the headquarters of existing and prospective
cofinanciers to promote the idea of a "program approach.. . in which donors could make
their contribution to a pool of funds on a proportional basis."7 Pooling was advocated
because of "the complexities of current project financing with too many parties
involved." According to the mission aide-memoire, the Bank encountered "views which
run counter" and "much scepticism" to the proposal. 8 Nonetheless, the Bank persisted by
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asking the Government to formulate a paper on how it could handle "implementation of a
program approach."9
 At a meeting of Government and donors, held in Paris in 1990 to
reach consensus on the FPHP, the program approach was again commended by the Bank
and "received with mixed reactions."° The idea of pooled resources was eventually
dropped for the FPHP due to cofinancier concerns regarding accountability as
characterised by the German position: "based on the Third Project implementation
experience, participation in a 'program finance' arrangement for the Fourth Project
cannot be recommended. Financing of distinct project components is recommended
instead, so that appropriate implementation planning and monitoring procedures can be
agreed upon a bilateral basis."
The Bank, however, did not lose sight of the program approach. The Completion Report
for the Third Population and Family Health Project, published in 1993, concluded that the
project "could perhaps have been designed better through a more complete pooling of
resources towards commonly defined objectives, without individual donors being
identified with separate sub-components.' 2
 Paradoxically, and despite the fact that
resources for the FPHP were not pooled, in March 1994, the Bank began to refer to the
project as operating within a 'program approach.' By this it meant putting "the project
activities in the holistic context of family planning and health programs rather than
leaving them disjointed." 3
 The extent to which the FPHP achieved such distinction is
debatable, yet it was certainly the intention of the Bank to shift investment in the sector in
the direction of a programme approach. Approximately one year later, the Bank wrote to
its Consortium partners "wondering if it would make sense to consider more a program
approach" in any follow-on project. 14 Despite the nomenclature, what was envisioned
was essentially a SWAp. "Under such an approach, we would reach agreement with
Government on the whole program of the MOHFW - broad priorities and strategies,
annual operational plans and policies, and annual expenditure programs and financing.
This agreement would provide a framework within which donors would offer assistance
according to their interests. This assistance could take the form of focused projects or of
times1icea (or program) finance, to help cover whatever the focused projects do not, in a
flexible manner." 15
 This letter was followed by a visit to Dhaka by a senior Bank official
who met with senior Government officials (MOF, ERD, and MOHFW) and with donors
to discuss the merits of a SWAp and to address the many concerns which the various
parties held.' 6 ' 17
 Thereafter the Bank circulated a concept paper which set out the
rationale and relevance of the SWAp to Bangladesh. 18 In a report on a GOB-donor
a Time-slice fmance is synonymous with budget-support.
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consultation on the future of the population and health programme, held in Paris later that
year, the Bank records "it was generally agreed that a sector-wide approach was
appropriate for a program of this importance and size," 19
 (although the claim that
agreement had been reached was later refuted by a participant at the consultation 20). In
early 1996, the Bank's internal 'Initial Executive Project Summaryö for the Consortium's
Fifth Health and Population Project (ITAPP-5) asserted that "the Bank is the only donor
,,21taking a sector-wide approach. By this the Bank presumably meant that other agencies
had yet to commit themselves. By the end of 1996, the Bank was still asserting its
leadership position in SWAp development. For example, the Bank memorandum on
meetings of the Secretary, MOHFW, with Bank staff in Washington, records that "IDA
was proposed [by the Secretary] to continue to work as the lead agency among donors for
devising the sector-wide approach." 22
 Thereafter, discussions on the preparation of
HAPP-5 and the sector-wide approach became intimately intertwined, and the Bank led
both.
Although the Bank attracted allies, it remained the principle proponent of the SWAp until
the end of this study, at which time considerable uncertainty persisted as to the nature and
even whether or not a sector approach would be adopted. A variety of motivations could
be imputed to the Bank to account for its support for the introduction of the SWAp in the
health sector in Bangladesh (speculation on these is reserved for the next Chapter), but its
own rationale proposed that the SWAp could facilitate two reforms. 23
 First, that within
the allocation of public-sector resources, priority be accorded to an Essential Package of
Services (EPS) reflecting those interventions identified by the Bank as particularly cost-
effective in an earlier global analysis.C24 It was argued that given the fungibility of
resources, ad hoc external investment could not ensure such an allocation. The SWAp
would provide the mechanism which would put all resources on the table for scrutiny and
negotiation and thereby ensure that aid would not replace Government funding of priority
activities. Consequently, the HAPP-5 appraisal mission aide-memoire specified that
project negotiations would only proceed once assurances were received from the GOB
that the EPS would constitute 60% of all public finance in the sector and that "donor
funds do not substitute for Government funds during the life of the program."25 Second,
the Bank wanted to secure sector reforms which could not be addressed in a piece-meal
manner. Consequently, the preparation of implementation plans for a host of sector
8 The JEPS is the document submitted to the Board for approval for project preparation.
The EPS in Bangladesh included low cost interventions in five categories: (1) Behaviour Change
Communication; (2) Reproductive Health Care; (3) Child Health Care; (4) Communicable Disease
Control; (5) Simple Curative Care.
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reforms served as pre-conditions of negotiation for HAPP-5.26
In that there was widespread dissatisfaction among powerful stakeholders over specific
features of the health sector in Bangladesh, conditions for the introduction of a SWAp
were ripe. First, a number of donors agreed with the Bank's reform objectives - even
though they may have disagreed with the methods for introducing them or with particular
details. Second, many donors, notably the European members of the FPHP Consortium27
and USAID, were concerned that developments in the sector lacked direction; something
that a policy framework could correct. Third, most donors, 28
 but most audibly DGIS,29
Sida3° and CIDA, 3 ' were concerned with the lack of Government ownership of the
programme and hence were apprehensive about its sustainability. Limited Government
commitment was in part attributed to the lack of an agreed strategy, which was
exacerbated in the face of donor-driven project investment. It was envisioned that
consultation and negotiation of a sector strategy would engender greater Government
commitment to the programme. Fourth, for many actors, it was thought that the sector
approach would provide the opportunity to improve aid coordination. Moreover,
numerous donors, the Bank and many Consortium members included, took the public
position that the transition to a SWAp was an opportune time for the MOHFW to
establish and lead some form of aid coordination arrangement. For the first time, USAID
pushed forcefully for GOB leadership in aid coordination. 32'33
 USAID may have seen the
potential of shifting the locus of aid coordination not simply from the Bank to the
MOHFW, but perhaps to an MOHFW mechanism over which it could exert control
vicariously! While some MOHFW officials were threatened by the proposed changes
(particularly Project Directors who were concerned about the loss of benefits and status),
senior officials were persuaded that they stood to gain, not least keeping the next World
Bank project on stream, and went along with preparatory work on the SWAp.
6.4 SWAp characteristics and coordination
This section explores the perceptions of various stakeholders towards the collaborative
programme of work, which is central to the sector-wide approach, so as to enable the
formation ofjudgements about its utility to aid coordination. The findings are based on
the survey described in the methods section of Chapter One, as well as documentary and
interview sources.
X Although there is no direct evidence to substantiate this claim, it remains that it was not until the
SWAp was floated that USAID publicly stated the need for MOHFW leadership over
coordination.
When asked what the MOHFW expected to from the SWAp, one official responded "more aid."
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6.4.1 Sectoral policy and strategy frameworks
One of the features which distinguishes the SWAp from previous ways of doing business
is that it "has demanded of new health policies that they be far more explicit than their
predecessors, and that they be formulated to address real choices for the sector."34 The
preparation of a sectoral policy or strategy framework was considered universally
desirable by the stakeholders consulted in the study. Respondents expressed the potential
for such frameworks to facilitate a comprehensive approach to decision-making for the
entire sector. As a result of such an approach, it was felt that expenditure could be guided
towards priorities established through evidence-based methods as opposed to political or
economic expediency, which would in turn lead to reduced sectoral fragmentation and
duplication of activities. MOHFW officials noted that in conflicts with interest groups,
reference to a previously agreed strategy might provide them with a measure of leverage.
Some donors shared this view, reiterating the much-used notion of putting the MOHFW
in the 'driver's seat.'
Notwithstanding the recognition accorded in principle to the importance of a health
policy to guide the SWAp (and donor activities therein), numerous anxieties were raised
about what might happen in practice. A majority of donors were apprehensive about the
possibility that they might not subscribe to the principles articulated in an 'agreed' policy.
For example, both UNICEF and WHO expressed concern that a too narrow definition of
the sector had been adopted in the Health and Population Sector Strategy (HPSS) which
formed the basis of the SWAp. Other donor concerns were that: (1) their values,
mandates and/or objectives may be incompatible with the consensus agreed to by other
stakeholders; (2) they may have insufficient involvement or influence over the
articulation of the strategy; and/or (3) their liberty to support specific activities and
propagate closely held values may be circumscribed by the resulting accords. The
majority of Government officials canvassed were concerned that donors might have too
much influence over the sector policy.
It is understandable that respondents were anxious that they may not concur with the
'agreed' policy frameworks nor agree to buy into them. Chapter Three described the
attempts to establish a formal and legislatively-based national health policy which were
so fraught with difficulties that they were aborted. While donors could have opted to
support the Government to evolve a national policy or plan which could have guided
efforts for reform in the sector, the Bank instead embarked upon a parallel exercise. The
annual IDA supervision mission of the FPHP in 1995 "informed the MOFIFW that a well
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thought out sector strategy needs to be developed and that the Bank will undertake to do
the work in partnership with the Government." 35
 While the Bank's motivations for
bypassing the GOB's established policy and planning procedures are not wholly clear, the
Bank may have been concerned about: (1) associating itself with the overtly political
process inherent in working with a national health policy committee; (2) slowing down
the pace of preparing HAPP-5 and the sector-wide approach by tying them to a
potentially protracted governmental exercise; and/or (3) relinquishing some influence
over strategy direction and content. Whatever the mixture of motivations, the Bank opted
to side-step the Government-led national health policy and planning processes by
demanding that a sector strategy be in place prior to the pre-appraisal of HAPP-5.
The Bank's intentions with respect to the HPSS included not only its desire to ensure a
comprehensive approach to the sector, but also to enlist the support of other stakeholders
for its reform agenda. According to the Bank, the strategy would provide the Government
with "the analytical basis.. .which will guide the development of... the sector over the
next five years.. .and firm up GOB priorities." For other donors, the Bank hoped the
HPSS would "provide a common framework for their support to the health and
population sector. ,,36
Although strategy preparation became a major focus of activity for a large contingent of
MOHFW and donor officials, the exercise was overwhelmingly Bank-driven. Initially,
political disturbances disrupted work on the sector strategy, at one point forcing the
cancellation of a mission to Bangladesh which aimed to reach consensus on a draft
strategy. To keep to project preparation schedules, in a letter to the Secretary, MOHFW,
the Bank proposed "as a fall back, IDA could prepare a very rough first draft of the
strategy paper." 37
 The Bank continued by suggesting that if it were not possible to field a
mission by April, "and bearing in mind the need to continue the momentum of sector
strategy and project preparation, it may be opportune to consider a 3 to 4 day meeting
elsewhere." Such an approach was resoundingly rejected by other members of the
Consortium, many of whom argued in favour of allowing the Government to proceed at
its own pace; both with its difficult reform agenda and with developing an indigenous and
domestically owned strategy. 39
 Opposition to the tactics adopted by the Bank was also
voiced by USAID which reminded the Bank that: "design of the HPSS is an inherently
governmental function which should be done in Bangladesh." USAID wanted to ensure
that the strategy was "not only a World Bank or Consortium product but a document
which represents the concerns and issues of all participants in the sector." 4 ' Ultimately,
the Bank postponed the HPSS preparation missions until it was feasible to field them in
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Bangladesh and consented to a more inclusive and participatory process. For example,
seven Technical Groups consisting of approximately 130 participants, comprising
technical experts, NGOs, civil society, and a policy think-tank, were established to work
with the multi-donor HPSS Reconnaissance Mission. 42
 Yet even the participatory process
was tightly managed by the Bank. The task manager of the FPHP emphasised "that
whatever process we follow it should not be seen to be donor driven... Management and
supervision of the process of stakeholders and beneficiaries being involved in the
preparation. . . should be done by the JGF [Japanese Grant Facility]X staff rather than the
P110. GOB views PHO as World Bank but they are likely to see JGF staff more as
belonging to them than to the Bank."43
After a series of Bank-donor and Bank-only missions, a draft HPSS was issued by the
MOHFW, yet its formal adoption by the GOB was stipulated as a condition by the Bank
for pre-appraisal of HAPP-5 .' Consequently, although the HPSS was approved by the
highest levels of Government in August 1997, in the eyes of many stakeholders, it
remained a document with the distinct imprint of the Bank. DFID was "deeply concerned
that the process of developing the HPSS has contravened two of the Bank's own
requirements for introducing Sector Investment Programmes, viz, that (i) local
stakeholders, usually Government, should be fully in charge; and (ii) local capacity,
rather than technical assistance, should be relied upon." A senior WHO official wrote
that the preparation of the HPSS and HAPP-5 were "a matter for concern.., there are so
many opinions on so many health and health services issues that someone, i.e., WHO,
needs to promote consensus."47
 Stakeholder reluctance to buy into the HPSS can,
therefore, be explained by the fact that: (1) the process was rushed; (2) not all positions
were equally and adequately considered; (3) the views of the Bank predominated; and (4)
the document did not adequately reflect the true intentions of the MOHFW. This example
begs the question of whether or not and how it might be possible to design a process
through which to arrive at a true consensus over sector development which can guide the
most important parties investing in the sector?
6.4.2 Sector financing and expenditure plans
The HPSS specified that it would be implemented through annual operational and related
expenditure plans - encompassing the entire programme of work of the MOHFW,
including revenue and development expenditures and inclusive of externally-supported
activities. By August 1997, a draft HAPP-5 Project Implementation Plan (PIP) had been
X The JGF constituted a million dollar grant provided by JICA to the MOHFW for expenditures associated
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prepared by MOHFW with estimated expenditure projections for the first year of the
programme.
All stakeholders consulted during the research provided enthusiastic support to the
principle of developing agreed, pnontised, medium-term and annual budgets for the
MOHFW which reflect the aspirations established in the sector strategy. Respondents
commented that these might: (1) facilitate resource allocation in a more systematic,
evidence-based and comprehensive manner than currently obtains; and (2) provide a
common framework to guide the deployment of all resources - irrespective of their
origin. Yet, in the survey both donors and Government officials voiced a number of
problems. Donors were concerned that: (1) their agency may not agree with the chosen
expenditure plans; (2) their agency may have difficulties supporting activities specified in
the programme; and (3) their freedom to finance activities which were not specified in the
PIP ought to be maintained under a SWAp (see Figure 1). Only two agencies committed
themselves to funding exclusively those activities agreed to in the annual expenditure
programme (i.e., the World Bank and Sida).
Figure 1: Donors views on an agreed MOHFW expenditure programme (n = 11
donors)
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All Government officials surveyed indicated that ideally all expenditure, particularly aid,
should support activities specified in the annual plans and expenditure programme.
Nevertheless, a significant number of officials paradoxically suggested that 'flexibility'
with preparation of HAPP-5. The JGF was executed by the World Bank on behalf of the MOHFW.
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should be maintained in practice and an open attitude adopted to 'ad hoc' projects of a
'political nature.' Officials were worried about what would be on the table during annual
review and budgeting exercises. As noted above, donors saw the procedure as
overcoming the fungibility problem and consequently ensuring that external funds did not
displace GOB funding for the Essential Package of Services. Government felt threatened
not only by external scrutiny of the budget, and, by implication, matters of national
sovereignty, but also by having its hands tied when dealing with the inevitable domestic
politics surrounding resource allocation.
Although the SWAp can accommodate a variety of financing instruments, the intention is
that over time, as accounting, auditing and other managerial systems within the recipient
administration become more robust, and thereby gain greater donor confidence, project-
specific investment will give way to budget-support. While the overwhelming majority of
Government staff considered a shift to budget-support as desirable, this sentiment was
shared by only about two-thirds of donor respondents. By the end of 1997, only three
agencies had committed themselves to providing some of their assistance during HAPP-5
in the form of budget-support (i.e., World Bank, Sida, and DGIS), and the Bank was the
only agency to specify that its entire credit would take this form.
Six of the seven agencies which responded to the survey indicated that they would likely
ear-mark funds for certain activities in the sector. Given the response bias inherent in the
survey, it is probable that it will be business as usual with project finance for the
remainder of agencies (i.e., the majority) in the sector for the foreseeable future. From the
donor's perspective, project-specific investment is the best way to protect those activities
which they feel have not received adequate attention in the consensus agreements - but is
also seen to safeguard tied aid and to support NGO operations under a SWAp. Moreover,
there was some reluctance to commit to the use of pooling arrangements until the
Government could demonstrate greater probity in the use, accounting and auditing of
funds. Although projects are potentially problematic with respect to coordination, donors
agreed overwhelmingly with three rules which ought to accompany the SWAp which
might partially ameliorate some of the problems.X Whether or not such guidelines would
be adhered to is a matter for speculation, but past experience suggests that some donors
tightly guard information about their programmes.
• The Bank faces, of course, different corporate exigencies than do the bilaterals, with the former
characterised by disbursement and the latter by financial accountability and attribution.
X Decisions regarding ear-marked funds should be communicated to Government and donors well
in advance of annual programme planning exercises; and agencies should make a commitment to
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Ministry officials are more favourably inclined towards budget-support than their donor
counterparts. In the case of senior MOHFW officials, this can be explained, in part, by
the fact that they bore the brunt of the workload imposed by the projectised approach but
also because they stood to gain from increased line authority with the SWAp.
Nevertheless, projects had a strong lobby among Project Directors (who gained a wide
range of benefits from them) as well as within the Planning Commission, where project
approval and extensions provided the main source of influence.
6.4.3 Common management systems
According to Peters and Chao, "one of the main technical innovations of the SWAp is the
concentrated efforts on building and using national management systems to plan, monitor
performance, and undertake the day-to-day business of purchasing and delivering goods
and services.49 Common management systems aim to facilitate more order and economy
in handling of resources. This covers functions such as aid-related appraisal,
disbursement, procurement, reporting, accounting, and auditing. The goal is to dispense
with the multiple, distinct, bilateral arrangements between individual donors and
recipients, in favour of the use of common, unitary systems. This may involve the
harmonisation of donor procedures or, ideally, donor use of systems embedded in the
recipient's public administration. Precedents for common management already exist for a
portion of resources managed under the FPHP. Donor procedures were harmonised for
joint missions, common disbursement through the Bank Trust Fund accounts, etc., and
there was limited use of government systems for aid management through, for example,
consolidated reporting by the Project Finance Cell, MOHFW. A review of global
experience with SWAps concludes that developing and using national systems presents
the greatest challenge.50
Although the HPSS did not address the issue of common management systems explicitly
(beyond the broad intention to use joint operational programmes and budgets) the aim
was implied. The survey of stakeholders' views found that almost all Government
officials found the concept desirable. It was envisioned that the use of common
arrangements might entail less 'day-to-day interference' and a 'hands-off approach to
aid management by donors. Nevertheless, Government officials recognised that, in
reality, they were relatively powerless to enforce common systems on donors.
Approximately seventy percent of donor officials reported that they found the notion of
sustained funding for an agreed period.
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common systems desirable in principle, yet cautioned that there is a major gap between
what is desirable and what they regard as currently feasible. Over one-half of donor
respondents anticipated having problems making use of common systems. Donors were
concerned with three issues. First was the question of attribution - donors expressed the
need to continue to be associated with specific inputs and outputs. The second problem
related to accountability. Questions were raised about the Government's ability to spend
funds on agreed purposes and account for them adequately. Third, and related to the first
two concerns, was the issue of adequate Government capacity (particularly if the
common management systems were to be managed by Government).
When respondents were asked who should take responsibility for specific management
systems (if they were established), while there was only limited agreement on specifics,
two clear patterns emerged: (1) Government should take on increased, and progressively
increasing, obligations concomitant with a relinquishing of donor control - this sentiment
is particularly strong among MOHFW officials, who no doubt felt empowered through
their role in the HPSS and HAPP-5 PIP preparation; and (2) the need to establish
modalities for joint GOB-donor management of a number of functions. The case of
responsibility for communication and information provides an illustration. While the
majority of respondents agreed in principle with the need for a central point of
communication in the sector as well as a depository for reports and information, and an
enhanced and leading role for the MOHFW in this area, there were grave reservations
among donors over current capacity in the MOHFW to perform this task effectively.
Weak institutional capacity was listed as the greatest threat to the SWAp by all donor
respondents and three quarters of their Government counterparts. Consequently, capacity-
building was underlined as having a central place in a successful SWAp.
6.5 Coordination architecture under the SWAp
The SWAp literature stresses that a SWAp entails risks for donors and Governments alike
and, consequently, that there is a need to develop processes and fora for dealing with
problematic issues. 51 '52'53
 The SWAp, therefore, demands that the architecture for aid
coordination be explicitly addressed.
6.5.1 Government-led sector-wide management board
In Bangladesh, the need for a Government-led arrangement for aid coordination had been
mooted long before the advent of a SWAp. As discussed in Chapter 3, a Government-led
initiative had been established in the 1970s but was abandoned. During the 1990s, the
desirability of greater Government involvement and leadership was expressed by
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individual donors working within the Consortium, by the Consortium as a group,54 by the
Preparatory Review Group which was commissioned by the Consortium to provide a
semi-independent review the of the FPHP prior to its mid-term review, 55
 by a European
Union situation analysis of coordination, 56 by the multilateral agencies, 57
 by donors
which were not members of the Consortium (such as USAID58), and by the Government
itself. 59 Yet it was discussions concerning the SWAp which crystallised the perceived
need and provided the impetus to place aid coordination on the health policy agenda.
Donors had different reasons for wanting a Government-led arrangement. For some
agencies, the introduction of a SWAp provided a window of opportunity to establish a
recipient-managed structure so as to redress past inadequacies in this area. Others were
concerned about the influence the Bank would wield if it led the principal aid
coordination forum in the sector under a SWAp. USAID frequently stressed that the
sector strategy should address the issue of donor coordination and that "we strongly
support the proposal to establish a single national coordination mechanism for health and
population."6° USAID suggested that a number of apex-level committees could "be
merged thereby bringing all parties under one coordinating mechanism."6 ' The proposed
merger was discussed at a meeting of the Minister, MOHFW, USAID and the Bank in
March 1996. According to Consortium meeting minutes, "the main point agreed upon
was to have only one, widely representative, apex body for the entire sector for policy
level decision-making" which would be chaired by the MOHFW. 62
 USAID, never a
member of the Consortium, proposed that a mechanism based on its own Future
Challenges Committee be established. As the Bank and other Consortium members had
relatively little influence over the Future Challenges Committee, they pressed for the
establishment of a new entity. As a result, a Government Task Force was convened on the
issue. It met twice in 1996, and "recommended the establishment of one single Apex
Advisory Committee on Health and Family Welfare, with the overall role of advising on
policy and programme issues at the national level. The Apex Committee would be
chaired by the Hon'ble Minster while the Secretary would be the Vice-Chairman." 63 Yet
the proposed Apex Committee was never established. According to Bank sources, this
was not because agreement could not be reached on the Committee, but rather that the
MOHFW had too many competing issues on its plate at the time and the discussion was
simply overtaken by more pressing events confronting the sector.TM
The Future Challenges Committee was established in 1994. It focused primarily on family
planning issues and its membership consisted largely of those NGOs through which USAID
operated as well as ministry of health and family welfare officials.
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The position that the sector strategy and HAPP-5 preparations should address the
modification of existing, or establishment of new, aid coordination arrangements was
held not only by USAJD, 65 but also by the Bank6
 and individual members of the
67	 68	 69	 70Consortium, particularly by Sida, CIDA, DGIS and DFLD. For reasons over which
one can only speculate, 8 discussions during preparation of the HPSS side-stepped the
issue, as did the HPSS document. Nevertheless, the architecture for aid coordination did
feature during preparation of IIAPP-5. The MOHFW Task Force on Sector-wide
Management was mandated, among other things, with proposing aid coordination
arrangements for the HAPP-5. 7 ' The survey of stakeholders' views found universal
support for the position that a Government-led aid coordination arrangement be
established. A range of views were expressed on questions of leadership, composition,
organisation, functions, operating procedures, rules and secretariat support for such a
body.
Leadership and membership of the sector-wide management board
Most stakeholders thought that the Government-led coordination arrangement, sometimes
referred to as a 'sector-wide management board', should be chaired by the Secretary or
Minister, MOHFW. Some respondents suggested that the chair rotate among participating
government agencies (i.e., MOHFW, ERD, Finance, Planning Commission), while others
proposed that it alternate between Government and donors. While it was agreed that the
body should be as widely-inclusive as possible, so as to achieve greater understanding,
participation and ownership in the SWAp instruments, opinions differed over
membership and participation. A number of respondents, particularly members of the
FPITTP Consortium, indicated that, based on their experience, the larger the group the
more difficult it would be to make it work effectively and reach consensus - thereby
arguing for some limits to participation. A majority of Government officials were wary of
including in the forum those donors who did not support activities outlined in the public
expenditure programme (by these criteria, USAID, AsDB and a number of other agencies
would have been excluded). The question of the involvement of NGOs, executing
agencies and civil society was also divisive, particularly within Government circles. On
the whole most respondents argued for a broadly representative body and a number of
' The Ban]c was more concerned with the architecture than the role of the Government in aid
coordination.
The Bank was, by virtue of leading the Consortium, in a strong position to influence health
policy and, specifically, to achieve the reforms it was seeking, through the status quo in
coordination arrangements. While the Bank's medium-term ambitions included tighter and more
encompassing aid coordination arrangements, and a central place within these, it is likely that the
Bank took the strategic decision to press for reforms first through the HPSS and to deal with
coordination architecture thereafter.
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suggestions were made which would accommodate a large group of stakeholders.
Functions of the sector board
Although discussions pertaining to the sector management board were very much in their
infancy, proposals had been made on functions and modus operandi. The following
sections touch briefly on these proposals, noting issues which are relevant in so far as
they point to perceived short-coming of the existing coordination arrangements and
challenges to establishing alternative mechanisms.
The board was envisioned as the primary forum for policy dialogue within the sector.
There was near universal agreement that the board should take leadership of the Annual
Programme Review (APR) process (i.e., the annual planning and review exercise for the
SWAp). Donors stressed, however, that this should be done in close collaboration. It was
suggested that: (1) the board lead the review, particularly, planning, monitoring and
reporting on the health programme (i.e., the PIP) and on progress in implementing the
reform agenda; (2) donors be closely involved with the MOHFW in preparing the Terms
of Reference and aide-memoires for the APRs; (3) donors take particular responsibility
for monitoring select performance indicators and programme conformity with aid pledge
conditionalities. It was stressed that within the framework of the APR, the MOHFW
should generate sufficiently comprehensive information so that donors could abstract
what they require to meet their individual reporting requirements, thereby obviating the
need for the MOHFW to prepare multiple donor-specific reports.
Board secretariat
There was agreement that the board would require a secretariat, yet opinions differed
over its institutional affiliation, staff composition and its physical location. Four options
for institutional affiliation of the secretariat were proposed: (1) within an upgraded and
strengthened Planning Cell of the MOHFW; (2) within the secretariat established by the
donors to service their Consortium (i.e., a modified PHO); (3) a new cell in either the
MOHFW or Planning Commission; (4) a semi-autonomous organisation independent of
either Government or donors but accountable to the sector-wide management board.
Options three and four had only minimal support. Although the idea of semi-autonomous
entity was desirable to a number of respondents, others thought that it would not have the
entrée and force to overcome the many obstacles which it would likely face. The option
of establishing a new structure within the Government was viewed by many respondents
as unnecessarily expensive and counter to the principle of strengthening existing
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organisations. Those who suggested utilising the Consortium secretariat to support the
sector-wide management board stressed that they would only recommend this option if its
staff were functionally responsible to a Government official representing the sector-wide
management board and not to the World Bank. A variant on this option entailed
establishing a twinning/mentoring relationship between PHO staff and their counterparts
in a MOHFW sector-wide secretariat along functional lines to strengthen institutional
capacity and enable it to undertake functions currently the responsibility of the P110.
Strengthening the existing Planning Cell in the MOHFW garnered the most support. It
was suggested that the Cell should include line MOHFW staff as well as externally
financed technical assistants, and/or staff seconded from donors, accountable to a line
MOHFW official. Most respondents felt that the Cell would only be effective if its
position in the organisational hierarchy were elevated. This might include establishing a
higher level post at its helm (i.e., Additional Secretary). This would allow for day-to-day
interaction between the Cell and the Secretary and, thereby, ongoing and more
substantive involvement of the Secretary in policy development and donor coordination.
While a number of respondents felt that the physical location of the secretariat was
immaterial, others demurred. Officials working in the MOHFW suggested that housing
the secretariat in the present MOHFW premises would reduce its effectiveness due to the
constraints associated with the operating environment (e.g., passes to enter premises, poor
facilities, etc.). Yet, a number of respondents felt strongly that the secretariat had to be
located in the MOHFW, for symbolic as well as more practical reasons of economy, ease
of access to decision-makers, etc. It was revealing that although there was universal
agreement that the MOHFW should play a greater role in aid management and donor
coordination, there was considerable opposition among donor agencies to the suggestion
that donors which were not providing budget-support (i.e., those which continue to
operate within a project framework) contribute towards the costs of aid management in
the sector.
6.5.2 A donor-only aid coordination arrangement under the SWAp: supporting the
Board?
The support of a number of donors, particularly members of the present Consortium, for a
Government-led aid coordination arrangement in the sector was conditional upon the
continued co-existence of an additional group consisting solely of donors. A dual
arrangement was also favoured by a minority of Government officials. The rationale
behind the proposition for parallel structures included: (1) a number of donors argued that
they require a forum where they can engage without potentially negative consequences in
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sensitive discussions ranging, for example, from perceptions of Government capacity to
debates on substantive policy issues; (2) some donors stated that a venue was required in
which mundane operational procedures relating mainly to aid agency bureaucracy could
be addressed. It was felt that involving Government representatives in such exercises was
not an efficient use of civil servant's time; (3) some donors were averse to having aid
coordination wholly dependent on a newly established, yet untested, Government-led
forum which may prove ineffective and/or inefficient. The donor-only group was seen as
a fall-back position, at least over the medium-term; and (4) in light of the capacity in the
PHO, it was contended that a modified version of the present arrangement could provide
technical assistance and guidance to the Government's sector-wide management board
and secretariat until it was no longer required. Some donors argued that it is unrealistic
for Government to expect donors to dismantle exclusive aid clubs - and if they are
abolished, informal arrangements would be established in their place.
The establishment of a donor-only coordination arrangement was opposed, at times
vociferously, by more than half of the Government respondents. MOHFW officials
argued that: (1) GOB had been party to decisions pertaining to the preparation of the
HPSS and PIP and, thus, should be fully involved in discussions concerning its
implementation; (2) the success of the SWAp demands greater transparency between
Government and donors - not discussions behind closed doors; and (3) it did not make
sense for donors to take decisions independently of the Government which may
subsequently need to be rejected when presented to the ministry for implementation.
The opposing differences are likely reconcilable, for opposition to a donor-only group
presumably rests with Government dissatisfaction over the present FPHP Consortium.
The Consortium could be modified to accommodate GOB concerns and, indeed many
members agreed with the need for its reform under a SWAp. The Swedish Ambassador to
Bangladesh, summed up the opinions of his colleagues when he wrote to the Bank in
early 1997, "a related issue is the role and responsibilities at present and for the future of
the PHO. . .Is there a need for a 'new' P110?"72 In addition to reform of the Consortium,
the establishment of a sector-wide management board could assuage some Govermnent
antipathy towards a donor-only group. For example, in contrast to prevailing situation,
the board would provide a forum for policy dialogue to which Government would be
party.
Consortium leadership and secretariat support: a Bank prerogative?
The only donor which was explicitly named by respondents in relation to suitable
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leadership of a modified Consortium was the World Bank, a proposition which was
supported by a number of agencies and by some Government officials as well. The Bank
was seen as having the necessary resources, influence and experience to perform this
demanding task effectively. Other respondents suggested that leadership should be
determined either on the basis of: (1) the size of financial contribution to HAPP-5; (2)
through elections held annually; or (3) rotation according to criteria not made clear.
All respondents commented on the need for the Consortium to be serviced by a
secretariat. Of those donor respondents who felt that the staff of such a secretariat should
be drawn from one of the member agencies, operating in line positions and accountable to
its management, all favoured the World Bank (one Government official concurred).
However, an equal number of donor respondents, and a majority of Government officials,
stated a preference for the Consortium secretariat to exist independently of any of the
donors. The desire for an independent entity likely stems from donor reluctance to
continue to rely on the Bank without seeing the viability of another donor taking over this
responsibility. It was proposed that those agencies might be appeased by an arrangement
which allowed members to second staff to the World Bank to work in the proposed
secretariat.
While the Bank foresaw the need to modify the Consortium under the SWAp, the Bank
did not envision a diminution of its role therein. 73
 Thus, in the Initial Executive Project
Summary for HAPP-5, Bank staff wrote for the Board audience: "The GOB and donors
want it [the Bank] to continue to lead a population and health Consortium, with its proven
track record."74
 At times, the Bank presented its justification for leadership in sweeping
non sequiturs: "There was a consensus [in a Dhaka heads of agencies meeting] that
regardless of the financing mechanisms of different donors, formulation of a single,
coherent strategy for each sector is the most effective approach to support an investment
program. For that purpose, the present consortia arrangement led by the Bank in the
education and health sectors is appropriate and should continue." 75 Therefore, while the
Bank acknowledged the need for, and desirability, of reform of the Consortium and its
secretariat, the Bank established fixed parameters, including its intention to remain
primus inter pares.
Consortium membership under a SWAp
A number of options were presented for membership of a modified donor Consortium:
(1) those agencies which cofinance in support of HAPP-5; (2) a limited group of donors
which provide budget-support for the public investment programme of the PIP; (3) a
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larger group of agencies which support the PIP (with financial or technical assistance)
irrespective of mode of financing; (4) an even larger group of agencies which support
health sector activities but may not have their contribution (entirely or in part) reflected in
the PIP (i.e., USAID, AsDB, UNFPA, UNICEF and a host of smaller agencies); or (5) a
very large group of donors, NGOs and executing agencies which finance and/or deliver
services in the sector irrespective of their participation in the PIP.
At the time of the survey, it appeared that arrangements represented by options (1) and
(2) would include too few players to achieve any real measure of aid coordination. A
question arose as to whether or not those donors which do not support activities in the PIP
should be allowed membership in the Consortium? Although the survey suggested that
approximately one-third of donor, and two-thirds of Government, officials found the
existing FPHP Consortium imperfect because it did not include all of the major external
agencies, a number of officials in the Consortium stressed the need to keep the group
sufficiently small to enable it to work effectively.
If most, or all, donors become members of a large, modified Consortium, there is a risk
that the group would become the sector's central coordination arrangement defacto, with
the following potential results: (1) the sector-wide management board could be rendered
less powerful than the Consortium (through emasculation or ceremonialisation) thereby
undermining attempts to encourage GOB leadership of aid coordination; and (2) the
leader of the Consortium (most likely the World Bank) would become even more
influential in the sector. Such considerations run counter to allowing full membership to
all donors in the sector.
Consortium functions under a SWAp
In terms of functions, there was agreement that a secretariat supporting the donor
Consortium should: (1) devolve some responsibilities which the PHO presently performs
to the MOHFW; (2) continue to perform those tasks which are presently carried out by
the PHO and which the MOHFW can not or will not perform; and (3) play a role in
supporting the MOHFW with those functions newly devolved to the secretariat of the
sector-wide management board and other entities taking on new responsibilities for aid
management. Generally, it was felt that the Consortium secretariat should have exclusive
responsibility for: (1) organising and participating in meetings of the Consortium; (2)
facilitating member dialogue on sector strategy and expenditure policy; (3) monitoring
GOB compliance with donor conditionalities and sector-wide performance indicators; and
(4) providing technical and steering support to the MOHFW sector-wide management
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board and its executive office.
6.6 Assessing the SWAp against the conceptual framework for aid coordination
The SWAp, as defined by Cassels, 76 stands up very well according to this study's
conceptual framework for good aid coordination and management practice. The concept
would also fare favourably if stakeholders' views of what is desirable in a SWAp were to
materialise in Bangladesh. The SWAp performs less well if stakeholders' actual and
probable intentions with respect to their participation in the initiative are considered.
While it remains a moot point as to how effectively any eventual SWAp, once
implemented, will actually contribute to aid coordination in Bangladesh, Table 15
presents an assessment according to the findings in this Chapter.
From the assessment it might be concluded that the SWAp is indeed a chimera with
respect to aid coordination. Few stakeholders intend to be bound by the policy and
expenditure frameworks developed for the SWAp and the use of common arrangements
for the management of aid resources is far from assured. Sixty percent of donors
surveyed were concerned, with good reason, that other donors would operate outside of
SWAp and thereby undermine its potential. Moreover, in that some form of a modified
donor Consortium is likely to persist, it is likely that the Government's aid coordination
role (as envisioned under the sector management board) will fall victim to decisions
pertaining to aid deployment taken in the donor Consortium.
The SWAp does, however, mark a watershed in that it provides an invaluable service to
the cause of aid coordination. It has, for example, forced most stakeholders to consider
the bigger picture and may, as a result, lead to better and more coordinated investment
practices. Second, it has highlighted the problem of agencies acting unilaterally and
independently of commonly accepted frameworks. Third, it has led, at least rhetorically,
to a consensus on the need for greater Government leadership in aid coordination, and
thrown up some proposals on how it might be achieved in practice. Finally, it has drawn
greater attention to some of the limitations of the PHO and Consortium arrangements and
will likely, therefore, contribute to their reform.
The shape and performance of the SWAp remains to be seen. Successful implementation
depends upon the Government establishing common management arrangements in which
donors can and will place their confidence. Experience with donor use of common
arrangements, even those established within the UN and the Consortium, suggests,
however, that donors are not sanguine when it comes to other institutions managing their
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resources. The SWAp will also demand processes through which partners establish a
level of trust which can lead to consensus among a wide constituency of stakeholders on
policy and resource allocation. The analysis of policy making and planning in Bangladesh
as well as relations within the Consortium suggest that the environment is marked more
by competition and mistrust than by cooperation. Finally, as Peters and Chao conclude,
"if government shows no interest in taking leadership for the health sector, a SWAp
would not make sense."77
 In Bangladesh, the health sector agenda has been primarily set
by donors, particularly the Bank. Although the Bank cultivated interest in the SWAp in
certain Government quarters, the notion of Government leadership remains fanciful.
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Table 15: Assessing the SWAp against the conceptual framework for aid
coordination
Process criteria I Remarks
Ownership	 0 The theoretical SWAp is predicated upon Government ownership and leadership.
o In Bangladesh, the SWAp was externally driven, mainly by one agency. A hand-
full of senior MOHFW bought into the exercise, as did the key donor agencies.
0 It is not clear that the Government fully owns the sector strategy document, nor
that all donor agencies completely agree with it.
0 Greater Government ownership will be manifest in the annual spending plans, as
these have to be agreed to by the fmance ministry.
o Donors are concerned that they may disagree with spending plans and want the
right to 'disown' them.
O It is not clear whether or not a Government-led coordination forum will be
established nor, once established how broad participation and ownership will be.
Participation	 0 The theoretical SWAp proposes a partnership between various arms of
Government and donor agencies - the greater the number of participants; the
greater chances are that the SWAp will achieve its intended aims.
O In Bangladesh, at the time of the survey, the MOHFW had committed itself to a
SWAp, but the ERD, Planning Commission and Finance Ministry remained
largely outside the process.
0 The World Bank, Sida and DGIS were strong proponents. Other members of the
Consortium were to varying degrees on board. Other donors were taking a wait-
and-see attitude to full participation.
o Agencies which will likely operate outside of the PIP, such as USAID, AsDB and
to some extent UNFPA, were nevertheless involved in preparation of the SWAp.
_______________ O Very limited stakeholder involvement beyond the agencies listed above.
Periodicity &	 0 In theory, once functional, the SWAp is a sustained partnership across a number
continuity	 of programmes of work, hence it is regular and continuous.
O In practice, in Bangladesh, since the SWAp activities were largely Bank-driven,
there obtained a 'mission culture' to cycles of activity and inactivity with regard to
the preparation of the SWAp.
Integration	 0 In theory, the SWAp provides tight integration between domestic and external
funds as these are pooled for budgeting, spending and reporting.
o In Bangladesh, the PIP and HAPP-5 conform to the principle of integration.
o How many donors will work within the PIP and submit to use of national
management arrangements remains unclear.
Realm	 0 The SWAp covers consultation, concertation and operational coordination.
0 In practice operational coordination may be limited as donors will programme
funds outside the PIP.
Breadth 0 The SWAp is one of the widest coordination arrangements conceivable at the
sector level, in that it attempts to coordinate all activities which fall under the
purview of the MOHFW.
0 Regulation of the private sector, including NGOs, is not considered under the
SWAn in Banuladesh. thus limitin g its breadth in nractice.
Authority &	 0 The GOB strategy, plans and budgets should confer authority and legitimacy on
adherence	 the SWAp. Limited adherence to the HPSS and PIP remains a serious threat to the
SWAp.
0 Although all stakeholders agreed to the broad principles of the SWAp, very few
wished to be bound by its instruments.
Costs	 0 Difficult to calculate.
0 Clearly one of the most resource intense of the various mechanisms.
Outcome Criteria Remarks
Efficiency	 0 The ideal SWAp would improve both allocative and technical efficiency.
O In Bangladesh, it may achieve efficiency savings in practice, but this depends on
the proportion of donor anencies which adhere to its instruments.
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Effectiveness	 Theoretically, the SWAp can improve effectiveness through agreement on
strategy direction, promotion of best-practice and systems strengthening.
________________ 0 Yet to be seen if these obtain in practice.
Equity	 0 In theory, the SWAp could improve equity in the sector. For example: in that the
SWAp is to be based on a holistic approach to sector development, it could reduce
inequities which arises from disparate donor-driven schemes (correcting inequities
in targeting of assistance); evidence-based approaches to decision making and
improved transparency could result in pro-poor resource allocations; joint
management frameworks could increase parity of benefits and perks for aid-
supported staff.
O The extent to which these are realised depends on the manner and extent to which
________________	 the SWAp is put into practice.
Sustainability	 0 In that a central component of the SWAp involves capacity development and
working through indigenous systems, the SWAp should be a sustainable model for
aid coordination.
O While stakeholders strongly endorsed capacity development for the SWAp in
Bangladesh, over the short term, it would appear that parallel (and unsustainable)
systems will remain the norm.
o The SWAp will only achieve its aims if effective incentives/sanctions are
established for compliance, participation and non-participation of donors and
________________	 GOB. This area had yet to receive attention in Bangladesh.
6.7 Chapter summary
The introduction of the sector-wide approach resulted in the preparation of the IIPSS
as well as the Programme Implementation Plan for HAPP-5. Although limited, the
participatory nature of their preparation provided a valuable process through which
Government and donor priorities and strategies were made explicit and a level of
agreement on these was reached. While marking a feat in the context of Bangladesh,
the achievement is tempered by the fact that numerous donor agencies as well as
Government officials are concerned that they may not agree with the strategic
framework and did not have enough say in its development. Moreover, the
Government is concerned that unprecedented levels of donor coordination may result
in undue leverage exerted by donors over policy direction and resource allocation.
The PIP includes expenditure plans which provide an umbrella framework to guide
all external investment in the sector under the purview of the MOHFW. However,
many donors indicated that they wish to retain the right to operate outside of this
framework and will do so in practice. The Government also indicated its preference
for a flexible approach to working outside of the agreed expenditure plans.
The SWAp makes provisions for and aspires to the use of common management
arrangements for resource deployment in the sector. While Government, and to a
lesser extent aid, officials described this as desirable, many donors indicate that they
will continue to rely on separate management arrangements. They will do so because
they are concerned about attribution, accountability and Government capacity.
)- Under the SWAp, the need for a Government-led, aid coordination arrangement has
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been agreed by all stakeholders. Nevertheless, its establishment has not been viewed
as a priority by Government nor donors.
Despite the possibility that a donor-only Consortium may usurp Government
leadership as well as the authority and effectiveness of the Government-donor sector
management board, many donors made their support for a Government-led aid
coordination arrangement conditional upon the coexistence of a donor-only
Consortium. The Bank stated its intention to remain at the helm of a modified donor-
only Consortium.
The idealised SWAp performs well according to the conceptual framework for aid
coordination. Nevertheless, over the short-term, it will not fulfil its potential because
too few stakeholders wish to be bound by its instruments. This is the case either
because they are concerned that the Government lacks the capacity to manage the
SWAp adequately or because the SWAp is seen to usurp the agencies of their
autonomy.
The process of the introduction of the SWAp has benefited health sector aid
coordination by bringing attention to certain failings and possibilities with respect to
prevailing arrangements.
- While it is difficult to predict what will happen over the next 5-10 years, given
experience with coordination arrangements in Bangladesh, it appears unlikely that the
systems for aid management and coordination will be established which match those
envisioned by the SWAp in its idealised form.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Summary and conclusions: room for optimism?
7.1 Introduction
This Chapter begins with a recapitulation of the rationale for the study, and speculates
why, based on the experience of conducting the study, aid coordination and management
has remained neglected in the literature. The following sections summarise the major
findings of the study with reference to the objectives set in the introduction. The
limitations of the conceptual framework are reviewed with the aim of suggesting
refinements and, reflecting the importance of power in the coordination equation, the
validity of the 'technocratic' approach is reconsidered. Thereafter, the prospects for
improved coordination are weighed. Given past experience and the intentions of the
stakeholders with respect to coordination arrangements under the SWAp, the prospects
are at best mixed and contingent upon major changes to ways both donors and
Government do business. Based on the analysis, a list of principles which ought to govern
the management and coordination of aid are proposed and areas for further research
identified.
7.2 Purpose and process
The literature reviewed for this study suggested that although there has been an intense
scrutiny of development assistance over the past decades, there has been relatively little
documented consideration (empirical or theoretical) of the processes of aid coordination
and management at the country-level, and little relating to these issues specifically in the
health sector. Nonetheless, the grey literature and discussions with actors in the
development community emphasised that, for a range of reasons, concern over
inadequate aid coordination in the sector was assuming an increasingly prominent place
in policy discussions. There remained, however, many unanswered questions concerning
the motivations and practice of aid coordination, not least the views, concerns and
behaviour of recipients. Consequently, I developed a conceptual framework for assessing
aid coordination in practice so as to provide a starting point for a more critical
examination of the processes at play. This study sought to evaluate specific aid
coordination mechanisms against the criteria proposed in the conceptual framework
based on documentary evidence as well as the views of stakeholders. It sought especially
to elucidate the views of the recipients, who, according to an agreed set of principles
governing aid coordination, were to be at its centre.
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Bangladesh was an excellent case study for empirically testing the evaluative framework
and for exploring unanticipated factors governing aid coordination. Not only had the
country attracted considerable developmental assistance from a broad range of
international agencies, but additionally, in the health sector, a long-standing effort to
coordinate donors provided a rare opportunity to learn lessons from this complex
dynamic. Conducting the research, however, proved difficult as the stakeholders were
reluctant to discuss openly the manner in which the mechanisms work, and to present
their views on the rationale for their participation in, and perceived effectiveness of,
coordination arrangements. For example, when this research was initially discussed with
World Bank officials in Dhaka, they did not see the need to document nor distil lessons
from the experience. 1
 Later, an official from Bank headquarters expressed his anxiety that
the Consortium would not be able to "withstand an academic scrutiny" as "it risked flying
apart" and, therefore, counselled me not to undertake the study. 2
 Once in Bangladesh, it
took nine months to reassure the donor community, and principally the Bank, that the
exercise could be constructive and mutually beneficial and, consequently, that
documentation should be made available (see Annex 3 for a synthesis of the field
research process). In the end, I was given access to material, yet the reluctance of donor
and government officials to allow any scrutiny of their practice goes some way to
explaining the gap in the published literature on aid coordination.
7.3 A synthesis of the major findings
7.3.1 Aid coordination and management in Bangladesh: a summary
Since independence, aid from a large number of external agencies has formed an integral
component of the country's public expenditure programme. This has provided donors
with an influential voice in the Government's policy orientation, resource allocation and
institutional structures. From the perspective of donors, it appears that the political and
administrative arrangements prevailing over the course of the country's history lent
credence to the view that the Government did not know its own affairs best, that it served
other interests and objectives than those sought by the aid agencies, and/or could not be
trusted to use the external resources placed at its disposal to their most judicious
advantage. These beliefs have influenced donor thinking in relationship to the desirability
and feasibility of relinquishing leadership in the management and coordination of aid to
the Government. Moreover, the perception of Government as weak, lacking capacity as
well as questions over its legitimacy and integrity provided an ongoing and disingenuous
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justification for external leadership over aid management and to some extent, aid
coordination.
Strong, effective control over the deployment of aid has not been exercised by the
Government. There has not been a great deal of political, public or external pressure to
improve or support the Government's coordination of aid. Attempts which have been
made to augment Government capacity were not sufficiently effective to displace the
apprehensions of donors. Moreover, there is a perception among some donor officials that
the Government is not only unable to provide effective leadership to aid coordination, but
may also be unwilling to do so. This is the case, it is argued, because effective
coordination, and the transparency it implies, would reduce the room for political
manoeuvring and limit opportunities among civil servants for rent-seeking through the
aid regime. Donor concerns were substantiated by the position which MOHFW officials
adopted in relation to the SWAp)3
This research suggests that some culpability for the relative absence of GOB leadership,
and the weakness of its institutions, in aid management rests with donors themselves.
This is due, in part, to the enthusiasm with which donors have established and maintained
independent and exclusive aid management and coordination systems which usurped
many of the Government's responsibilities. Moreover, the weak and reactive pattern of
Government decision-making can be partially explained, and was likely exacerbated, by
the proclivities of donors to inundate Government officials with foreign visitors and other
demands, to induce confusion through advocacy of contradictory policy prescriptions,
and perhaps, most importantly, to orient the development agenda towards external
priorities and, thereby, weaken domestic ownership and support of it.
7.3.2 Aid coordination and management in the health sector. the Government's
machinery
The Government has concluded that "in the absence of a well planned and systematic aid
negotiation and coordination arrangement for the health and population sector, piecemeal
aid allocation and donor pressure for assistance in particular areas have resulted in
duplication of efforts in some areas and inadequate attention to other areas.. An
argument was made in this thesis that the absence of an over-arching sector policy and,
It will be recalled that a Project Implementation Plan (PIP) was prepared to provide an umbrella
framework to guide all investment in the sector under the purview of the MOFIFW. The reluctance
expressed by Government officials to insist that all external assistance be deployed with reference
to the PIP signalled their interest in maintaining maximum flexibility.
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until very recently, an agreed strategic plan setting out the Government's priorities,
provided donors and interested domestic parties with a virtual tabula rasa for imposition
of their priorities and independent action. As a result, external funds tended to be
allocated on a project-by-project basis, in an ad hoc manner, largely uncoordinated from
other activities in the sector. Broad policies which were endorsed by the Government,
such as the population policy and the health and population sector strategy, were largely
driven by parties within the donor community. Minimal stakeholder involvement in
policy development resulted in shallow commitment and ownership. Consequently, few
stakeholders were willing to deploy their resources with reference to these 'government'
frameworks (e.g., only two of the 31 donors would fund exclusively those activities
jointly agreed and specified in the implementation plan for the SWAp).
The national level, over-arching, institutional arrangements for Government-led aid
coordination were found by both donor and Government officials to be inadequate for
sector level coordination. In particular, the Economic Relations Division could not
provide meaningful oversight because: (1) its organisational structure is not sector-related
but corresponds with source of funds; (2) it has become largely severed from the planning
process; and (3) it aims to maximise aid mobilisation (which may occur at the expense of
rationalisation). The Planning Commission can no longer play a strong role at the sector
level because: (1) it has been gradually emasculated; (2) many of its responsibilities
devolved to the ministry; and (3) donors have tended to operate relatively independently
of its five-year and annual plans.
While donors acknowledge that the Government's plans are intended to rationalise the
deployment of aid, plans have not, at least according to the donors, proven particularly
effective. This is said to be the case because: (1) the planning process places excessive
emphasis on project formulation and approval to the detriment of sector planning; (2)
there exists an inability, or unwillingness, on the part of high-level decision-makers to
delegate lower-level decisions to lower-level managers which results in the former being
preoccupied with routine tasks at the expense of strategic planning; and (3) at the sector
level, planning skills are in short supply, inadequately developed, and overwhelmed by
the exigencies of project processing and administrative demands.
The non-availability of GOB sponsored and donor supported plans served as just one of a
number of factors which subverted GOB-led aid management and coordination. There
was also the problem of limited capacity within government institutions to manage
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external resources in such a way that inspired donor confidence. In addition, there existed
ambivalence on the part of MOHFW officials, due in part to their lack of confidence, but
also to the impact which coordination might have on their influence, paironage and
opportunity to seek rents. These limitations to government involvement in aid
coordination were compounded by the absence of a government-led, sector-level, apex
body for interaction among government and donor officials.
7.3.3 Aid coordination and management in the health sector: the donor's machinery
Even prior to the resumption of health services after the war, competition among the
major donors (i.e., World Bank, UNFPA, WHO, USAID and later UNICEF) over the
leadership of aid coordination in the sector led to a schism between the agencies which,
among other contributory factors, has obviated against substantive coordination amongst
them to this day. Great differences between agencies, in mandates, perceived authority,
financial and technical capacity, approaches, and operational autonomy at the country
level often frustrate attempts which are made to coordinate. As a result, each of these
donors (which remain prominent actors in the health sector) mount relatively independent
programmes and, to a large extent, manage these through relatively independent means.
Some attempts have been made to coordinate assistance, but these have been piece-meal
and, with the exception of the Consortium, largely ineffectual. Hence, for example, some
coordination tools have been introduced in Bangladesh under the aegis of the Resident
Coordinator System (RCS). While these tools provide, to varying but limited degrees, a
measure of increased consultation, concertation and a modicum of operational
coordination amongst the UN organisations, they remain constrained by a host of factors.
The constraints include the lack of clarity among UN staff on the rationale for
coordination; differing perspectives and priorities among agencies; differing (frequently
negative) perceptions among agencies of one another; the lack of familiarity of
operational procedures of other agencies; concern among staff that coordination will
increase bureaucracy and reduce action; and a lack of time and resources for coordination
(i.e., other higher order priorities crowd out coordination). A major barrier to
coordination was found to be the significant degree of competition among these agencies
for leadership, resources and visibility. It appears that officials are often provided with
insufficient direction and incentives from their respective headquarters to support the
RCS. Consequently, the system remains dependent on personal interests and chemistries,
which constantly change due to the turn-over of staff. In reality, the Resident Coordinator
lacks adequate authority over a system in which participation remains essentially
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voluntary. The system is further weakened by a lack of resources and the perception that,
as an off-shoot of UNDP, it lacks impartiality.
Hence, while a system exists through which to achieve improved coordination of UN
agencies, insufficient authority and resources are vested in it to make it work. This casts a
shadow over the prospects of inter-agency coordination more generally. For if these
agencies, which (1) form part of a loosely configured system with one, albeit weak and
distant, central authority; (2) pursue increasingly integrated goals; (3) have some
commonalties in terms of operating procedures; and (4) do not need to pursue narrow
domestic agendas through the aid regime, cannot coordinate amongst themselves, is it
possible that the bilateral agencies which do not possess these facilitating characteristics
will be able to do much better? The case of the Consortium has provided some tentative
answers.	 -
In contrast to the UN agencies, a striking amount of effort has been expended by bilateral
donors to coordinate their efforts through the Bank-led Consortium. To a considerable
degree, the arrangement has enabled donors to submerge and accommodate differences in
policy and operational practices so as to improve the coordination of a proportion of their
aid to the sector. During the FPHP, this involved the resources of ten donors covering
approximately 35% of external investment in the sector as well as the participation of
three health-related multilateral agencies (although the latters' membership took the form
of implementation assistance). It appears from this study that these donors 8
 chose to
channel some of their assistance to the sector through the Consortium principally because
they thought that it would save costs and magnify their policy leverage.
The ingredients which made the Consortium relatively successful appear to be the
following: (1) an ongoing and concerted effort to address threats as they arose, to adapt
practices and formalise procedures; (2) the availability of ear-marked funds for aid
coordination as well as considerable flexibility in their deployment; (3) an explicit
financial investment, and hence ownership, in the mechanism by all parties (save the
multilateral agencies which may account for their erratic and problematic participation);
(4) specific characteristics of the lead agency which included the perception of it as
relatively competent and neutral, institutional support and internal incentives for aid
coordination coupled with the dedication of particular staff; (5) tangible benefits for the
That these agencies were predominantly from middle-ranking powers, and thus held many
similar values and priorities, may partially account for their proclivity to coordinate with one
another.
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lead agency (i.e., the availability of more aid and enhanced influence to pursue its policy
objectives); (6) material benefits for all members (i.e., cost-savings and policy leverage);
and (7) an operational component in the form of a project around which to coordinate.
Despite the achievements, this research found that there was significant disenchantment
among participants with the manner in which the Consortium functioned. This was
particularly the case with respect to differences of opinion over appropriate policies and
strategies for the sector, as well as roles, responsibilities, accountability, expectations and
communication among Consortium members. The persistence of difficulties within the
Consortium raises the question of whether or not it would have been possible to mitigate
against dissatisfactions by providing greater ex-anle specificity to agreements and placing
greater emphasis on process issues. Alternatively, might the specific and changing
institutional interests of members take precedence over their general organisational
commitment to coordinate and thereby perpetuate conflict? Three findings may suggest
that up-front agreements will not suffice when differences arise. First, conflict persisted
despite the progressive specification and institutionalisation of rules and procedures to
guide working arrangements, due to the tendency of stakeholders to transgress the codes
outright or to interpret rules so as to suit their interest. Second, those donors which
envisioned that coordination may result in a conflict with the values or interests of their
agencies, refrained from even attempting to cooperate (only 10 of the 31 donors
supporting the MOHFW were members of the Consortium). Third, when conflict arose
within the Consortium, the cofinanciers apportioned the greatest amount of blame to the
conflicting roles of the Bank as lender and consensus builder, suggesting that
organisational interests do over-ride attempts to compromise when differences arise. In
the case of disparate views, presumably inevitable in the development enterprise, the
prospects for coordination are not encouraging unless much greater attention is paid to
the process of achieving consensus and the development of incentives and sanctions.
Findings demonstrated agreement that no donor in Bangladesh could have substituted for
the Bank as leader of the Consortium. Yet, the lack of absolute authority,C and
consequently legitimacy, of the World Bank to lead donors in the sector provided donors
with the option of whether or not to join the Consortium. As a result, the majority
demurred. While fourteen reasons were postulated by donor officials for the reluctance of
their agency to acquire membership, they could be grouped into two basic themes: (1)
In light of the domestic objectives which the agencies pursue, as well as the fact that they are
often imbued with different values, it is difficult to imagine that they would ever vest absolute
authority in any one agency.
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due to perceived differences in policy and strategy; and/or (2) the constraints which
membership would entail for their operational autonomy. The latter is particularly the
case for agencies which must maintain a high profile (such as UNICEF) but was of
concern to the other agencies as well. The lack of authority of the Bank (i.e., "no real
sanction over bilaterals who won't play ball"4) also provided members with the option of
whether or not, and how, to participate in activities of the Consortium and whether or not
to abide by the decisions and rules established by the group. The fact that most donors did
not join and that member-donors were only willing to cede partial authority to the Bank
raises a fundamental question with regard to this research. By virtue of its national
sovereignty the GOB enjoys a certain legitimacy (albeit undermined due to concerns
regarding integrity and accountability) not enjoyed by the Bank. Given that legitimacy,
would donors be prepared to vest the required authority in the Government to lead on aid
coordination arrangements if it were adequately strengthened to take on such a role?
Disregarding for the moment the question of how to augment the capacity of the GOB to
assume a greater rOle in aid management, it is worth considering the experience of aid
management in the Consortium. It was difficult for the Bank, arguably well endowed with
technical and financial resources, and seen by many observers as managerially
competent, to escape bilateral criticisms over the aid management services it provided.
Indeed, donor criticisms suggest that the bilaterals sought, through their concerns
regarding accountability, a pretext for maintaining their own management structures. If
the Bank could not meet the exacting standards laid down by the donors, is it likely that
the GOB will be in a position to do so in the near future?
Some of the questions raised through the experience with the Consortium are partially
answered by the short-lived experience with the sector-wide approach. The introduction
of the SWAp resulted in the preparation of a Health and Population Sector Strategy
document as well as a Programme Implementation Plan (PIP) for the first five years of
the SWAp. Although limited, the participatory nature of the preparation of these two
documents provided a valuable process through which Government and donor priorities
and strategies were made explicit and a level of agreement on these was reached. In
particular, it marked the first time that most donors worked together with different arms
of Government (albeit mainly the MOHFW) to consider the activities in the sector in their
entirety.
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While representing a feat in the context of Bangladesh, the achievement of producing
working documents for the SWAp is tempered by the fact that numerous donor agencies
as well as Government officials are concerned that they may not agree with the strategic
thrust or particular aspects of the 	 This is ostensibly the case because of the
perception held by many stakeholders that the SWAp, and the reform agenda
encapsulated within it, was predominantly articulated by the Bank and that other
constituents did not have enough say in its development. Perhaps, however, donors will
never feel that they have had enough input into the preparation of a document unless they
are its principle authors. Nonetheless, as a result, many donors indicated that they wish to
retain the right to operate outside of this framework and will do so in practice. The
Government also indicated its preference for a flexible approach to working outside the
agreed public expenditure plans. Officials in the MOHFW argued that they have taken
this position because the Government is concerned that unprecedented levels of donor
coordination could result in undue leverage exerted by donors over policy direction and
resource allocation. It may equally be the case that civil servants wish to retain a degree
of non-transparency which would permit them to continue expropriating resources or to
retain control over a particular programme or other fiefdom.
The SWAp makes provisions for and aspires to the use of common management
arrangements for all resources deployed for public sector activities, irrespective of their
source. While Government, and to a lesser extent aid, officials described this as desirable,
many donors indicate that they will continue to rely on separate bilateral aid management
arrangements. They are concerned about attribution, accountability and the Government's
capacity to manage the common arrangements.
During the preparations of the SWAp, the need for a Government-led aid coordination
arrangement was agreed to by all stakeholders. Nevertheless, its establishment was not
viewed as a priority by Government nor the influential donors and it has, therefore, not
yet been created. Many donors made their support, for a MOHFW-led, Government-
donor coordination arrangement conditional upon the maintenance of a donor-only
Consortium. But the very existence of a donor-only Consortium (even one that is partially
reformed), particularly if it is led by the Bank, threatens the authority and effectiveness of
any eventual Government-donor coordination arrangement.
For example, there were differences of opinion over the emphasis which should be placed on
cost-recovery, regulation of the private sector, reorganisation of the MOHFW, etc.
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The process of the introduction of the SWAp has benefited the cause of health sector aid
coordination by bringing attention to certain failings and possibilities with respect to the
prevailing arrangements. Although the idealised SWAp performs well according to the
conceptual framework for aid coordination, over the short-term it will remain business as
usual. The SWAp will not fulfil its potential because too few stakeholders wish to be
bound by its instruments. It may be the case because donors are concerned that the
Government lacks the capacity to manage the SWAp. It is, however, also likely that for
many stakeholders the SWAp instruments reflect too closely the signature of the Bank as
opposed to that of the Government. Alternatively, donor hesitation may arise due to the
perception that the SWAp, irrespective of its sponsorship and leadership, would usurp the
agencies of their autonomy. Nevertheless, as is the case with the Consortium, it remains a
case of coordination by persuasion and not by the command of the authority of an agreed
and legitimate leader.
7.4 Limitations to the conceptual framework
The conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 1 for the assessment of aid coordination
instruments and empirically tested in the health sector in Bangladesh was useful in terms
of identifying key characteristics which determine the effectiveness of specific
arrangements and passing judgement on them. It also provided a prism through which to
understand the complex relationships among donors and Government. Nonetheless, the
framework was subject to limitations which operated on three levels.
On one level, the conceptual framework can be criticised on the basis of its foundations.
First, the principles upon which it rests were espoused through fora in which the donor
community has greater influence than recipient nations and, consequently, the framework
is biased in favour of donor values, interests and priorities. It was, however, beyond the
scope of this enquiry to validate the universality of the conceptual framework in this
manner. Second, as the indicators were extrapolated from first principles, as opposed to
being culled from actual experience in the field, existing mechanisms are evaluated
against a hypothetical gold-standard. It is unlikely that any mechanism will excel in light
of the exacting criteria. Nonetheless, the criteria, irrespective of their genesis, biases and
high expectations, do provide a basis for considering the effectiveness of aid coordination
within a given context.
A more substantive problem with the evaluative framework lies in the unit of analysis
adopted by the study. The unit consisted of the aid coordination instrument, whose
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definition was intentionally broad and included every conceivable activity which served
to increase the integration of aid. As noted above, aid coordination tools in Bangladesh
included processes within the recipient administration, those established by the United
Nations, the Consortium arrangement as well as the SWAp. The emphasis on aid
coordination instruments, although conceptually helpful, contributes to the separation
between the management and coordination of aid and the management and coordination
of domestic resources and programmes. While this distinction has a significant basis in
reality in Bangladesh and elsewhere, ultimately, sustainable aid coordination should be
viewed as inseparable from the coordination and management of domestic resources. The
implications of failing to take this distinction into consideration include the very real
possibility that a coordination arrangement which performs well according to the
conceptual framework, such as the Consortium in Bangladesh, is provided with ever
more resources and responsibilities. This may divert attention and resources from the
development of national capacity and systems and thereby usurp important national
functions with respect to aid management. A case could be made for assessing the efforts
of donors to coordinate aid from a more holistic perspective. The unit of analysis could
be the government systems themselves (e.g., for policy making, resource
allocation/budgeting, reporting, auditing, etc.). Aid coordination would be measured by
the extent to which external resources are integrated into these indigenous processes -
with the goal of comprehensive integration.
The foregoing scenario suggests that although the individual variables within the
conceptual framework consisted of valid and necessary indicators (e.g., proportion of
donors active in the mechanism), they were insufficient and inadequate in an important
respect. The problem lay not in the indicators themselves but with the need to prioritise
(or place greater weight on) those indicators which are deemed of greater importance.
The argument advanced in this thesis was that a premium should be placed on those
mechanisms which are managed by the recipient administration (or contributes to
achieving such an end). By extension, those mechanisms which are in many respects
exemplary but which undermine the capacity or willingness of the recipient to provide
leadership on aid coordination services should be considered flawed. In terms of the
conceptual framework, this raises the question of subjectivity and values.
The study has provided evidence that the motive held by some donors to coordinate aid
(or become involved in an aid coordination arrangement) related to the potential of
coordination to confer leverage in a competitive arena. This suggests that the objectives
Chapter 7: Conclusions	 278
pursued by stakeholders through their involvement in aid coordination instruments do not
necessarily coincide with the implied aim of such mechanisms (i.e., to rationalise external
investment in the sector in accordance with recipient priorities and strategies). The
conceptual framework, however, failed to capture this dimension of coordination as it
emphasised technical over political factors, suggesting objectivity and neutrality over
subjectivity and power. The evaluation of the effectiveness of aid coordination is not
simply a technocratic exercise but is also inherently value-laden. Different weights would
likely be placed by different analysts on the individual indicators. Thus, for example,
those donors which sought to advance their corporate policy positions through an aid
coordination arrangement would presumably consider favourably the ability of a
mechanism to engineer a common donor front for forcefully influencing Government
decision-making, but they might rate recipient leadership as less desirable. This does not
detract from the value of the conceptual framework per Se, but does complicate the
issues. In particular, it suggests that, although it is useful to consider the strengths and
weaknesses of the mechanics of the various arrangements to coordinate aid, and whether
they are effective according to specific benchmarks, it would be facile to consider the
arrangements without giving consideration to the objectives sought by the stakeholders
through their involvement. This is an important consideration when addressing the
prospects for coordination more widely. The case has demonstrated that only the minority
of donors are willing to accommodate the costs of coordination so as to contribute to the
goal of aid rationalisation, and that this is most likely explained at least partially by their
desire to enhance their policy leverage.
7.5 Prospects for health sector aid coordination
Experience with health sector aid coordination in Bangladesh over the past quarter
century suggests that the prospects for improved practice are at best mixed. The
Consortium demonstrates that, given certain facilitating and demanding conditions, some
donors are willing to devote considerable resources to coordinate a proportion of their
aid, even when the process is fraught with tension, unmet expectations and acrimony.
However, most donors found it preferable to pursue bilateral and independent
relationships with the Government for the deployment and management of their
assistance.
Four principal obstacles were proposed as having accounted for the very constrained
extent to which aid was coordinated. (1) In the absence of GOB leadership, there existed
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no alternative authority which commanded sufficient legitimacy to coordinate aid on
behalf of donors. The UN agencies neither vested such authority in the Resident
Coordinator System nor in the sovereign Government. The bilateral agencies involved in
the Consortium only partially acknowledged the need for a first-among-equals in their
group. As a result, most donors pursued independent action on the basis of the authority
of their respective governing bodies and mandates. (2) Donors, with to some extent the
exception of those in the Consortium, were not prepared to delegate the responsibility for
aid coordination and management to other institutions. Although this was purportedly for
reasons of accountability, it appeared equally plausible that this provided a convenient
justification for independent and unfettered action. (3) The Government did not provide
an adequate framework for the deployment nor management of aid resources. While this
was an objective reality, there are indications that not enough was done by the donors to
address and correct the limitations so that the Government could have assumed a more
central position. There was also, however, evidence to suggest that the GOB would not
readily assume this role even if it were enabled to do so (discussed in Chapter Six). (4)
This dissertation has provided a number of examples, and strong supporting evidence,
which suggest that both the aid agencies and the Government of Bangladesh understand
that aid coordination presents a powerful tool with which to exercise leverage over the
development process. Indeed, it is not difficult to interpret the successive coordination
initiatives of the Bank (i.e., from project cofinancing to donor Consortium to SWAp) as
attempts to increase its influence over an ever larger sphere of aid, donors and activities
and policies for the sector. The consideration that aid coordination provides the
coordinator with influence has coloured the desire of stakeholders to lead coordination
processes and conditioned the extent and manner in which they took part in various
coordination arrangements.
The prospects for improvements to aid coordination in Bangladesh are thus dependent on
at least three preconditions. First, the Government would need to assume a position of
authoritative leadership so as to fill the current vacuum. Clearly leadership will not be
conceded to the Government on the basis of sovereignty alone. Government will have to
'earn' it. This will require vision, resources and a very different approach to work from
the one which currently prevails. Second, common management systems would need to
be established by Government in which donors could and would place their confidence
(i.e., meet donor expectations in terms of accountability). Experience elsewhere (e.g.,
Zambia) has been frustrating in this regard. 5
 Third, processes would need to be
established through which donors would have some opportunity to influence the
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Government's policy and expenditure frameworks within the context of Government
leadership and management. The fulfilment of each of these conditions appears to be very
unlikely.
7.6 Proposed principles of aid coordination and management
Although the prospects for improved coordination are diminished in practice by the
political dimensions of the processes in question, the Consortium demonstrates that under
certain conditions donors are willing to sacrifice some autonomy and self-interest in the
interest of coordinated action. Based on the foregoing discussion, a number of principles
which ought to govern such initiatives suggest themselves as follows:
(1) The provision of foreign assistance within the framework of a single, unifying health
sector strategy, and comprehensive operational and expenditure plans, provides the
basis for effective coordination of aid;
(2) Government leadership in preparing strategic, operational and expenditure plans, and
harnessing foreign resources within the framework of these instruments, is essential
to effective and sustainable management of external resources. This is the case
because it confers authority on these instruments (and thereby encourages the donors
to buy in) and it encourages Government commitment and ownership;
(3) The primacy of Government leadership in providing the framework for deployment
of external assistance does not imply that the Government needs to lead, nor be
involved, in all aid coordination fora: there are important areas of aid coordination
which should not involve Government - either because this would represent an
unnecessary burden on the Government machinery (e.g. harmonisation of donor
procedures) or because Government officials may resist external agency initiatives
(e.g. harmonising benefits for Government staff). While multiple aid coordination
mechanisms may be both necessary and desirable, it is crucial that effective
arrangements for communication between the Government and the donors'-only
groups are established;
(4) Aid coordination is a process which seeks increasing levels of integration between
Government and its development partners in terms of: (1) policy and strategy; (2)
expenditure programme; and (3) programme implementation (including financing)
and monitoring. Therefore, the sector-wide approach represents a desirable goal in
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terms of aid management. In light of the various areas in which integration needs to
takes place, distinct and different aid coordination arrangements may be required for
each of these three processes;
(5) To the maximum extent possible, the mechanisms for aid delivery and monitoring
should support and strengthen existing Government systems and procedures, instead
of circumventing or establishing new systems to accommodate short-term
development partner concerns for accountability, disbursement or impact. Capacity
development for resource management must be part of any aid coordination strategy;
(6) The pursuit of increased integration of external and Government resources in the
health sector should proceed on an incremental basis which builds on past
experience, relationships and existing structures as opposed to implantation of
imported and/or idealised notions of best-practice;
(7) Increased coordination entails risks as it is premised on changes on the part of
Government and donors in the way they do business. Therefore, to make headway on
coordination, individual programme officers and their Government counterparts will
have to push and challenge their organisational boundaries. Secondly, new ways of
doing business may initially result in confusion and conflict and may set back
progress and impact temporarily;
(8) Effective coordination is dependent upon the timely availability of a range of reliable
information to guide the decision-making processes of all parties active in the sector.
Communication channels and networks which involve all agencies supporting health
sector activities and encompass Government must be systematically established and
adequately maintained. These channels should be formalised and should not duplicate
those which Government may have already established for other purposes;
(9) Aid coordination and management is dependent on the availability of considerable
resources which are ear-marked for coordination but can be deployed in a flexible
manner. All donors which do not provide budget-support should be required to
contribute to the costs of aid coordination and management so as to increase their
interest in these coordination processes.
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7.7 The study's contribution to knowledge
The study has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. For one, it provided the
first contributions to the published literature on the characteristics of health sector aid
coordination as well as a methodology for analysing and assessing the effectiveness of
aid coordination arrangements.6'7
 Second, it made a unique contribution to the
understanding of aid coordination because it provided an analysis of the issues from a
third-party perspective. Other studies of health sector aid coordination which are in press,
while benefiting in many ways from the fact that they were not undertaken by outsiders,
demonstrate biases leading to undue optimism or undisguised donor interests. 8 '9
 In
contrast, this study, whose results have been validated through triangulation and peer-
checking, provides a balanced view of the actions and behaviour of both parties to the
process. Moreover, given the depth and breadth of the study, which covers over 20 years
and is based on a wide-range of sources, the analysis provides a realistic assessment of
the practice and prospects of aid coordination. Third, it provides a useful addition to the
meagre store of policy analyses centred on the health sectors in low income countries. In
particular, its political-economy approach may help to explain how and why certain
policies are on the agenda and the role of policy coordination networks therein. Picking
up on the last point, an account of the World Bank's interests and mode of operations,
although somewhat specific to Bangladesh, is important as the Bank has assumed a
prominent place in the health policy arena in countries of low- and lower-middle income.
Finally, the analysis of the determinants and limited effectiveness of aid coordination
provide further empirical data with which to improve understanding of the broader issue
of aid effectiveness.
7.8 Research questions in the field of aid management and coordination
Although this exploratory research has contributed to the store of knowledge on aid
coordination and provided some tentative positions on the prospects for better practice
based on experience in Bangladesh, it could not provide definitive answers nor properly
address a number of issues. Perhaps, the central question which arises from the
conclusions drawn in this study relates to whether or not most donors are truly averse to
the coordination of their assistance at the country level. It was argued that in Bangladesh,
three obstacles would have to be addressed before the type of aid coordination envisioned
in the conceptual framework could realistically obtain: (1) real government leadership to
assuage concerns of legitimacy, commitment, etc.; (2) sufficient government capacity to
assuage concerns of accountability; and (3) the establishment of fora for negotiations
aimed at building consensus. How best to enable these facilitating factors remains a
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matter for operational research. However, the central question relating to aid coordination
remains that if recipient capacity were strengthened to the extent that it no longer
provided a pretext for external management, and if the recipient assumed ownership of
the coordination instruments, and if some sort of process were evolved to handle the
politics of consensus development, would the donors continue to act independently of the
Government and one another? It would appear that this could be tested through a case
study of experience with a SWAp in a country in which government capacity were not a
limiting feature. The paradox arises, however, that it is in the most aid-dependent
countries that capacity is most lacking and where the integration and coordination of
external resources is most urgently required.
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ANNEX 2:
QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
MOHFW Sector Programme Management Task Force 1997
Aid & Donor Coordination under Sector-wide Programme Management
I	 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS IN BANGLADESH 	 I
PLEASE NOTE
1. This questionnaire does not seek definitive positions nor any commitments from your
agency. It aims to solicit your interpretations, views and concerns so as to inform the dialogue on
aidldonor
coordination under the proposed sector-wide approach. Responses are confidential in the sense
that they will not be linked to respondents nor agencies in the analysis nor report.
2. Please complete this questionnaire by 20 August 1997 and return it to Kent Buse do the
World Bank Resident Mission in Dhaka. Fax no. 880-2-863-220.
3. If clarifications or elaboration of your responses is deemed desirable, Kent Buse, the consultant
undertaking this work on behalf of the Task Force, will request to meet with you in late August.
4. are being administered to Government and Headquarters officials.
ACRONYMS
FPHP
GOB
HAPP-5
HPSS
MOHFW
PEP
PHO
SWAP
TORs
Fourth Population and Health Project
Government of Bangladesh
Fifth Health and Population Project
Health and Population Sector Strategy
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Public Expenditure Programme
Population and Health Office
Sector-wide Approach
Terms of Reference
IDENTIFICATION
1. Name of Respondent:
2. Name of Agency:
3. Position of Respondent:
4. Length of time in Bangladesh (in months):______ Length of time in Position (in
months):________
AGENCY PROFILE
Structural characteristics of development agencies influence their needs and concerns with respect
to participation in sector-wide approaches. This section builds a quick profile of your agency in
the context of the Bangladesh health and population sector.
5. In which year did your agency become active in the Bangladesh health and population sector?
19
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6. Please comment on the current autonomy of country-level decision-making in your agency as
follows:
(a) Rank and describe the decision-making power of your agency's country office in relation to
programme resource allocation decisions:
(from 1 = no authority to 5 = full authority): 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Comments:
(b) Rank and describe the flexibility of your agency's country office in making alterations to the
programme during implementation:
(from I = no authority to 5 = full authority): 1 	 2	 3	 4	 5
Comments:
(c) Describe and attempt to quantify the influence of the following entities in setting funding
priorities for your agency in the sector at the country level (percentages should add up to 100):
headquarters:	 %
country office:	 %
other donors:	 %
MOHFW:	 %
other:	 % (please specify): _______________
Comments:
7. Please specify the current complement of human resources in your agency's country office
with responsibility for health and population sector programme management:
(a) Total	 Full-time	 Part-time
(b) Expatriate	 Full-time	 Part-time
(c) Local	 Full-time	 Part-time
(d) Health Professionals	 Full-time	 Part-time
(e) Administrative/Managerial 	 Full-time	 Part-time
8. Please specify the approximate budgetary commitment your agency made (will make) to the
sector in the table below (in US$ millions and percentages as appropriate):
___________________________________________ 1994/95	 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99
(a) Commitment to health and population activities
(b) % of (a) for MOHFW expenditures/activities
(c) % of (a) in Consortium FPHP
(d) % of (a) as budget support to MOHFW
(e) % of (a) in technical assistance
(f) % of (a) disbursed in practice 	 N/A	 N A
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AIMS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SECTOR-WIDE APPROACHES (SWAPs)
In the health sector, SWAPs have been defmed as a sustained process of collaboration between
different arms of Government and one or more donor agencies with the common goal of
improving people's health, which involves four key components: (1) the articulation of sectoral
policies and strategies; (2) preparation of a prioritised public expenditure programme for the
sector; (3) design and use of a common management framework for programme implementation;
and (4) a programme of work in institutional development to strengthen Government capacity for
components 1-3. Donor provision of direct budget (programme) support, as opposed to project-
specific investment, is also sometimes associated with a SWAP.
9. From your point of view, what are the most desirable components of a SWAP, and therefore
the most worthy of attention? Please choose and circle as many components as desirable:
(a) agreed sector policies and strategies;
(b) agreed and prioritized public sector expenditure programme;
(c) the use of a common management framework for programme implementation (e.g.
common technical assistance pool);
(d) institutional development of MOHFW for sector-wide management;
(e) provision of direct budget support to MOHFW as opposed to project-specific
investment?
(1) other (please specify):
10. What does your agency see as the major advantages of operating within a SWAP framework
in the health sector in Bangladesh?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
11. What are your principal concerns about working within a SWAP framework in the health
sector in Bangladesh?
(k) do not ascribe to the sector strategy which guides the SWAP? Yes / No / Perhaps
(1) may not agree with the prioritized public expenditure programme? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(m) may find it difficult to channel your agency's aid within the expenditure programme?
Yes / No / Perhaps
(n) foresee organizational barriers to participating in the common management
framework for programme implementation? Yes / No / Perhaps
(o) unsure of how to manage the transition to the SWAP? Yes / No / Perhaps
(p) fear that other agencies might not support the SWAP, thereby undermining its
potential benefits? Yes / No / Perhaps
(q) Government may lack adequate management capacity to operate a SWAP? Yes /No /
Perhaps
(r) project-specific investment has advantages over SWAPs? Yes /No I Perhaps
(s) other (please specify):
PARTICIPATION IN THE SWAP IN THE HEALTH SECTOR IN BANGLADESH
This section does not seek definitive positions from agencies. It seeks to explore preferences and
where agencies are at in terms of making decisions about their potential participation in a SWAP
for the health sector in Bangladesh.
291
12. Will your agency likely finance the SWAP public expenditure programme (PEP)? Yes / No /
Perhaps
13. If your agency should fmance the SWAP - PEP, has any thought been given to funding
modalities? Yes /No /Perhaps
If yes, will your agency use any of the following modalities?
(a) earmarking funds against specific activities/projects? Yes / No / Perhaps
(b) providing programme budget support to the MOHFW? Yes / No / Perhaps
(c) co-financing with World Bank through Trust Fund? Yes / No / Perhaps
(d) co-financing with Government on parallel basis? Yes / No / Perhaps
(e) other (please specify):
14. If your agency is likely to earmark funds for particular activities/projects:
(n) what is the approximate proportion of funds to be earmarked? 	 %
(o) what criteria would determine activities to be earmarked?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(c) what modalities would govern monitoring and reporting on earmarked funds? Please
comment:
15. If your agency is likely to finance health sector activities outside of the Government's public
expenditure programme, what is the likely approximate proportion of the funds? 	 %
16. Will your agency likely participate in the annual SWAP planning and review processes? Yes /
No / Perhaps
If yes, would your agency be represented by:
(a) headquarters? Yes / No / Perhaps
(b) field office? Yes /No /Perhaps
(c) consultants? Yes / No /Perhaps
17. In your opinion, should being a financier of the SWAP public expenditure programme be a
pre-condition for participation in the annual review processes? Yes / No / Perhaps
18. In your opinion, which stake-holders, in addition to GOB and its Development Partners,
should participate in the SWAP planning and review processes and how?
Stake-holders to be involved in SWAP	 The manner in which to involve stakeholders
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) _____________________________________________________
MODALITIES FOR AID & DONOR COORDINATION UNDER SWAPs
This section seeks to solicit the range of views on possible modalities for aid and donor
coordination under the proposed health sector SWAP. Multiple choice options are listed below
some questions, they are intended to save time in responding. Please feel free to include other
possibilities as required.
292
19. Which aid coordination responsibilities should the MOHFW bear under the SWAP?
(s) lead on annual SWAP programme planning and review processes? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(t) chairing regular meeting of all donors for information exchange? Yes / No / Perhaps
(u) nodal point for communication in sector? Yes /No I Perhaps
(v) depository for information on activities in sector? Yes / No / Perhaps
(w) other (please specify):
20. Which common programme implementation arrangements should Government manage and
which should be managed by donors? Please choose and circle your preferred choice:
(t) coordinated and joint appraisal of donors' inputs? GOB / Donors
(u) planning, monitoring and performance evaluation of sector programmes? GOB /
Donors
(v) procurement and contracts? GOB / Donors
(w) reporting? GOB / Donors
(x) accounting on expenditure? GOB / Donors
(y) auditing? GOB / Donors
(z) technical assistance pool? GOB /Donors
(aa) others (please specify):
21. If the Government is to take on increasing responsibility for sector management, will a
Government SWAP secretariat be required? Yes / No / Perhaps
If yes, should it be distinct from the MOHFW Planning Cell? Yes / No / Perhaps
If it is situated in the Planning Cell, should the Cell be strengthened? Yes / No / Perhaps
22. Should those agencies which are not providing budget support (i.e., those that are earmarking
funds) to the MOHFW be obliged to earmark a percentage of their health sector contribution
to defray aid coordination costs by the MOHFW? Yes /No /Perhaps
23. Should a Government - donor coordination mechanism, chaired by Government, such as a
Local Consultative technical sub-group on health and population be established? Yes /No /
Perhaps
24. Should a donors-only coordination arrangement exist (e.g. Consortium)? Yes / No / Perhaps
25. Should a set of 'rules of the game' for coordination accompany the SWAP? Yes /No /
Perhaps
If yes, what should they involve?
(a) no donor expenditures outside of SWAP - PEP, except for specified one-off
activities undertaken by GOB (e.g., pilots) and those activities consistent with HPSS
carried out by the voluntary and private sectors? Yes / No / Perhaps
(b) funds for ear-marked activities specified well in advance of annual planning
processes? Yes INo /Perhaps
(c) commitment to sustained funding for agreed period? Yes / No / Perhaps
(d) participation in key and specified events? Yes / No / Perhaps
(e) agree to common donor voice on conditionalities, sanctions and how to implement
them? Yes / No I Perhaps
(f) draft and fmal TORs and reports concerning appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of
parallel fmanced activities shared with sector information nodal point to ensure all
stakeholders are apprised of developments in the sector? Yes / No / Perhaps
(g) others (please specify):
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CONDUCT OF ANNUAL SWAP REVIEWS
It is generally envisioned that the SWAP be implemented through annual operational programmes,
budgets, and subsequent reviews of performance. The key to monitoring is the development of
agreed indicators, covering both impact and process. The section seeks to understand your
agency's requirements and concerns in relation to indicators and monitoring responsibilities.
26. Who should lead the SWAP review, prepare the TORs, Aide Memoire, etc.? GOB IDonors /
Other
If other, please specify: ______________
27. What fmancial and operational information would your agency likely require to monitor its
investments?
Financial information required	 Operational information required
(a) (a)
(b) (b)
(c) (c)
(d) (d)
(e) (e)
28. Would a standard reporting format be acceptable to your headquarters if it incorporated the
annual operational plans for the main programme components, their planned mile stones,
indicators for results obtained, and expenditure data? Yes / No / Perhaps
29. What external verification would be required, and how should it be provided?
Type of verification	 Means of verification
(a) (a)
(b) (b)
(c) (c)
(d) (d)
30. Would the timing of the annual review in February be acceptable to your agency (i.e. to
coincide with GOB reviews)? Yes / No / Perhaps
ADAPTATION OF THE DONOR CONSORTIUM AND INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH IT TO MEET NEW NEEDS UNDER HAPP-5
In 1992, the GOB and a Consortium of donors embarked on the Fourth Population and Health
Project (FPHP). A project support unit (PHO), financed with project funds and staffed by the
World Bank, was established to act as a secretariat to the Consortium and to coordinate donor
inputs. While this approach has served its members well, there is a recognition that modifications
may be required to address donor coordination needs for HAPP-5 and the SWAP. This section
seeks to explore options and preferences for modification of this arrangement.
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31. Which agencies should participate in a Consortium?
(ee) only joint co-fmanciers of HAPP-5? Yes /No /Perhaps
(ff) all financiers of the SWAP PEP? Yes /No /Perhaps
(gg) SWAP fmanciers and multilateral technical agencies? Yes / No / Perhaps
(hh) SWAP financiers, interested donors and multilateral technical agencies? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(ii) (d) and major NGOs? Yes INo /Perhaps
(jj) should the Government be included? Yes / No I Perhaps
Comments:
32. If the Government is not a participant, how should the Consortium interface with GOB?
(ff) minutes of meetings shared with GOB? Yes / No / Perhaps
(gg) GOB attends tail end of meetings for briefmgs and dialogue? Yes / No / Perhaps
(hh) other (please specify):
33. Which agency and/or official should provide leadership to the Consortium?
___________________ For what period of time should the leader serve? ____________?
According to what criterion should the selection be made? Please choose and circle one
option:
(gg) largest investor in the SWAP PEP;
(hh) elected by members;
(ii) rotating basis;
(jj) other (please specify):
34. What should be the rules of the game and the roles and responsibilities of membership in the
Consortium?
(hh) leader has sole responsibility for liaison with GOB on Consortium issues? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(ii) leader chairs regular meetings of members? Yes / No / Perhaps
(jj) leader circulates draft agenda and minutes of meetings for comment prior to
finalization? Yes / No / Perhaps
(kk) leader circulates draft TORs and Aide-memoires for joint missions in relation to
appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of Consortium support to SWAP? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(11) members agree to attend certain minimum activities of Consortium? Yes /No /
Perhaps
(mm) decision-making by consensus? Yes / No / Perhaps
(nn) decision-making by majority vote? Yes /No I Perhaps
(oo) reports from all sector work supported by agencies shared in Consortium? Yes INo /
Perhaps
(pp) agreement to abide by similar rules and regulations (e.g. for engaging consultants,
incentive payments, etc.)? Yes / No / Perhaps
(qq) others (please specify):
35. In your opinion, should a secretariat exist to support the Consortium? Yes /No I Perhaps
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36. If you agree that a Consortium secretariat should exist, which functions should it fulfil that are
not undertaken by GOB?
SWAP Management
(a) planning, monitoring and performance evaluation of sector programmes? Yes / No / Perhaps
(b) maintaining data base on sector activities/outputs? Yes / No / Perhaps
(c) reporting? Yes INo /Perhaps
(d) accounting on expenditure? Yes / No / Perhaps
(e) auditing? Yes / No / Perhaps
(f) organize and participate in annual SWAP review? Yes / No / Perhaps
(g) monitoring GOB compliance with donor conditionalities? Yes / No / Perhaps
(h) steering and technical support for GOB SWAP secretariat? Yes / No / Perhaps
(i) others (please specify):
Donor Coordination
(a) coordinated and joint appraisal of donors' inputs? Yes / No / Perhaps
(b) management of Consortium procurement and contracts? Yes / No / Perhaps
(c) technical assistance pooi for Consortium members? Yes / No / Perhaps
(d) facilitate member dialogue on sector strategy and expenditure programme? Yes / No / Perhaps
(e) organize and participate in Consortium meetings? Yes / No / Perhaps
(1) undertake conflict management? Yes / No / Perhaps
(g) others (please specify):
37. Would your agency be likely to finance a Consortium secretariat as a proportion of its costs?
Yes /No /Perhaps
38. In your opinion, what should be the institutional affiliation of the staff of such a secretariat?
Please choose and circle one option:
(11) from one of the Consortium member agencies, operating in line positions and
accountable to its management? Yes / No / Perhaps If yes, which agency?
(mm) seconded from member agencies to a semi-autonomous entity? Yes / No / Perhaps
(nn) recruited on the open market to a semi-autonomous entity? Yes / No / Perhaps
(oo) other (please specify):
39. Where should the secretariat be located? Please choose and circle one option:
(mm) in a MOHFW premises? Yes / No / Perhaps
(nn) in one of the member agencies? Yes /No /Perhaps If yes, which? -
(oo) elsewhere (please specify):
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THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EXISTING DONOR/MD COORDINATION
MECHANISMS AND THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN CAPACITY FOR A SWAP
40. How would you defme aid and/or donor cordmation?
41. Could you please comment on the present health sector aid coordination patterns and
mechanisms?
42. How would you describe the present role of GOB agencies in health sector aid coordination?
Please choose one option and comment:
(pp) MOHFW	 adequate / inadequate
(qq) Planning Commission 	 adequate / inadequate
(n) ERD	 adequate / inadequate
43. In your opinion, did the FPHP undermine the ability of the Government to lead on aid
coordination? Yes /No /Perhaps
If yes, how?
44. What have been the key benefits of the FPHP donor Consortium for Government? Please
circle those benefits below:
(n) reduced burden on MOHFW through:
(i) joint donor appraisal and supervision missions? Yes /No /Perhaps
(ii) common disbursement through World Bank? Yes /No /Perhaps
(iii) consolidated fmancial expenditure reporting mechanism? Yes /No /Perhaps
(iv) single bi-annual reporting requirement? Yes INo /Perhaps
(v) fewer meetings with FPHP donors on an individual basis? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(vi) provision of project management support? Yes / No / Perhaps
(vii) other (please specify):
(b) reduction of conflicting policy advice from Consortium members because policy
consensus was reached within the Consortium and communicated to Government by
the PHO? Yes / No / Perhaps
(c) useful mechanism through which to communicate Government views to donors? Yes
/No /Perhaps
(d) other (please specify):
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45. What have been the key benefits of the Consortium for donors? Please choose and circle as
many benefits as appropriate:
(ss) increased leverage of your agency over GOB strategy and expenditure? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(tt) increased aid efficiency and cost savings through common programme
implementation arrangements? Yes / No / Perhaps
(uu) improved coordination of donor inputs? Yes / No / Perhaps
(vv) improved project design and implementation through information sharing? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(ww) other (please specify):
46. In your opinion, what have been the major drawbacks of the Consortium?
(tt) imperfect aid coordination instrument since it does not include all major donors? Yes
/No IPerhaps
(uu) imperfect aid coordination instrument since it excludes participation of MOHFW?
Yes / No / Perhaps
(vv) inadequate in reducing the burden of aid management on MOHFW since FPHP co-
financiers persist in:
(i) fielding individual appraisal, supervision, and review missions? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(ii) arranging numerous meetings with senior Government officials on a
bilateral basis? Yes / No / Perhaps
(iii) funding numerous distinct projects? Yes / No / Perhaps
(iv) requiring additional information for project monitoring? Yes / No / Perhaps
(a) imperfect because members advanced conflicting policy advice to GOB? Yes / No /
Perhaps
(b) other (please specify):
47. Do health sector aid coordination activities currently occupy a significant proportion of your
time? Yes /No /Perhaps
Could you estimate how much? 	 % Is this too much time? Yes / No / Perhaps
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ANNEX 3:
FIELD WORK MILESTONES
Date	 Event	 Activities/Comments	 Outcome
Dec 10-15 Reconnaissance	 * met with key donors and	 * opposition from Dhaka office of
1995	 trip to Dhaka	 Government officials to discuss
	 World Bank
proposed study	 * support from some donors:
particularly those outside Consortium
and those dissatisfied with Consortium
* Government officials were non-
__________ _______________ ______________________________ committal
April	 Commence field * affiliate as research fellow at the * although seen as a relatively
1996	 work	 Centre for Health and Population	 apolitical, the Centre does not have the
Research (ICDDR,B)	 resources nor expertise in policy
analysis to provide the prestige nor
influence required to gain collaboration
____________ _________________ __________________________________ from aid coordination actors
May 1996 Introductory	 * letter sent to all major donors 	 * some officials agree to meetings
letter and	 supporting health activities and to
synopsis of	 Planning Unit of MOHFW
research	 * followed-up with phone calls
May - Aug Meetings with 	 * 9 donor officials, mainly those
	 * some donor concerns with
1996	 select donor and critical of coordination 	 Consortium and aid coordination are
Govermnent	 arrangements, agree to informal
	 gleaned from officials
officials	 meetings	 * basic documents from some donors
* meet with hand full of GOB	 as well as GOB planning documents
____________ __________________ officials
	 are collected
June - Aug Donors divided	 * local office of World Bank leads * access to documents and officials
1996	 over study	 opposition to study - but other 	 temporarily blocked as donors decide
officials also concerned with 'non- how to handle my request to undertake
stakeholder' scrutiny of process	 research and have access to documents
* I lobby supportive donors to	 and officials
__________ _______________ argue my case in Consortium
23 June	 I request meeting * letter sent to World Bank
	 * World Bank agrees to idea of
1996	 with Consortium * follow-up with several meetings presentation which is subsequently
with World Bank staff
	 agreed in meeting of Consortium on
2 lAugust
9 Sept	 Fonnal	 * presentation made to about 60	 * I requested documents, observation
1996	 presentation of	 officials of Consortium and
	
of Consortium meetings and
research	 visiting donor mission	 collaborative approach to research (i.e.
proposal to
	 Consortium members could sit on
Consortium	 steering committee and input into
__________ ________________ ______________________________ design)
14 Sept	 Consortium	 * Consortium requests that I: (1) 	 * research delayed until Government
1996	 response to my	 prepare historical review of donor agreement to historical review obtained
proposal! request involvement in health sector; (2) 	 * compelled to pursue relatively
via World Bank obtain clearance of GOB for 	 fruitless line of research as
review; (3) re-approach	 documentation for review not readily
Consortium for cooperation once	 available among donors
historical review completed and	 * World Bank makes eventual release
reviewed by Consortium	 of donor documents subject to (1)
Consortium of approval of the
historical review as well as (2)
restrictive Bank policy on 'disclosure'
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Date	 Event	 Activities/Comments 	 Outcome
Sept - Oct Historical review * GOB clearance requested
	 * GOB clearance communicated to
1996	 * TORs drafted, shared with, and
	 Consortium on 28 November
cleared by Consortium	 * very few donors respond to request
* Consortium members requested
	 for documentation to prepare historical
in writing and with follow-up calls review
to collaborate by sharing required
	 * those donors who do respond
historical documents
	 positively, do not have historical
documentation required
* assigmnent is forgotten by donors
Nov 1996 Case study for	 * Task Force commissions me to
	 * assignment will eventually provide
UN Inter-	 prepare case study on health sector patronage required for access to (1)
Agency Task
	 aid coordination in Bangladesh	 officials and documentation among the
Force on Basic	 UN agencies; and subsequently to (2)
Social Services	 other relevant officials
17 Dec	 Dhaka office of 	 * given GOB clearance for	 * ignore offer as documents offered
1996	 World Bank	 historical review, local office of
	 by the Bank are largely in my
offers limited	 World Bank agrees to sharing	 possession already (e.g. Staff Appraisal
support to	 some limited documents if I sign 	 Reports, mission aide-memoires but not
research	 waiver regarding use
	 meeting minutes)
Jan 1997	 Visit to UN	 * interviews with officials of
	 * first useful data obtained
agency	 World Bank, UNICEF, UNFPA
	 * examine correspondence relating to
Headquarters	 and UNDP	 Bank health projects in Bangladesh
* gain access to World Bank 	 from 1972-1996
__________ ________________ archives in Washington 	 __________________________________
Feb - Jun	 Increasing access * supportive Dhaka-based donor 	 * able to collect most minutes of
1997	 to documents	 officials (CIDA, Sida, UNFPA)
	 Consortium meetings, as well as other
___________ ________________ make files available to me
	 useful documents
Feb 1997	 Interviews with	 * my elevated status results in broader
officials in	 range of GOB and donor officials
__________ Dhaka
	 ______________________________ agreeing to meet with me
Mar 1997 Draft report for	 * draft report circulated among 	 * feedback from donors and GOB
UN Task Force	 interested parties for comment	 officials provides relatively honest
___________ ________________ ________________________________ views on aid coordination
July - Aug Survey of 	 * World Bank HQ commissions	 * allows for collection of standardized
1997	 stakeholder	 me through a MOHFW HAPP-5	 data from a significant proportion of
views on aid	 Task Force to prepare survey	 donors as well as some GOB officials
coordination	 * with difficulty, I convince
	 * some follow-up interviews
under a sector- 	 sponsors to include views of GOB
wide approach	 in survey
* questionnaire administered to
officials of GOB and donors
____________ _________________ locally and at HQ levels
	 ______________________________________
Aug 1997 Field work
__________ completed
	 ______________________________ __________________________________
Sept 1997 Draft report on	 * survey results are interpreted
	 * feedback on report provides further
aid coordination according to my conceptual
	 refmement of donor and GOB officials
and sector-wide	 framework	 views on aid coordination
approach	 * draft report widely circulated for * feedback used as validation technique
___________ ________________ comment 	 on interpretation of results
Dec 1997	 Follow-up visit	 * meetings with key informants to
__________ to Dhaka	 verify fmdings and interpretations __________________________________
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ANNEX 4:
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT
The Prime Minister is Chief Executive, and the President the Head of State. The apex of
government is formed by 36 ministries which are responsible for policy formulation and
oversight functions. Political leadership of each ministry is vested in a Minister, while
chief executive and accounting responsibility is assigned to the Secretary, a senior
permanent civil servant. Moving down the hierarchy is the Joint Secretary followed by
the Deputy Secretary. Other officers, such as the Senior Assistant Secretaries and
Assistant Secretaries, have little decision-making responsibility. Within the ministries,
power struggles between the minister and secretary provide an ongoing dynamic. Given
the turmoil in Bangladeshi politics, the turn over of ministers is very high which allows
the Secretaries to wield considerable control.
Territorially, the country is divided into six divisions, 64 districts, 487 sub-districts
(Thanas), 4422 unions, and over 68,000 villages (see Table). The union currently forms
the lowest tier of elected government. Since independence, a variety of systems of local
government have been introduced following changes of leadership at the national level.
It has been argued that the implicit purpose of all local government reforms have been to
serve the political ends of national leaders, as successive local governments have never
been accorded economic or political autonomy.'
Bangladesh's sub-national administrative structure
Typeof unit	 ____________________________
Divisions	
Number
6
Districts	
Average population 20.5 million
64
Thanas	
Average population 1.92 million
487
Unions	
Average population 252,000
4,422
Villages
	
	
Average population 27,800
68,000
_____________________________________ Average population 1,800
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is responsible for the formulation and
implementation of national health and population policies and the overall administration,
coordination and management of health care and family planning service delivery. The
task of implementing health policy, including its technical aspects and service delivery,
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lie with two Directorates (often referred to as wings), that of Health Services and that of
Family Planning, each headed by a Director-General. Programme management is highly
centralised in Dhaka, the capital. The Directorates operate relatively independently of
one another. Each has specialised cadres of staff and training institutions, a separate
chain of command, and largely independent facilities and information management
systems. There have been halting attempts to integrate service delivery in a 'functional'
manner at the Thana local government level and below.
'Westergaard K, Alam MM. Local government in Bangladesh: past experiences and yet another
try. World Development. 1995; 23 (4): 679-690.
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ANNEX 5:
MOHFW PLANNING UNIT PERSONNEL 1997:
QUALIFICATIONS AND SPECIALISATION
Joint Chief
MSc (Econ) BD
Deputy Chief- Health 	 Deputy Chief - Family Planning
MSc (Econ) UK	 MSc (Econ) BD
MSc (Econ) BD	 Ii•v••_•••._I
vacant
	
Assistant Chief, MA (Econ) BD
Assistant Chief, MSc (Econ) BD
	
Assistant Chief, MA (?) BD
Assistant Chief, MSc (Stats) BD
	
Assistant Chief, MA (Soc) BD
Assistant Chief, MA (Econ) BD
Research Officer, MA (?) BD
Research Officer, MBBS, BD
Research Officer, MBBS, BD
Research Officer, MBBS, BD
Research Officer, MSc (?) BD
Research Officer, MSc (?) BD
Research Officers, MA (?) BD
Research Officer, MSc (?) BD
Research Officer, MSc (?) BD
Research Officer, MA (?) BD
BD
MA
Msc
Econ
Stats
Soc
MBBS
Bangladesh
Master of Arts
Master of Science
Economics
Statistics
Sociology
Medical Degree
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ANNEX 6:
THE FINANCING OF WORLD BANK POPULATION AND HEALTH
PROJECTS IN BANGLADESH
(in US$ millions)
Project	 Total	 GOB	 IDA	 Cofinanciers Grant
________________________________ Value
	 ________ Credit ______________ _______
First Population	 45.7	 5.3	 15.0	 1. Norway	 8.5
________________________ ________ ______ ________ 2. Germany
	 6.1
________________________________ ___________ ________ __________ 3. Australia
	 2.6
_________________________ _________ ______ ________ 4.UK 	 3.2
_________________________ _________ ______ ________ 5. Canada
	 2.0
_____________________________ __________ _______ _________ 6. Sweden
	 3.0
Second Population & Family Health	 110.0	 10.8	 32.1	 1. Norway	 20.0
__________________________ _________ _______ ________ 2.Gennany
	 18.2
______________________________ __________ ________ _________ 3. Australia
	 4.0
_________________________ _________ ______ ________ 4.UK 	 4.0
________________________ ________ ______ ________ 5. Canada
	 5.0
______________________________ __________ ________ _________ 6. Sweden
	 8.0
________________________________ ___________ ________ __________ 7. Netherlands	 7.9
Third Population & Family Health	 263.1	 34.6	 100.9	 1. Norway	 27.9
_________________________ _________ ______ ________ 2.KfW
	 28.2
_____________________ _______ _____ ______ 3.GTZ 	 16.9
______________________________ __________ ________ _________ 4. Australia
	 6.5
__________________________ _________ _______ ________ 5.IJK	 12.5
______________________________ __________ ________ _________ 6. Canada
	 27.7
________________________________ ___________ ________ __________ 7. Netherlands
	 7.9
Fourth Population and Health	 774.7	 306.5	 188.3	 1. Norway	 28.7
_________________________ _________ ______ ________ 2.KIW
	 78.4
_____________________ _______ _____ ______ 3.GTZ 	 12.6
________________________________ ___________ ________ __________ 4. Australia 	 5.1
_________________________ _________ ______ ________ 5.UK	 27.1
___________________________ _________ _______ ________ 6. Canada
	 38.1
________________________________ ___________ ________ __________ 7. Netherlands
	 28.8
________________________ ________ ______ _______ 8. Sweden	 15.0
________________________ ________ ______ _______ 9. EEC 	 49.9
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